Intersectional activism: Dutch-Turkish Muslim women “talking back” to securitization and Islamophobia

ABSTRACT

This article investigates the efforts of influential Turkish Muslim civil society actors to amplify the voices of Muslim women in the Netherlands. Through interviews, the research uncovers the impacts of Islamophobia and securitization policies on the classification of Muslim women as either threats or victims. The study captures participants’ responses challenging intersectional discrimination based on gender, religion, and race, employing the notion of “talking back” as an analytical framework reflecting resistance. This includes criticisms of boundaries, discrimination, a lack of representation, and patriarchal practices. Participants engaged in talking-back practices by critiquing mainstream feminism’s homogenous approach, advocating for Muslim women’s rights through Islamic feminism, distinguishing culture from religion, and participating in local women’s organizations. The findings hold significant implications for integration, citizenship, security, and multiculturalism amidst rising Islamophobia. This research contributes to uncovering the voices of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women pushing back against marginalization at the intersection of racism, sexism, and discrimination.

KEYWORDS:

• Securitization
• Islamophobia
• culturalization of citizenship
• Dutch-Turkish Muslim women
• intersectionality
• talking back

Introduction

The Dutch “Face-Covering Clothing Act” banned Islamic niqabs and burqas in schools, hospitals, and public transportation on 1 August 2019. Politicians, women’s groups, religious leaders, and many Dutch citizens’ groups criticized this ban as it violates Muslim religious freedom and women’s rights. This political decision has raised important questions, ranging from its Islamophobia roots to the marginalization of Muslim women whose religious identity is visible by appearance. Far-right, anti-immigration parties that support this legislation gained ground in the November 2023 elections in the Netherlands, further amplifying these concerns. The new ruling coalition’s expanded representation of parties promoting Islamophobic rhetoric and policies highlights the urgent need to address the impacts of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim legislation. This article examines how this decision has contributed to Islamophobia in the Dutch context. It examines securitization and Turkish Muslim women’s influencers’ “talking back” against this ban in relation to the current domestic political climate, which threatens further exclusion and discrimination against Muslims in the Netherlands.

The literature on Dutch ethnic minorities, their cultures, and governmental policies gradually shifts from an inclusive discourse that emphasizes diversity, transnational citizenship, and multicultural integration to one that underscores surveillance and control. This shift is characterized by the delineation of symbolic boundaries between Muslim minorities and the societal mainstream. It is supported by a range of measures, including the emergence of extreme right-wing movements in the Netherlands, such as the Dutch People’s Union (NVU) and United We Stand Holland (UWS). Moreover, various measures like the “occupation” campaign organized by the Identitarian Resistance against Islamic assemblies, principally exemplified by the aggressive actions targeting a Muslim secondary school in Amsterdam in 2017 and antagonistic protests towards the As-Soennah mosque in The Hague in 2017 (General Intelligence and Security Service 2018), encouraged this trend. In addition, stricter integration policies and negative portrayals of Muslims in Dutch media (Sözeri, Kosar-Altinyelken, and Volman 2019) further reinforce this transformation. According to these discussions, there is an increasing perception that Islamophobia, the marginalization of Muslim communities, and the portrayal of Muslims as a national security concern are on the rise in the Netherlands (De Koning 2023). In 2019, the Dutch government implemented a partial ban on face coverings, including the Burqa and Niqab, which also revealed how securitization of Muslim women operates specifically in the Dutch context. The 9/11 attacks, the assassination of populist politician Pim Fortuyn, and extreme right-wing rhetoric against immigration and Islam likely exacerbated these trends.

In the Netherlands, the Turkish community is one of the ethnic minority groups frequently investigated when understanding migration patterns. Turkish immigration to Western Europe began in the 1950s and 1960s to meet European countries’ need for cheap domestic labor (Bahçeli 2018). The guest worker program brought Turks to the Netherlands, who immigrated, married, settled, and worked. Recent statistics show that Dutch Turks are the largest minority group in the Netherlands, with 430,000 people, or 2.5 per cent of the population, including first-generation workers and subsequent generations born in the Netherlands (CBS 2022). The failure of the widespread assumption that “guest labor migrants” will return to their homeland based on the increasing number of migrants powered debates on integration policies to maintain stability, homogeneity, and order in the Netherlands. However, securitization and mounting Islamophobia, especially toward Muslim women as subjects of an ostensibly “backward culture”, solidify the already existing distinction between the Dutch as the “emancipated self” and Muslim immigrants as the “unemancipated other”. The dominant discourse portrays migrant Muslim women, especially those who wear the signs of Islam on their bodies, as oppressed, submissive, or in need of amelioration to emancipate or be visible (Bracke 2011; Bracke and Fadil 2012; Ghorashi 2010; van Es 2016a). These discussions also suggest that Muslim women can fight against sexism, racism, and Islamophobia by “talking back”, which is defined as an oppositional position or rhetoric that counters, challenges, and responds to dominant patterns (Oumlil 2013).

This qualitative study investigates how Islamophobia and securitization affect Dutch-Turkish Muslim women, as well as their responses and struggles. Despite well-documented patterns (see, e.g. Roggeband and Verloo 2007; Essers and Tedmanson 2014; van Es 2016b), there is a lack of understanding regarding Muslim women’s responses to exclusion. As a result, this research is critical to determining the status of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women in the Netherlands, as well as their individual and organizational responses. We use bell hooks’ (1989) feminist method of “talking back” to show how influential Dutch-Turkish Muslim women civil society actors in the Netherlands resist. Hooks suggests that “talking back” involves resisting oppression by speaking out, while highlighting its transformative power of progressing from being an object to a subject. This notion entails questioning authority with critical awareness, by raising one’s voice from a marginalized position. As a powerful figure emphasizing diverse experiences of women’s oppression, hooks also underscores the complexity of “talking back”, rejecting a one-size-fits-all approach. Therefore, this multidimensional approach is invaluable for comprehending the voices of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women pushing back marginalization at the intersection of racism, sexism, and discrimination.

