Two sides of the same coin: a taxonomy of academic integrity and impropriety using intellectual virtues and vices

Abstract

While the integrity of academic work has always been vitally important, since the establishment of the International Center for Academic Integrity in 1992 increasing attention has been paid to the area. The term academic integrity now explicitly appears in policy and in job titles or offices tasked with either detection, training, or both. Equally, regulatory, quality and standards agencies, such as Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI), the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) in the UK, and the Australian Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) have mobilised around academic integrity with frameworks, lexicons, charters and networks that offer national guidance and promote shared action and understanding. However, despite efforts to interrogate and standardise the use of the term ‘academic integrity’ from those working and researching in the field, it is often used inconsistently and frequently conflated with its opposite – academic misconduct – in practice. Our aim, in this paper, is to acknowledge a lack of clarity around the term ‘academic integrity’ and to address this ambiguity by offering a taxonomy of academic integrity. We will arrive at the taxonomy of academic integrity through philosophical conceptual analysis and making use of pre-existing philosophical work in virtue (and vice) epistemology. The outcome of this analysis will be a taxonomy of academic integrity that represents the various concepts related to it in an organised way, classified into distinct groups, along with a graphic to aid understanding.

Keywords:

• Academic Integrity
• Taxonomy
• Virtue Ethics
• Virtue Epistemology
• Virtue and Vice

Introduction

Our aim, in this paper, is to provide clarity on the concept of ‘academic integrity’, and actions that contravene it. Through the method of conceptual analysis (Myburgh and Tammaro 2013) we will probe academic integrity, identifying its simplest forms and situating actions that align with these, while arguing for a consistent understanding of related (but separate) concepts of academic impropriety and academic misconduct. The outcome of this analysis will be a taxonomy of academic integrity that represents the various concepts related to it in an organised way, classified into distinct groups, along with a graphic to aid understanding.

To add clarity, our taxonomy will make use of virtue theory, focusing on ‘intellectual’ virtue and vice, or those virtues and vices that can be linked to a concern and respect for the truth. We will situate academic integrity as a ‘meta’ virtue, which sits over other intellectual virtues and we will argue that these virtues are inextricable from the aims of higher education: the intellectual pursuit of knowledge and learning. In this context, academic integrity is applicable to all in the academic community, including students, educators, researchers, third space professionals, and institutions (Whitchurch 2013), aligning with Eaton’s Comprehensive Academic Integrity (CAI) framework in which academic integrity is positioned as foundational across all facets of education (2023). The opposite to academic integrity becomes ‘academic impropriety’, a meta-vice which sits over other intellectual vices. Cheating then cannot be conflated with academic integrity in discourse, nor is it antithetical to honesty; rather cheating is one instantiation of academic impropriety.

In the first section of this paper, we will motivate the taxonomy by describing the rise of the term ‘academic integrity’ and how the current usage (in practice) may give rise to conflation and confusion. In section two we will begin our examination with a brief description of conceptual analysis and virtue theory. In section three we will become specific by focusing on the intellectual virtues as a means of informing our taxonomy; it is in section four that we will describe academic integrity as a meta-virtue. The focus then shifts to intellectual vice in section five and in section six we will describe academic impropriety as a meta-vice, before concluding with a graphic that presents the taxonomy.

Background, or why is there a need for this taxonomy?

While the integrity of academic work has always been vitally important, since the establishment of the International Center for Academic Integrity in 1992 increasing attention has been paid to the area. Large-scale incidents of cheating, including the 2014 MyMaster scandal where journalists revealed thousands of students had purchased essays that they submitted for credit (McNeilage and Visentin 2014), have led to increased efforts by higher education institutions globally not only to enhance detection methods for academic misconduct, but to educate in the area of academic integrity. More recently, the move to online teaching and assessment during the COVID-19 pandemic inspired additional focus on and interest in this area, as have developments in generative artificial intelligence (GenAI) technology. The term academic integrity now explicitly appears in policy and in job titles or offices tasked with either detection, training, or both. Equally, regulatory, quality and standards agencies, such as Quality and Qualifications Ireland (QQI), the Quality Assurance Agency for Higher Education (QAA) in the UK, and the Australian Tertiary Education Quality and Standards Agency (TEQSA) have mobilised around academic integrity with frameworks, lexicons, charters and networks that offer national guidance and promote shared action and understanding.

