Reverse supply chain decisions with online and offline dual recycling channels considering consumer fairness concerns and channel preference

Abstract

Online recycling is becoming more prevalent as a result of the quick development of innovative technologies to enhance the recycling system. Based on consumer fairness concerns and channel preferences, we establish an online and offline dual-recycling channel reverse supply chain model in which a processor dominates and a recycler follows according to Stackelberg game theory and investigates the impact of two consumer’s behavioral preferences upon supply chain decisions. The results show that: (1) for the game leader, the impact of consumer fairness concerns is greater than that of channel preference; (2) for the game follower, the impact of channel preference is greater than that of consumer fairness concerns; (3) entrusting the recycler to collect can help the leader reduce profit losses caused by consumer fairness concerns.

Keywords:

• Consumer fairness concerns
• consumers’ preferences
• online recycling
• reverse supply chain

Data availability statement

We state that all the data within this manuscript will be available upon request.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.