Standing tall like Caesar? Qatar’s unwavering voice for Palestine at the United Nations

Abstract

This article examines the complexities of Qatar’s Palestine policy, emphasising Doha’s multifaceted role as a mediator, problem-solver, humanitarian aid provider, and representative of the Palestinian issue at the United Nations. The study employs a mixed-methods research approach. Firstly, it utilises qualitative data from official statements, key policymakers’ remarks, and literature on Qatar’s foreign policy and Palestinian engagement. Secondly, it introduces text analytic methods such as latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic modelling, word clouds and network analysis to identify key themes, relationships and trends in Qatar’s speeches. The findings reveal that the Palestinian issue has been a prominent and consistent topic in Qatar’s United Nations General Assembly General Debate addresses over the past five decades. Qatar has consistently advocated for a resolution to the conflict, emphasising the importance of peace, justice and the two-state solution. Qatar’s support for Palestine remains steadfast, despite pressure from other regional actors to end its engagement with Hamas and divert its attention from the Palestinian issue. This commitment to the Palestinian cause aligns with Qatar’s broader state preferences for an independent foreign policy, its opposition to external interference, and its aspiration to restore its role as a trusted international partner on global platforms.

Keywords:

• Qatar
• Palestine
• UNGA
• general debates
• text analysis

Introduction

Qatar’s mediation in the release of Israeli hostages held by Hamas in November 2023 has drawn significant attention to Qatar–Palestine relations and Qatar’s influence over Hamas.¹ Mediation, a structured and voluntary conflict resolution mechanism, involves an impartial third party (mediator) who facilitates communication and negotiation among disputing parties (Moore 2014). Historically, international dispute mediation has been dominated by superpowers using their geopolitical influence to shape outcomes (Fraihat 2020). However, recent years have seen the increasing involvement of smaller powers as mediators, who leverage their perceived impartiality and diplomatic adaptability (Kelleher 2006). Qatar’s engagement with the Palestinian cause is well known. However, its emergence as the most prominent mediator in Palestinian issues remains a subject of inquiry in academic and policy circles. Several questions arise: Why is Qatar involved in the Palestinian issue, and why does it pursue a pro-Palestinian policy? How does this foreign policy align with Qatar’s status as a resource-rich small state in a hostile regional environment? Is this policy a state preference or a temporary choice based on its regional policy? Has Qatar’s stance towards the Palestinian question evolved over time? Why does Qatar provide unwavering support to a so-called fallen cause on international platforms? And how is Qatar’s pro-Palestinian position compatible with its key role as facilitator and mediator? These questions have yet to be fully addressed in the literature. There is a lack of up-to-date or systematic analysis of Qatar’s policy towards Palestine. This study aims to fill this gap by conducting an in-depth examination of Qatar’s foreign policy using mixed methods, including both qualitative and quantitative tools.

Utilising framing theory, this study examines the political narrative of Qatar’s leadership on the Palestinian issue as presented in their General Debate (GD) addresses at the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) from 1971 to 2023. The GD serves as a valuable platform for understanding Qatar’s state preferences due to its formal setting, global representation, and annual recurrence. Narratives are crucial for comprehending government actions, providing context, identifying key actors and conflicts, and shaping perceptions (Roselle, Miskimmon, and O’Loughlin 2014). They enhance public understanding and facilitate policy evaluation. However, they can also constrain policymaking by defining friends and adversaries (Thies 2012). By employing text analytical methods and network analysis, this study explores Qatar’s foreign policy narrative on the Palestinian issue, deepening our understanding of international politics and enabling systematic analysis of state preferences.

The qualitative analysis, which combines a literature review with statements from key policymakers and official documents on Qatar’s foreign policy in general and Qatar’s Palestine policy in particular, provides valuable information for understanding the wider context. The results of this analysis are detailed in the first section – Qatar’s foreign policy – and the second section – Qatar’s Palestine policy. For the quantitative analysis, we created a Dataset of Qatar United Nations General Assembly Addresses (UNGAQ) of all of Qatar’s GD addresses to the UNGA. We discuss the utility of the GD in identifying state preferences in the third section. Then, we apply text analytic methods, including Latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) topic modelling, word clouds and network analysis, to analyse Qatar’s GD statements to provide additional measures and tools to help understand Qatar’s state preferences and the place of the Palestinian question within them. After the empirical section, we end with concluding observations.

Qatar’s foreign policy

Qatar’s foreign policy is notable for its ability to mediate and facilitate regional initiatives, despite its status as a small resource-rich state. Qatar’s economic development has been driven by its utilisation of oil and gas resources, fuelling its increased foreign policy activism. The literature on Qatar’s foreign policy emphasises the country’s pursuit of regime and state security in a volatile region (Gray 2019). Three primary discussions surround the Qatari foreign policy roles aimed at achieving this goal.

Firstly, Qatar seeks to secure its position as a major liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporter in the international political economy. Sharing a vast gas reserve with Iran, Qatar has invested heavily in LNG technology and boasts the world’s largest LNG carrier fleet. Additionally, Qatar collaborates with major international companies and diversifies its LNG supply in the global market. Its regional initiatives aim to ensure the stability and security of LNG flow. Secondly, Qatar strives for an autonomous foreign policy that maintains stable relations with Iran while avoiding tensions within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). This strategy aims to protect the country’s position in a threatening neighbourhood environment and is further strengthened by an alliance with Turkey. Such activism represents pre-emptive measures to address nearby crises (Steinberg 2023). Thirdly, Qatar institutionalises its ties with the US through mechanisms for consultation and cooperation. It also hosts a US base, serving as the headquarters for both the United States Central Command (USCC) and the United States Air Force Central Command (USAFCC) in Qatar (Steinberg 2023). The ongoing Iran–Saudi rivalry, the hegemonic ambitions of these states, and the limited conflict resolution capabilities of the GCC prompted Qatar to develop a security arrangement with the US (Keating and Abbott 2021). This autonomous and flexible foreign policy allows Qatar to secure a conditional security guarantee from the US while managing regional relations through initiatives and alliances. It enables Qatar to pursue relations with both the US and Iran without contradictions (Gray 2019).