However, despite efforts to interrogate and standardise the use of the term ‘academic integrity’ from those working and researching in the field, it is often used inconsistently and frequently conflated with its opposite – academic misconduct – in practice. Surveys of academic integrity education in Australia, New Zealand (Sefcik, Striepe, and Yorke 2020) and Canada (Miron et al. 2021) found that the primary focus of this education tended to be on plagiarism, one form of misconduct. Educative opportunities on the topic of academic misconduct are important as understandings of what constitutes plagiarism and perceptions of its levels of severity, for example, can vary across contexts, with a particular disconnect evident between academic/professional staff and student understanding (Blum 2011; Tremayne and Curtis 2021). However, these should not be conflated with understanding ‘academic integrity’. Equally important is education that does focus on academic integrity and its positive aspects, including the development of academic literacies and ethical decision-making (Hughes and Bertram Gallant 2016).

Considering the variation in perception regarding academic integrity, misconduct, and even referencing, particularly in a global higher education context (Bretag 2015; Gravett and Kinchin 2020, 91), Hensley, Kirkpatrick, and Burgoon suggest that ‘policies and educational interventions should […] strive for clear, comprehensive definitions of acceptable and unacceptable behavior’ (2013, 903). As a central aspect of this, a clear distinction is required between behaviours associated with the three categories of academic integrity, impropriety (which may not constitute misconduct), and misconduct (defined in policy with actionable consequences). Framing integrity and impropriety as two sides of the same coin, rather than discussing misconduct under the umbrella term of ‘academic integrity’, avoids conflating the these areas and aids the positive framing of academic integrity. Offering a clear delineation of these categories (and associated actions) in this taxonomy will support educators and policymakers to consider all of the ways that academic integrity acts as a guide or motivating factor for strengthening and improving our intellectual pursuits. As such, academic integrity is framed, in part, as striving to do ‘good work’ (Gardner et al. 2001) and encouraging others in the same pursuit.

There are several existing taxonomies and glossaries of academic integrity and misconduct that usefully define these terms, and related concepts, to support consistent usage. One of the most comprehensive of these is the Glossary for Academic Integrity, developed by the European Network for Academic Integrity (ENAI) in 2018. This glossary, which includes 212 terms, plus synonyms, has since been used as a foundation for others, including the National Principles and Lexicon of Common Terms published in 2021 by QQI. These glossaries are excellent resources, but, as they are necessarily arranged from A to Z, terms relating to integrity versus misconduct are interspersed throughout, separated only through an understanding of their definitions. Existing taxonomies usefully apply some of these concepts in a variety of ways, including to map how quality assurance and integrity interrelate at a whole-institution level (Gilmore 2023), to improve the development of research integrity training (van den Hoven et al. 2023), and to delineate appropriate versus inappropriate academic conduct with particular disciplinary or research areas (Stenmark and Winn 2015; Hall and Martin 2019). However, these are focused on specific contexts rather than education more broadly and do not directly interrogate the concept of impropriety as opposed to misconduct and how it is situated in relation to integrity. Therefore, a further taxonomy that does not contain the same breadth of defined terms as the glossaries, but that focuses specifically on very clearly delineating the three distinct areas of academic integrity, impropriety, and misconduct through a layered understanding (including examples of associated actions) will serve as a necessary addition towards building consistent usage of these terms in relation to one another.

