https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6588-640X
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Abstract
This essay delves into the significance of self-cultivation in the thought of Li Zhi (1527–1602), particularly the process of rediscovering one’s childlike innocence (tongxin 童心). This journey challenges conventional morals and doctrines due to Li Zhi’s various levels of interpretation, which scrutinize the concept of self and the objectives of self-cultivation. Li Zhi’s notion of the self develops some concepts elaborated within the School of Mind, notably those of Wang Ji (1498–1583), and reconstructs an alternative Chinese model of a self, centered on individual autonomy. His ideas provoke ethical and philosophical considerations from both intra-cultural and transcultural perspectives. Central to Li Zhi’s concept of self-cultivation is based on his psychological realism, which begins with an acknowledgment of the inherent “selfishness” of human nature. However, unlike Xunzi’s viewpoint, Li Zhi contends that this innate selfishness is not the cause of conflicts and disorder. On the contrary, it is the source of morality and a positive dynamic force both in society and in personal life. He harnesses the concept of emptiness inherited from Buddhism and Wang Ji, employing it as a practical and secular tool to liberate individuals from biases, authoritarian dictates, and social norms. Situated within the framework of the cult of qing and the reclamation of emotions and desires, Li Zhi’s notion of the childmind, with its natural inclinations, self-interests, and desires, resonates with modern psychological theories on the flow of consciousness and self-motivation, as well as contemporary discussions on the morality of self-interest. This juxtaposition unveils the paradox of “Unsocial sociability,” prompting an exploration of the intricate relationship between sociability and selfishness. Questions remain, then, concerning the efficacy of self-cultivation in fostering the spontaneous expression of moderate and genuine inclinations. Can such self-cultivation establish a moral standard accessible to all, on their own terms, while simultaneously preventing harm among individuals (bu xianghai 不相害)? These inquiries underscore the complexity inherent in Li Zhi’s philosophy and invite further contemplation on the dynamics of selfhood and ethical conduct.
Acknowledgements
I express my gratitude to Philip Ivanhoe for his comments, and to the anonymous readers of Ming Studies for their suggestions.
Disclosure Statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
1 Zuo Dongling, de Bary, Pauline Lee, Handler-Spitz, Rowe, Billeter, Huang Ray are among the many authors of studies on his thought.
2 Cf. my Facets of the Self, chapter three, under press.
3 Li Zhi, Fu Jiao Ruohou 復焦弱侯 (1589), Fenshu, 2: 46.
4 Plato, Republic, book IV, 444e4– 445b2.
5 The scientific literature on this key concept in Neo-Confucian self-cultivation is very rich. See for instance Ivanhoe, “Senses and Values of Oneness,” id, “Selfishness and Self-Centeredness,” Journal of Korean Religions 9, no. 2 (2018): 9–31 on different notions of selfishness and self-centeredness and their relationship with the concepts of altruism, empathy and spontaneity. On the emptiness of the pure substance of the mind, see Chen Lai, Youwu zhi jing, 82–92, 193–267; Li Yuntao, “Li Zhi tongxin shuo dui Wang Yangming liangzhi shuo jicheng yu fazhan”; Tai Ching-hsien, “Li Zhi yu Fojiao”; Id., Ming Qing Xueshu sixiang shi lunji, 179–82. See also the contributions by Kwong-Loi Shun, “Zhu Xi and the Idea of One Body,”; “On the Idea of ‘No Self’’”; David Tian, “Oneness and Self-Centeredness”; Youngmin Kim, “Rethinking the Self’s Relation to the World in the Mid-Ming,” 28–29, 32–36. For a general discussion, see C. Zahn-Waxler, E. M. Cummings, and R. Iannotti, eds. Altruism and Aggression: Biological and Social Origins, VvAa. The Oneness Hypothesis: Beyond the Boundary of Self. Metzger (in Escape from Predicament, 49–165) dedicates an entire chapter to the Neo-Confucian linkage and the sense of cosmic oneness. Zheng Zemian, in “Two Kinds of Oneness” deals with different ways of interpreting the notion of oneness, and focuses on the different approaches by Zhang Zai (1020–1077) and Cheng Hao (1032–1085).