The literature identifies three pivotal turning points in the evolution of Qatar’s foreign policy in recent decades. The first is the accession of Emir Hamad Al Thani to the throne in 1995. The emir implemented a foreign policy strategy aimed at distancing Qatar from Saudi Arabia’s sphere of influence, enhancing Qatar’s regional influence and international prestige through mediation efforts, fostering relationships with significant non-state actors, and adopting a pro-Palestinian stance in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (Khatib 2013). He sought to capitalise on Qatar’s hydrocarbon resources, particularly its position as the world’s leading LNG exporter, to develop the country while simultaneously increasing its foreign policy activism. He made bold and decisive moves to establish Qatar as an influential power broker in regional politics. His visit to the Gaza Strip in 2012 was particularly noteworthy, as no other leader had visited the area since Hamas took control in 2007 (Rudoren 2012). During this period, Qatari leadership also engaged in successful mediation efforts in Yemen, Sudan and Lebanon.

The Arab Spring also constituted a pivotal juncture in Qatar’s foreign policy. During this period, Qatar transitioned from its traditional role as a mediator and conflict resolver to actively engaging with opposition movements in the Arab world, particularly by supporting revolutionary movements. According to Roberts (2019), Qatar’s foreign policy during the Arab Spring was characterised by an increased engagement with Islamist groups, a strategy aimed at strengthening its geopolitical position. Prior to 2017, Qatar faced criticism for its support of these organisations, leading to concerns about an underlying Islamist agenda. However, there is no conclusive evidence to suggest that Qatar’s foreign policy is driven by a clear Islamist ideology; rather, pragmatism appears to be the primary guiding principle.

Roberts (2019) underscores the importance for policymakers, especially in the US, to carefully consider the strategic implications of Qatar’s actions. By leveraging Qatar’s influence in the Middle East, the US can expand its diplomatic reach and potentially facilitate negotiations with Hamas. The US has been aware of Qatar’s facilitative role since before the Arab Spring, with Qatari officials indicating that the US and other parties have approached Qatar to establish a communication channel with Hamas since 2006. In 2012, the US and Qatar collaborated to relocate Hamas’ political office from Damascus to Doha. This channel has played a crucial role in de-escalating conflicts between Israel and Hamas on numerous occasions.² However, this period also witnessed a decline in Qatari mediation initiatives, which reshaped Qatar’s image as a driver of regional transformation in the Arab world. Ironically, this period sowed seeds of resentment and discontent against Qatar, particularly within neighbouring countries Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). These two countries aligned themselves in opposition to revolutionary change, collaborating to reverse regional advancements and re-establish the previous order (Kamrava 2014).

The third turning point occurred during the reign of the new emir, Tamim Al Thani, who ascended to power during the Arab Spring. This period, spanning from 2014 to 2021, was characterised by a series of blockades. Two major crises erupted within the GCC during this era, one in 2014 and the other in 2017. The first crisis commenced when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar, alleging Doha’s interference in their internal affairs. Diplomatic negotiations resolved this crisis in the same year. The second crisis escalated beyond the GCC’s boundaries when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt (collectively known as the Quartet) severed diplomatic relations with Qatar and imposed a comprehensive land, sea and air blockade in 2017. This marked an unprecedented crisis within the GCC, as the parties sought external support rather than resolving the issue internally. Jordan, Yemen, the Libyan rival government, Maldives and several other countries aligned with the Quartet’s decision, severing their diplomatic ties with Qatar and regionalising the crisis.

Qatar vehemently opposed the blockade imposed by the Quartet and rejected their demands for restoring diplomatic ties by aligning with actors outside the Gulf region. During this period, Qatar leveraged its institutional connections with the US, signing specific agreements on combating and limiting terrorist financing to mitigate the initially pro-Quartet stance of the US President Donald Trump (Kabalan 2018). Qatar further strengthened its institutional ties with the United States by establishing mechanisms for consultation and cooperation (Keating and Abbott 2021).

During this period, Qatar increasingly relied on Turkey and Iran to meet its immediate food security needs. Additionally, it deepened its special military ties with Turkey as a further security guarantee during the blockade. This period was characterised by a restraint in Qatari foreign policy, a shift towards mediation efforts, development and humanitarian aid initiatives, and the hosting of major sports and cultural events (Al-Dosari 2021). Doha successfully mediated several conflicts, including the facilitation of the US–Taliban agreement through hosting the Taliban office in Doha, reconciliation in Chad, and containment of the crisis in Libya. This period represented a significant course correction in Qatar’s foreign policy, restoring its role as a ‘trusted international partner’, as described by Qatari Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman.³

Qatar’s Palestine policy

Former Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani’s visit to Gaza in 2012 marked a significant turning point in the relationship between Qatar and Palestine. Prior to his accession to power in 1995, Qatar had played a relatively limited role in the Palestinian issue. However, during his reign, Sheikh Hamad adopted an independent foreign policy agenda, with the Palestinian cause occupying a central position. This period also witnessed Qatar’s emergence as an influential mediator and problem-solver in the region.