Academic integrity is frequently discussed as synonymous with academic honesty and academic misconduct with dishonesty. This fails to capture the range of behaviours or actions associated with both of these concepts, which extend beyond honesty/dishonesty. For example, we can see a broader range of behaviour encapsulated in the six fundamental values that underpin academic integrity as outlined by the International Center for Academic Integrity (ICAI): ‘honesty, trust, fairness, respect, responsibility, and courage’ (2021). The ENAI glossary’s definition of academic integrity as ‘compliance with ethical and professional principles, standards, practices and consistent system of values, that serves as guidance for making decisions and taking actions in education, research and scholarship’ (2018, 7–8) equally suggests a range of principles and values. However, a study of this taxonomy examines it as one of ‘academically honest and dishonest behaviors’ (Tauginienė et al. 2019, 354). Prior taxonomies of academic integrity are similarly organised around dishonest behaviours (McClung and Schneider 2015) or under the higher-level concept of academic ethics (Jordan 2013), demonstrating a variety of approaches. To bring these all together into one clear conceptual framework around academic integrity and impropriety (with a subset of misconduct) as distinct categories, we suggest a taxonomy that uses Aristotelian intellectual virtues and vices to outline the breadth and depth of each of these categories. This brings a unique philosophical perspective to the transdisciplinary field of academic integrity, introducing the literature of virtue epistemology to usefully map the characteristics and actions associated with each category.

Preliminaries – conceptual analysis, virtue theory and distinguishing the intellectual from the moral

When it comes to providing a clear taxonomy of academic integrity, we do not need to start from scratch; nor do we need to invent a methodology. Conceptual analysis, one of the main methodologies involved in philosophical research, has been brought to bear in the field of virtue theory for many years. Conceptual analysis is used to distinguish terms, analyse the understandings those terms refer to and represent the connections between these terms (Myburgh and Tammaro 2013). As such, it is difficult to think of a more useful tool than conceptual analysis for the task of creating taxonomies, particularly in the context of virtues and vices.

Virtue theory has risen in popularity over the last half century or so, motivated in part by the publication of Elizabeth Anscombe’s highly influential paper, ‘Modern Moral Philosophy’ in 1958. This popularity is plain to see in institutions of higher education, where research on virtue and character (Carr 2017; Schwartz 2022) is combined with policy initiatives around graduate attributes and values. These initiatives can vary from institution to institution, but often follow international guidance (i.e. OECD, UN) on identified attitudes and values integral to individual and social well-being (OECD 2019), which prioritises human dignity, respect, equality, justice, responsibility, global-mindedness, cultural diversity, freedom, tolerance and democracy (and the virtues or values which support these). Moreover, in the context of academic integrity, specific values are consistently mentioned. For example, the ICAI’s six fundamental values.

At this juncture, it is worth asking what makes values (or virtues) appropriate for the higher education context? This question probes the validity of moral education at the level of higher education. The idea of advocating an educational approach that fosters ‘graduate attributes’, ‘graduate values’, or ‘graduate virtues’ is not without its critics. Most relevant at the level of higher education is the criticism that attempting to educate the character of ‘grown adults’ could be termed paternalistic (Carr 2017; Giesinger 2020). Is it really the role of a lecturer of art history, for example, to foster compassion within their students? Does a student need to show empathy to be regarded as a good mathematician? One could easily think of situations wherein students might find efforts to improve their character as being deeply problematic. Yet, there is a way to avoid this critique of paternalism, while at the same time delineating a set of virtues that is consistent with the work of addressing student cheating. The way to do so, we argue is through differentiating between moral and intellectual virtues.

Moral virtues and intellectual virtues

Partly, the issue of the appropriateness of moral education at higher levels is linked to the purpose of higher-level education. If we view higher-level education as concerned with creating moral citizens, then it makes sense to include moral education within institutions of higher education. Indeed, Bertram Gallant and Stephens consider educational approaches to academic integrity to be aligned with the development of moral character, and a moral imperative of the institution, as opposed to solely punitive approaches to cheating that do not encourage learning from our mistakes or character growth (2020). Bretag, while maintaining a similar argument regarding the importance of education, including ethics, argues that learning is what should be foregrounded here rather than character (2020, 2). The idea of higher education functioning to create moral citizenship is divisive; particularly in the context of the ‘culture wars’. Commentators have drawn attention to the increased polarization of the moral role of higher education institutions (Campbell and Jason 2016). Yet, there is a way of understanding the role of higher-level education as fostering character, without invoking contested moral notions. In fact, understanding higher education as supporting the formation of the ‘whole individual’ (rather than merely transmitting subject knowledge), yet shying clear of moral education, dates back to Cardinal Henry Newnam’s The Idea of the University (1996). According to Newnam (1996, 101–102), the purpose of the university is not limited to the specific knowledge communicated through particular subjects, yet this purpose should not extend to moral education. In language reflective of ‘intellectual virtue’ as delineated below, Newnam states:

I say, a university […] has this objective and this mission; it contemplates neither moral impression nor mechanical production; it professes to exercise the mind neither in art nor in duty; its function is intellectual culture; […] It educates the intellect to reason well in all matters, to reach out towards truth and to grasp it. (Newnam 1996, 92)

If we agree that the good of a (higher-level) education is not tethered to conferring subject level knowledge but can form the intellect more broadly; and that this ‘broad formation’ pertains to the character of students, then a focus on intellectual virtues is warranted. When conceptualising intellectual virtues, it is important to distinguish intellectual virtues from moral virtues. What makes a virtue an intellectual virtue is the fact that it can be linked to a concern and respect for the truth (Steutel and Spiecker 1997; Wilson 2017); or as Jason Baehr argues, intellectual virtue emerges from caring deeply about ends like truth, knowledge, evidence, rationality, and understanding (2011).

Acting with intellectual virtue means acting in such a way that reliably leads to an epistemically good outcome (i.e. truth is uncovered, understanding attained, fair evaluation given), or acting in accordance with virtuous motivations. Acting with intellectual virtue might mean investigating as thoroughly as possible whether our belief/academic work is well-justified or aims at the truth. Thus, intellectual virtue may overlap with moral virtue, which aims at concern or respect for persons, but intellectual virtue is not synonymous with moral virtue. What is required in this context is the exercise of particular (intellectual) character traits, ways of thinking and attitudes (intellectual virtues). As Jason Baehr states, in the context of intellectual virtue, successful inquiry requires:

that one engage in attentive observation, thoughtful or open-minded imagination, patient reflection, careful and thorough analysis, or fair-minded interpretation and assessment. As this suggests, inquiry makes substantial personal demands on inquirers. It demands an exercise of a range of “intellectual character virtues.” (2011, 1)

Baehr gives the following list of such intellectual virtues: inquisitiveness, attentiveness, carefulness and thoroughness in inquiry, fair-mindedness, open-mindedness, and intellectual patience, honesty, courage, humility, and rigor (Baehr 2015, 87).

Differentiating between intellectual virtue and moral virtue in this way is an important benefit of this taxonomy. Academic integrity need not be a moral issue; upholding academic integrity need not become an endeavour at moralising to academics and students and can instead be concentrated on learning. A focus on intellectual virtue allows those interested in the academic integrity of students to appeal to students’ character as scholars, and their burgeoning identity as academics within their disciplines, rather than appealing to their moral code.

For an example of this distinction between intellectual and moral virtue in practice, we can consider the following scenario: Noticing a change in students’ writing styles and an increasingly surface level of analysis within their essays, an instructor suspects that several students may be using GenAI tools, like ChatGPT, to complete their assignments without acknowledging this use. The instructor decides to have a conversation with their class about inappropriate use of GenAI to explain why this contravenes academic integrity, hoping that this will prevent continued misuse of these tools. In this conversation, the instructor highlights that the students are responsible for their own academic work. The instructor may remind students to show the intellectual virtues of attentiveness, thoroughness and rigour through careful consideration of the sources they use for information, explaining that, while ChatGPT may produce content that sounds authoritative, merely copying ChatGPT output will not promote their learning or cultivate their intellect; and given that ChatGPT is not held to the standards of intellectual virtue, it can include incorrect and/or biased information. There are moral concerns evident in this situation in that students may have used ChatGPT in the ‘wrong’ way as a shortcut to completing their assignment, perhaps taking advantage of their instructor and fellow students in doing so. However, the instructor does not make a moral judgement on the students’ intent here, and instead focuses on intellectual virtues to use the situation as a learning moment to reinforce critical academic skills.