Theoretical framework

Cultural citizenship

Over the past few decades, the contemporary rationale of state surveillance and multiculturalism has increasingly emphasized the importance of shared norms and values, symbols and traditions, identity, and a sense of belonging in shaping a new form of citizenship (van Es 2019). The culturalization of citizenship appears to embrace cultural resilience and the reproduction of knowledge and skills based on the diversity of social groups, but it is based on an essentialist construction of the nation as a place where some people belong, and others do not. Hence, it draws a distinct symbolic boundary between a dominant majority (mostly white, non-Muslim, and native people in a Western society) and cultural others (mostly ethnic minorities, Muslims, and migrants seen as guests). Many scholars use these concepts as an essential tool in discussions of the marginalization of Muslim minorities (Abdul Khabeer 2017; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; van Es 2019). Within these debates, scholars view culture as an essential factor in categorizing Muslims as either good or bad. While Muslims labeled as bad are strictly bound by culture and religion, those who are considered good Muslims embrace cultural and religious flexibility; in other words, they are “moderate”. According to Mamdani (2004), “culture talk”, which oversimplifies religious experiences into a political framework, leads to the dichotomy of categorizing individuals as either “good Muslims” or “bad Muslims”. This approach portrays individuals from “traditional” cultures as inherently shaped by an unchanging culture, disregarding their dynamic identities. In this context, the rhetoric of “moderate versus radical” (van, Es 2021, 170–171) is prominent in political debates on the minority Muslims in European countries. Muslim women, especially those whose religious identity is recognizable, should prove their loyalty to avoid being on the negative side of this binary distinction. This “legibility effect” emphasized by Abdul Khabeer (2017, 108) is one of the key aspects of labeling Muslim women in Western societies as both citizens and suspects based on raced and gendered markers of body and behavior.

The discourse of “protecting our culture”, which is widely produced in many Western societies, is frequently seen in public debates in the Dutch context (De Koning 2016; Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). The dominant majority distinguishes between “us” and “them” (the Muslim minority) and expects Muslims to demonstrate loyalty to the Dutch government. In the recent past, the discourses of Dutch political figures such as Pim Fortuyn, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Theo Van Gogh reproduce the symbolic and material boundaries of Dutch identity and “the Islamic other” (Bracke 2011). As such, Dutch citizenship is framed in the context of certain characteristics compatible with modern Europe, such as “liberal democracy, secularism, and progressive values regarding gender and sexuality” (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016, 9). Furthermore, Ghorashi (2010) distinguishes between Muslim women, perceived as passive and suppressed by Islamic rules and men in their cultural circles, and Dutch women, recognized as independent and already emancipated, thus creating a binary discourse. The whole discussion, which is based on the culturalization of citizenship, fuels the securitization of Muslims in the Netherlands by positioning them as incompatible with a typical Dutch citizen (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016; van den Brandt 2019; van Es 2019).

Interconnections between securitization and Islamophobia

The concept of securitization in security studies raises important questions about the causes and perceptions of security threats, moving beyond traditional definitions. Buzan and other Copenhagen School members argue that “security” has no single definition because it transcends traditional notions. Securitization is “the move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the issue either as a special kind of politics or above politics” (Buzan, Wæver, and De Wilde 1998, 23). Initially, the concept of security focused on state protection. Instead of military or political concerns, it prioritizes identities, ethnicities, religious revivals, and migrations to protect society, culture, and race. Migration is one of the non-military threats to state security, with the notion that liberal migration policies increase cross-border risks, whereas stricter policies reduce such threats and enhance state and societal security. As a result, Western governments aim to strike a balance between facilitating global economic mobility and controlling it through securitization measures integrated into migration systems. This leads to categorizing migrants as potential sources of social instability and creating divisions between “natives” and “newcomers” (Lazaridis and Wadia 2015). According to Abbas (2019), the media’s dominance consistently suppresses any positive portrayals of Muslims, perpetuating fear among audiences and highlighting the centrality of (in)securitization and the creation of enemies in neoliberal governance. Hence, he addresses the othering of Muslims not solely through cultural lenses but within the broader context of capitalism, modernity, and colonialism, which construct certain individuals as inherently prone to terrorism.

Over the years, many scholars have tried to explain how the dynamics of the “war on terror” shape securitization and surveillance policies targeting Muslim minorities in the Netherlands. Dutch policies have shifted from multiculturalism to new realism in the 1990s, a change that can be associated with Islamophobia and securitization, especially after 9/11 in the US and various bombings in Western Europe within the rise of debates on radical Islam (De Koning 2020). According to De Koning (2016), Dutch secular values strongly oppose women wearing headscarves or face veils, numerous mosques, and the public hearing of the call to prayer. The growing tendency to emphasize the incongruity between Islam, European civilization, and modernization has contributed to Muslim immigrant and ethnic minority marginalization and Islamophobia. On 1 August 2019, the Netherlands implemented a burqa ban due to pressure from right-wing discourse, driven by de-radicalization efforts and an anti-violence surveillance policy. The prohibition on religious attire demonstrates Islamophobic attitudes and heightened security concerns regarding Muslim women in the Netherlands.