Qatar’s involvement in the Palestinian cause has undergone a three-decade evolution marked by adaptable yet unwavering support. In 1999, following the expulsion of Hamas leadership from Jordan, Qatar provided temporary refuge for the organisation in Doha before facilitating their return to Amman amidst a dispute between Jordan and Hamas. This intervention was orchestrated by then-Qatari Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim (Milton-Edwards 2013). Sheikh Jassim also played a pivotal role in lifting the siege on Yasser Arafat and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) headquarters in Ramallah in the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm in 2000 (Robinson et al. 2003).

In 1996, Qatar became the only Gulf state to allow the establishment of an Israeli trade office in the wake of the Oslo Accords. That same year, then-Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres paid an official visit to Qatar. In 1997, Doha hosted the Middle East and North Africa Economic Summit, a follow-up to the Madrid Conference that sought to facilitate a resolution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. Israel was among the participating nations. Other high-ranking Israeli officials visited Qatar in the ensuing years, including Minister of Foreign Affairs Tzipi Livni in 2008 (Yaari 2020). However, relations between Qatar and Israel soured during Israel’s Operation Cast Lead in Gaza. Qatar vehemently condemned Israel’s actions and closed its trade office in Doha in 2009.

Qatar’s pragmatic policy approach has positioned it as a significant player in the region, surpassing other powerbrokers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The small Gulf emirate has successfully established connections with various actors and Palestinian factions, making Qatar accessible to all relevant parties. Despite its limited power capabilities compared to other major regional players, Qatar has pursued a distinct agenda regarding the Palestinian cause. While Syria and Iran have sought to maintain factional divisions among Palestinian groups for their own strategic purposes, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have aimed to strengthen the PLO’s control over Palestinian territories (Milton-Edwards 2013). In contrast, Qatar has focused on fostering reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas, with the additional goal of moderating Hamas and distancing it from the Syria–Iran alliance.

Qatar’s diplomatic strategy brought it closer to Hamas, as the Fatah leadership pursued a divergent path in Palestinian politics during the early 2000s. However, following Hamas’s 2007 seizure of power in Gaza, other regional nations began to perceive Qatar as a competitor in the realm of Palestinian politics (Rabbani 2012). Qatar’s actions were seen as detrimental to Fatah’s interests, leading to resistance from the latter against Qatar’s reconciliation efforts. This dynamic was evident in the emergency meeting of Palestinian stakeholders held in Doha after Israel’s 2008/2009 offensive on Gaza. Qatar successfully convened the Palestinian political factions Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) for the Doha summit in January 2009. The Doha communiqué issued from this meeting advocated for the opening of all crossings to Gaza under the supervision of the European Union or Turkey. However, Saudi Arabia and Egypt opposed this proposal, suggesting that the Palestinian Authority (PA) should retain control of the crossings.⁴

Several years later, the Palestine Papers, published in Al Jazeera and The Guardian in January 2011, exposed the extent of ongoing negotiations between the PA and Israel.⁵ These negotiations resulted in a significant erosion of PA President Mahmoud Abbas’s authority. Abbas was widely criticised for making unacceptable concessions to Israel on issues such as Israeli settlements, the status of Al-Aqsa Mosque, and certain security arrangements. The embarrassment caused by the leak weakened Abbas’s position in the Palestinian cause and forced him to negotiate with Hamas. Qatar has played a prominent role as a mediator in Palestinian affairs, particularly in negotiations between Hamas and Fatah, the two major Palestinian political factions (Krieg 2019). Since 2007, when Hamas took control of the Gaza Strip, division has prevailed between Hamas and Fatah. Traditionally, Egypt served as the mediator between the two factions. However, following the 2011 Egyptian uprisings, Qatar emerged as an alternative mediator. Qatar hosted mediation talks in Doha between Hamas and Fatah, and the Doha Agreement of May 2012 was a significant outcome of these efforts. Hamas political bureau chief Khaled Meshaal and Abbas, representing Fatah, signed the Doha Agreement at this meeting. This was a major achievement, as these leading Palestinian factions had established separate governments in 2007.⁶ Previous deals between 2007 and 2012 had collapsed due to mistrust between the factions and the intervention of regional countries. As outlined in the Doha Agreement, the factions agreed to appoint PA President Mahmoud Abbas as interim prime minister and entrusted him with the responsibility of preparing for general elections. Although the agreement was short-lived and failed to achieve its intended goals, Qatar emerged as a reliable and capable mediator in the Palestinian question (Rabbani 2012).

Qatar has consistently played a mediating role between Hamas and Israel. During the escalating conflict between the two parties in July 2014, Qatar offered mediation and provided $500 million in humanitarian aid to the Palestinians.⁷ Qatar facilitated indirect mediation for the cessation of hostilities, serving as a conduit for messages between Hamas, the US and the European Union.⁸ Traditional powerbrokers Egypt and Saudi Arabia had lost their grip on regional politics during this period, focusing on domestic affairs. Meanwhile, Qatar pursued a higher profile in regional politics and strengthened its relations with the US administration. The reluctance of Saudi Arabia and Egypt, coupled with the absence of alternative aid prospects, left Israel to deal with Qatar in the reconstruction of Gaza. Qatar’s elevated position in the Gaza issue resulted in a new system for dispersing Qatari aid to Gaza in coordination with Israel, the US, and the UN in 2014 (Zureik 2018). Qatar also played a constructive role in PA–Hamas reconciliation, despite attempts by Egypt and other countries to limit Qatar’s influence on the Palestinian question. During this period, Qatari envoys worked with both Hamas and the PA to facilitate reconciliation, even amidst the challenges posed by the Gulf Crisis.