Intellectual virtues and academic integrity

Thus far, we have outlined the relevance of a particular set of virtues to the sphere of higher education, but we have not explicitly tied these virtues to the concept of academic integrity. Yet this relationship should be made explicit. A lack of clarity here may compound the issue of equating academic integrity to cheating and/or honesty. For the purposes of providing a taxonomy of academic integrity, one conceptualisation of integrity stands out as particularly relevant: Kristján Kristjánsson’s (2019) work on integrity is illuminating. For Kristjánsson, integrity is a higher-order (meta and/or master) virtue rather than a standard virtue among many (akin to justice, courage, honesty). Meta-virtues are virtues that stand above other virtues and integrate them; these higher order virtues can be used to adjudicate between virtues or to inform the successful execution of the virtues through action (Kristjánsson 2019, 95). As such, integrity is not synonymous with honesty, although integrity may well include acting honestly.

Notably, Kristjánsson posits integrity as an intellectual (or epistemic) meta-virtue. As such, integrity relates to choosing wisely and judging appropriately. Integrity, as an intellectual meta-virtue, allows us imperfect cognisors to aspire towards an intellectually flourishing life, guides our decision-making (by helping us integrate relevant virtues and adjudicate among competing virtues) and helps us think critically (Kristjánsson 2019). Thus, we are left with a conception of integrity as that intellectual meta-virtue which functions to integrate our virtues by informing us about what virtue demands (adjudication between virtues) and/or framing our decision making through helping us to ‘live our virtues’ through action.

If integrity is an intellectual meta-virtue, then academic integrity is the integration of virtues relevant to the academic sphere. As such, academic integrity should help us to know which virtue is at issue in particular academic contexts and what it means to act in accordance with that virtue. Moreover, as discussed above, the virtues at issue are themselves intellectual virtues, or characteristics that promote intellectual flourishing, or which make for an excellent cogniser.

What does this look like in practice? Take the example of Sean and Susan. Sean and Susan are pharmacy students who have been placed together to plan and present on a topic. Susan is a ‘top student’, she is always engaged in class and thorough in her preparations. Sean is engaged and thorough but lacks confidence. The pair organise meetings to plan their presentation, where it becomes obvious that, although both have done an equal amount of work, they disagree on how to format and present on the topic. Initially Susan, who knows she is an excellent student and ‘rarely wrong’, feels irritation at Sean not agreeing with her reading of the subject matter. Initially, Sean doubts himself, knowing that Susan is ‘rarely wrong’; he feels tempted to just ‘go with the flow’ and not question Susan’s interpretation. Academic integrity here might amount to Susan adjudicating between her own ‘carefulness and courage’ and ‘fair-mindedness and open-mindedness’ (Baehr 2015, 87). To behave with academic integrity in this context might mean taking a risk and giving Sean a chance. Sean might have to adjudicate between humility and courage. Behaving with academic integrity, for Sean, might mean having the confidence to argue his position forcibly (but respectfully).

Thus far we have focused on the sorts of virtues or values that are appropriate within the context of higher education, and academic integrity as the integration of those virtues. As such, we have illustrated how academic integrity is larger (in our words it is ‘meta’) than honesty. As can be seen in the example of Sean and Susan, academic integrity is not synonymous with honesty. In fact, academic integrity is not only a student issue. All those engaged in intellectual pursuits are subject to the standards of academic integrity; seasoned academic and first year undergraduate student alike. For example, it might be fruitful to probe the concept of academic freedom using the framework of academic integrity. Academic freedom is a poorly understood concept, threatened from inside and outside the academy (Bartel 2019). Yet ‘academic freedom’ can itself be weaponised in ways that give justification to poor conduct. As Farhana Sultana (2018, 228) puts it, ‘academic freedom’ can be used ‘to provide a “scholarly” veneer to what are otherwise hateful ideologies’. Perhaps if tokens of academic freedom were analysed in terms of whether or not they showed a concern or respect for truth (through the presence of intellectual virtue), and whether their utterance showed an appropriate integration of these virtues (academic integrity), we would be in a better position to understand the uniqueness of academic freedom (as opposed to free speech) and the sorts of obligations such freedom entails.