Intersectionality

The development of black feminism, which highlighted how earlier feminist movements had ignored women’s diverse identities – especially ethnicity – is the origin of intersectionality. Crenshaw’s (1989) initial articulation of intersectionality encapsulates the core critiques of black feminism, which argued that conventional approaches were insufficient in explaining the inequality and discrimination faced by African American women. By defining intersectionality, Crenshaw illuminated multiple forms of discrimination against different groups and categories, fostering the construction and representation of intersectional identities. Crenshaw’s work illuminates the social construction, interrelationship, and intertwining of race and other social categories in understanding the discrimination and exclusion experienced by black women. Collins further developed this concept, referring to it as “the critical insight that race, class, gender, sexuality, ethnicity, nation, ability, and age do not operate as single and mutually exclusive entities but as mutually constructed phenomena” (Collins 2015, 2).

The concept of intersectionality has gained significant attention within various feminist groups, including Marxist, lesbian, and Islamic feminists, who emphasize the multiple sources of oppression and marginalization in Western societies, such as capitalism, sexuality, religion, and gender (Salem 2013). In the European context, intersectionality is particularly relevant when examining the experiences of Muslim women in relation to immigration, nationalism, and Islam (Rottmann and Ferree 2008). The representation of middle-class white women’s experiences as universal has led Islamic feminists to focus on the term “intersectionality” to analyze the discrimination faced by Muslim women, which encompasses ethnicity, religion, class, gender, and other factors. Moors and Shanneik’s (2017) study on the experiences of Moroccan and Dutch-Turkish Muslim women regarding their gender and religious identity highlights the active role these women play in negotiating and redefining their identities, rather than being passive victims. The authors suggest that Islamic feminism offers a valuable framework for understanding and addressing the intersectional challenges faced by these women. As such, Islamic feminism has a twofold purpose: to correctly interpret religious teachings that have been influenced by patriarchal perspectives in Islamic countries and to emphasize the struggle of Muslim women against multiple forms of discrimination in Western countries. Rottmann and Ferree’s (2008) study of the headscarf debates and anti-discrimination laws in Europe through an intersectional lens shows how hard it is for German feminists to find a form of feminism that recognizes women’s complex experiences without using “difference” as an excuse for nationalism, exclusion, or discrimination. Recognizing the crucial role of intersectionality in understanding the complex nature of discrimination experienced by diverse identities is essential for developing a more inclusive and nuanced approach to addressing social inequality.

Research methodology

Study design

This qualitative study examines the responses and struggles of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women in the Netherlands against securitization and Islamophobia. The focus is on influential Dutch-Turkish Muslim women from civil society who actively participate or pioneer in Turkish women’s organizations, considering their success in raising their voices (van Es 2016b). According to Norwegian research based on archival material and semi-structured interviews, these organizations aim to break the stereotype of Muslim women as victims of a “backward” and “oppressive” religion. While this study helps explain Muslim women’s organizational efforts in Norway, the Turkish experience in the Dutch context remains unclear. Our research addresses these efforts to close the gap.

Studies show that Muslim women and girls join organizations that offer religious, educational, and recreational activities to connect with each other, participate in various activities, and produce political discourse because they feel a sense of belonging to the area where they want to change things. Their efforts and motivation in such organizations inspired this study. Although there are many in-depth studies that highlight minority groups’ religious, ethnic, and gender struggles in the Dutch context, this study focused on Dutch-Turkish women because of convenient sampling and the primary researcher’s Turkish Muslim background. This approach provides both an insider and outsider perspective and emphasizes the intersection of Muslim women’s Turkish backgrounds.

Profiles of participants and the interview process

We conducted fieldwork in the Netherlands from August to October 2019, conducting a total of ten interviews with Dutch-Turkish Muslim women influencers, primarily involved in women’s organizations in The Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam. These organizations aim to challenge intersectional discrimination against Muslim women in the Netherlands. In this study, the term “influencer” refers to women who challenge the stereotype of Turkish Muslim women as passive and confined to traditional roles, seeking to make a significant impact on the Dutch context by amplifying their voices within women’s organizations.

The focus was on highly educated Dutch-Turkish citizens who were struggling, either individually or organizationally. We initially reached out to participants via emails sourced from the contact pages of women’s organizations, primarily Muslim groups that define themselves based on their Islamic identity, to investigate the religious aspect of securitization. Our focus was on Dutch-Turkish Muslims who belong to these organizations, and we then requested more participants from them. The women were mostly between the ages of twenty and mid-thirty, born and raised as Dutch citizens with parents or grandparents who migrated to the Netherlands. Three participants were students at Leiden University, one of whom was also a Ph.D. student and worked as a manager in an Islamic-feminist women’s organization. Four participants worked in different Dutch institutions, mostly public institutions, while two were homemakers and members of women’s organizations (see Table 1).

Table 1. Characteristics of the participants.

Pseudonym	Location	Position
Burcu	Amsterdam	PhD Candidate and manager in a woman organization
Kübra	Rotterdam	A journalist in a Dutch broadcast
Vefa	Den Haag	Student and manager in a young woman organization
Elif	Amsterdam	Student and manager in a woman (student) organization
Sude	Rotterdam	Manager in a Dutch municipality
Esra	Den Haag	Manager in a woman organization
Zeynep	Den Haag	Student and manager in a woman (student) organization
Cansu	Amsterdam	A political party’s representative in the municipality
Beyza	Den Haag	Public servant in the university and manager in a woman organization
Melike	Amsterdam	Housewife and member of a woman organization

Ethics statement

This qualitative study did not require formal ethical approval or arrangements, as it relied on voluntary participation from self-selected respondents who shared their views without manipulation. The study focused on capturing the perspectives and struggles of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women, ensuring anonymity and confidentiality, and did not expose participants to risks beyond everyday life, thus falling under the category of minimal-risk research.