Over the past two decades, Qatar has supplemented its political involvement in the Palestinian cause by financing civilian projects in the Palestinian territories. These projects have made Qatar a major contributor to infrastructure projects, in particular highways, and the healthcare and education sectors. In March 2009, Qatar had already committed to the Sharm al-Sheikh early recovery and reconstruction conference for Gaza. The donors pledged nearly US $4.5 billion in aid, and Qatar became among the few countries that fulfilled their promises.⁹ Qatar established the Qatar Committee for the Reconstruction of Gaza (QCRG) as a government agency in 2012 under Sheikh Hamad to oversee and implement reconstruction projects in the Gaza Strip. It began operations immediately, in 2012, and implemented the state of Qatar’s aid for the reconstruction of Gaza. Since then, QCRG has completed dozens of projects in a range of fields from housing, buildings, roads, and infrastructure to healthcare, agriculture, and education, among others (Zureik 2018).

On 12 October 2014, over 50 nations gathered in Cairo for a one-day pledging conference to mobilise international support for the reconstruction and economic rehabilitation of Gaza. The participating countries pledged approximately $5.4 billion in aid at the conference, with half of this amount allocated towards the reconstruction of Gaza. The new system established border crossings and routes for the delivery of construction materials and other aid to Gaza following the 2014 war. The PA became responsible for coordinating the projects, with Israel responsible for security checks at entry points, and deliveries under United Nations (UN) supervision (Zureik 2018). Qatar emerged as the top donor at the Cairo summit, committing $1 billion in aid. Following the summit, Doha began channelling its aid to Gaza through this mechanism. Subsequently, Qatar’s special envoy to Gaza, Mohammed al-Emadi, engaged in discussions with Israeli authorities to coordinate aid delivery to Gaza. In response, Israel allowed a €13 million aid package from Qatar to be delivered to Gazan workers in 2018 as an instalment of its biannual assistance for the humanitarian crisis in the Gaza Strip (Zureik 2018).

During this period, Qatar’s Palestine policy, mediation efforts, and bridge-building between different Palestinian factions were perceived as tools to break geopolitical impasses and pursue a more independent foreign policy. Consequently, Qatar’s foreign aid disbursements and humanitarian diplomacy became intertwined with its mediation activities. Palestine received 60% of Qatar’s total foreign aid in 2019 and 45% in 2020.¹⁰ This aid to Palestine was also connected to Qatar’s new foreign policy orientation following the Qatar blockade. Palestine received significantly more aid than other conflict-affected regions during this period, despite the fact that humanitarian crises and conflict intensity were far greater in Syria, Yemen and elsewhere compared to Palestine at the time.¹¹ This level of foreign aid demonstrates the continued prioritisation of Qatar’s relations with Palestine. Qatar’s willingness to develop special relationships with various political factions, particularly Hamas, distinguishes its humanitarian diplomacy and mediation activities from those in other conflict-affected settings (Ulrichsen 2014). In its Palestine policy, Qatar pursued a foreign policy that ran counter to what the Quartet countries had attempted to impose on Doha during the 2017 blockade – not only in terms of humanitarian diplomacy but also in terms of genuine political relations. This situation highlighted a key distinction between Qatar and other Gulf countries: the more independent Qatar became from mainstream Gulf foreign policy, the more it supported Palestine.

In the post-blockade era, the Gulf countries and Egypt distanced themselves further from the Palestinian issue. While Bahrain and the UAE signed normalisation agreements with Israel in November 2020 (Singer 2021), Qatar maintained its stance on the Palestinian question, emphasising that normalisation should only occur in alignment with the fulfilment of the Arab Peace Initiative and a two-state solution in the Palestinian territories. Qatar’s Foreign Minister, Sheikh Muhammed, expressed a lack of enthusiasm for normalising relations with Israel, stating, ‘Right now, I do not see that normalization of Qatar and Israel is going to add value to the Palestinian people’.¹² He later reiterated that ‘the firm position of the State of Qatar [is] in supporting the rights of the Palestinian people’.¹³ Despite its reluctance to establish normal relations with Israel, Qatar refrained from directly criticising the Abrahamic Accords. Instead, it adopted a conciliatory stance, reaffirming its commitment to the Palestinian cause in accordance with the principles of the Arab Peace Initiative, the two-state solution and international law.

Hamas’s attack on Israel on 7 October 2023 served as a wake-up call for regional actors, including Israel, demonstrating that ignoring the Palestinian question would not solve the issue. Qatar has emerged as a significant advocate for addressing the escalating situation and humanitarian crisis in Gaza. The nation has generously provided substantial aid to the Gaza Strip. Following an extended conflict, Qatar, in collaboration with Egypt and the US, played a crucial role in mediating a deal between Israel and Hamas on 24 November. This agreement secured the release of 105 hostages, facilitated the delivery of humanitarian aid to Gaza, and resulted in the release of 240 Palestinian prisoners. Despite internal divisions within both Hamas and Israel, Qatar’s unwavering and unified approach fostered hope for a sustainable diplomatic solution and a shift away from exclusive reliance on military strategies (Krieg 2023).

State preferences in UNGA general debates

The UNGA, established in 1945 by the UN Charter, is a central organ of the United Nations. It serves as a central forum for dialogue, negotiation and cooperation among UN member states, addressing a wide range of international issues and playing a crucial role in shaping global policies and norms. It serves as a platform for discussing any issue within the scope of the UN Charter, functioning as the UN’s primary policymaking and representative body.