The remaining sections will examine the ‘other side of the coin’, illustrating intellectual vice and academic impropriety. In these sections we will explain where cheating and plagiarism sit in a taxonomy of academic integrity.

Intellectual vice and epistemic corruption

Intellectual vices impede ‘effective and responsible inquiry’ (Hookway 2003; Cassam 2016). In contrast to intellectual virtues, which are ‘cognitive excellences’, intellectual vices are ‘cognitive defects’ (Cassam 2016, 160). Acting with intellectual vice means acting in such a way that fails to reliably lead to an epistemically good outcome (i.e. falsehood is maintained as truth, conspiracy theory goes unchallenged) or acting in accordance with intellectually vicious motivations. Epistemic vices include, ‘close mindedness, arrogance, dogmatism, prejudice, over-confidence, and wishful thinking’ (Cassam 2019), intellectual dishonesty, intellectual disrespect, disregard for truth, intellectual laziness, intellectual carelessness, and intellectual cowardice (Baehr 2020).

One recent and novel way of understanding intellectual vice is as ‘character traits, attitudes, and ways of thinking that obstruct the acquisition, transmission, and retention of knowledge and/or cause other kinds of epistemic harm’ (Kotsonis 2022, 1). In the literature on epistemic injustice, epistemic harm is usually understood as harm done to persons in their capacity as knower (Fricker 2007). Yet, we believe that epistemic harm could be understood much more broadly to include harm done to knowledge per se. In higher education, phrases like ‘advance knowledge’ (Geiger 2004, 413), ‘knowledge construction’, ‘knowledge creation’ (van Aalst 2009, 259) are commonplace. This is hardly surprising, given the intellectual goals of higher education delineated in section three. We believe that the proliferation of intellectual vice could be seen as harming the state of knowledge itself and, by proxy, institutions of higher education as places of knowledge construction.

The literature on research integrity is helpful here. Often authors will cite the effect on ‘Science’ of acts that could be linked to intellectual vices (i.e. altering data, fabricating results) (Zigmond and Fischer 2002; Carnero et al. 2017). The idea here is that researchers can influence the future of science and education (Masic 2014). If this influence is based on work that lacks credibility and authenticity, it is less likely to direct science towards the truth. Each piece of research may be seen as a brick in the wall of science. If too many of the bricks are faulty, then the wall lacks structural integrity. When other researchers (with integrity) rely on faulty science to build/test their theories, then their own work is weakened. It is worth noting here that research integrity and academic integrity are intertwined, with the same intellectual virtues applying to research as to other academic activities. While research integrity is often discussed as distinct from academic integrity, or as a subset of it, it is actually on the side of misconduct where any distinction occurs, and even here, this is grounded in particular actions of misconduct (i.e. data manipulation or a lack of data privacy/security) rather than a differentiation in the intellectual vices themselves.

The role of institutions of higher education here is to support cultures that foster integrity at all levels; specifically, these institutions should be careful not to facilitate the proliferation of intellectual vices through their incentivisation structures. Many scholars have noted that contemporary higher education culture has a tendency to promote perverse incentives, which reward low quality research and/or misconduct (Edwards and Roy 2017). Driven by an emphasis on quantitative metrics, competition for research funding, and a shift towards a managerial approach to the higher education sector (Deem et al. 2007; Grimes et al. 2018), it has been argued that higher education is increasingly failing to foster virtue among academics.

Here the work of Ian Kidd on ‘epistemic corruption’ is particularly relevant. Kidd uses the term to describe how individuals’ intellectual or epistemic character can be harmed through inhabiting cultures that erode intellectual virtues and/or foster intellectual vices (Kidd 2019; Tanswell and Kidd et al. 2021). According to Kidd, ‘education of certain sorts can erode or fail to nourish virtues, and encourage or incentivise a set of vices, or both’ (Kidd 2019, 220). Kidd, along with other theorists (Battaly 2013; Forstenzer 2018) claim that systems of higher education tend towards epistemic corruption, insofar as they tend to damage the intellectual characters of academic and students.