We scheduled interviews at convenient times and predetermined locations. We informed the participants about the research, the confidentiality process, the audio recording, and their right to withdraw at any time before commencing. The researchers assured participants of the project’s confidentiality and anonymity. The researchers randomly chose pseudonyms from common women’s names in Turkish communities to replace the participants’ names in the discussions. We audio-recorded and transcribed the interviews as soon as possible. Participants chose to conduct interviews in Turkish, except for two who preferred English. We meticulously transcribed all semi-structured interviews in Turkish, which lasted from 45 min to an hour.

Limitations

When interpreting this research’s findings, there is a clear limitation to consider. The small sample size makes it difficult to generalize the results, as the study aimed to investigate the perspectives of Dutch-Turkish women, specifically those who actively participate in Muslim women’s organizations. Only a limited number of Turkish women, due to their low participation in these organizations, were available for interviews. Thus, it is challenging to generalize their statements and opinions to all Dutch-Turkish women, who may have different experiences.

Data and analysis

The concept of “talking back”, described by bell hooks (1989), serves as a framework to explore how Dutch-Turkish Muslim women, including public intellectuals, professionals, artists, and activists, challenge the notion that Muslims and Islam are fundamentally incompatible with Western culture and society (van den Brandt 2019; van Es 2019). These women address Islamophobic discourses in diverse ways, emphasizing the intersection of gender, religion, and ethnicity. “Talking back” practices or discourses denote the oppositional and critical standing of respondents on issues of Islamophobia, sexism, and racism, serving as a tool for individuals subjected to inaccurate representations to confront these depictions.

The researchers analyzed the findings through the intersectionality of an Islamic, feminist, and anti-racist lens, identifying five main themes highlighted by the participants: (i) symbolic boundary between the “western/us” and “Muslim/other”; (ii) responses to securitization of Muslim women’s visual appearances; (iii) organizational efforts of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women; (iv) distinguishing between Turkish culture and “real” Islam; and (v) Islamic feminism as a tool for Muslim women to raise their voices. In examining the interviews within these categories, the researchers considered not only the participants’ responses against contemporary dominant discourse about Islam in the Dutch context but also their counter-discourses to the homogenous approach of white feminism and their criticism of patriarchal traditions in Turkish communities.

Symbolic boundaries between “Western/US” and “Muslim/other”

The culturalization of citizenship debates, which emphasize the distinction between Islam and Western values, is evident in Dutch surveillance policies that question the loyalty of Muslim immigrants. Participants revealed that Dutch-Turkish Muslim women actively seek recognition in the public sphere with their ethnic and religious identities, highlighting the culturalization of citizenship. They strive for representation in media, government policies, and decision-making processes, along with equal access to educational, religious, and professional resources, all without facing marginalization due to their religious attire.

Burcu, a Ph.D. student who identifies as a Marxist, feminist, activist, and anti-racist, critiqued the framing of Western modernity as “holy and unique” in its criticism of Islamic values. She argued that portraying Muslims as a threat reinforces the invisibility of critical social problems and reproduces existing inequalities in European societies, despite the idea that Western Europe is the most developed and enlightened. Furthermore, she criticized the Dutch government for clearly drawing a boundary between Muslim minorities and native Dutch citizens, linking the securitization of Muslims to the shift in integration policies from multiculturalism to pillarization.

In the Dutch context, immigrant organizing, encouraged, and funded by the government to construct their own private schools, places of worship, and foundations, reflects cultural distinctions among immigrant communities and between immigrants and non-immigrants. This institutionalization has led immigrants to represent themselves with their ethnic identities, but it has also served as a means of being defined by others and subsequently “othered”. The unintended outcomes of pillarization and multiculturalism in the Netherlands have strengthened essentialist beliefs, which perceive cultures as static and integration or adaptation as impossible (Schrover 2010). This debate suggests that counter-terrorism policies that constantly question the loyalty of Muslim minorities fuel Islamophobic and anti-immigrant discourses.

In the Netherlands, they [Dutch ethnic majorities] see themselves as a super progressive, super democratic, super emancipated country. If you look at violence against women, sexual harassment, the division of paid and unpaid labor, and anything else, inequality is the name of the game. But Muslims are the only ones who are posing a threat. Putting the Muslim community, mosques, and schools under a microscope and problematizing them shows that securitization manifests itself here. That is a definite form of Islamophobia. (Burcu)

Based on increasing Islamophobic discourses, participants mostly highlighted the 9/11 attacks, which have strengthened the idea that Islam is incompatible with Western societies and led to the position Muslims as enemies of “Western” values such as secularism, democracy, and gender equality. They described these approaches as “ignorant”, “Islamophobic”, and “exclusionary”. In the aftermath of 9/11, participants frequently noted that the media’s reinforcement of Islamophobic rhetoric perpetuated the sense of “otherness” felt by Muslims. The Dutch Parliament’s anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant policies, along with the dissemination of discriminatory views through media channels, have accused some societal actors of promoting Islamophobia.

