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Abstract
Why do some armed forces remain loyal to the regime while others switch sides during nonviolent uprisings? The existing research predominantly focuses on the roles of domestic actors and dynamics in explaining security defections. We extend this line of research by exploring external factors that might potentially affect troops’ decision to defect. In particular, we suggest a combined effect of U.S. military training and external support for campaigns on defection decisions. Our findings show that substantial Western power involvement in support of campaigns might induce security defections in militaries with which the U.S. military has established ties. We further probe this relationship by disaggregating Western power support into its constituents and find that security defections are most likely to occur when a campaign is backed by both the U.S. and at least one other Western power. This study contributes to an understudied aspect of security force defections during nonviolent campaigns, highlighting how external dynamics might shape militaries’ decisions regarding loyalty and defection.
RESUMEN
¿Por qué algunas fuerzas armadas permanecen leales a un régimen mientras que otras cambian de bando durante los levantamientos no violentos? La investigación existente se centra, principalmente, en el papel que desempeñan los agentes nacionales y sus dinámicas con el fin de explicar las deserciones de las fuerzas de seguridad. Ampliamos esta línea de investigación explorando los factores externos que podrían influir, potencialmente, sobre las decisiones en materia de deserción por parte de las tropas. En concreto, sugerimos que existe un efecto combinado del entrenamiento militar estadounidense y del apoyo externo a las campañas en las decisiones relativas a la deserción. Nuestras conclusiones demuestran que la participación sustancial por parte de las potencias occidentales en apoyo de las campañas podría provocar deserciones de las fuerzas de seguridad en aquellos ejércitos con los que el ejército estadounidense ha establecido vínculos. Investigamos más a fondo esta relación desglosando el apoyo de las potencias occidentales en quienes lo constituyen y concluimos que resulta más probable que se produzcan deserciones de las fuerzas de seguridad cuando una campaña está respaldada tanto por Estados Unidos como por, al menos, otra potencia occidental. Este estudio contribuye a un aspecto poco estudiado de las deserciones de las fuerzas de seguridad durante las campañas no violentas, destacando cómo las dinámicas externas pueden influir sobre las decisiones de los militares con respecto a la lealtad y la deserción.
RÉSUMÉ
Pourquoi certaines forces armées restent-elles fidèles au régime quand d’autres changent de camp lors d’un soulèvement pacifique? La recherche existante se concentre majoritairement sur le rôle des acteurs et des dynamiques nationaux pour expliquer les défections des forces de sécurité. Nous prolongeons cette branche de la recherche en nous intéressant aux facteurs externes qui pourraient avoir une incidence sur la décision de défection des troupes. Plus particulièrement, nous suggérons l’existence d’un effet combiné de la formation militaire américaine et du soutien externe aux campagnes sur les décisions de défection. Nos conclusions montrent qu’une implication importante des puissances occidentales dans le soutien des campagnes pourrait provoquer des défections des forces de sécurité chez les militaires avec lesquels l’armée américaine a établi des liens. Nous analysons plus finement cette relation en décomposant le soutien des puissances occidentales en éléments constitutifs. Nous observons ainsi que les défections des forces de sécurité ont plus de chances de se produire quand une campagne reçoit le soutien des États-Unis et d’au moins une autre puissance occidentale. Cette étude contribue à un aspect sous-étudié des défections des forces de sécurité lors des campagnes pacifiques, en soulignant l’effet des dynamiques externes sur les décisions militaires en matière de loyauté et de défection.
Acknowledgement
We would like to thank the three anonymous reviewers and editors for their constructive comments and suggestions. Additionally, we extend our thanks to our colleagues at Bilkent University and the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research (CFPPR) for their support and valuable feedback, particularly acknowledging Firuze Simay Sezgin, Faruk Aksoy, and Omer Deniz Ozdemir.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 We use the terms nonviolent movement, nonviolent resistance, nonviolent campaign, mass uprising, and resistance movement interchangeably throughout the paper.
2 Maximalist goals refer to those that demand significant institutional or regime change, territorial independence through secession or elimination of a foreign occupation or colonial power (Chenoweth and Stephan Citation2011; Chenoweth and Lewis Citation2013).
3 Note that there are also earlier studies (see, for example, Huntington Citation1969) as well as more recent ones (Biddle, Macdonald and Baker Citation2018) suggesting no relationship at all.