There is what might be termed a ‘web of epistemic harm’ at work here. Epistemically corrupting cultures undermine the epistemic character of researchers, thereby perpetrating harm upon them; these researchers may go on to behave in epistemically vicious ways (perhaps falsifying results), thereby harming knowledge per se and perhaps even adding to the epistemically corrupt culture (‘publish or perish’).

Consider Sean and Susan, the pharmacy students, again. In this example, Sean has not revised for the examination, while Susan has studied hard. During the examination, Susan uses her phone to share an answer with Sean. Consistent with the empirical literature on the prevalence of cheating and the reasons underlying cheating among pharmacy students (Aggarwal et al. 2002; Harries and Rutter 2005; Ip et al. 2016), Sean cites ‘fear of failure’ as the main motivating factor in his choice to cheat; while Susan cites ‘peer pressure’. Susan believes she has been a good friend, and since she did not cheat on her own examination (she only ‘let Sean copy’) believes she has not offended against academic integrity. Susan’s test results show that she has been attentive and thorough in her own inquiry. Yet, she has not integrated these virtues with intellectual honesty (she has abetted Sean to commit intellectual fraud); nor has she been intellectually careful. The outcome of Susan’s help allows Sean to qualify as a pharmacist, even though he has not shown authentically that he has the knowledge necessary to be a competent pharmacist. With respect to her own commitment to protecting and contributing to pharmaceutical knowledge, aiding Sean shows a lack of intellectual care. Her behaviour shows a disrespect for knowledge, thereby endangering Sean’s future customers/patients.

Sean and Susan inhabit a corrupting culture. They are part of the shift towards a commercialization of higher education. This picture of the culture of higher education is consistent with the theory and empirical findings on the shift to a neoliberal approach in the sector (Lawrence and Sharma 2002; Silverio et al. 2020; McKenna 2022). Sean views himself as a consumer and believes that he is entitled to a good grade, especially as a good grade is a gateway to a high paying job. Sean’s aim is to be a pharmacist. The examination is instrumental to this aim. While Sean does not value the knowledge that would have been gained had he revised, he still feels entitled to become a pharmacist. He cheats because he views education as a commodity; something he has bought.

Consistent with the web of harm idea above, this culture, wherein knowledge is commodified, undermines Sean’s and Susan’s epistemic character (McKenna 2022); thereby harming them. Were they to become pharmacists (their cheating was not reported), they would be worse pharmacists for being a part of this corrupting culture. As a pharmacist, Sean may have aspects of his professional knowledge that are weak; these weaknesses, which would have resulted in a failed examination, might result in harm to his customers. Moreover, as an outcome of this corrupting culture undermining their epistemic character, Sean and Susan may play their part within this web too. Sean may go on to behave in epistemically vicious ways as a pharmacist (perhaps showing the vice of intellectual carelessness with respect to dosage). He may even teach other, more junior pharmacists, epistemically lazy ways of being a pharmacist. Susan, on the other hand, may continue to cave to peer pressure and similarly demonstrate the vice of intellectual carelessness, and perhaps arrogance, in her professional setting, potentially allowing her friends to pick up medicine without a prescription if she feels that it will not harm them.

Academic impropriety

In our latest Sean and Susan example, both students have shown themselves to lack academic integrity. By this, we mean that Sean and Susan have shown a disrespect to truth and a failure to integrate the intellectual virtues. Yet by using this terminology, we are perilously close to conflating academic integrity with cheating ourselves. Although it is a lack of integrity that is at issue here, it is still a slippery slope towards the sort of lack of clarity we identified in section one.