The media is totally one-sided in building discrimination against immigrants and increasing Islamophobia. But also, the attitudes and behaviours of the Turks when they first came here affected this discrimination against them. While the people living here work hard, the Turks have received social aid from the state through fraud. (Melike)

News about Turks and Muslims and their presentation in the media affect the creation of fear of immigrants. For example, if a Muslim carries out a bomb attack, the media immediately publishes it and labels them a terrorist. But if a white person who is not Muslim commits such an act, they present the terrorist as a psychological patient. (Cansu)

These quotations highlight the hegemonic role of media in spreading anti-Muslim and anti-immigrant discourses in Western Europe. They explicitly characterized the Dutch government and media as biased platforms for not adopting a dissenting position against Islamophobic messages. Melike labeled the media as “one-sided”, contributing to Islamophobia, yet also criticized the Dutch Turkish community for fueling anti-Islamic and anti-immigrant sentiments due to their perceived incompatible actions. Her critical stance towards people of her own nationality reflects a talking back on the misleading attitudes embedded in the citizenship duties of Turkish citizens in the Netherlands. Additionally, the discriminatory approach expressed by Burcu points out debates on the expectation for Muslims to present counter-terrorism messages against violent attacks. The essentialist and stereotypical notion of Islam as a religion that promotes violence leads to expectations for Muslim minorities to denounce violent extremism and radicalization to prove their loyalty in the Netherlands (van Es 2019). The participant challenges this practice of “othering” Muslims, which operates as a tool for securitization, by exposing the media’s role in instilling fear of Muslims.

The policy based on surveillance and regulation is also evident in the experiences of two Dutch-Turkish political actors who were expelled from the Labour Party in 2014 for speaking out against the government’s proposal to regulate some Turkish religious organizations (such as the Diyanet) and who are now the founders of the DENK party. DENK takes a critical stance against the transition of the Dutch integration policy towards Dutch-Turkish citizens. This criticism of the Dutch state’s policy shift was promoted by participant Cansu, an active member of DENK and employee at a Dutch municipality. Specifically, Cansu, a woman who clearly identifies as a Muslim and wears a headscarf, expressed that she experienced discriminatory attitudes while working for a Turkish political party, particularly one that aligns with the Turkish government and the conservative AKP. Also, one participant, Kübra, a journalist in a broadcast, pointed out that after the protests in 2017, over the denial of Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu’s planned visit to the Netherlands to campaign for the referendum in Turkey, many Turkish Dutch citizens participated in the protests both to raise their voices against the growing anti-immigrant rhetoric by right-wing parties in Dutch policy and also to criticize this discriminatory attitude of the Netherlands toward the Turkish government.

Responses to securitization of Muslim women’s visual appearances

The securitization of Muslims manifests through a gender dimension, particularly in the visual appearances of Muslim women who wear a headscarf or burqa. These markers are perceived as a threat to the achievements of enlightened, modern Europe and seen as a symbol of the backwardness of the Muslim community in public (Bracke and Fadil 2012). Names and appearances peculiar to a Muslim or Eastern background, especially headscarves or clothing styles for Muslim women, make them legible as signs of threats to state security.

Vefa, a university student and active member of a women’s organization, perceived the attitudes of Dutch people towards Muslim women as “contradictory to the multicultural diversity found in Dutch society” during a discussion on this topic. Elif, another university student, expressed that “the headscarf acts as a visible symbol of a woman’s Muslim identity, evoking various responses from others”. Burcu, a PhD candidate, shared an experience where a co-worker confronted her about Muslim women wearing headscarves, viewing them as “oppressive”. These accounts suggest that the form of gender-based violence reflecting multiple systems of power within the intersection of sexism, racism, and Islamophobia is more visible towards veiled Muslim women. The headscarf is commonly perceived as a clear indication of a woman’s Muslim identity rather than a stylistic choice.

Some Muslim families encourage their daughters to wear headscarves to signify their Muslim and Turkish identities, despite facing discrimination. These women choose to wear the headscarf to express their national, religious, and gender identities, as well as to show their sense of belonging to their respective groups. The criticism during interviews centered on arguments made by Ayaan Hirsi Ali that the headscarf is a symbol of patriarchy. The interviewees felt that this kind of resistance posed a hindrance for Muslim women in making their own decisions about what to wear, which could impede their emancipation regarding their thoughts, values, and appearances.

Beyza, a manager in a Turkish Muslim women’s organization and a staff member at a university, expressed discomfort at the questions she received from her Dutch environment when she first chose to wear a headscarf. She felt that the feedback from people made her feel like an “other” in her own country. This marginalization has a direct impact on the daily lives of Muslim women, including their educational and occupational lives. As a result, Muslim women and other minority women sometimes hide their femininity, ethnicity, or religious identity to cope with prejudices in their workplaces. Cansu, an active member of a Turkish political party and employee at a Dutch municipality, reported that her headscarf created an employment barrier.

I can definitely say there is particular discrimination against women with headscarves that focuses on their visual appearances whether it is visible or invisible. For example, I wasn’t hired for some jobs because of my headscarf. But my headscarf is part of my lifestyle, my religion, and my beliefs—not just a cultural thing. (Cansu)

Dutch-Turkish Muslim women widely criticized the new niqab ban in the Netherlands due to public visibility and security concerns. Most interviewees opposed the ban, considering it a restriction on freedom of religion and a tool marginalizing Muslim women. However, two participants considered the burqa ban to be a reasonable measure based on the fear of uncertainty and the invisibility of identities. Some participants expressed concerns about a potential future ban on the headscarf, arguing that it interferes with Muslim women’s choices about what to wear and serves as a tool to marginalize them.