6 Lunyu, Shu Er 述而, 12; Li Ren 里仁, 5.
7 Li Zhi (Ming Deng Dao Gu Lu, shang 明燈道古錄 上, Part one, in Li Zhi Quanji zhu 李贄全集注, vol. 14, 9: 252–53) quotes the two mentioned passages from Lunyu (Lunyu, Shu Er, 12 述而 and Li Ren, 5 里仁). Cf. Mizoguchi, Yūzō. Zhongguo de gong yu si 中国的公与私, 公私., 16–18.
8 Li Yuntao, “Li Zhi tongxin shuo dui Wang Yangming liangzhi shuo jicheng yu fazhan,” 109–10.
9 Li Yuntao, “Li Zhi tongxin shuo dui Wang Yangming liangzhi shuo jicheng yu fazhan,” 105–10.
10 I am grateful to Ivanhoe for his notes and the reference to Dai Zhen, who similarly argued that we must recognise and appreciate these tendencies in ourselves in order to understand others.
11 See Tai Ching-hsien, “Li Zhi yu Fojiao,” 533–34.
12 See Wang Yangming, Chuanxilu, 165,
There is one nature, that is all. Humanity, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom are its basic nature. Quickness of apprehension, intelligence, insight, and wisdom are its physical nature. Pleasure, anger, sorrow, and joy are its feelings, and selfish desires and passions caused by external stimuli are its obscuration. Physical nature may be clear or turbid and therefore feelings are sometimes excessive or insufficient, and the obscuration heavy or light. Selfish desires and passions caused by external stimuli are the same disease with two different kinds of pain.
13 Chen Lai, You-Wu zhi jing, 204–205.
14 See Tai Ching-hsien, “Li Zhi yu Fojiao,” 538.
15 Li Zhi, Deye Ruchen Houlun德業儒臣後論, Cangshu, 32: 626, cit. by Tai Ching-hsien, “Li Zhi yu Fojiao,” 526–28.
16 Tai Ching-hsien, “Li Zhi yu Fojiao,” 533–34.
17 Chen Lai, You-Wu zhi jing, 3–4, 9, 17, 74, 103, 194–205; Tai Ching-hsien, Ming Qing Xueshu sixiang shi lunji, 55, 160–65, 194 note 31.
18 Wang Ji, Huayang Minglun tang huiyu 華陽明倫堂會語（二） (Lectures in the Confucius Temple at County School of Huayang), 98: 376–377 (7:20b–21a), in Longxi Wang xiansheng quanji 龍溪王先生全集, juan 7(online: https://ctext.org/wiki.pl?if=gb&chapter=281336#華陽明倫堂會語, 二, 7). On the “four negations” see Zhang Xuezhi. History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, 165–87; Mou Tsung-san, “The Immediate Successor of Wang Yang-ming.”
19 Zhang Xuezhi, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, 184–87.
20 The four axioms are:
1. In the original substance of the heart-mind, there is no distinction between good and evil. 2. When thoughts are activated, there is a distinction between good and evil. 3. The innate conscience knows good and knows evil. 4. Investigation of things (gewu) is doing good and removing evil.
21 Wang Yangming, Chuanxilu, 315; Chan Wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Learning, 243–45. Cf. also Shun, Kwong-loi, “Wang Yang-Ming and the Self-Cultivation in the Daxue.” These theses are useful to understand Li Zhi’s childmind. Ng On-cho (“The Ethics of Being and Non-Being,” 91–98) examines two debates, respectively between Zhou Rudeng and Xu Fuyuan, and Gu Xiancheng and Guan Zhidao, on the essence of self and its nature beyond good and evil. On the one side, Xu Fuyuan許孚遠 (1535–1604) and Gu Xiancheng顧憲成 (1550–1612) stress that the theory of nature beyond good and evil is against the teaching of old sages. On the other side, Zhou Rudeng周汝登 (1547–1629) and Guan Zhidao 管志道 (1536–1608), who follow Wang Ji’s doctrine, retort that the original essence (benti本體) of mind, in its “ultimate authenticity” (zhicheng 至誠) and “sublime good” (zhishan 至善) cannot be encapsulated in conventional categories; it is neither subject to the differentiation between activity and quiescence, pre-emotion (weifa 未發) and arousal (yifa 已發), interiority and exteriority, nor to the pride of self-righteousness and contrived conception of doing goodness. Cf. also Pan Jen-tai, “Liu Zongzhou’s Criticism,” 18–21; Tai Ching-hsien, Ming Qing Xueshu sixiang shi lunji, 179–82; De Bary, “Wang Chi and the Freedom of Innate Knowing,” 139–153.
22 The two classical sources are Lunyu, Xian Jin先進, 26 and Mencius, Jing Xin, xia, 83.
23 Cf. Chen Lai, Youwu zhi jing, 10–11, 252–57; id., The Realms of Being and Non-Being, 20–22, 334–38, 346–51; Santangelo, Individual Autonomy and Responsibility, 110–11, 130–32.
24 Chen Lai, The Realms of Being and Non-Being, 9–11, 23.
25 Chuanxilu 101, Chan Wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Learning, 64.
26 Zhu Xi, Zhuzi Yulei, 13:224–25; see also, ibidem, 94:2414, 96:2472, and Jinsilu Jijie, 5:165–6, 175–6 On the change of values, cf. Clunas, Superfluous Things; Wai-Yee Li, “The Collector, the Connoisseur, and Late-Ming Sensibility”; Zhang Dequn, Mingdai shangrenwenxue yanjiu. On the erosion of the Neo-Confucian hold on intellectual culture, see also Peter K. Bol, “Looking to Wang Shizhen.”
27 See for instance Xunzi, Xiu Shen 脩身, 10. (Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, 157). Li Zhi’s concern for autonomy goes in the opposite direction.
28 See for instance Brown, “Psychological Egoism Revisited”; Sober, “What Is Psychological Egoism?”; Krebs, “Altruism and Egoism: A False Dichotomy?” The thesis that pleasure determines voluntary action may be understood in different ways and implies the evaluation of variants such as the meaning given to “desire” and “flow” (see flow in consciousness), the distinction between the factor that determines voluntary action (delight) and the object of desire, experience and expectation, the limits to one’s wishes. Cf. for instance McAllister, “Toward a Re-Examination of Psychological Hedonism”; Garson, “Two Types of Psychological Hedonism.” From an anthropological perspective, see the notion of “career” in Goldschmidt, The Human Career, 107–4, 16–17. For Chinese thought, see Ivanhoe, “Senses and Values of Oneness.”
29 “I like fish, and I also like bear’s paws. If I cannot have the two together, I will let the fish go, and take the bear’s paws. So, I like life, and I also like righteousness.[…]” (Gaozi shang 告子上, 10). For apparently analogous positions, worth notice is Zhu Xi’s comparison of the natural moral progress (自然一步趲一步去) with the spontaneous search for a warm place in the cold months and a cool and breezy place in the warm ones (如人當寒月，自然向有火處去；暑月，自然向有風處去. Zhuzi yulei, 23:551) and Wang Yangming’s metaphor of disgust for stench (如惡惡臭; Chuanxilu, 5) or his apologue of the gardener in front of weeds and flowers (Chuanxilu, 101; Chan Wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Living, 63). The acknowledgement of the possible conflicts of conscience and their creative solution is present in Wang Yangming, who hints at the possibility of an evaluation of contradictions like in the case of king Shun’s marriage without his parents’ permission (“weighting all factors” 權 輕 重: Chuanxilu 139; Chan Wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Learning, 110, discussed by Angle, “Sagely Ease and Moral Perception,” 46–47).
30 On the Mencian development model, see Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, 29, 33, 36, 40 note 16, 101–2.
31 For instance, concerning the true self-cultivation (zhenxiu 眞修) from personal to a universal dimension which results in embracing oneness (baoyi抱一), see Li Zhi, Laozi jiezhu老子解注 zhang 章 54, in Li Zhi quanjizhu李贽全集注 vol. 14 p. 77. Cf. Kim Hak Ze, “Two Neo-Confucian Perspectives on the Way,” 267–68; Zhang Xuezhi, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty.
32 Edward Slingerland, Trying Not to Try: The Art and Science of Spontaneity; id. “Cultivating Sprouts: Unavoidable Tensions in Early Chinese Confucianism,” 211–218. For ancient Confucianism see also Kupperman, “Confucius and the Problem of Naturalness”. Concerning the concept of spontaneity in Wang Yangming, see Cocks, “Wang Yangming on Spontaneous Action,” 342–358. For Ivanhoe (“The Values of Spontaneity,” 185–202) spontaneity can perfectly match the rituals in ancient Confucianism: individuals who have internalized the ritual norms and practices are able to interact with others in a free and fluid manner, sharing a sense of community, common purpose, and comfort. Cf. note 82.
33 Huang Zongxi, Mingru xue’an 明儒學案, 34: 335 (Taizhou xue’an san 泰州學案三); transl. by Julia Ching, (ed. and tr.) The Record of Ming scholars, 188.
34 His letter in response to Zhou Liutang (答周柳塘, 1588) is in Fenshu zengbu 焚書增補, (Fenshu. Xu Fenshu, zengbu增補260–64, or Li Wenling ji 李溫陵集, 4:30; see translation by Rivi Handler-Spitz in A Book to Burn and a Book to Keep, 68). The letter includes a description of an enlightenment achievement of total concentration and abstraction: “While one is rolling, one’s internal perception of oneself ceases, as one’s perception of others. […]and loses all consciousness of self, walks through a room seeing none of the people there.” (ibidem, zengbu增補, 263; transl. by Handler-Spitz in A Book to Burn and a Book to Keep, 71).
35 Cf. Li Zhi, You da Shi Yang Taishou 又答石陽太守, Fenshu, 1:6. This notion is not incompatible with Mencius’ sentence: “All things are already complete in us. There is no greater delight than to be conscious of sincerity on self-examination. If one acts with a vigorous effort at the law of reciprocity, when he seeks for the realization of perfect virtue, nothing can be closer than his approximation to it” (萬物皆備於我矣。反身而誠，樂莫大焉。強恕而行，求仁莫近焉) （Mencius, Jin Xin, shang盡心上 4; Legge’s translation）. For the use of the metaphors of health and illness, see Pauline Lee, “There is Nothing More … Than Dressing and Eating,” 73–74.
36 Chuanxilu, 39, translation by Chan wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Living, 135. Li Zhi considered reasonable desires and ambitions natural and positive. For self-cultivation according to Wang Yangming, see the mentioned studies by Ivanhoe and Kwong-Loi Shun.
37 See also Pauline Lee, Li Zhi, 61–64; Julia Ching, To Acquire Wisdom, 70, 192, 292–93.
38 Li Zhi, Zizan 自贊 (1588), Fenshu, 3: 130 (See translation and comments by Handler-Spitz, in Handler-Spitz, Lee, and Saussy, A Book to Burn, 138–139). See also Li Zhi, Fu Deng Shiyang 複鄧石陽 (1585), Fenshu, 1: 10.
39 Li Zhi, Fu Song taishou 複宋太守, Fenshu, 1: 23. Cf. also the quotation from the Daodejing, 65 (Bing shi lun 兵食論, 1588, Fenshu, 3: 96 and Zhang Zai 張載 in Cangshu 藏書, 43: 735).
40 Ming Deng Dao Gu Lu, shang明燈道古錄上, in Li Zhi Quanji zhu, vol. 14, 1 shang: 232–33.
41 Ming Deng Dao Gu Lu, shang明燈道古錄上, in Li Zhi Quanji zhu, vol. 14, 10: 255. Concerning the non-duality of mind, see Wang Yangming’s Chuanxilu, 151 and 160; Chan wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Living, 132, 140.
42 I am indebted to the remarks of the anonymous reviewer and his comments.
43 See for instance, Araki Kengo, “Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming,” 48–51, 56–62.
44 Wang Yangming, Chuanxilu, 315 (Chan wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Living, 243–45). The spontaneous transcendence of distinction is relative to the enlightenment and condition of the agent. Cf. also Chen Lai, You-Wu zhi jing, 193–212; Kwong-loi Shun, “Wang Yang-Ming and the Self-Cultivation in the Daxue.”
45 See text and comment in Li Zhi quanjizhu李贽全集注 vol. 6 (藏书注III): 526, 527. Tai Ching-hsien (“Li Zhi yu Fojiao,” 528), stresses that this passage demonstrates that “mind” is not only seen in accordance with the subjective “consciousness of self” (自覺), but also is expression of “personal interest” (為己). The subjectivity is constructed on one’s individuality, as well as autonomy and the vital dynamic force.
46 Becker, Accounting for Tastes, 4–23, 118–21.
47 Against the eudemonistic core of morality see Schmidtz. “Self-interest: What’s in It for Me?” Social Philosophy & Policy 14, no. 1 (1997): 107–121.
48 For “embodied virtuous emotions,” see Seok, Embodied Moral Psychology and Confucian Philosophy. This book emphasizes the basis of Confucian morality as fundamentally affective and spontaneous. Ivanhoe has discussed many issues as already mentioned.
49 Cf. Scheffler “Potential Congruence,” 133.
50 Upon various forms of “self-actualization,” and the theory of flow state see Csikszentmihalyi and Csikszentmihalyi, Optimal Experience. Psychological Studies of Flow in Consciousness, 15–35, 36, 46, 55–59, 68, 85–91, 183–192; Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi, Flow, 39–163. Kurt Goldstein (“The Organism”) introduced the concept of the organism as a whole with its fundamental tendency to actualise all its capacities and its whole potential: every individual, every being, has its basic inborn goal to actualize itself. According to Abraham Maslow (Motivation and Personality, 149–200), people are motivated to search for personal goals which make their lives meaningful and rewarding, according to a “hierarchy of needs”, through the “self-actualization”, i.e. the full realisation of one’s potential “true self”, free from reliance on external authorities or other people. The creativeness of the self-actualized in the case of the “second naiveté” has been compared with Li Zhi’s tongxin theory and its spontaneity (Tong Qingbing 童庆炳. “Tongxin shuo yu dierci tianzhen shuo de bijiao yanjiu”). Cf. also Maslow, Motivation and Personality, 170–1, 132–35. The flow experience –as well as Zhuangzi’s wuwei concept--- has been considered an example of a kind of transcendence of reflective awareness in which one exercises agency by losing the consciousness of the self (Jochim, “Just Say No to ‘No Self’ in Zhuangzi,” 62–66; Velleman, “The Way of the Wanton”; Ivanhoe, “The Values of Spontaneity,” 185); Santangelo, “Is the Pursuit of Self-interest Really Selfish?” 13.
51 Samuel Scheffler (“Potential Congruence”), 118. Joseph Raz (Engaging Reason: On the Theory of Value and Action) questions whether either morality or self-interest is a sufficiently unified concept and if their difference is philosophically valuable.
52 To understand some of Li Zhi’s positions, including the notion of empathy in Chinese philosophy, Yong Huang’s study about Wang Yangming (Yong Huang, “Empathy with the Devils”) is helpful. It associates empathy with humaneness (ren) and feeling to be “in one body with myriad things” (yi wanwu wei yiti 以萬物為一體), and deals with the dangers of paternalism when one extends to others and imposes his/her self-oriented perspectives on them. See also Ivanhoe, “Senses and Values of Oneness”; id., Oneness: East Asian Conceptions of Virtue, Happiness, and How We Are All Connected; “Selfishness and Self-Centeredness”. See also my Facets of the Self.
53 See note 53.
54 Da Ma Lishan答馬歷山 (1601), Xu Fenshu續焚書, 1:2.
55 The trial-and-error method is not only an epistemic exercise to avoid impulsiveness and inertia, as implies the evaluation of the error, the balance between the difficulty and attractiveness of the target, and the imponderable of changing circumstances and fate. On the need for self-cultivation to the realization of natural potentiality and the metaphor of the acorn as the destined oak tree, see Roger T. Ames, Confucian Role Ethics: A Vocabulary, 154.
56 The search for the genuine nature is the return to one’s original essence, but this hypothetical genuine nature has to be reconciled in practice with the multiplicity of perspectives, expectations, contradictions and negotiating engagement and disengagement, and in theory with a clearer definition of the natural-self and moral-self relationship. On the contradictions concerning self-representation and coherent self-management, see Wai-yee Li, “Paradoxes of Genuineness: Problematic Self-Revelation in Li Zhi’s Autobiographical Writings”; Maram Epstein; “Li Zhi’s Strategic Self-Fashioning: Sketch of Filial Self”, or the occasional debates Li was involved during his life.
57 They practised doubt for enlightenment, with Li referring to his disciples as “Dao learners with authentic colour” (bense xuedaoren 本色學道人) when asked about self-cultivation by Yuan Zhongdao. Cf. Jiang Wu, “Performing Authenticity: Li Zhi, Buddhism, and the Rise of Textual Spirituality in Early Modern China,” 165–66. Xuedaoren was the same term used by Wang Yangming for those who got free from the desires and worries and the other “clouds” and “dust” without “retention” in the Great Void (See Chen Lai, The Realm of Bring and Non-being, 278–98). But Li Zhi lowered the level of moral target, and considered these clouds and dust as natural and innate in human nature so that everyone can find the equilibrium accepting and starting from them.
58 Cf. Jiang Wu, “Performing Authenticity,” 164–84.
59 Ming Deng Dao Gu Lu, shang, Part one, in Li Zhi Quanji zhu, vol. 14, 4: 239; 5: 242.
60 From Mencius, Li Lou, shang 離婁上, 2, Legge, IV. 2:292. See Li Zhi, Geng Chukong xiansheng zhuan 耿楚倥先生傳 (1595), Fenshu, 4:142–43.
61 Chen Lai, Youwu zhi jing, 178; Id, The Realms of Being and Non-Being, 239.
62 蓋良知即是未發之中，此知之前，更無未發；良知即是中節之和，此知之後，更無已發。此知自能收斂，不須更主於收斂；此知自能發散，不須更期於發散 (Chuyang huiyu 滁陽會語 [Dialogue at the meeting in Chuyang], 7 in Longxi Wang xiansheng quanji 龍溪王先生全集, juan 2), Italics added. See Xuezhi Zhang, History of the Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, 184. Wang Ji goes on holding that “This conscience can restrain itself, and does not need to be further controlled by restraints; and it can diffuse itself, and does not need to be further expected to diffuse. […] Innate conscience is originally being produced within non-being, without knowing or non-knowing.” (Cf modified transl. in Xuezhi Zhang, History of the Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, 184).
63 See Kengo, “Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming,” 41–60.
64 See Kengo, “Confucianism and Buddhism in the Late Ming,” 52–54.
65 Li Zhi, Fu jingzhong youpeng, Fenshu, 1: 20–21.
66 According to Wang Ji, the innate conscience is present all the time, flowing naturally (“Dialogue at the meeting in Chuyang” [Chuyang huiyu 滁陽會語], in Complete Collected Works of Master Wang Longxi 龍溪王先生全集, juan 2), without any conflict between principle and desire. However, Zhang Xuezhi holds that Geng Dingxiang and Li Zhi’s disagreement was not as great as it is depicted in usual works, and also did not concern their fundamental thoughts (Xuezhi Zhang, History of Chinese Philosophy in the Ming Dynasty, 2121, p. 406).
67 Ming Deng Dao Gu Lu, shang, Part one, in Li Zhi Quanji zhu, vol. 14, 15: 271–72.
68 See Tai Ching-Hsien, “Li Zhi yu Fojiao” 534; id, Ming Qing xueshu sixiang shi, 172–82, 200.
69 Li Zhi, Ziyou Jie Lao, xu 子由《解老》序 (1574), Fenshu, 3: 111.
70 Li Zhi, Ming Deng Dao Gu Lu, shang 明燈道古錄上, in Li Wenling ji李溫陵集卷之十八, 18:15 (in Li Zhi Quanji zhu, vol. 14, 11: 259). To Wang Yangming, the median position before arousal was the level of proper conduct so that all attain due measure and degree keeping the essence of the mind without any impediment and impartiality. (Chuanxilu, 28,101, Chan wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Living, 30, 65).
71 Li Zhi, Da Deng Shiyang 答鄧石陽 (1585), Fenshu, 1: 4. transl. by Pauline Lee in A Book to Burn, 8–9. However, Li Zhi is always flexible and respectful of rules. Sometimes, Li’s position recalls Zhuangzi’s words (Wai外, Zai You 在宥, 6).
72 Quotation from Lunyu, Yan Yuan 顏淵， 1. Li Zhi, Da Geng Zhongcheng 答耿中丞 (1584), Fenshu, 1:16. On the social harmony and tolerance derived from letting individuals follow their natural tendencies, see ibid. 17–18 (cf. also Li Yuntao, “Li Zhi tongxin shuo dui Wang Yangming liangzhi shuo jicheng yu fazhan,” 108). Li Zhi explains his ideas of autonomy and style of life in many passages (like Gankai pingsheng 感慨平生 (1596), Fenshu, 4: 185, translated by Martin Huang in A Book to Burn, 185–86). He challenged the traditional hierarchical relationship between master and disciple and criticised “bowing four times and receiving assignments” (si bai shouye 四拜受業) (Zhenshi er shou 真師二首 Fenshu, 2: 80). Li had many disciples, that he often scolded and cursed to improve their self-discipline. See, for instance, Li Zhi, San Chun ji 三蠢記 (1593), Fenshu, 3: 107.
73 On Buddhist influences on Li Zhi, both in the interpretation of scriptures and according to his discourse of reinterpretation of Confucianism concerning the self and the creation of a kind of “textual spirituality”, see Jiang Wu, “Performing Authenticity: Li Zhi, Buddhism, and the Rise of Textual Spirituality in Early Modern China,” 164–84. I will leave aside the Buddhist doctrinal implications, focusing on Confucian and secular aspects.
74 Li Zhi, Zashu 雜述，Guanyin 17 tiao觀音問十七條． Da Zixin答自信， Fenshu, 4:171 172; cf. Wang Yangming,’s sentence “there is nothing under heaven external to the mind” 天下無心外之物 (Chuanxilu, 275; Chan wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Living, 222). See Chen Lai, You-Wu zhi jing; Tai Ching-hsien, “Li Zhi yu Fojiao,” 529–30; Ming Qing Xueshu sixiang shi lunji, 189–90.
75 See Chen Lai, You-Wu zhi jing; Tai Ching-hsien, “Li Zhi yu Fojiao”; Ming Qing Xueshu sixiang shi lunji.
76 See the volume edited by JeeLoo Liu and Douglas L. Berger, Nothingness in Asian Philosophy. On the distinction between the physical and metaphysical levels, for instance the “empty space that contains shaped things” and the metaphysical “emptiness.” Cf. Chen Lai, Youwu zhi jing, 182–227; id., The Realms of Being and Non-Being, 248–312; Kim Hak-Ze, Two Neo-Confucian Perspectives on the Way, note 216 p. 111.
77 Li Zhi, Da Mingyin 答明因, Fenshu, 4: 175, quoted by Junjiang Wang, “On Li Zhi’s Theory of Growing up in Spirit,” 97.
78 Billeter, Li Zhi, 214–22.
79 Li Zhi, Da Deng Shiyang 答鄧石陽 (1585), Fenshu, 1:4, transl. by Pauline Lee in A Book to Burn, 8. Cf. also Junjiang Wang, “On Li Zhi’s Theory of Growing up in Spirit,” 96–97.
80 Li Zhi, Da Deng Shiyang, Fenshu, 1: 4. translated by Pauline Lee in A Book to Burn, 8–9. Cf. with Feng Menglong’s prefaces to the Sanyan collections, where he contrasts the spontaneity of qing as a source of morality to the pedantic norms of the Confucian Classics. (cf. Santangelo, The Culture of Love, 127, 136). Cf. Wang Yangming’s “conscious discernment” (ming jue jing cha chu 明覺 精察處) and the “unity of knowledge and action” (zhi xing he yi 知行合一).
81 The spontaneity of doing good recalls also the Christian spontaneity. As Arendt notices, goodness for Christians is independent of all beliefs and expectations, without self-complacency, and when a good action becomes known and public, it loses its specific character of goodness (Arendt, The Human Condition, 74).
82 Tai Ching-hsien, Ming Qing Xueshu sixiang shi lunji 185–86.
83 Zhao Qing 赵青, “Lun Li Zhi 'ziran zhi wei mei' wenyi sixiang.”
84 Li Zhi, Da Deng Shiyang 答鄧石陽 (1585), Fenshu, 1: 4. transl. by Pauline Lee in A Book to Burn, 8–9.
85 Cf. Slingerland, Effortless Action, 179, 199–201.
86 Li Zhi, Da Deng Shiyang 答鄧石陽 (1585), Fenshu, 1: 4. transl. by Pauline Lee in A Book to Burn, 8–9. This allegory (見性成佛) is used by Wang Ji, (Da Wu Tai Lu zi Wen答五臺陸子問, 3 in Longxi Wang xiansheng quanji, juan 6).
87 XinJing Tigang 心經提綱 (1581) Fenshu, 3:100, transl. by David Lebovitz, A Book to Burn, 118. See also Li Zhi, Tongxin shuo (1592), Fenshu, 3: 98.
88 In a letter to Deng Shiyang, Li refers to the fundamental human relations, that are understood as pursuing everyday life affairs.
89 Li Zhi, Siwu shuo 四勿說 (1574), Fenshu, 3: 101. In his innovative sentence bu qian bu er不遷不貳, qian 遷 is anderstood as “changing.” Originally the sentence from Lunyu, Yong Ye, 3, reads “[Yan Hui] did not transfer his anger; he did not repeat a fault.” 不遷怒，不貳過. (cf. his In Memoriam of Master Wang Longxi 王龍溪先生告溫, Fenshu, 3:121).
90 Li Zhi, Da Ma Lishan答馬歷山 (1601), Xu Fenshu續焚書, 1:2.
91 Li Zhi, Da Zhou Xiyan 答周西岩, Fenshu, 1:1, and Yu Ma Lishan 與馬歴山 (1601), Xu Fenshu, 1:3; see de Bary’s translation and comment in “Li Chih: Arch-Individualist,” 209–210, 242. See also the translation by Handler-Spitz, in A Book to Burn, 241–244. The childmind might be also influenced by the Daoist “baby”, ying’er 嬰兒. Cf. Gong Jianwei. “Siyu yu shifei,” 45. For the different position of Wang Yangming, see Chuanxilu, 15 (Chan wing-tsit, Instructions for Practical Living, 25), where Wang opposes the heavenly principle against greed and lust.
92 Damasio, Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the Feeling Brain, 170–75.
93 Li Zhi, Da Geng Zhongcheng lun dan 答耿中丞論淡 (1585–1586?), and Tongxin shuo童心說 (1592), Fenshu, 1: 24–25 and 3: 99; translated respectively by Timothy Brook, in A Book to Burn, 45–47; by Pauline Lee and Handler-Spitz, 106–10; Saussy, 111–13. On Li Zhi’s only care for genuine inclination and lack of any recommendation of moral effort in Tongxin shuo, see Li Yuntao, “Li Zhi tongxin shuo dui Wang Yangming liangzhi shuo jicheng yu fazhan,” 109; Gong Jianwei, “Siyu yu shifei,” 46–48.
94 Li Zhi, Da Zhou Ruozhuang 答周若莊 (1586) and Tongxin shuo (1592), Fenshu, 1: 2 and 3: 98; Ming Deng Dao Gu Lu, shang, Part one, in Li Zhi Quanji zhu, vol. 14, 18:278. These concepts are confirmed in Li’s letter to Ma Lishan (Yu Ma Lishan (1601), Xu Fenshu, 1:3, translated by Pauline Lee in A Book to Burn, 241–244). Cf. also de Bary, “Li Chih: Arch-Individualist,” 238–244, 248–49. For the sensorial metaphor for the sincerity of intentions, see Daxue 大學 3, quoted by Wang Yangming, Chuanxilu, 5. Peimin Ni (“Seek and You Will Find It; Let Go and You Will Lose It: Exploring a Confucian Approach to Human Dignity,” Dao 13 (2014): 173–198, 181), compares the Mencian prescriptive moral optimism to a mother’s encouragement to her child.
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Paolo Santangelo
Paolo Santangelo, Professor Emeritus of East Asia history at Sapienza University of Roma, is Editor of the series “Emotions and States of Mind in East Asia” (Brill), Asia Orientale 古今 東亞, and the annual publication Ming Qing Studies. Among his books he is the author of An Interdisciplinary Textual Research in Ming and Qing Sources; Materials for an Anatomy of Personality in Late Imperial China; Shan'ge, the ‘Mountain Songs’: Love Songs in Ming China (co-authored with Oki Yasushi); Zibuyu, “What the Master Would Not Discuss”, according to Yuan Mei (1716-1798): A Collection of Supernatural Stories (in cooperation with Yan Beiwen); Passion, Romance and Qing: The World of Emotions and States of Mind in Peony Pavilion (co-authored with Tian Yuan Tan); Revisiting Liaozhai Zhiyi; The Culture of Love in China and Europe (with Gábor Boros); and Individual Autonomy and Responsibility in Late Imperial China (Cambria Press): and Facets of the Self: Escape from Authoritarian and Moralistic Predicaments in Early Modern China (Cambria Press). Email: [email protected]