Thus, we suggest an alternative conceptualisation of Sean and Susan. Instead of failing to integrate the virtues, we can say of them that they do integrate the intellectual vices. We use the term ‘academic impropriety’ to refer to this phenomenon. Thus, academic impropriety becomes the integration of the intellectual vices outlined in the previous section. So instead of explaining Susan’s actions in terms of a failure to be honest and careful, we would say Susan has been dishonest and careless. Similarly, we would explain Sean’s actions in terms of the vices of intellectual dishonesty, disrespect for truth and perhaps even wishful thinking (‘I can be an excellent pharmacist even if I don’t study hard’).

It is important to note here that there is a further distinction between academic impropriety and academic misconduct in that not all acts of impropriety will fall under the category of misconduct or ‘cheating’ as it is set out in policy. However, they do not meet the standards of academic rigour. For example, a student that chooses to cite the first two sources that appear in their search for a particular keyword is not committing academic misconduct, but they are demonstrating the vices of intellectual laziness and intellectual carelessness, perhaps due to time pressures or a lack of research training (potentially systemic issues related to the previously discussed ‘corrupting culture’). This can be considered academic impropriety. Equally, a student that refuses to consider any sources that argue against their existing opinion is not committing academic misconduct but is participating in academic impropriety by demonstrating close mindedness, dogmatism, and prejudice. The distinction between impropriety and misconduct can be a grey area, but as these examples demonstrate, there are several cases where actions that integrate the intellectual vices don’t lead directly to cheating (at least as it is defined in most policy) but do lead to not doing the ‘good work’ encouraged by academic integrity. The following graphic helps to illustrate our distinctions between academic integrity, impropriety and misconduct. We situate these in relation to each other, the intellectual vices and virtues they integrate, and the actions that may result from integrating these (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Academic integrity and academic impropriety as meta-virtue and meta-vice.

This may seem like a small point, but a focus on the integration of vice here will help maintain the conceptual barrier between academic integrity and impropriety. Moreover, the differentiation of intellectual virtue and vice (and integrity and impropriety as the ‘meta’ virtues and vices) allows for us to appreciate the complexity of the issues involved. Making this differentiation allows us to understand academic integrity as the ideal to which all those involved in intellectual pursuits should aspire. Academic integrity is larger than the particular norms associated with student conduct around examinations or academic conduct around research. Similarly, academic impropriety is larger than student plagiarism and the falsification of results in research.

Finally, it is worth noting that the taxonomy gives us a vocabulary with which we can articulate the role of academic cultures in fostering or corrupting intellectual character. As such, conceptualising cheating as a behaviour associated with academic impropriety (the integration of particular intellectual vices) allows us to reflect on the sorts of academic cultures that enable these behaviours that are so disrespectful to knowledge and truth. It is noteworthy that these cultures, which seem to have proliferated in recent years, are perversely incentivising. The aim of higher education (if we follow Cardinal Newnam) is to promote knowledge, truth and intellectual character. In commodifying knowledge, we may be guilty of corrupting this aim and instead promoting cultures wherein intellectual vice can flourish. If this is the case, it is worth questioning whether any attempt to address the widespread phenomenon of cheating, by ‘catching’ individual students or focusing on promoting honour codes, without also addressing the systemic aspect of academic cultures, will be carried out in vain.

Conclusion

As we have described them, academic integrity and academic impropriety are two sides of a coin. Academic integrity, as an intellectual meta-virtue relates to choosing wisely and judging appropriately in the academic context. Academic integrity helps us to think critically by integrating the intellectual virtues. In contrast, academic impropriety is the intellectual meta-vice, which integrates the vices in the academic context. Our main contribution, in this article, is to use philosophical methods and theories to inform a taxonomy of academic integrity. It should be noted that this taxonomy could be fleshed out further. For example, in this paper, we have sketched out where we believe to be the overlaps between academic integrity and research integrity. Yet it is outside the confines of this paper to give proper analysis of this theme. Moreover, one of the implications of a focus on intellectual virtue and vice is to question the extent to which the Higher Education system supports or corrupts the intellectual character of those working and learning within it. We believe these are interesting topics which may further the field of research on academic integrity.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).