Each September, the UNGA holds its annual gathering of world leaders in New York, where representatives from all UN member states convene to discuss their foreign policy objectives, domestic priorities, and issues they deem crucial for the UN’s future work (Hecht 2016). The General Debate (GD) marks the commencement of the annual UNGA regular session. Traditionally, Brazil delivers the opening speech, followed by the US on the first day. Heads of states and governments typically address the GD during the initial days, succeeded by vice-presidents, deputy prime ministers and foreign ministers, culminating with the heads of delegations to the UN (Luard and Heater 1994; Smith 2006).

These statements encompass a wide range of topics, including nuclear non-proliferation, conflict resolution and prevention, development and international aid, terrorism, climate change, regional and global crises, development and democracy, among others (Rafael and Pires 2023). The GD serves as a platform for governments to publicly declare their official stance on significant international events that occurred in the preceding year (Hecht 2016). Country representatives utilise the GD to present their governments’ perspectives on broader underlying issues in international politics. In the GD, member states have greater freedom in comparison to issue specific multilateral platforms to express their views on critical issues, including controversial ones, due to the lack of external constraints. This platform allows them to voice their opinions without causing undue harm, which is especially important for smaller nations seeking to raise contentious political issues (see Nicholas 1959). However, the absence of constraints does not mean that GD statements are not strategic. Member states carefully craft their speeches to present themselves favourably and influence international perceptions.

The absence of constraints enables member states to prioritise specific topics, thereby indicating their most pressing concerns (Baturo, Dasandi, and Mikhaylov 2017). This approach provides insights into a government’s stance on policy matters and the relative significance of various issues for that government. An analysis of GD addresses reveals recurring themes, concepts, and terminology that embody Qatari foreign policy narratives. These addresses, considered a primary source for understanding state preferences, offer insights into the evolving priorities and positions of Qatari foreign policy from 1971 to 2023. By examining the context of these speeches, we illuminate the underlying factors influencing Qatari decision-making. However, GD addresses often employ diplomatic language that may not fully reflect actual policies, focusing predominantly on international issues while potentially neglecting bilateral or domestic concerns. To overcome these limitations, an innovative topic modelling technique has been developed, seeking to identify refined topics while filtering out irrelevant discussions. This approach provides a more nuanced understanding of Qatar’s foreign policy. As Smith (2006) observed, the GD serves as a barometer of international opinion on critical issues. By analysing the positions and salience of topics within Qatar’s GD addresses, the study reveals the most prominent issues in international relations of Qatar over time. Consequently, the analysis of Qatar’s UNGA GD addresses can stimulate further studies aimed at codifying and deepening our understanding of state preferences and international politics.

Qatar’s addresses to the UNGA (1971–2023)

Data and method

We collected Qatar’s GD addresses from the UN Dag Hammarskjöld Library. For addresses before 1992, when the documents were converted to online formats, we rewrote the missing parts based on the typewritten transcripts of the documents in the library. With utmost care and attention to detail, we conducted a comprehensive review of all speech records, ensuring their accuracy and completeness in our dataset (Balci 2023). The UN translates all addresses into English, alongside five other languages; however, the Dataset of Qatar United Nations General Assembly Addresses (UNGAQ) analyses only the English version of the addresses. To initiate our analysis, we embarked on comprehensive data exploration and processing, employing a diverse array of techniques to extract meaningful insights from the raw data. These techniques included tokenisation, stop word removal, and stemming. These techniques collectively served as essential steps in preparing the data for topic modelling, ensuring its accuracy, consistency and relevance to the research objectives.

Topic modelling is a text analysis technique that employs unsupervised machine learning to discern patterns of word usage within a given text (Shorten, Khoshgoftaar, and Furht 2021). This technique operates under the assumption that a document comprises specific topics, each characterised by a distinct set of words. Topic modelling calculates the probability distribution of each topic’s occurrence, which is interpreted as the proportion of different topics within the text data (Liu et al. 2016). Traditional LDA topic modelling extracts topics and calculates their distribution within the entire data set. In our study, we utilised various Python libraries, including NLTK, gensim, and scikit-learn, for feature extraction and model training. We employed CountVectorizer and TF-IDF for feature extraction and subsequently fed them into LDA and non-negative matrix factorisation (NMF) for topic modelling, respectively (Choubey 2020; Doll 2019). This step provided an initial understanding of the topics and their distribution within the text data.

To enhance performance, we employed BERTopic, a state-of-the-art topic modelling technique that enables precise and nuanced topic analysis.¹⁴ BERTopic allows for the utilisation of various clustering models to determine topics. In this study, we opted to use k-means for clustering. The number of topics (k) was set to five (we tested k ∈ [3, 10]) based on perplexity, salience and readability when visualised. After identifying the contents of each topic and manually inputting them, we calculated each topic’s distribution based on topic proportions over time and normalised to 100% scales (Table 1). The result illustrates the proportion of each topic within certain metadata by showing the probability of each topic’s appearance (Salgado 2020). We then proceeded to extract the distributions of topics in each document and visualise the results using seaborn and matplotlib libraries. This visualisation allowed us to observe the prevalence of specific topics in different documents, providing insights into the overall thematic structure of the text data. Our comprehensive topic modelling approach, combining traditional methods with cutting-edge techniques, provided a deeper understanding of the underlying themes within the text data. This analysis enabled us to extract meaningful insights and identify patterns that would have been difficult to discern through manual examination alone.

Results

Figure 1 depicts the normalised topic proportions of speeches delivered by Qatar at the GD from 1971 to 2023. The five topics analysed are economy, governance, region, security and the Palestinian question. Over the past five decades, the Palestinian issue has been a prominent topic in Qatar’s speeches at the UNGA. Despite fluctuations in the proportion of speeches dedicated to the Palestinian issue, it has remained relatively high, particularly since 2010. This indicates Qatar’s unwavering commitment to the Palestinian cause and its consistent advocacy for a resolution to the conflict. The graph illustrates the temporal distribution of speeches addressing the Palestinian question, with notable peaks in 1974, 1982, 1987, 2000 and 2012. A significant increase in the proportion of speeches devoted to the Palestinian question was also observed in 2022.