Melike, one of the interviewees, highlighted the difference between Muslim women who wear headscarves and those who cover their faces or bodies with a burqa or niqab. She identified herself as a modernly dressed Muslim woman wearing a headscarf, and she experienced less discrimination compared to women wearing niqabs or burqas. Melike also noted that non-Muslims’ tolerance and respect vary depending on visual appearance, even regarding headscarves.

The Dutch-Turkish Muslim women were particularly critical of Muslim women’s securitization, believing it perpetuated discrimination based on visual appearances. Some participants in the debate around the Dutch burqa ban have perceived it as politically motivated rather than driven by security concerns. Scholars have pointed out that the niqab ban is problematic as it paints Muslim women who wear burqas or niqabs as incompatible with Western society (van Es 2019). The perceived necessity for such bans stems from the rise of fundamentalism and political movements that promote Islamophobia and racism.

Political parties such as the Party for Freedom (PVV) and Forum for Democracy Party (FVD), politicians such as Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet, and civil organizations including Pegida Netherlands (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West), Demonstranten Tegen Gemeente (DTG), the Dutch Defense League (DDL), and Identitair Nederland have been associated with promoting discriminatory attitudes and policies targeting Muslims and immigrants in the Netherlands. Consequently, the “talking back” practice, framing the burqa ban as a restriction on Muslim women’s autonomy, religious freedom, and control over their bodies, serves as a useful counterstance to these organizations’ portrayal of Muslim women as passive victims of violent Islam.

Organizational efforts of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women

One of the most important “talking back” practices identified in this study is the organizational activities that participants mostly perceive as contributing to their own and other women’s empowerment. These women organize recreational activities for the socialization of Turkish women in the Turkish Muslim women’s associations of which they are members. They also support the education of young people in need in their ethnic communities through charitable activities and contribute to religious activities by working together with mosques of Turkish origin. These actions can be seen as an instance of talking back to combat securitization.

However, the participants also noted that Turkish women’s participation in these organizations is insufficient. They identified several reasons for this low participation, including insufficient language skills and lower education levels, which are mostly prevalent among the older generation. Additionally, the domestic roles of homemakers and mothers also hinder their participation.

As seen in this study, younger generations of Muslim women are more aware and tend to participate in women’s organizations to defend their rights as Turkish Muslim women. This contrasts with the older generation of Turkish women who settled in the Netherlands in the 1960s, primarily to work. The younger generation’s increased awareness and participation in women’s organizations demonstrate a shift in the attitudes and priorities of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women, as they actively engage in efforts to combat discrimination and securitization.

The participation of Turkish women in the organizations is very low. In the environments I’ve been in, there are mostly Moroccan women. I think it’s because we’re depoliticized. Reflecting on my upbringing and my family, where my Turkishness is constituted, I realize that we never discussed politics. Also, there was this idea that you stay under the radar, practice your religion, and live your Turkishness in your own home. (Burcu)

The participation of Turkish women in the organizations is very poor. There are different reasons for this. First, if you really want a place in the Netherlands, you need an education, and there are very few Turkish people with a higher degree as their educational background. But you need to be active and assertive to attain a better position. (Vefa)

The Turkish population in the Netherlands originally arrived under the “guest worker program” and has since increased due to marriages and the migration of family members from Turkey, resulting in different generations of Turks in the Netherlands. The first generation comprises those who migrated as workers, while the second and third generations were born in the Netherlands. The Turkish community in the Netherlands has tended to preserve its national and religious identity while living in Western society, settling in areas with a Turkish population and Turkish shops, and sending their children to mosques at an early age to reinforce their religious and national identities.

Participants in this study emphasized that preserving national and religious identities helps them avoid assimilation into Dutch society, thereby strengthening their ties with the Turkish community. However, compared to the first generation of Turks who came to the Netherlands, the second generation’s identity is more hybrid and multifaceted, as they interact with both Turkish and Dutch cultures. This influences Turkish youth, who define their identities as dual, bicultural, and multiple.

At the heart of their longstanding ability to identify as both Muslims and Dutch is the drive to free themselves from securitization. Unlike their parents and grandparents, younger Turkish generations are more willing to learn the language of the country they live in and engage in social activities. This research shows that young Turkish people in the Netherlands express different perspectives on how they display their national identities in Dutch society. Some strongly adhere to their traditional values and cultural beliefs and prefer to live within their community, while others try to integrate into Dutch society out of fear of assimilation.

Participants expressed that it is possible to integrate and participate in multicultural environments while preserving national and religious identities. In a globalized world, minorities tend to be more mobile, and inclusion in their countries of residence actualizes multiculturalism. Turkish youth who are willing to participate in multicultural activities, interact with different groups of people, and broaden their perspectives are aware of the importance of being visible in the Netherlands. This awareness motivates active participation in the public sphere. However, young women who actively participate in Muslim women’s organizations criticized Turkish youth who only condemn European society without making any effort to be included in the society they live in. They stated that participation in any social organization is an effective way to show that they are aware of their rights as Turkish and Muslim citizens.

The structures, programs, and overarching objectives of women’s organizations can vary significantly. In the European context, some women’s organizations prioritize the Islamic feminist perspective and provide a platform for Muslim women to engage in political discussions. Conversely, through Islamic education, some religious organizations are primarily associated with mosques and neighborhoods. In this study, Dutch Turkish women who are actively advocating for Muslim women’s emancipation in the Netherlands reported attending mosques or Islamic institutions for religious education. However, they emphasized that Muslim women’s organizations, where they resist Islamophobic challenges, are distinct from these Islamic institutions. These organizations are defined as spaces where Muslim women can engage with different groups of people, discuss diverse social and political issues, and maintain their religious identities.