4 Please note that a recent study suggests that this finding is limited to IMET programs, concerning a small fraction of U.S. military training activities (McLauchlin, Seymour and Martel Citation2022).
5 We feel the need to emphasize that it was the Chilean popular movement that forced the U.S. to join the right side of history. Please see Maria Stephan’s (Citation2022) post at Waging Nonviolence.
6 Contact theory in social psychology suggests that intergroup contact, under the right conditions, can reduce prejudice and build positive perceptions (Allport Citation1954). This positive interaction and shared experience are likely to result in greater empathy towards one another (Pettigrew Citation1998).
7 The U.S., in particular, has a bad reputation due to its past of helping right-wing autocrats to come power in different regions, such as Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in Iran, General Joseph Mobutu in Congo, and General Augusto Pinochet in Chile (Chenoweth Citation2020).
8 Although NAVCO 2.1 covers nonviolent movements from 1946 to 2013, we limit our sample between 1970 and 2009 owing to the availability of data on foreign military training.
9 For example, in cases of Arab Spring protests of Egypt and Tunisia in 2011, as well as the grassroots nonviolent movement in Chile against Pinochet (1985–1988) and Anti-Banda campaign in Malawi in 1993, NAVCO codes the security force defection variables as 1. In these cases, it is known that the respective militaries sided with the civil resisters, but there is no significant evidence suggesting that police forces defected to protesters.
10 The availability of IMET data from 1970 through 2009 might raise questions about the appropriateness of a 20-year threshold, given that the data does not extend before 1970. This could cast doubt on the accuracy of information for the periods between 1970 and 1990. However, it is important to note that IMET was formally instituted in 1976, and Savage and Caverley (Citation2017) trace IMET data back to 1970 relying on the Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) information on training through the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Consequently, we can confidently assert that before that time, there were zero U.S.-trained officers (IMET-trained) in countries, ensuring the accuracy of our measure. We thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this critical issue.
11 Although U.S. foreign military training programs are funded by the U.S. government, participants are selected by sending countries. The majority of participants in U.S. foreign military training programs are rising elites in their home countries (Atkinson Citation2015). Also, militaries tend to have a policy that adds additional years of active service obligations for those who gain scholarship or attend foreign military training. See, for example, the U.S. Military Service Obligation: https://www.rand.org/paf/projects/dopma-ropma/military-service-obligation.html.
12 To avoid any biases that might arise from picking this threshold, we replicate the results with using other thresholds as well and report the findings in the Online Appendix.
13 In our dataset, out of 356 campaigns, 70 received support from at least one Western power. Among these, 30 campaigns received support solely from the U.S., 31 campaigns received joint support from the U.S. and at least one additional Western power, and 9 campaigns included Western powers without U.S. involvement. Due to small observations, these nine cases are coded within the category of no-support. However, we provide an additional analysis in the appendix where we created a distinct category for these nine cases.
14 As our variables are coded on a yearly basis, the GDP and Polity scores may be affected by the outcome of a nonviolent movement in a given year, particularly in the case of a regime change resulting in a significant increase in Polity score, for example. Since we cannot control for this, we have lagged these variables by one year to ensure a more robust analysis.
15 The number of observations in the models is lower than the original sample size for two reasons: (a) inclusion of lagged variables (Democracy and GDP); and (b) missing values in covariate variables leading to the loss of a number of cases. In particular, the variable campaign size causes 48 missing cases as it is not always easy to measure the size of participants in a campaign.
16 Given the widespread engagement of the U.S. in instances of Western support, it is difficult to determine whether the same effect would occur with support from two non-U.S. Western powers. However, we have theoretical grounds to anticipate that this effect is more likely to be applicable in cases involving U.S. support, as our emphasis is on the numbers of U.S.-trained officers as an indicator.
17 It could be beneficial to consider the insights gained from U.S. training as indicative of broader Western training when examining the connection between foreign (Western training) and defection decisions. In numerous Francophone African nations, like Chad or Mali, for instance, France plays a more pivotal role as a trainer than the U.S. Nevertheless, there is a lack of systematically collected cross-national data on training provided by other major powers, such as France, the UK, or the EU, that comes close to the quality of the data available for the U.S. Our findings show that the broader Western response holds significant importance. This might also explain why the U.S.-only reaction appears to be particularly significant for cases with the highest level of U.S. training. We thank the anonymous reviewer for highlighting this critical issue.
18 In our data, only about 20% of cases experienced security defection.