Figure 1. Normalised topic distribution over time in Qatar’s addresses to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

This figure shows the normalised topic distribution of Qatar’s General Debate addresses to the United Nations General Assembly from 1971 to 2023. It covers political narratives of economy, governance, region, security, and the Palestinian question.

In 2012, a peak year for Qatar’s GD addresses on Palestine, Sheikh Hamad Al Thani emphasised that ‘despite the suffering in the Middle East, the core problem remained the Palestinian question. He condemned the ongoing Israeli occupation of the West Bank, Golan Heights, and Shaba’a farms in southern Lebanon, as well as the blockade of the Gaza Strip and the imprisonment of Palestinians in Israeli prisons’.¹⁵ In 2022, Sheikh Tamim Al Thani reiterated Qatar’s support for the Palestinian cause and urged the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take action towards a solution. He emphasised Qatar’s solidarity with the Palestinian people and called for the UNSC to compel Israel to end the occupation and establish a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital.¹⁶ Qatar’s GD addresses have consistently adopted a critical tone, highlighting the UNSC’s failure to resolve the Palestinian question. Notably, peaks in Qatar’s GD addresses on Palestine have coincided with Israeli assaults and wars in the Palestinian territories, including the 1982 Lebanon War, 1987 First Intifada, 2000s Intifada, and 2012 Israeli occupation of Gaza.

The word cloud analysis of Qatar’s addresses to the UNGA from 1971 to 2023, presented in Figure 2, demonstrates the country’s consistent emphasis on promoting peace and security in the Middle East, with a particular focus on the Palestinian question. The most frequently used words in Qatar’s speeches include ‘peace’, ‘security’, ‘conflict’ and ‘resolution’, indicating a sustained focus on mediation and conflict resolution. Additionally, the word cloud encompasses terms related to peace and security, such as ‘justice’, ‘stability’, ‘cooperation’ and ‘dialogue’, reflecting Qatar’s commitment to its foreign policy vision as a trusted partner in regional and international crises. The prominence of words like ‘Palestine’, ‘Israel’, ‘development’ and ‘peace’ in the speeches further highlights Qatar’s dedication to humanitarian aid and development, as well as its unwavering support for the rights of the Palestinian people. Notably, the word cloud also includes terms that resonate with Qatar’s own history and culture, such as ‘Islam’, ‘tradition’ and ‘heritage’. These words suggest that Qatar incorporates its unique identity into its speeches, emphasising its commitment to preserving its cultural heritage. It is worth noting that the Palestinian issue holds particular significance for Qatar, intertwining with its identity, history and culture.

Figure 2. Word cloud of Qatar’s addresses to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

This figure visualises a word cloud of all speeches of Qatari leadership in the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly from 1971 to 2023.

Table 1. Topics extracted for latent Dirichlet allocation (LDA) analyses.

Topic	Selected words from word cluster	Example from corpus
Topic 1 Security	Peace, security, crisis, humanitarian, terror	Ensure success peace; question crisis utmost; terrorism affirmed urgent; result major humanitarian
Topic 2 Economy	Economy, energy, Global South, development	Assistance to developing country; competent conducted work; leadership assembly historic; positive role
Topic 3 Region	Region, Syrian, Iraq, Africa, order	Arab state: Oman; comprehensive Arab security; Islamic conference minister; Qatar launched initiative
Topic 4 Governance	Commitment, democracy, millennium, governance, process	Diplomatic activity united; nation non-aligned; safeguard regime internate; order help Iraqi
Topic 5 Palestinian question	Palestinian, occupation, settlement, Gaza, Israel	United Nations Palestinian; nations those Arab resolution; success peace process; targeting civilian Gaza; solution government Israel

An analysis of the word cloud generated from Sheikh Tamim’s addresses to the UNGA reveals that his primary concerns encompass terrorism, security, regional affairs, crises and peace. This underscores Qatar’s preoccupation with the proliferation of terrorism and its detrimental impact on regional stability. Additionally, Qatar’s commitment to mediation and peaceful conflict resolution in the region is evident in the word cloud. It also highlights Sheikh Tamim’s concern for the humanitarian situation within the region. Notably, the GCC Crisis between 2017 and 2020, including the blockade imposed on Qatar, has contributed to the increased focus on global issues and regional security matters in his addresses (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Word cloud of Sheikh Tamim’s addresses.

This figure visualises a word cloud of speeches of Qatar’s Emir Sheikh Tamim Al Thani in the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly from 1914 to 2023.

A comparison of the word clouds reveals a disparity in the frequency of specific terms. Nonetheless, both clouds demonstrate that all of Qatar’s GD speeches and Sheikh Tamim’s addresses emphasise themes like development, peace and security. They also reveal that Qatar’s speeches consistently employ particular terms related to the Palestinian issue, indicating Qatar’s ongoing commitment to the Palestinian cause and its efforts to raise international awareness of the issue through its UNGA speeches. Sheikh Tamim places a stronger emphasis on the Palestinian issue as a regional and international concern than his predecessors did, whereas the majority of speeches before his reign addressed the Palestinian issue in conjunction with other Arab issues. He emphasises Qatar’s state preference for viewing the Palestinian issue as the core of regional problems and a root cause of broader security issues in the Middle East, with global repercussions. He asserts that a just and lasting resolution to the Palestinian issue can only be achieved through the implementation of UNSC resolutions and international laws and norms.