Distinguishing between Turkish culture and “real” Islam

The tendency to distinguish between patriarchal, “cultural” practices of the Turkish community and “real” Islam, which values women’s rights, can be considered a practice of talking back. The interviewees respond to Islamophobia in Dutch society, as well as conservative patterns in their communities. Some of them criticized the patriarchal structure of the Turkish family, interpreting it as a barrier to gender equality. These women’s criticisms of both those who cannot represent Islam strongly due to their weak religious beliefs in the Turkish community and ignorant people who do not distinguish between culture and religion remind us of “the rhetoric of knowledge versus ignorance” (van Es 2016a). According to their expression, the culture, not Islamic or religious beliefs, socially constructs the gender roles framed in Turkish families. Accordingly, they stated that Turkish men tend to maintain traditional gender roles where women are mostly responsible for domestic work while men dominate public spheres. Traditionally, the patriarchal family model in Turkey has excluded women and unmarried daughters from positions of decision-making. They largely remain passive in family decision-making, contrasting directly with male family members. In this traditional family type, there is an ideal division of labor in which men are accepted as the head of the family and the breadwinner for the family’s welfare. Male family members perceive women as responsible for childcare, housework, and protection. Coşar and Yeğenoğlu (2011) demonstrate that the conservative government system in Turkey defines the family and the domestic sphere as the natural places for women to maintain the historical continuity of the Turkish family structure. In this context, social and political views on women’s status in Turkey explicitly intensify the existence of patriarchy in the traditional Turkish family. Participants interpreted that the culturally constructed traditional gender division of labor hinders women from increasing their visibility in social life.

No offense, but Turkish people often don’t know the difference between culture and religion. They sometimes prioritize nationalism over religion. Turkish culture can be male-dominated, which isn’t consistent with Islam, where no one dominates another. In Islam, we’re all equal but have different responsibilities. For me, my religion, Islam, comes first, followed by culture and tradition. So, first and foremost, you should determine if what you’re doing is Islamically right. (Vefa)

This statement reminds us of the study, which reveals the emphasis of Norwegian Muslim women influenced by the growing Islamic revival movement and Islamic feminism on the strict distinction between an essentially “good” religion and culture (van Es 2016a, 118). We view this as a way to challenge stereotypes about the oppressed status of women resulting from Islamic rules, and to foster acceptance of Muslim women in Dutch society. These women’s fight against gender inequality is fueled by patriarchal discourses in Turkish culture and draws attention to gender equality in “pure” Islam based on the Qur’an and hadith. They also indicate that such traditional practices in Turkish families are increasingly linked to the fact that Islam is an inherently “backward” and “patriarchal” religion, which is assumed to be incompatible with the “Dutch” or “Western” notion of gender equality.

Islamic feminism as a tool for Muslim women to raise their voices

The participants in this research mostly interpreted Islamic feminism as an effective “talking back” for Muslim women to resist challenges such as securitization, Islamophobia, and racism, incorporating an intersectional perspective. They frequently criticized right-wing politicians such as Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet, who are radical defenders of these political ideas, and the representation of Muslim women as oppressed, ignorant, and in need of protection. In the Islamic feminist debates, critical reflections against such discourses as “empowering, saving, and giving voice to Muslim women”, which risk treating them as devoid of agency, were highlighted. Islamic feminism has challenged the ignorance of Muslim women as well-educated, highly skilled, and vocal women through both oppositional discourses and actions. In the Netherlands, scholars specifically question the discriminatory approach that depicts Dutch women as liberated and emancipated, while portraying Muslims as victims of Islam (Bracke 2011; Roggeband and Verloo 2007; van Es 2016b). Here, Islamic feminism is not identified merely as a women’s movement, perspective, or theory. Instead, Muslim women perceive it as a strategy to counteract inaccurate depictions by safeguarding their religious values. In this research, participants depict the act of defending their rights and speaking out as veiled women as a means of dispelling derogatory portrayals. Talking back, which bell hooks defines (1989, 8) as “a political gesture that challenges politics of domination that would render us nameless and voiceless”, appears in the problematization of these discourses by participants. The motto “our body is not your battleground” used in the quotes reflects a form of resistance both against patriarchal control mechanisms over female bodies and discriminatory attitudes that marginalize Muslim women’s religious attire. These quotes indicate that Dutch-Turkish women who held managerial roles in organizations contribute to activism by amplifying voices and advocating for their rights based on their religious, ethnic, and gender identities.

I and three other women started a collective organization called S.P.E.A.K. with the slogan ‘our body is not your battleground’ inspired by Mohja Kahf. We identify ourselves as radical, anti-racist, feminist Muslim women’s organizations. And what we do is organize Muslim women who identify themselves as feminists, activists, and anti- racist. (Burcu)

We are trying to act as a bridge between the government and local people (Dutch-Turkish women). There are decision-making boards, and we are trying to take our place at the table as a representative of Muslim women. (Beyza)

Turkish Muslim women who identify themselves as Islamic feminists not only critique Islamophobic, racist, and patriarchal discourses but also challenge mainstream white feminism. They often criticized Western feminism, citing its inadequacy in addressing the issues faced by minority women in the Netherlands and other Western societies. Participants observed that feminist institutions in the Netherlands primarily advocate for the rights of older, white, and middle-class Western women, highlighting the intersectional nature of oppression. Both proponents and critics of Islamic feminism typically define classical feminist thought in Western Europe as white-privileged, representing a specific group of women, not all women. They criticized the centrality of secular discourse and universal womanhood in Western feminism and suggested a postmodernist perspective for feminism emphasizing the importance of different identities (third-wave feminism). Participants remarked that individual experiences, views, and subjectivity are crucial for the Islamic revival of Muslim women.

Well, if you look at the women’s organizations that are providing input on ministry, education, culture, and science, they’re all white and old. There’s no younger generation, no women of color, or no Muslim women providing input on themselves. It’s mostly white feminism, and it’s not inclusive or diverse. (Vefa)

One of the remarkable talking-back practices is the employment of almost all participants in professional occupations, such as political party members and managers. In contrast to the first generation of Turkish women (their mothers or grandmothers) who came to the Netherlands as migrants under the “guest worker program”, the participants stated that they were always willing to maintain their educational developments and work in a paid job to get rid of the labeling of uneducated and passive women. Moreover, they stated that being a member of a women’s organization, especially one that empowers Muslim women in addition to their profession, contributed to breaking away from this stigma. The discourses of these women with Muslim backgrounds in line with Dutch values such as freedom of expression, gender equality, and women’s independence contributed to the blurring of sharp boundaries between the Dutch “us” and the Muslim “them”. Some women see their struggle to exist as strong women visible in the public sphere not only as a response to the marginalization of minority Muslim women in the Dutch context but also as a way to challenge the marginalization they face from the secular Turkish community due to their representation of the pious Turkish community. The participants who emphasized the existence of distinction between the secular and the religious here, which has very strong foundations in Turkey, stated that they were involved in activities that would empower them as a response to the secularists who characterized them as backward.

Concluding thoughts

This research aims to uncover the effects of securitization and Islamophobia on Dutch-Turkish Muslim women in the Netherlands and explore their counter-voices to the intersection of sexism, racism, and Islamophobia. The study employs the notion of “talking back” as a key analytical framework to explain the responses of influential Dutch-Turkish Muslim women civil society actors. The findings reveal that talking-back practices contribute to changing the perception of Muslim women from being seen as oppressed, passive, and silent figures, as promoted by Islamophobic and stereotypical approaches, to being viewed as struggling and vocal actors. This study stands out by highlighting the intersection of religion, gender, and ethnicity in the responses of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women, providing an inner critique of the patriarchal traditions embedded in Turkish culture, as well as Islamophobic and racist stereotypes in the Netherlands. The research also underscores the critical awareness of younger Dutch-Turkish generations and their hybrid and multifaceted identities. Unlike the older generation of Turkish women who settled primarily to work in the Netherlands, these younger generations are willing to participate in multicultural activities, interact with different groups of people, and broaden their perspectives.

The gradual transition of Dutch policy from inclusion and multiculturalism to surveillance and securitization (Essed and Nimako 2006; Prins 2002), along with discriminatory discourses emphasizing a clear distinction between Islam and Western virtues, has rendered the position of Muslim women controversial (Ghorashi 2010). This shift in policy and discourse reinforces the othering of Muslim women, who are already perceived as oppressed victims in a backward culture opposed to gender equality and women’s emancipation. Participants frequently emphasized that right-wing politicians like Geert Wilders and Thierry Baudet contribute to the prevailing divisive discourse by arguing for the oppression, ignorance, and need for protection of Muslim women. Consequently, women with a legible religious identity are perceived as a threat in Dutch society due to the perceived conflict with values such as liberal democracy, secularism, and gender equality in the Western world (Tonkens and Duyvendak 2016). In addition to increasing Islamophobic and racist discourse in the Netherlands, the present religious and secular dichotomy in the Turkish community (Göle 2015) also appears in the Dutch public sphere.

Considering these controversial issues, Dutch-Turkish Muslim women engage in various talking-back practices. They criticize the construction of fear related to immigration, xenophobia, and anti-Muslim hostility due to Islamist radicalization, the rise of right-wing populism, and ethnic nationalism, which have led to the “othering” of Muslims. These women also challenge negative depictions of Muslim women’s religious attire and highlight the distinction between Islam and local national culture, uncovering patriarchal traditions in Turkish families. Moreover, they participate in local women’s organizations to raise their voices through institutional means and identify Islamic feminism as a tool for empowerment by criticizing mainstream white and secular feminism. The study reveals that Dutch-Turkish Muslim women employ talking-back practices to challenge the marginalization they face from both the Dutch society and the secular Turkish community. By actively participating in the public sphere and engaging in activities that empower them, these women resist the characterization of being backward by secularists.

The findings of this research have significant implications for understanding the complex experiences of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women and their strategies for countering discrimination and marginalization. The study highlights the importance of considering the intersectionality of religion, gender, and ethnicity when examining the experiences of Muslim women in Western societies. Moreover, the research underscores the need for inclusive policies and discourses that recognize the diversity within Muslim communities and challenge the essentialist notions of Islam and Muslim women. By amplifying the voices of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women and their talking-back practices, this study contributes to the ongoing efforts to combat Islamophobia, racism, and sexism in the Netherlands and beyond.

This research provides valuable insights into the experiences and strategies of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women in the face of securitization and Islamophobia. It highlights the importance of recognizing the agency and diversity of Muslim women and the need for inclusive approaches that challenge discriminatory policies and discourses. By shedding light on the talking-back practices of Dutch-Turkish Muslim women, this study contributes to the ongoing efforts to promote social justice and equality in increasingly diverse societies. The findings emphasize the necessity of fostering dialogue, understanding, and collaboration between different communities to create a more inclusive and equitable society for all.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).