Sheikh Tamim actively participates in Palestinian politics and advocates for reconciliation between opposing factions. In his 2023 speech, he directly addressed these Palestinian factions:

The international community must prioritize the resumption of peace negotiations with the aim of ending the Israeli occupation of Arab territories within a specific timeframe. A just, comprehensive, and viable settlement must be reached based on the two-state solution, as agreed upon by the international community and in accordance with the resolutions of international legitimacy and the Arab Peace Initiative. I reiterate my appeal to my Palestinian brothers to achieve national reconciliation, strengthen their positions, and present a unified voice in addressing the dangers and challenges confronting the Palestinian cause and the future of the Palestinian people.¹⁷

Network analysis, as depicted in Figure 4, reveals a strong correlation between the Palestinian issue and other themes, particularly those related to security, governance and regional affairs. Additionally, it demonstrates the Palestinian issue’s interconnectedness with broader topics such as human rights, peace and justice. The analysis underscores Qatar’s unwavering support for the Palestinian cause since 1971. Qatar’s advocacy for a just and lasting solution to the conflict, based on the two-state solution, is also evident in the network diagram. Qatar’s GD addresses further highlight the centrality of the Palestine question to Qatar’s state preferences. It is perceived as an international security issue and forms the core of Qatar’s regional rhetoric for stability. This issue is linked to the United Nations, humanitarianism and development. The connections indicate Qatar’s engagement with Gaza and its commitment to providing financial and diplomatic support to the Palestinian people in this enclave.

Figure 4. Network analysis of Qatar’s United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) addresses.

This figure presents a semantic network analysis of Qatar’s addresses at the General Debate of the United Nations General Assembly from 1971 to 2023. It covers political narratives of economy, governance, region, security, and the Palestinian question.

Conclusion

Qatar’s involvement in the Palestinian cause has undergone a significant transformation over the past three decades, evolving from a limited role to a prominent one. This study explores Qatar’s foreign policy narrative on the Palestinian cause through a quantitative analysis of speeches delivered by Qatari leaders at the UNGA GDs from 1971 to 2023. This analysis complements existing literature by engaging with extant research on the subject. The findings reveal Qatar’s consistent diplomatic support for the Palestinian people’s aspirations for self-determination, justice and a viable state within internationally recognised borders. Unlike other regional powerbrokers, Qatar aimed for reconciliation between Fatah and Hamas in the 2000s, hoping to moderate Hamas and drive it away from the Syria–Iran axis. This pragmatic approach brought Qatar closer to Hamas, though leading to tensions with Fatah inside the Palestinian territories and with other regional actors, namely Saudi Arabia and the UAE. Since this rift, Qatar’s mediation efforts have been instrumental in addressing conflicts and facilitating dialogue between Palestinian factions.

The Doha Agreement of 2012, signed by Hamas and Fatah, represented a significant achievement, despite its ultimate failure to realise its long-term objectives. Qatar played a pivotal role in mediating between Hamas and Israel during Operation Protective Edge in 2014. Qatar’s engagement in the Palestinian cause extends beyond political mediation to encompass substantial humanitarian aid and infrastructure projects. The QCRG has overseen numerous initiatives, spanning housing, healthcare, education and agriculture. Qatar’s aid commitments have established it as a leading donor in international pledging conferences for Gaza’s reconstruction. Qatar’s willingness to engage with Hamas, its capacity to reach out to all Palestinian factions, and its lack of direct involvement in the conflict have bestowed upon it a unique position as a mediator and humanitarian actor. Qatar’s efforts have gained particular significance in light of the diminishing involvement of traditional powerbrokers such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

The word clouds, topic modelling and network analysis employed in this study provide valuable insights into the state preferences surrounding Qatar’s involvement in the Palestinian cause. These methods have enabled the identification of key themes, relationships and trends within the speeches of Qatari leaders at the UNGA. The word clouds offer a visual representation of the frequency of words used in Qatar’s speeches, highlighting the prominent topics discussed by Qatari leaders. The words ‘Palestine’, ‘Israeli’, ‘occupation’ and ‘peace’ consistently appear among the most frequently used words in the same topical dimension, indicating the centrality of the Palestinian issue in Qatar’s foreign policy. Topic modelling allows for the uncovering of latent themes and concepts within these speeches. The results of the topic modelling analysis reveal that Qatari leaders have consistently addressed Palestinian issues pertaining to security, human rights and development issues, demonstrating their commitment to the Palestinian cause within a wide range of regional and global concerns. The network graph, which visualises the relationships between different topics, provides further insights into the interconnectedness of the Palestinian issues discussed by Qatari leaders. It suggests that Qatari leaders have often discussed the Palestinian issue in the context of the Israeli occupation and the need for a peaceful resolution. Collectively, these findings paint a picture of Qatar’s active and multifaceted engagement with the Palestinian cause. Qatari leaders have consistently used their platform at the UNGA to advocate for an end to Israeli occupation, express support for the Palestinian people, and promote a just and lasting solution to the conflict.

In light of qualitative and quantitative analyses of state preferences, Qatar’s unwavering support for Palestine persists despite pressure from other Gulf countries to distance itself from the issue or normalise relations with Israel. Qatar’s commitment to the Palestinian cause reflects its desire for an independent foreign policy and opposition to external agendas. Qatar’s evolving role in the Palestinian cause has been marked by its pragmatic approach, mediation efforts and humanitarian diplomacy. Its unique position allows it to play a constructive role in mediating between Israel and Palestinian factions in conflicts and facilitating dialogue between divergent Palestinian factions. Qatar’s unwavering support for the Palestinian cause, extending to its assumption of a stewardship role, reflects a broader strategic calculus that drives its foreign policy. This commitment serves as a means for Qatar to assert its autonomy amidst the geopolitical complexities of the Gulf region. Qatar has deftly balanced the challenges of securing protection under the US security umbrella while maintaining amicable ties with both Iran and Hamas. Text analysis of Qatar’s speeches at the GD provides a valuable tool for assessing its policy preferences on the Palestinian question. This text-analysis approach complements existing methods for studying state preferences and international politics. By expanding the corpus to include other key regional players and adopting a nuanced text-analysis approach, we can enhance comparative research and deepen our understanding of the positions of different states on this critical issue and beyond.

Acknowledgements

Open Access funding provided by the Qatar National Library. The authors express their gratitude to Nihat Mugurtay, Jad Salha and Orcun Demir for providing valuable research assistance. The insightful comments and suggestions offered by two anonymous reviewers and the editor considerably enhanced the quality of this manuscript.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Data availability statement

The data that support the findings of this study are available from the corresponding author upon request.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Bülent Aras

Bülent Aras is Research Director at the Center for International Policy Research. He is also Senior Scholar and Coordinator of the Conflict Resolution and Mediation stream at Istanbul Policy Center and Research Professor of international relations at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. He specialises in text analytics of political narratives, foreign aid, mediation and conflict resolution, and international security. His recent writings include Geopolitics of the New Middle East (Routledge, 2023), Turkey’s State Crisis (Syracuse University Press, 2021), and Turkey, the Arab Spring and Beyond (Routledge, 2019). His articles have appeared in Middle East Policy, Third World Quarterly, Political Science Quarterly, International Journal, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics and Security Dialogue, among others.

Majed Al Ansari

Majed Al-Ansari is Director of the Center for International Research in Doha, Qatar. He specialises in GCC foreign and security policies, MENA regional issues, development/humanitarian aid, international security, and conflict resolution. He is author of a book titled ‘Minority of Citizens: The Effects of Religious, Social and Political Values on Trust in Immigrants in Qatar’ published in 2020. He also wrote on ‘The Unbridgeable Gulf: Applying Bennett’s Model of Analysis to the 2017 Gulf Crisis’ in the Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies in 2021, ‘The New Gulf Order: Crisis, Mediation, and Reconciliation’ in Middle East Policy in 2021, and ‘Qatar’s Foreign Aid and Least Developed Countries’ published in Alternatives: Global, Local, Political in 2022.

Notes

1 “Why Is Qatar Often a Mediator and What Is Its Role in Israel–Hamas War?” Guardian, 21 November 2023, available at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/nov/21/why-is-qatar-often-a-mediator-and-what-is-its-role-in-israel-Hamas-war

2 “Qatar: Hamas Office in Doha Cannot Be Closed Due to Its Importance in Ending the Conflict,” Middle East Monitor, 30 October 2023, at https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20231030-qatar-Hamas-office-in-doha-cannot-be-closed-due-to-its-importance-in-ending-the-conflict/

3 “Qatar Continues to Enhance Status as Trusted International Partner, Source of Energy: PM,” Doha News, 23 May 2023, available at https://www.qatar-tribune.com/article/65922/latest-news/qatar-continues-to-enhance-status-as-trusted-international-partner-source-of-energy-pm

4 Ian Black, “Gaza Split Prompts Arab Countries to Boycott Emergency Summit,” Guardian, 15 January 2009, at https://www.theguardian.com/world/2009/jan/15/gaza-egypt-saudi-qatar-summit

5 Ziyad Clot, “Why I Blew the Whistle about Palestine,” Guardian, 14 May 2011, at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2011/may/14/blew-the-whistle-about-palestine

6 Robert Danin, “The Doha Palestinian Unity Agreement: Now the Hard Part,” Council of Foreign Affairs, 6 February 2012, at https://www.cfr.org/blog/doha-palestinian-unity-agreement-now-hard-part

7 Amena Bakr, “Qatar Seeks Role as Gaza Mediator, Israel Wary,” Reuters, 17 July 2014, available at https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN0FM2GD/

8 “Operation Protective Edge: Israel’s July 2014 Assault on Gaza,” Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, 13 July 2014, at https://www.dohainstitute.org/en/PoliticalStudies/pages/operation_protective_edge_israels_july_2014_assault_on_gaza.aspx

9 Nicholas Watt, “Gaza conflict: Brown Finds His Feet at Sharm el-Sheikh,” Guardian, 18 January 2009, at https://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2009/jan/18/gordon-brown-egypt-gaza-israel-the-palestinian-territories

10 Calculated from OECD Statistics DAC2a: “Aid (ODA) Disbursements to Countries and Regions [DAC2a],” n.d, OECD.Stat. at https://stats.oecd.org/

11 Calculated from OECD Statistics, Yemen and Syria get US $4.39 million and $31 million, while Palestine received $229 million from Qatar in 2020.

12 “Qatar Rules out Normalization of Israel Ties for Now,” AP News, 4 December 2020, available at https://apnews.com/article/bahrain-israel-italy-united-arab-emirates-qatar-7a1b9defebe7c8f2efeda54403b265e9

13 See Qatar Tribune, 2 December 2020.

14 “Introducing BERTopic Integration with the Hugging Face Hub,” n.d., available at https://huggingface.co/blog/bertopic

15 67th sess. [25 September 2012]: A/67/PV.6: Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani.

16 77th sess. [20 September 2022]: A/76/PV.3: Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani.

17 72nd sess. [19 September 2017]: A/72/PV.4: Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani.