Interactions and Interferences of Italian and German Nationalist Regimes in Asia during the Interwar Period (1928–1937)

Abstract

This article presents a comprehensive narration and interpretation of the political relations between nationalist regimes in Asia and Europe during the interwar history from 1928 to 1937. Authoritarian regimes with political affinities and similar autarchic economic strategies created the ground for an unprecedented collaboration among governments situated on the opposite side of the world. China, Italy, Germany had a prolonged political, military and economic dialogue which lasted for almost a decade and involved the active mediation of political leaders, scholars and highly professional military officers. The interaction with Japan disrupted that partnership and finally changed the perspectives of the strategic alliance. Ultimately, affinities and disagreements among these governments were relevant in leading the world into the abyss of the Second World War. The preparation of this article is supported by primary sources consulted at diplomatic and historical archives and historical literature written in three languages (English, German, and Italian).

Keywords:

• Nationalism
• the interwar period
• East and West relations in the interwar period
• authoritarian regimes
• international fascism

Introduction: political affinities and autocratic ambitions

Nationalism was the most engaging and powerful historical force in the first post-war period. Nationalist doctrines were an inspirational source of dramatic political change, thanks to a new generation of intellectuals who laid the groundwork for the political rise of nationalist movements and promoted patriotic values. In the interwar period, nationalist propaganda rapidly emerged as a new source of political energy in developed and developing countries alike. Supporters of nationalist ideals joined parties and movements with which they had strong affinities and supported the ascent to power of conservative and autocratic political forces. In the years following the First World War, political developments in China, Italy and Germany had this strong common denominator. The connection between the emergence of nationalisms, and the doctrinal foundation of national-fascism and national-socialism is historically documented and supported by undeniable evidence. Nationalist movements and related intellectuals contributed and supported the rise of autocratic regimes. Nationalist ideals were responsible for the consequences of the wave of political extremism that gradually led the world to its next global conflict.

Autocratic affinities and related autarchic economic policies made the cooperation between the Chinese, Italian and German regimes possible and mutually attractive. In the 1920s, Italian fascism was the first autocratic regime in Europe to take power (in October 1922)¹ and commit the country to a project of rapid industrial development and a comprehensive process of modernisation of the economic system. In this context, domestic policies were largely governed by the idea of improving efficiency in bureaucracy and supporting industrial production. Italian enterprises with government support were searching for new markets to export national products and import vital raw materials. Fascism wanted to liberate the country from foreign political interferences and economic exploitation.

The cause of ‘mutilated victory’, after the Treaty of Versailles, was embraced by Italian nationalists, irredentists, and military factions and, in several situations, inspired spectacular actions of courage, such as the Gabriele D’Annunzio’s attempt to occupy the Dalmatian city of Fiume (today’s Rijeka) with irregular militia and the establishment of the Italian Regency of Carnaro in 1919.² The same nationalist groups became the most enthusiastic supporters of the fascist regime in the following years.

In those same years, after the collapse of the Qing dynasty and the dramatic events of the First World War, China was trying to emerge from decades of conflicts and social unrest in the new republican era, to develop its economy, improve infrastructures, and acquire an international political role and reputation. The country was still isolated and not integrated in a network of international political alliances. The goal of developing the country could not be achieved without the support of influential and powerful allies with similar political objectives and economic ambitions. China had no experienced public administrators or the necessary political unity to plan ambitious economic targets. As political scientist Anthony James Gregor (1929–2019) explains,³ the economic challenges and political confusion in that specific historical context in the early 1900s were reflected in opposite ideological choices, leftist and conservatist, but all inspired by the idea of bringing China to regain control of its own destiny. Sun Yat-sen expressed his thoughts in unequivocal terms:

China has already endured several decades of economic domination from the Powers, and nobody has felt irritated at all. The result is that China is everywhere becoming a colony of the Powers. The people of the nation still think we are only a semi-colony and comfort themselves with this term, but in reality, we have been crushed by the economic strength of the Powers to a greater degree than if we were a full colony. China is not the colony of one nation but of all, and we are not the slaves of one country, but of all. I think we ought to be called a hypo-colony…⁴

Even China felt betrayed by the terms imposed by the Treaty of Versailles. China joined side with the victorious alliance during the Great War, but the dominant, victorious powers at the end of the conflict denied a solution to the main Chinese demand concerning the province of Shandong. The province was instead assigned by the members of the Entente to the Japanese administration.⁵ As a consequence, China did not sign the Treaty of Versailles. Instead, new patriotic movements promoting an antiforeign campaign ignited the first flame of the new intellectual reformist force that contributed to the rise of the students and labour movements and the reorganization of the nationalist party (Guómíndǎng).

The post-war socio-political situation in Germany presented a scenario of depression and humiliation. The Great War was a national trauma for Germany. The nation came out humiliated by the peace negotiations and faced radical social and political changes in the following years. No longer an imperialist power, Germany had to rebuild the own economy and reformulate its international policy. The Treaty stripped Germany of the own defensive strengths. It made impotent its air power, much of its navy, and reduce the army resembling the duty of a police force rather than a defensive organization. National socialism emerged from the incapability of the political parties to achieve a sustainable coalition and lead the country out of the sands of desperation and the economic depression. Hitler raised to power supported by the discontent of the masses and the need of decisionism and rediscovering the pride of the German people. Hitler joined the political challenge in a national election only in 1928, after attempting to undermine the stability of Weimar Republic, at the beginning achieving a modest consent of less than 3 per cent, but with a rapid ascent, he became the Führer only five years later, in 1933. At the time, Mussolini had already acquired power more than a decade earlier, undertaken a broaden political international campaign supported by unrelented propaganda. At this point of history, as later explained, the political relations between Chinese and Italian regimes were already established and consolidated.

What was the main force of attraction between Chiang’s and Mussolini governments? The answer is political and economic. Italian fascism was born from foundations of nationalism and patriotism with the ideals of liberating the country from foreign interferences and regain dignity and build national identity.⁶ At the beginning of the century and the pre-fascist nationalist intellectuals, such as Enrico Corradini and Alfredo Rocco, inspired the doctrinal ground for the national-fascist ideology.⁷

Nationalism is above all sentiment, impulse, natural instinct. One loves the homeland, which is not just a territory, but a nation, just as one loves the family. But since the nation lives and acts in the world, it needs a meditated and prepared action, for which sentiment or impulse is no longer enough, but a conscience and a will are needed… Nationalism does not deny contrasts between classes, does not even deny the class struggle, but believes that their spiritual and material importance is infinitely inferior to that of contrasts between nations and the struggle of nations; believes that they must be subordinated to the requirements of national solidarity…⁸

Based on his accurate analysis and comparison, Gregor glimpses strong affinities between Sun Yat-sen’s nationalist ideology and that of Italian fascism. The objectives of self-government and independence from any external influence together with the claim of ethnic and cultural identity to strengthen the spirit of the nation and drive it towards more ambitious goals, such as a self-sustaining economic growth, were peculiarities, which shared a common intended achievement. In Italy, this goal was further implemented with the experience of economic autarchy promoted by fascism from the 1930s.

Gregor further examines this topic and the parallelism with the Italian and Chinese experience in the same period and asserts, ‘Given the vast differences in political circumstances, the particulars in each case differed in emphasis and specific content, but their similarities are unmistakable.’ Particularly when we analyse the objectives of economic and industrial modernisation and the hostility towards foreign imperialistic attempts to influence the economy, the plans of the two leaderships seem to reflect the same strategy and objectives.⁹ These ideological affinities, made a political, economic and, as explained in the following pages, military connection between the two countries viable.

There is not a direct parallel literature about similarities in the political development in Germany and China. Indeed, the two countries had common economic and military interests, but there was not an immediate political doctrinal interest in the development of the relations. As said, Hitler political proposal emerged as inspiration of an autocratic regime about a decade after Mussolini’s fascism. This factor is an essential distinction in the political partnership between China and Germany and differentiate it from the Sino-Italian relations. However, it is undeniable that several of the doctrinal ideas inspiring the Chinese and Italian nationalist regimes had a common denominator also in the German leadership. Hitler pursued a policy of autocracy and autarchy, as much as Mussolini and Chiang try to achieve in the own countries.

Another important point of distinction between the Italian fascist and German national-socialist attitude was that at the beginning of his regime, Hitler and his foreign minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop, failed to recognize the importance of Sino-German political relations and trade policies even for the military industry, while this was the main goal of Mussolini, always in search for supporting the domestic industries as a strategic priority. Hitler, following several clear signs of distrust.,¹⁰ had more positive attention for Japan, because politically positioned in line with the German foreign policy which at the time opposed Soviet Union and Great Britain as main international challengers in the race for Germany to become a dominating power. In case of military conflict, Japan could be of great support opening a second front in the Far East against these great enemies of Germany. Nevertheless, German private industries, as explained in the following pages, remained more attracted by the opportunity of a Sino-German cooperation and were encouraged by the advice of a significant German presence of military advisers in China.

When Sun Yat-sen died in 1925, Chiang Kai-shek inherited the legacy of his mentor’s envisioned national project. The Generalissimo chose to stand for a strong conservative position, which allowed political cooperation between the international national-autocratic regimes as a match for the Chinese nationalism. The process of rapprochement began only when Chiang Kai-shek took power as president of China in 1928. In fact, differently from the Italian experience and in line with the political strategy pursued by Sun Yat-sen, Canton’s Nationalist government sought the cooperation of the country’s various political ideologies, including Marxism, with the sole purpose of unifying the nation. Sun truly believed that it was still possible to form an alliance with Soviet Russia, which he admired for the political enthusiasm of its youth and the constant revolutionary vigour.¹¹ Sun envisioned an economic programme with private capital and state initiatives, whereas the state had to maintain control of strategic manufacturing industries and infrastructures. In Sun’s political vision, state socialism in economic affairs could coexist with nationalist elements of social organisation. For instance, Sun emphasised the need to avoid a socio-proletarian revolution, and state and industry had to cooperate in the same project to transform the country. The Chinese people should be educated to discipline, loyalty, and readiness to sacrifice individualism for national interests. Civic and patriotic reformation of the society, to recover and assert traditional Chinese values and virtues, was one the main pillars of Sun’s China vision, influenced by the traditional Confucian doctrine.¹² Sun’s Three Principles – nationalism, democracy, and welfare of the people – can be seen as intimately related to the Confucian doctrine based on values of morality and collective interest. In the early years of the republic, groups of intellectuals and students of all political views committed themselves to a common effort to reform and modernise the country. However, with the death of Sun in 1925, Marxist-Leninists and conservative nationalists inevitably parted. After 1927,¹³ the most conservative wing, supported by the army, continued to back Chiang. The Generalissimo opposed the Left-Nationalist Party and Communist Party until December 1936,¹⁴ when the military developments concerning the Sino-Japanese War made it necessary – or more accurately, forced him – to cooperate with his political rivals.

At the beginning of his government, Chiang Kai-shek aimed to combine militarist national modernity with nationalist Guomindang spirit. He was indeed impressed by Prussian-German militarist model and by the political energy of the Italian fascist doctrine, especially in the economic field. He found common ground in shared values and objectives and wanted to learn more about its principles and methods. The ideological affinities and objectives contributed to a more rapid diffusion of the political and economic vision of fascism in China.

China’s nationalist leadership

The Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek was an admirer, for different reasons, of Mussolini’s and Hitler’s regimes. He supported the influence of principles and ideas of fascism in the Chinese culture. However, he understood the obstacles to importing foreign ideas that had no connection with the past of his people. Although he was fascinated by the transformative ability of fascism, he also realised that the ‘ideology’ must be adapted to the Chinese culture, which had its roots in the classical philosophy of Confucianism, the model that inspired and made the Middle Kingdom great and powerful.¹⁵ The word ‘fascism’ entered the vocabulary of Republican China in the early 1930s (法西斯主义, fàxīsī zhǔyì)¹⁶ while the international propaganda carried out by the Italian government was intensely celebrating the successes of the regime in developing the Italian economy and the achievements of the government in reorganising the public administration. In the early 1930s, Mussolini and fascism were at the height of international reputation. News and articles about Italy and its leader also appeared in China.¹⁷ Italy’s regime was one of the first authoritarian governments to emerge in post-war Europe, and Chiang drew inspiration from it without, however, neglecting to build ties with similar political expressions in Germany and Japan. Chiang was convinced that fascism could be the appropriate solution for the country:

What China needs today is not an ‘ism’ that discusses what kind of ideal future China will have, but a method that will save China now […] Fascism is a stimulant for a declining society […] Can Fascism save China? We answer, yes. Fascism is what China most needs.¹⁸

The political leaders of the nationalist government also began a radical transformation, to such an extent that some historians regard the period between 1927 and 1936 as the phase of fascist ideology in China.¹⁹ Chinese nationalism and Italian fascism shared similar social attitudes and model of governance. Echoing the Italian experience, Chiang encouraged the establishment of the Blue Shirts Society²⁰ (Sānmín Zhǔyì Lán Yī Shè), also known as the Society for the Vigorous Practice of the Three Peoples’ Principles.²¹ The Blue Shirts took on the role of defenders of the nationalist party and were an obvious emulation of the organisations established in Italy and Germany. Just like Mussolini’s first paramilitary organization called Fasci di Combattimento (also known as the Black Shirts, established in 1919),²² the Brown Shirts and the Blue Shirts, were created to protect the regimes and were antiliberal and anti-communist. The opinions about the influence of fascism in the political model adopted by the nationalists in China is open and controversial. According to Lloyd Eastman, for example, the Blue Shirts were unmistakably of fascist origins. Another author, Michael Godley, asserts with evidence that Chiang intended to shape the principles of Guomindang using the model of the Italian fascism.²³ However, other scholars, such as Maria Hsia Chang,²⁴ propose that those assumptions were overestimated and that the similarities were the result of a frank admiration for an authoritarian and hierarchical system, which in the end led nationalist government to be intrigued by Italian fascist proposals and attitudes. In fact, the Turkish leader, Kemal Atatürk, was also mentioned as a model of inspiration for Chiang at the time.

Overall, it is probably more the fact that Chiang wanted to inspire his followers with sense of sacrifice and loyalty to reaffirm true traditional Chinese values. He found in fascism the vital strength and the doctrinal reference to implement a decisive programme of structural changes starting from his own closest collaborators. He was attracted by fascism’s capacity to maintain discipline and allowed the adoption of fascist attitudes not only within the military but also in the government offices.²⁵ Public officials and military officers were exposed to their thinking and working methods and certain behaviours of fascism were absorbed in the military culture during the frequent training missions organised in Europe, particularly in Italy.

The unrelenting propaganda of fascist regime in those years and certain mutual economic interests led to more initiatives proposed by Italian and Chinese governments. The Generalissimo sent missions of his own to Italy and Germany, to conclude trade and military agreements and familiarise themselves with fascist and national socialist ideology. Hsiang-Hsi Kung (1881–1967),²⁶ a member of the Kuomintang Executive Committee, minister of industry and brother-in-law of the Generalissimo, joined one of those high-level meetings in Rome. In February 1933,²⁷ Kung met with the Pope and Mussolini. Returning to China, the Chinese minister spoke directly to Chiang about his favourable impressions of Italy. From that mission, the foundations for economic and military cooperation were laid.

After Kung, another member of Chiang’s family, the other brother-in-law, Tse-Ven Soong (1894–1971), finance minister and governor of the central bank,²⁸ arrived in Italy with Ciano, son in law of Benito Mussolini, when returning to Italy after concluding his diplomatic mission as Consul General in China and was designated for a new assignment in Mussolini’s government. Song scheduled his journey in conjunction with the World Economic Conference in London and planned to meet with high-level European representatives.²⁹ In London on 1 July 1933, Soong signed with the Italian finance minister Guido Jung (1876–1949) an agreement that finally resolved the controversial issue of the Boxer indemnity.³⁰ He then travelled through Italy from 3 to 14 July, where he met Mussolini (13 July), During the meeting in Rome, King Vittorio Emanuele III awarded Soong with a medal of honour.³¹ The mission was crucial for future relations between the two governments, which endorsed cooperation in fields of national interest, from trade to cultural exchanges, but above all, as strongly requested by Chiang, military support.³²

Chiang did not fail to openly appreciate the courtesy and the political efforts of the fascist regime and its leader. Mussolini, from his side, explicitly thanked for the genuine esteem espoused by Chiang, which added strength to their political relations and to their open collaboration, as evidenced by this telegram of August 1934 to, Luigi Neyrone, General Consul in Shanghai:

I ask Your Excellency to meet the Generalissimo personally, to thank him for his expressions of esteem and to tell him that I agree with his contentment and his work in general to implement his government plans in line with the Italian politics. This will only give undoubted advantages to the two countries. By adapting China’s requirements to the principles of the Fascist State, the body of the Republic will be strengthened, able to acquire real control over the whole country and meet the needs of defence in foreign policy. The importance of these results, which can generate even greater Italian-Chinese collaboration, certainly does not escape Chiang Kai-shek, who knows how such collaboration is conducted with the most friendly sentiment and spirit of equality […] Finally, Your Excellency will warn, in a very reserved and prudent way, Chiang Kai-shek about the serious suspicions of intent between Germany and Japan, well-substantiated suspicions, I would say almost about the nature of things, as it is natural that Germany wants to loosen Russian pressure at the eastern borders. If the Generalissimo considers it prudent to replace military advisors and turn to Italy, we will be happy to meet him in this field as well.³³

The experience of the German military ‘advisors’ in China

The words of Mussolini mention the presence of military advisors in China and open an interesting new context in the relations between the three regimes in question. His words confirm that besides the appearances, at the time, the duce had a personal agenda in matters of international relations, not only strictly political but more importantly economic in nature and objectives. In the 1930s, the economic competition was intense, even with political allies and China was at the same time a potential source of natural resources and an attractive market.

However, Chiang was always an admirer of the Prussian discipline and efficiency adopted by the German army. From the point of view of a military leader, Germany was a source of powerful attraction and this favoured the initial developments of economic relations with Germany, whenever there was the opportunity.

According to statistical records, in the early 1930s, Germany rapidly regained its pre-WWI position in China. It was helped by the recognised efficiency of its industries and the willingness of China to cooperate economically with countries, such as Italy, with political affinities and without any political privileges in its own territory.

According to statistics published by Charles Remer in 1933,³⁴ in 1913, Germany held 4.7 per cent of the Chinese trade and only 1.3 per cent after WWI in 1921, whereas the German firms represented, respectively, in the same years 7.7 and 0.9 per cent of the total foreign firms in China. However, in the early 1930s, German trade with China grew rapidly to reach 4.2 per cent of China’s foreign trade. Germany enjoyed an enviable position in the commercial and industrial fields, especially in the heavy and chemical industrial sectors, while China supplied Germany with essential raw material needed for the industries of war, especially manganese and tungsten. German capital invested in China also grew up mainly in infrastructural projects. Starting from 1934, a German consortium led by the firm Otto Wolff was awarded with several railway contracts, such as the 300-kilometre Yushan–Nanchang section of the Chekiang–Kiangsi railway and the 200-kilometre extension from Nanchang to Pingxiang.³⁵

As occurred, and later explained, for the Italian political and economic connections, the Chinese interest in economic affairs with Germany increased with the ascent of the nationalist government. Chiang Kai-shek sent several representatives of his government to Germany, such as Chang Hsueh-liang, Hu Han-min, Wang Ching-wei, T’ang Leang-li, Tai Chi-t’ao, and Chiang Wei-kuo (Chiang’s son), to build an anti-communist political partnership, to learn military organisation and at the same time to earn support against the Japanese ambitions in China.

The German military advisors already in China played an important role in the development of the military and economic relationships. After the defeat suffered in the First World War, the German army was dismantled by the terms of the Treaty of Versailles and statutorily reduced to a figure of 100,000 (art. 163). The ousted large number of officers and soldiers were forced to retire or to be discharged at a time in which the consequences of the war were still gravely affecting the country. Unemployment and poverty added social disruption to the disgrace of the defeat. Differently from the experience of the Italian military cooperation established with China, which was clearly supported by the fascist regime without any international restriction, German governments during the early Weimar period always denied their direct involvement in sending military advisors and in assisting the Chinese nationalist army in military training, because of the clause of Art. 179 of the Treaty of Versailles that banned German military industry and officers to provide any support to foreign countries:³⁶

Germany agrees, from the coming into force of the present Treaty, not to accredit nor to send to any foreign country any military, naval or air mission, nor to allow any such mission to leave her territory, and Germany further agrees to take appropriate measures to prevent German nationals from leaving her territory to become enrolled in the Army, Navy or Air service of any foreign Power, or to be attached to such Army, Navy or Air service for the purpose of assisting in the military, naval or air training thereof, or otherwise for the purpose of giving military, naval or air instruction in any foreign country […]

The German military establishment disliked the Weimar Republic because of the passive attitude of the post-war governments and the most qualified officers pursued the own goals and policies abroad as individual professionals. Within ten years from the end of WWI, about 150 Germans, mostly military veterans, immigrated to China during Chiang’s ruling. Reports sent from the Italian delegation in Shanghai to the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs reveal most of the names of those officers but also underline the policy of the German government in not providing direct assistance to avoid any involvement. The reports also mention the attempt of German officers to liaise with Italian military staff to overcome the issue of international restrictions concerning military equipment.³⁷ The Italian Ministry of War, in that circumstance, gave the authorisation to the Italian intermediaries to negotiate the production and supply of military material in Italy. German military personnel engaged in training troops in China worked as private citizens with individual employment contracts, without ties or commitments formally referable to the German government. This is an important point, often not clearly underlined in history books. Often historians recall the strong connections between Germany and China and the military and industrial cooperation but seem to ignore the strong limitation imposed by the international treaties, at least until the rise of Adolf Hitler, who, however, as earlier explained, clearly favoured a more strategic relation with Japan.

Political interference from Berlin was minimal until the German presence of ‘mercenaries’ was meant to fight communism and there was no direct mention on fighting the Japanese aggression. On the other side, instead, Chiang’s government relied on the fact that German military leadership, including the Chief of the German Army from 1920 to 1926, Gen. Hans von Seeckt, openly declared himself against the idea of supporting Japan in the contemporary political context.³⁸ Also, it was an evident fact that Japanese industrial presence in occupied territories in China at the time meant the exclusion from those provinces of foreign industries for the benefit of Japanese manufacturers. Therefore, there was no economic advantage for Germany in supporting Japanese interests in China in the early 1930s.

The strategic presence of German military advisors began in 1927, when the Soviet military advisors were expelled from China and the national government moved to Nanjing. Chiang turned to Germany for aid in military training for the excellent reputation of its army in matters of discipline and efficiency. Chiang’s nationalist government searched for advisors among the ranks of German Imperial Army, since, as said, many of them were hostile to Weimar Republic and, more importantly, strenuous opponents to the rampant spread of communism. However, it is also evident that Chiang was a strong admirer of German military organization and discipline. The first of the list selected by Chiang was the ultra-nationalist Gen. Erich Ludendorff, but he declined the invitation and recommended his most trusted officer, Col. Max Bauer (1869–1929), who became the first high-ranking officer to move to China in December 1927. Bauer and Ludendorff had several characteristics in common which made the choice the suitable for Chiang’s goals. They both came from middle class families and their career was a convincing example of determination and technical skill. Their style of leadership was unconventional and radical in adopting changes in contrast with officers with aristocratic origin who still felt a kind of feudal respect for the emperor. These aspects were certainly appreciated by Chiang, who came from humble origins.

Bauer not only served as Chiang’s advisor but also started the selection of qualified Chinese officers to form a division able to mould the entire Nationalist army and was the main intermediary in selecting German industries for supplying armament. To the public and the business counterparts Bauer always qualified himself as Chiang’s economic adviser.³⁹ He returned to Germany in March 1928 accompanied by Chiang’s trusted officer, Chen Yi and the trade commissioner Yu Ta-Wei of the Chinese legation in Berlin, for a mission aimed at establishing political and industrial relations, but it failed to achieve concrete results.⁴⁰ Instead, the mission raised suspicion on Bauer’s activities in China. British and French secret services disclosed the true nature of the activity and, following concerns also expressed by Japan, the German government restricted his involvement and business intermediation.⁴¹ The news published in the main international newspapers increased the public attention on the case and made every attempt to achieve a practical result impossible. It all occurred in a delicate moment in which German Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann was negotiating the new reparation settlement and his mission to be convincing had to present the German proposal expressed with open sincerity.

Therefore, Bauer’s mission was unsuccessful, but it is interesting to notice that Chiang’s strategy to consider commercial and military affairs as inseparable in negotiating international relations, and this was a crucial factor later contributing to develop the relations with the Italians as well.

Because all the international restrictions in place, in China, some German industries remained for long behind other competitors in some strategic sectors, such as aviation, in which certainly the country could successfully compete. In this important industry, the contingent situation favoured Americans and Italians, who were able to build their own assembling and training facilities in China, without constraints. ⁴² Bauer also advised Chiang to consider further foreign missions led by foreign advisors and involving important aspects of reorganisation of the country, including the financial system. This latter aspect was considered of vital importance to allow future investment in infrastructure serving the project of modernisation of the army, such as the establishment of a central military academy under the strong leadership of the Chinese central government. ⁴³ Bauer did not see any of the policy recommendations achieved, because he died on 6 May 1929 after contracting smallpox. It was indeed a heavy loss for Chiang.⁴⁴

After Bauer, Lt. Col. Herman Kriebel (1929–1930) and Gen. Georg Wetzell (1930–1934) followed in his footsteps, but Chiang was not satisfied with their performance and methods, in addition to the fact that they never blended well with the local environment and culture. ⁴⁵ This despite the fact that Chiang agreed to implement a strategy facilitating the cooperation with German entrepreneurs. This was the main purpose of the newly established National Defence Planning Commission, which intended to create a suitable environment for German industries to settle in China. This was a moment of challenges for Chiang’s government because of the Japanese occupation of Manchuria, the richest region of natural resources. The plan for the economic industrialization proposed in fact to use the exploitation of raw materials as export source to encourage and settle the building of infrastructures like road and railways expected to be assigned to German companies, but the richest region of natural resources was in Japanese hands at the time.

When Hitler sized full power and launched full rearmament in Germany in 1933, Germany and China found this project ideally answering the mutual needs. Berlin government gave to Chiang even the opportunity to use the own financial resources to increase the import of German products This obviously increased German influence and reputation. But China had not an impeccable record in financial settlements, rather the opposite, and this jeopardised a more comprehensive effort to develop industrial relations. Germany and China found a compromise in the terms of settlements with China accommodating German urgent need for tungsten and manganese for the military industries. Things moved relatively slowly when Gen. Georg Wetzell was in China.⁴⁶ But gradually improved in time. For instance, it was estimated that German companies acquired contracts equal to about half of the railways built from 1927 to 1935.⁴⁷ Repayments were in the latter case linked to railways flow of revenues, but even in this case the incoming war challenged the expectations of full settlement of capital and interests.

The situation further improved with Gen. Hans von Seeckt (1934–35) and Gen. Alexander Ernst Hermann von Falkenhausen (1935–38), who are recognized as the most appreciated and trusted advisors of Chiang. They adapted to and understood Chinese culture and society. However, the success of their task was strictly connected with the aleatory dynamics of politics. Seeckt (1866–1936) was highly respected by Chiang, so much that he was revered as the ‘military Confucius of China’.⁴⁸ The General had excellent relations with German industrialists who were eager to pursue the offer of new opportunities and markets for the national trade and the Reichsminister of Economics, Hjalmar Schacht, supported the strategic plan. The collaboration respected national interests of each partner and did not create interference with negative influence in the own economic environment. Seeckt personally supervised the establishment and monitor the functioning of relation between the Reichswehr, representatives of German industries and Chinese politicians.

As reiterated, what most interested German industrialists and German regime as well was the supply of strategic raw material, such as tungsten, needed for the industries of rearmament. The tungsten diplomacy gradually increased its effectiveness until 1937 when the Second Sino-Japanese war broke out. Statistics reported by Kurt Bloch in ‘German Interests and Policies in the Far East’, ⁴⁹ reveal the apex of trade reached still in 1937 of 8,037 tons compared to 2,510 tons traded in 1934.

For Chiang, the need for a well-trained army was an absolute priority. As recommended by Seeckt, following the plan suggested by Bauer, a training brigade, Lehrbrigade, was set up and served as propeller for the training of other army divisions. The 87^th and 88^th Training Divisions became the best armed and trained in China and were used during the war against the Japanese. ⁵⁰ Italian diplomatic reports from China mention that about 120,000 soldiers were highly trained with the model of the Reichswehr that Seeckt had personally led in Germany. ⁵¹ When Seeckt returned to Germany for health reasons, he was replaced by von Falkenhausen (1878–1966), an austere general and veteran of WWI with military experience on the Turkish front. But the rise to power of Hitler’s national socialism brought a pragmatic reorientation of the entire German foreign policy, despite several inconsistencies remaining in the Far East.

In 1936, Germany was involved in the Spanish Civil War, like Italy, and at the end of the year Chiang was forced to deal with the Xian incident.⁵² The Sino-German cooperation faced first a period of slowdown until the Sino-Japanese conflict became a full-scale war. The German mission and plans ended by mid-1938. As said, Hitler had his own military strategic vision and this directly influenced the perspectives of the international alliances and, according to wishes of the Führer Germany committed herself to a stronger alliance with Japan. As secretly anticipated by Mussolini to Chiang these signs of German-Japanese liaison started earlier, in 1934.⁵³ The German diplomatic apparat supported that political decision and played an essential role in strengthening the relations with Japan. However, economic relations with China had to continue in the interest of the German industries even without a pro-China political strategy. This went on until 30 April 1936, when the signing of the German–Manchurian Trade Agreement dissolved even any economic doubt about the future trend of the alliances. In the intentions of the signatories, the treaty was the mean to solve that political predicament and finally convince German industries to find Japanese partners in the ‘Japanese’ Manchukuo. The Anti-Comintern Pact signed with Japan on 25 November 1936 was then the final and definitive act of that strategic plan.

Relations between Chinese and German industrialists did not end abruptly. Also, von Falkenhausen continued his advising role since he had committed himself to bring the mission to a honourable conclusion. He guided the future military reorganization of the country even beyond the army interests. He encouraged Chiang to initiate a naval training mission for Chinese officers and the acquisition of several German submarines and cruisers for the Chinese navy, which, however, never arrived in China due to the fact that the war broke out before the deliveries. Von Falkenhausen organised heavy artillery regiments and promote a self-sufficient munitions production. Chiang’s government purchased large quantities of artilleries and anti-aircraft guns from Krupps, tanks from Daimler and Henshel and to underline the training similarities with the German army soldiers started to wear German-style helmets and use Mauser pistols and rifles. The evidence suggests that the rearmament of Germany and the Chinese mobilization in preparation for a war against Japan although historically unrelated were in reality linked with a mutual sense of needs and integrated in reciprocal national interests. The two armies were organised and prepared according to new modern models and the German Wehrmacht was the leading example to follow.

In June 1937, Minister Kung visited Germany and met the Führer. Sino-German relations, at least for a short period, were again revived by words of friendship and strategic partnership. One month later, the Second Sino-Japanese War ended that illusion in the same way, as later explained, it changed the perspective of the relations with the fascist regime. German and Italian governments later attempted mediation between China and Japan to end the war, but Japanese determination and the Chinese nationalist-communist alliance made that goal unachievable from both the sides.

Von Falkenhausen performed his task and, ignoring instructions from Berlin, continued advising ‘his’ trained army during the siege of Shanghai and Nanjing. Undeniably, Japanese forces, although lower in number, were better trained and organised and easily advanced and prevailed, but on Chinese side, improvements were also attributed to German tactical influence, as in the battle of Tái’érzhuāng (in Shandong) in March 1938, which is considered the first major victory of the Chinese army in the war. ⁵⁴ It was an unexpected success with several uncertainties about the effectiveness. Even von Falkenhausen was disappointed by the fact that Chinese had lost an important moment of advantage in failing to pursue the enemy.⁵⁵ The Japanese regrouped and returned to battle with a different spirit and tactics. Anyway, after that battle, von Falkenhausen received a dispatch, as most of the German officers in China, from the German Foreign Minister von Ribbentrop asking, as express order of the Führer, for his return to Germany as he did, also fearing for his family’s safety, in July 1938. Similarly, to what occurred to the Italian Air Force Mission, as later explained, Hitler decided to recall the own support to the Chinese cause to avoid an embarrassing justification with the new Japanese allied. Again, and remarkably in the same way as presented to the new Italian allied, Japanese vehemently protested about shipment of armaments to the Chinese. The Italian and the German governments at first conveniently underlined the position of neutrality in the conflict but later, when the scale of conflict could anticipate a much longer conflict, more coherently complied and halt military supply to China. It was a tribute to pay to the consolidation of the alliance. On 28 April 1938, Herman Göring instructed that the German military export to China was to be stopped. On 12 May 1938, Germany recognized Manchukuo, just a few months after Italy did on 29 November 1937. These sudden decisions bitterly shook Chiang’s government. However, it is interesting to underline the fact that the governments maintained an open communication, which was later used in an attempt of peace negotiation, as later explained.

As said, Hitler was very specific in asking an immediate return to Germany of all the advisers, or losing the citizenship and have the properties confiscated. Most of them departed by July 5^th and Chiang gave a farewell dinner.⁵⁶ Some of the German officers remained faithful to the own mission. They decided to remain in service with the Chinese and for those returning to Germany, von Falkenhausen forbade return via Japan. ⁵⁷ Two decades later, in 1958, as a testimony of appreciation for the service provided, Chiang Kai-shek sent a medal to von Falkenhausen; Chiang was the only man, the German general once commented, who remembered the service he rendered during his military career. ⁵⁸

The German military experience is deeply entangled to that of the Italian military officers in China, as explained in the following pages. Chiang always paid tribute to recognition and appreciation to foreign advisors when a sincere personal relation was established in serving the exclusive interest of the nation. It did not occur frequently because, being a soldier more than a politician, Chiang’s gesture was always based and motivated by real actions and valour, more than political interests and relations.

Mussolini and Chiang kai-shek: political affinities and military partnership

Chiang never met Mussolini in person, but diplomatic archives present the evidence that there was mutual admiration, and their governments certainly had an intense collaboration through their representatives. The figure who most contributed to the political rapprochement of the two parties was, without doubt, Mussolini’s son in law, the Count Galeazzo Ciano (1903–1944). ⁵⁹

Ciano had two separate experiences in China. The first began in 1927, when he was appointed secretary of the Italian legation in China during the mandate of Daniele Varè (1880–1956) as chief of delegation. The latter was a veteran, highly respected international diplomat, and true expert on Oriental history, was appointed plenipotentiary minister in Peking in 1927. The diplomat wrote in his memories:

I was considered an ‘expert’ on Chinese things, and in 1927, when a major crisis arose, I was hurriedly recalled from Luxembourg and told to go out to Peking […] There was trouble in China. There is always trouble in China. It would be strange were it otherwise […]

(Thursday, 10th March) I was received by Mussolini at 7 p.m. He seemed in excellent spirit and told me, in almost the same words as the king, that he understood very little of what was happening in China: ‘When you get there, you will inform me.’ ⁶⁰

Varè’s words confirm the general impression that Italian diplomacy in those years lacked guidelines and specific knowledge of Chinese affairs, but it could not be otherwise, given the uncertainties characterising the political affairs and conflicts of power in China.

Replacing Varè was for Ciano a challenging task and indeed was an honour with high responsibility. Ciano had started his diplomatic career after giving up journalistic and literary ambitions. He was never a fanatic fascist, perhaps more a nationalist, but indeed an opportunist. He was helped by the eminent profile of his father, a loyal and respected supporter of fascism and a member of Mussolini’s government. However, it is also true that Ciano had innate diplomatic skills and a charismatic personality. He was assigned to Peking after working in some consular offices in South America (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Edda Mussolini e Galeazzo Ciano at the wedding reception in Villa Torlonia on 24 April 1930 (License acquired by Istituto Luce).

photo reproducing newlyweds during the wedding reception in Villa Torlonia in Rome.

Ciano returned to Italy in 1929 and was assigned again to China after a brief diplomatic experience in the Vatican. Before departing for the new mission, he married Edda, the eldest daughter of Benito Mussolini.

When he arrived in China, Ciano decided to reside in Shanghai rather than Peking, because he knew well the vibrant environment of one of the most lively and dynamic cities in the world. Shanghai was also closer to Nanjing, which Chiang had chosen as the place of his government.⁶¹

The couple remained in China until 1933 and, despite several unofficial sentimental stories,⁶² remained united and helped to carry out the main mission in the diplomatic interest of the country with an outstanding impact.⁶³ They were constantly committed to bringing local and international personalities in their own circle of connections with the primary intent of promoting the image of the new Italy and fascism. Overall, the couple transformed the consulate into a youthful and dynamic environment. The official handover of responsibilities between Varè and Ciano took place on 1 July 1931. On 1 October, Galeazzo and Edda announced the birth of the first son, Fabrizio, in Shanghai. ⁶⁴ Ciano was a witness of the most critical period in Chiang’s rise to power, starting with the renegotiation of political relations between China and the Soviet Union, which gradually fell apart after the death of Sun Yat-sen and the following civil conflict, which irreparably disrupted the process of Chinese unity.

Ciano attended the sessions of the Guomindang Central Executive Council in 1930 and, inspired by the development of the political events, wrote several reports to ministries in Italy. The young consul was impressed by the profuse energy of the new China and the extraordinary vigour of the new generations called to transform the country. At the time, Chinese youth were invited to get educated abroad and to learn about international culture and languages. ⁶⁵ It was Ciano who proposed the leadership of the Italian fascism to be involved in the political process of modernization of China. He found in the political events occurring in China strong analogies with the history of Italian fascism, starting with the proposal of a new electoral law which resembled the fascist corporative model. It related the proportion of the delegates to the respective social and professional categories with the political dominance of the party over the respective appointments, as in the corporative system implemented in Italy. Ciano underlined Chiang’s role and strategic ability:

[…] Chiang Kai-shek has shown on several occasions that he is a man who knows how to confront danger, who knows, in difficult situations, to find the key to the most intricate skein to lead himself and the government he represents to safety. And about this, those who have followed the inept and so unmanly policies of the Chinese governments in recent years can only be favourably impressed […]⁶⁶

The initial collaboration involved the mission of academics, like the jurist Prof. Attilio Lavagna who lectured at the academy of magistrate and worked for two years to the new Chinese penal code; Alessandro Sardi, President of Istituto Luce who promoted the filmmaking industry; Angelo Omodeo, engineer who was sent to China by the League of Nations to present a solution to the devastating floods of the Yangtze River.

However, the apex of the relations between the two countries, as it was for the German experience, had a military nature and occurred in 1933 with the departure from Italy of the Air Force Mission to be stationed in Nanchang in today’s Jiangxi province.⁶⁷ The mission was mutually agreed by Benito Mussolini and Chiang Kai-shek for the training of Chinese pilots and the construction of an assembling factory for Italian aircrafts. The industrial plant was the most important Italian investment in China in the interwar period. The project of constructing a factory for assembling Italian aircrafts and establishing a modern training facility in the military airfield in Nanchang was a mutual political decision, as first discussed by Chinese Finance Minister H. H. Kung when he visited Italy and met Mussolini and Ciano in February 1933. Formal and diplomatic contacts prepared for a training mission that was designed to enhance the strength and capability of the Chinese Air Force, an accomplishment which was strongly desired by Chiang, who considered it to be of the utmost strategic importance. The Air Force mission was then formalised with a diplomatic request to the fascist government on 10 April 1933,⁶⁸ along with a purchase order for 100 million lire worth of military aircrafts from Fabbrica Italiana Automobili Torino (F.I.A.T.), Breda, Società Idrovolanti Alta Italia (S.I.A.I.) and Caproni. At the time, the Italian aviation industry was considered to be amongst the most advanced and competitive aviation industries.

The final terms of the agreement were decided during Tse-Ven Soong’s mission in Italy in July 1933. The factory was later constructed in Nanchang, in today’s Jiangxi province. The factory and the training programme for Chinese pilots represents the historic pinnacle of the military cooperation forged between Italy and China. At the time, Italy surmounted the strong challenge posed by the Americans and the British competition.

The Italian and Chinese governments selected the members of the official first mission to China. The contract included personal details and ranks of officers – expected to be nine members in total – and relevant remuneration. Colonel Roberto Lordi (1894–1944) was selected as the mission commander,⁶⁹ and Captain Nicolo Galante was selected as a first assistant. They departed from Naples on 7 September 1933 and arrived in China in October 1933. Other Italian officers were scheduled to arrive later, reaching a total of ten, plus four assistants and a substantial number of other technicians from Italy to be sent to China in accordance with specific needs.

In December 1934, the Società Anonima Consorzio Aeronautico per la Cina, or the Sino-Italian National Aircrafts Works (S.I.N.A.W.), was finally established under the tight supervision of the fascist government, which aimed to avoid a futile competition amongst manufacturers, which would jeopardise the success of the initiative. The headquarters were established in Milan and Shanghai, and the company’s mission was to manage the assembling factory and intermediate the trade of Italian aircrafts with the Chinese government.

The Italian military mission was destined to compete with a similar American mission, which had operated since 1932 in Hankou, in the Hubei province, and was led by Colonel John H. Jouett.⁷⁰ The Americans had been amongst the first to propose deals for modern armaments to the leader of the nationalist government. The Chinese had concluded contracts for the purchase of aircraft with the Mahoney Ryan Corporation in 1928 and with the Curtiss–Wright Company the following year. China was considered a latecomer in the aviation field, and the domestic industry had lost the opportunities offered by the technological advancement since the First World War. However, the bombardment of Shanghai by the Japanese in 1932 exerted an immediate effect and revealed the unpreparedness of the military aviation to defend their own country, as well as the need to mitigate that vulnerability as quickly as possible.

At the time, it was clear that the need for military advisors for training and technical personnel was to be secured without further delay. T. V. Soong suggested building a training facility in China and recommended the American military personnel as the optimal choice for training pilots. However, General MacArthur, the Army Chief of Staff at the time, denied that form of assistance in foreign territory. The American manufacturers were more flexible than the government in terms of feasibility and decided to pursue the opportunity. The Curtiss–Wright Company quickly arranged a ‘commercial’ contract that included in its terms the service of Colonel J. H. Jouett.

Jouett was considered Soong’s choice for the aviation programme, and for this reason, also in relation to deep divergences with Chiang in matters of economic policies at the time,⁷¹ the American initiative had to face internal political hurdles from other interested parties. Despite the support arising due to the high political profile of Soong, the political connection soon gradually became a liability for the entire mission. In fact, H. H. Kung, the other Chiang’s brother-in-law, supported the Italian alternative. Chiang was also amenable to the Italian initiative because the direct presence of the Italian government made the proposal more official in comparison to the American mission, which was entirely a private venture.

Additionally, the direct investment, partially assisted by payments settled with the remaining quota of the Boxer indemnity and the permission by Mussolini to use the military resources against the communist resistance, brought the project substantially closer to fulfilling the expectations of the Generalissimo.

In 1933, Chiang still dedicated all the available resources to the main military objective, which was, from his perspective, to eliminate the Chinese Communist resistance. Chiang’s strategic policy was ‘first internal pacification, then external resistance’, meaning that the most important priority at the time was fighting domestic adversaries before confronting the Japanese occupation, as well as implicitly asserting that China, which was still fighting a civil war, was overly weak to engage with such a formidable enemy.⁷² Therefore, it was no coincidence that in April of 1934, the aviation headquarters of the nationalist government moved to Nanchang and, from that base, began air sorties against the resistance.

Lordi, leader of the Italian mission, was meanwhile appointed Brigadier General by Mussolini and personal aeronautical adviser and Air Force chief of staff by Chiang one month later, in May 1934. Chiang did not spare his praise and demonstrations of confidence for the Italian officer in correspondence or public appearances.

The success of the mission precipitated the signing of additional contracts with the manufacturers who were part of the Italian consortium,⁷³ and Chinese pilots and engineers were sent to Italy to study the Italian language at the Oriental University of Naples, with scholarships offered by the Ministry of the Italian Colonies. Chinese engineers were sent to study at the Polytechnic of Turin and pilot officers at the Aeronautical Academy in Caserta (Figure 2).

Figure 2. The Italian military training mission in Nanchang. General Lordi in the center.

(Kindly provided for publication by General Lordi’s family)

photo presenting the opening of the training school in Nanchang led by General Lordi (officer in the center between the flags). Officers and training staff, Italian and Chinese are in full uniforms.

Meanwhile, the mission of Colonel Jouett at the American base of Hankou ended on 1 June 1935. Although remarkable in achieving effective results, even when operating in highly unfavourable conditions, the American government was not ready to officially recognise that accomplishment and did not reward the private initiative. Therefore, the contract with the Americans was not renewed,⁷⁴ transmitting the clear impression that Chiang Kai-shek was keen to unconditionally support the Italian mission.

Just when the mission was becoming an exemplary success of military cooperation – for reasons explained later in this paper – Mussolini gave the order to withdraw Lordi from the command of the mission.

This decision changed the entire perspective of the mission and affected political relations with Chiang. Mussolini decided to assign the mission to Colonel Silvio Scaroni,⁷⁵ and Lordi was repatriated without official explanations presented to Chiang.

In his diary of the mission, Scaroni reported his concerns about the delicate relationship and described the deep disagreement between Chiang and Mussolini, one that was never formally healed. The Generalissimo bemoaned the serious defect in formal behaviour, which was attributed to the fact that he was not previously informed of the change:

The Generalissimo told me in all the letters. For him Mussolini had done an undeserved wrong […] The Generalissimo had chosen my predecessor as his chief advisor for Chinese aviation, but he could equally have chosen any other foreign officer, leaving aside the Italian Aeronautical Mission as much as the similar American mission. It was a strictly personal matter for the Generalissimo.⁷⁶

The political and diplomatic entanglements concerning Lordi and the relationship between China and Italy affected the future existence of the airport and ultimately the relations between the two governments. After the departure of Lordi, the airport and the factory of Nanchang were placed under scrutiny by Chiang and the high military command. After Lordi’s departure, Chiang was advised by General Chow,⁷⁷ who had taken full responsibility as the Head of the Aviation Commission, while Madame Chiang was made Commander in Chief of the Chinese Air Force and became known as the ‘Mother of the Chinese Air Force’. As of that moment, the Americans were back in business with China, and the first strong signal of this was the negotiation for the acquisition of American aircrafts (80 Curtiss Wright).

The change of attitude towards China and Chiang’s government from Mussolini’s side were not personal, but as in the case of the German leadership, more strategic. Diplomatic evidence shows that Italian and Japanese diplomacies entered discussion on how to protect mutual interests. It appears that a quid pro quo situation convinced the two sides about the future steps of their relations. Japan was ready to recognize the Italian occupation of Ethiopia,⁷⁸ which had started in October 1935 and at the time harshly it was condemned by the League of Nations, in exchange of the stop of military assistance to China. To facilitate the compromise between Italy and Japan also the evidence that General Chiang, for the sake of his country’s defense, had exhibited signs of compromising with the domestic communist adversaries. This change strongly diverged from the rigid intransigence displayed at the beginning of his mandate as leader of China and staunch anti-communist. The political strategy dramatically changed after the rebellion in Xian,⁷⁹ which forced the Generalissimo to reach an agreement with Mao and forming a united front against the Japanese invaders. The events of Xian also demarcated the beginning of the end of any prospect of further cooperation between China, Italy and Germany.

On 18 November 1936, the emperor of Japan officially recognised Vittorio Emanuele III’s title of Emperor of Ethiopia. In 1936, Italy and Japan agreed to the simultaneous opening of consular offices in Addis Ababa (representing Japan) and Mukden, capital of Manchukuo (for Italian diplomatic delegation). This episode was obviously interpreted as anticipating the recognition of Manchukuo. On 24 December 1936, Chiang signed the National Unity Agreement with the Chinese Communist Movement to oppose the Japanese invasion. These latest events also decided the future set of alliances. The signing of the Sino-Soviet non-aggression pact on 21 August 1937 was the final decision that sanctioned the departure from any possible partnership between China and Italy, as well as Germany. Italy signed the Anti-Comintern Pact, joining Japan and Germany, on 6 November 1937.

The Italian mission continued until the autumn of 1937, although not without difficulties and frequent misunderstandings, but the Italian officers themselves never lacked the commitment and dedication required for their mission. Amongst these officers was Captain Enrico Cigerza, who, in addition to his role as instructor, was also Chiang’s personal pilot and who performed various delicate missions with the Generalissimo.⁸⁰

In the spring of 1937, the American Colonel Claire J. Chennault, ⁸¹ strongly supported by Madame Chiang, arrived to supervise the development of a Chinese Air Force. On 21 August 1937, China and the Soviet Union signed a non-aggression pact in Nanjing. On 29 November, Mussolini’s government, which had accepted the legitimacy of Japanese interests in the Far East, recognised Manchukuo, bringing to a de facto end even the economic relations with nationalist China.

The Italian Air Force Mission was not the only Italian operation at the time. Another agreement, considered equally vital for the Chinese military strategy, was operational with the Navy. It involved Captain Luigi Notarbartolo, who had arrived in China in 1935 with two other officers, Captain Vincenzo Ruta and Lieutenant Lorenzo Bezzi,⁸² to serve as advisors to the Generalissimo regarding matters of naval defense and to assist in procuring material for the Chinese navy. The Italian officer devoted himself to reorganizing the Submarine Mines College and to strengthening the defenses along the Yangtze. The plan entailed placing heavy artillery on both banks of the river and using torpedoes, to be purchased in Italy. Although funding was approved by the nationalist government, there was no time to realise the project, as it was suspended at the beginning of the conflict with Japan. The order for torpedo boats and other Italian materiel was cancelled and subsequently assigned to British and American companies. Even the naval mission departed from Hong Kong to return to Italy on 2 January 1938. The total retreat was the last testimony regarding the end of the nearly decade-long economic and military collaboration between Italy and China, which left behind moral obligations and unpaid debts in its wake.

The end of the partnership with China and the establishment of the axis with Japan

The concrete factors which enabled Japan, Italy and Germany to achieve an alliance are to be found first in the ideological understanding and common goal of fighting communism around the world. Ironically, they are the same factors which made possible the partnership with China as well. The anti-communist propaganda was the most powerful and probably only true factor of strong political affinity between these regimes. From this point of view, as it was in the case of Chiang’s government, the common aversion to communism made the alliance with Japan not only possible, but even more solid compared to the understanding reached with nationalist China, which in the end failed the test of political coherence when the truce between Mao and Chiang was achieved. The Italian, German and Japanese governments never compromised on this main objective. They were fighting the ‘communist conspiracy’ to bring revolution to the world, and with that in mind, there was no possibility of reconsideration. The connection with Germany worked as collagen and made possible the creation of the Axis. The seal of this political alliance was achieved with the German-Japanese Anti-Comintern Pact, signed in Berlin by German Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop and Japanese Ambassador Kintomo Mushakoji on 25 November 1936. ⁸³ One year later, on 6 November 1937, Italy joined the protocol and, in this way, distanced itself from any possible compromise with the Franco-British positions. In the spring of 1938, while Hitler visited Rome in May, the Italian fascist government organised a mission to visit Japan and Manchukuo. It was a journey of forty days to deliver a strong message of propaganda.⁸⁴ A true opportunity to present the achievements of fascism in the international arena and consolidate the ongoing relations among members of the Axis after the signing of the Anti-Comintern Pact. Among the events organised in Japan, Italian marines marched on the street of Tokyo, Osaka, and Kyoto at the end of May.⁸⁵ Propaganda parades gave a signal of strength and an emotional message of solidarity between nations. During the official events, the members wore political black shirts even when it was forbidden by diplomatic protocol. Finally, the delegation was received by Emperor Hirohito in person (Figure 3).

Figure 3. The Japan Times, published on 13 April 1938 (source: ASMAE Japan Archive, Affari Politici 1931–1945, folder 11).

photo presenting the front page of The Japan Times published on 13 April 1938 introducing the visit of the Fascist Mission in Japan.

These events were a strong political signal to the world. As the Italian Ambassador Giacinto Auriti mentions in his report to the ministry in Rome:

[…] Fascism but also Hitlerism find the greatest sympathy and not only because Italy and Germany have no territorial interests in these seas, but also because they have overthrown an old world and built a new one, as well as, mutatis mutandis, they would like to do too […] ⁸⁶

Another, not secondary factor, in explaining the alliance is the strong stance taken against the decisions of the League of Nations by Japan, which impressed and led the way for Germany and later Italy to abandon the institution. The Japanese withdrawal from the league in March 1933 was strongly criticised by the Western powers, and the political message undeniably impressed the fascist leadership in Italy. Germany acted similarly just nine months after Adolf Hitler was appointed chancellor of Germany against the international arrogance of liberal powers in October 1933. At the beginning, the withdrawal of Japan was seen with suspicion even by Mussolini. This also explain that at the time Mussolini was still genuine committed to consolidate the partnership with Chiang.

In 1934, the Italian ambassador Giacinto Auriti was involved in an intense diplomatic effort with the Japanese Vice-Foreign Minister Yōsuke Matsuoka to cool down the animosity of the verbal conflict concerning the position and international role of Japan after the abandonment of its seat at the League of Nations. One article published in Italy on 18 January 1934 by Mussolini on the front page of the Popolo d’Italia, the newspaper founded by Mussolini himself and considered the herald used by the regime for mass communication, even resurrected the abandoned term ‘yellow peril’ to address the actions of Japan. The diplomatic correspondence shows that, at the time, Italy and Japan certainly were not on a verge of an alliance. Again, it is evident that there was no intention by Mussolini to prefer Japan to China. There was instead a security dilemma in development, which left Mussolini, as well as most of the foreign leaders, still puzzled about the future intentions of Japan. The progressive militarisation process of the country, which already had a strength comparable to other superpowers of the time, such as the British and the French, obviously could not pass unobserved and underestimated.

The Italian regime changed perspective a few years later, when Italy, as earlier occurred to Japan, faced the league’s sanctions after the invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935.⁸⁷ At the origin of the contrast with the league was the same imperialistic strategy of expansion adopted by Japan, but also the political conviction that behind the political condemnation was hidden either the oppression of the great powers’ imperialism or a Bolshevik plot. Italy was under the impression that the league was deeply influenced by ‘red’ destabilising initiatives, especially after the Soviet Union joined the league in September 1936. China, instead, maintained a strong connection with the league, still believing that stronger support from France, Great Britain, and the same Soviet Union could stop Japanese ambitions in China. This change in the Italian attitude and, on the other hand, solidarity with Japan form another essential factor to consider in explaining the process of rapprochement between the two countries and the decision to join the Axis.⁸⁸

The above factors enabled Italy and Japan to join together and support the tripartite alliance with Germany. They were partners with a common status of international isolation, economic shared interests and ideological adversity against expanding bolshevism. Through the alliance, Italy found a way to politically balance the challenge of the Mediterranean and African hegemony of Great Britain and the competition of France in contested territories. The alliance with Japan, as the historian Valdo Ferretti explained,⁸⁹ was valuable for Italy, as a military alliance could weaken Britain’s global position ⁹⁰ and help to diverge attention and resources from areas of mutual interest with British and French, including the Mediterranean Sea. Ciano in his diaries so commented:

(November 6^th, 1937) We signed the Pact this morning. Everyone was conscious of an atmosphere unlike that of the usual diplomatic ceremony. Three nations are embarking together upon a path which may perhaps lead them to war […] Italy has broken out of her isolation: she is in the centre of the most formidable political and military combination which has ever existed […] ⁹¹

It was a satisfactory conclusion as Prince Fumimaro Konoe, the prime minister of Japan and admirer of Mussolini,⁹² with words of appreciation, wrote in an open letter published in the fascist newspaper Popolo d’Italia. He expressed the gratitude of the Japanese people for the Italian support in China, which ceased to deliver armaments to China and recalled its military advisers. With words of salutation to the Italian mission departing from Japan, so commented with satisfaction:

[…] Italy and Japan have many points in common and have always enjoyed cordial relations; now, our two countries have seen these friendly relations become ever closer, following the conclusion of the agreement which aims to defend and protect civilisation and humanity from the scourge of international communism […]⁹³

The final attempt of mediation of Italy and Germany in the Sino-Japanese conflict

The Anti-Comintern Pact was one important and decisive step of the tripartite alliance. However, Germany and Italy had still unsolved issues of substantial economic interests and capitals invested in China. In this context, the following attempt to mediate the peace between China and Japan can be seen still as an opportunity to avoid heavy losses for the national industries.

This is an episode of history less known and forgotten in historical publication.⁹⁴ In January 1937, Italy and Germany began to develop a plan of mediation in the conflict between China and Japan. The diplomatic endeavour is presented in documents preserved in the archive of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.⁹⁵ The plan, which was favourable to maintaining a de facto status quo, proposed the recognition of the Manchukuo and the reactivation of relations between the opposing Asian nations starting from an active process of trade expansion between them. The Italians were convinced that Great Britain and Soviet Union could not be considered true friends of China because of their strategic and conflicting territorial interests and, in the case of the latter, their deep ideological differences. Therefore, Italy and Germany were the only reliable diplomatic liaisons, trusted by both contenders, for the plan. According to military sources, the plan could serve Japanese interests in that contingent situation, since the army was facing strong resistance in the military invasion and the military leadership was keen to consider a solution to the conflict. General Iwane Matsui, at the time in command of the Japanese forces in China, is mentioned in the documentation as the bearer of a conciliatory message in this specific context. Further, both Asian countries were aligned in a potential pact against communist forces and advancement. On this last point, Germany was the most interested party in achieving the goal of peace, also in preparation for a possible conflict with Soviet Union.

The liaison began after the contact initiated by Hsiang-hsi Kung from Chinese side. The Chinese minister still had an open channel with the Italian diplomacy, and Chiang was still in contact with some trusted sources, including the former Chiang’s economic advisor, Alberto de’ Stefani. ⁹⁶ Ciano, in person, was the mastermind of the plan from the Italian side, as witnessed by an intense correspondence with the Italian ambassadors in Japan and China. In response to the mediation in progress, Kung seemed to accept the mediation and reported a message from Chiang, expressing devotion and admiration for the Duce. The reason was made clear, and it was that if Japan was not ready to make concessions, there was the concrete possibility that China would fall into the arms of the Bolsheviks. The Italian ambassador in China, Giuliano Cora, also underlined the fact that Kung was a reliable source since he was, at the time, president of the Yuan and considered by many the most likely successor of Chiang. Also, Alberto de’ Stefani was actively involved in the diplomatic mission. He received the visit of the Chinese General Tsiang Pa-lie, ⁹⁷ who confidentially reported that the Generalissimo agreed with the mediation undertaken by Italy and was confident in Ciano’s active role in the plan.

In a message written by Ambassador Cora, ⁹⁸ the main points of discussion during the negotiation were summarised. China was ready to accept mediation provided that the occupation of its north be replaced by a large autonomy and a special regime for the provinces without affecting Chinese sovereignty, and this could include the Mongolian territory. These aspects were considered of the utmost importance because the territories were part of the ‘heart’ of the Chinese nation. Other important points mentioned were the fact that China was ready to recognise the Manchukuo but also wanted to receive the payment of indemnities from Japan and finally was ready to sign a pact to fight communism in the region.

About the position of Germany, Italian diplomatic sources underline the real motivation for Hitler to seek a mediation between China and Japan and confirm that it was mainly connected to the fact that Germany had important economic interests in China including the fact that China remained one of the main supply sources of vital raw materials for the industry of German armament. ⁹⁹

Meanwhile, the Japanese plan for the city of Shanghai was unveiled, including a demilitarised zone around the city and the establishment of a military board, with one Chinese officer, whose duty was to observe the respect of the agreements and report to his own government. In this area, the Chinese government was not to maintain a police force of its own larger than an agreed number. The gradual withdraw of foreign military forces was to be implemented within a period of three years, and the city should be controlled by a board of governors, including a representative of France, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan.

However, as is known, the conflict was prolonged and Japanese forces gradually occupied more territories and important cities of China. The mediation of Germany and Italy did not achieve any de facto improvement of the situation. Time was on the side of the Japanese, who began to also demand the resignation of Chiang from the position of Chinese leader. Germany continued to provide China with armaments of any kind, but excluded military airplanes. The shipments were mainly produced by the Deutsche Waffen und Munitionsfabriken from Lübeck and Mauser Werke Waldeck from Hamburg and were directed to Hong Kong and, from there, to the destination. However, as earlier presented, starting from mid-1938, the policy suddenly changed. On 5 July 1938, as earlier mentioned, the so-called German military advisors in China were ordered by von Ribbentrop with a sort of ultimatum to return to Germany.

The Generalissimo did not wait for long to seek support abroad, and armament and military support – such as several officers and, as earlier explained, pilots – arrived from the Soviet Union starting from the first months in 1938, de facto replacing the German and Italian advisors. The Soviet Union was the political winner in this geo-political conflict between China and Japan and achieved what was considered impossible before the beginning of the conflict: the opportunity to establish permanent influence in the political and economic future of a vast and strategic territory led by an anti-communist regime and, in doing so, even escape the isolation and boycott of the Western powers, which now were aligned with the same strategic plan. Further, Japan was caught off guard by the move, and several members of the Japanese establishment began to fear the possibility of opening two fronts in the Sino-Japanese war, the second directly involving the Soviet Union in the conflict. Incidents at the border between the Soviet- and the Japanese-occupied China made this eventuality even more realistic.

Meanwhile, General Hiroshi Oshima, appointed Japanese ambassador in Germany, continued the process of strengthening the liaison with Germany and became a frequent guest of Hitler and von Ribbentrop. The Japanese representative excluded the mediation of Great Britain in the Chinese question and underlined the strong relations and common views with the German leadership, but at the same time, in matters concerning China, also the preference for a direct negotiation with the Chinese government rather than using diplomatic intermediaries.

The overall explanation of facts presents a complicated tangle of relations in which even the evident connections among the tripartite alliance appeared in many ways less than ideal. The situation in China evolved against the will of the involved parties, excepts for the Japanese government. Chiang appeared to be on the weakest side of the negotiations in the diplomatic development of relations. In this context, the position assumed by the Italian government supporting, on one side, the process of peace between the belligerents, but also showing a growing sympathy for the Japanese position. The latter was particularly true after the changes in the ideological visions of Chiang after signing a truce with the domestic communist factions, along with the alliance with the Soviet Union. This led to the abandonment of the perplexities about the alliance and strengthening the relations between Rome, Berlin and Tokyo. Overall, it is reasonable to assert that the convergence on similar expansionist policies and the growing dissatisfaction with the contemporary model of governance of the international system, led by an arrogant and suffocating Western leadership, created a convenient scenario for an opportunity for the ‘middle powers’, Germany, Italy, and Japan, to create the conditions for an alliance of nationalist regimes unthinkable until the first half of the 1930s.

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Notes on contributors

Orazio Coco

Orazio Coco received his Ph.D. in History of Europe from the Sapienza University of Rome (summa cum laude) with a thesis concerning the political and economic impact of European Colonialism in pre-communist China. He graduated in Political Sciences and International Relations and in Economics from the Sapienza University of Rome. Orazio continued his studies in economics and business disciplines at the British universities of London and Bradford and earned a master’s degree of International and Public Affairs at the University of Hong Kong.

Orazio’s manuscripts are published in Italy in ‘Dimensioni e Problemi della Ricerca Storica’, ‘Il Pensiero Storico’, ‘Giornale di Storia’, ‘Archivio Storico Italiano’ and in international academic journals including ‘The Journal of Modern Italian Studies’ (Routledge), ‘The Chinese Journal of Global Governance’ (Brill), ‘The International History Review’ (Routledge) and ‘The Chinese Historical Review’ (Routledge). His main research interests focus on Sino-European political and economic relations and global political studies. Orazio has worked for several financial institutions in six countries (Europe and Asia) as an expert in international affairs, for the Italian government (in Hong Kong) and lived in Asia for over 20 years. He has lectured at the City University of Hong Kong and the University of Hong Kong (European Studies). Currently, he is a lecturer at the Hong Kong Baptist University and teaches International Relations, European Studies and General Education courses and an academic tutor at the Faculty of Education and at the School of Modern Languages and Cultures of the University of Hong Kong.

Notes

1 Nello Paolo, Storia dell’Italia Fascista 1922 – 1943 (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2020); De Felice Renzo, Il Fascismo (Bari: Biblioteca Storica Laterza, 2008).

2 Ledeen Michael, D’Annunzio: The First Duce (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 2002).

3 Gregor Antony James and Chang Maria Hsia, Nazionalfascismo and the Revolutionary Nationalism of Sun Yat-sen, The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 39, No. 1 (Nov. 1979) 21. Gregor was an American political scientist, professor of political sciences at the University of California (Berkeley).

4 Sun Yat-sen, The Three Principles of People (second lesson) (Taipei: Taipei China Publishing Company, 1981), 8.

5 Ellemann Bruce, Wilson and China: A Revised History of the Shandong Question (Routledge, 2002).

6 Ibid, 22.

7 Salvatorelli Luigi, Nazionalfascismo (Turin: Gobetti, 1923), 24–25.

8 Rocco Alfredo, L’ora del nazionalismo (Roma: Associazione Nazionalista Italiana, 1919), 7 and 13.

9 Gregor and Chang, Nazionalfascismo, 25.

10 Fox John, Germany and the Far Eastern Crisis 1931–1938. A Study in Diplomacy and Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982).

11 Eastman Lloyd E., The Abortive Revolution. China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937 (Harvard University Asia Center, 1974), 3.

12 Gregor James Antony, Confucianism and the Political Thought of Sun Yat-Sen, Philosophy East and West, Jan. 1981, Vol. 31, No. 1, 55–70.

13 The most violent episode of repression occurred in Shanghai on April 12, 1927, from which started the conflict with the communists in the country.

14 On 24 December 1936, Zhōngguó Guómíndǎng (nationalist party) and Zhōngguó Gòngchǎndǎng (communist party) united forces against the Japanese invasion after the Xi’an Incident. Eastman, Lloyd E. (ed.). The Nationalist Era in China, 1927-1949 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

15 Wakeman Frederic, A Revisionist View of the Nanjing Decade: Confucian Fascism, The China Quarterly n. 150, June 1997, 395-432.

16 Chung Dooeum, Elitist Fascism (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2000) 74.

17 Fatica Michele, ‘The Beginning and the End of the Idyllic Relations between Mussolini’s Italy and Chiang Kai-shek’s China (1930–1937)’, in M. Marinelli and G. Andornino G. (eds), Italy’s Encounters with Modern China (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 89.

18 Chiang Kai-shek’s speech held in 1932, reported in E. Lloyds Eastman, The Abortive Revolution: China Under Nationalist Rule, 1927–1937 (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1974) 40.

19 Chang Maria Hsia, Fascism and Developmental Nationalism (Berkeley, University of California, 1985), 27 and Chung Dooem, Elitist Fascism, 74.

20 Eastman Lloyd E. defined the Blue Shirts ‘One of the most influential and feared political movements in China during the 1930s’, The Abortive Revolution, 31. Maria Hsia Chang, The Chinese Blue Shirts Societies, Institute for East Asian Studies (Berkeley: University of Berkeley, California, 1985) challenges several affirmations proposed by Eastman on this topic.

21 The Three Principles of the People is the title of the most famous political publication of Dr. Sun Yat-sen (Sānmín zhǔyì, 三民主义), published in 1924, as collection of speeches in conferences held in Canton. The principles are also mentioned in the political will of the statist, written on 11 March 1925, the day before his death.

22 About fascism and the Black Shirts, De Felice Renzo, Mussolini il fascista. La conquista del potere (1921–1925) Vol. I and L’organizzazione dello stato fascista (1925-1929) Vol. II, (Turin: Einaudi, 1981).

23 Godley Michael, Fascismo e nazionalismo cinese: 1931-1938, Storia Contemporanea, No. 4 (December 1973) 741.

24 Chang Maria Hsia, “Fascism” and Modern China, The China Quarterly, Sep. 1979, No. 79, 553-567.

25 Eastman Lloyd, The Abortive Revolution, 56.

26 Kung Hsiang-hsi (1881-1967, Kǒng Xiángxī) was one of the richest and powerful man in republican China. He was of Protestant faith. Born in 1881 in Shanxi he completed his studies in the United States (Yale). Kung was a loyal ally of General Chiang, also for more personal reasons, being the brother-in-law of the Generalissimo, since he married Ai-ling Soong, eldest Sister of Mei-ling, Chiang Kai-shek’s wife. A brief biographical note is kept at Diplomatic and Historical Archive of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (from now ASMAE) China archive, Affari Politici (1931-1945), folder 30.

27 The mission took place from 5 to 10 February 1933.

28 Soong Tse-ven (1894–1971, Sòng Zǐwén) was one of the three brothers of Mei-ling Soong, the last wife of Chiang Kai-shek. The story of the Soong family is remarkably intertwined with the history of modern China, through the tale of the Soong sisters who married respectively Sun Yat-sen (Ching-ling Soong), Chiang Kai-shek (Mei -ling Soong) and Kung Hsiang-hsi, minister of industry in Chiang’s Government (Ai-ling Soong). Seagrave Sterling, The Soong Dynasty (London: Cox and Wyman Limited, 1996).

29 Orazio Coco, Sino-Italian relations told through the archive’s papers of the Banca Italiana per la Cina (1919–1943), Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 25:3, 318-346, DOI: 10.1080/1354571X.2020.1741941

30 The agreement was kept secret, and the documentation is archived in ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), Folder 30 (including the agreement signed in London on July 1, 1933). The agreement was personally authorized by Mussolini with a telegram dated 29 June 1933.

31 The Grand Cross Order of Saint Maurice Lazarus, documentation in ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), Folder 30 (including several articles of the Japanese press, among them the Japan Times of July 14, 1933).

32 Later planned and built at Nánchāng with a mission that began a few months later. It was the most important Italian investment realized in China in the pre-Communist period.

33 Telegram dated August 1934 sent by Benito Mussolini to the Italian General Consul in Shanghai, ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), Folder 35.

34 Remer Charles, Foreign Investments in China, 652.

35 Rosinger Lawrence, Germany’s Far Eastern Policy Under Hitler, Pacific Affairs, Dec.1938, Vol. 11, No. 4,422.

36 Walsh Billie, The German Military Mission in China, 1928-38, The Journal of Modern History, Sep. 1974, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sep. 1974), 502.

37 ASMAE China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 35, telespresso n. 21488G, from Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Ministry of War ‘militari stranieri al servizio dell’esercito cinese’ (foreign military personnel in China) dated 8 May 1934.

38 Rosinger Lawrence, Germany’s Far Eastern Policy Under Hitler, Pacific Affairs, Dec. 1938, Vol. 11, 4, 423.

39 Bernd Martin (ed.), Die Deutsche Beraterschaft in China (1927–1938) (Düsseldorf: Droste, 1981), 356–358.

40 Fox John P., Max Bauer: Chiang Kai-Shek’s First German Military Adviser, Journal of Contemporary History, 1970, Vol. 5, No. 4 (1970), 31–33

41 The investigation was reported, among others, by the London Times on 24,25,26 October 1928; Berliner Tageblatt on 25, 26 October 1928 and North China Daily News on 25 October 1928.

42 Walsh, 507.

43 Fox, 40.

44 Lindemann Fritz, Im Dienste Chinas, Erinnerungen aus den Jahren 1929 bis 1940, Im Selbstverlage des Verfassers, 1940, 34–35.

45 Sutton Donald, German Advice and Residual Warlordism in the Nanking Decade: Influences on Nationalist Military Training and Strategy, The China Quarterly, Sep. 1982, No. 91, 387.

46 Martin (ed), Die Deutsche Beraterschaft in China, 113–114.

47 Chang Kia-Ngau, China’s Struggle for Railroad Development (New York: John Day Company,1943), 91.

48 von Rabenau Friedrich, Seeckt, aus seinem Leben, 1918–1936 (Leipzig: Hase & Koehler, 1940), 707.

49 Bloch Kurt, German Interests and Policies in the Far East (New York: Institute of Pacific Relations, 1940), 28.

50 Ibid. 393.

51 ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945) folder 35, confidential letter to Benito Mussolini from the Italian Embassy in Berlin dated 27 January 1934.

52 The episode happened in December 1936. The Generalissimo was arrested by one of the warlords, Chiang Hsue-liang, and released only after accepting the compromise to unite the front with the Communists against the Japanese invaders. Chang Kai-shek described the episode as the greatest humiliation of his life.

53 Telegram dated August 1934 sent by Benito Mussolini to the Italian General Consul in Shanghai, ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 35.

54 Fenby, Jonathan (2003). Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the China He Lost (illustrated ed.). Simon and Schuster, 319.

55 Tuchman Barbara, Stilwell and the American Experience in China, 1911- 1945 (New York: Macmillan, 1971), 186.

56 von Falkenhausen Alexander, von Falkenhausen 1922-1945, Oral biography given to Historical Division, Headquarters United States Army, December 1950, National Archives Washington D.C., 15

57 Walsh Billie, The German Military Mission in China, 1928-38, The Journal of Modern History, Sep. 1974, Vol. 46, No. 3 (Sep. 1974), 512.

58 Quoted in Coox Alvin, Year of the Tiger (Tokyo: 1964), 10.

59 Among the recent publications, Hof Tobias, Galeazzo Ciano. The Fascist Pretender (University of Toronto Press, 2021); Moccia Vincenzo, La Cina di Ciano, (Roma: Libreria Universitaria Edizioni, 2014) and Di Rienzo Eugenio, Ciano. Vita pubblica e privata del «genero di regime» nell’Italia del Ventennio nero (Roma: Salerno Editrice, 2018).

60 Varè Daniele, Laughing Diplomat (London: J. Murray, 1938), 293–294.

61 Coco Orazio, Sino-Italian Political and Economic Relations. From the Treaty of Friendship to the Second World War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2024), 40–85, DOI: 10.4324/9781003143260.

62 Ciano Edda, La mia vita. Intervista di Domenico Olivieri, Nicola Caracciolo (ed) (Milano: Mondadori, 2002), 39.

63 Orazio Coco (2021) The Penetration of Italian Fascism in Nationalist China: Political Influence and Economic Legacy, The International History Review, 43:2, 264–280, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2020.1754273.

64 Ciano Edda, 108.

65 Ciano to Ministry of Foreign Affairs report dated 17 December 1930, ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931-1945) folder 1.

66 Ciano’s report to Dino Grandi on 29 May 1931, ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945) folder 2.

67 Orazio Coco (2022) The Italian Military Aviation in Nationalist China: General Roberto Lordi and the Italian Mission in Nanchang (1933–1937), The International History Review, 44:4, 697-720, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2021.1984277.

68 ASMAE, China archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 34. Letter sent by minister Kung to Ciano dated 10 April 1933. It also includes the foreseen budget of expenditure.

69 Documents of the aviation mission in China are hold at ASMAE, China archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 54.

70 Leary William M., Wings for China: The Jouett Mission, 1932-1935, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Nov. 1969). The facts are also quoted in the telegram sent by the Italian Embassy in Washington to the Italian Foreign Minister dated 15 September 1933, ASMAE, China archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 54.

71 Chiang was always committed to provide Chian with a strong army as a primary goal, while Soong’s primary goals were focused on the economy. Jonathan Fenby, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and the China He Lost (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

72 So Wai Chor, The Making of the Guomindang’s Japan Policy, 1932–1937: The Roles of Chiang Kai-Shek and Wang Jingwei, Modern China, Vol. 28, No. 2 (Apr.2002), 232.

73 A squadron of Fiat CR 32, one of Breda 27, one of Caproni 111 and one of Savoia Marchetti S.72. Orders and supplies are contained in ASMAE, China archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 35 and 45.

74 Leary William, Wings for China: The Jouett Mission, 1932-1935, Pacific Historical Review, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Nov. 1969) 355; Arthur Young, China Nation-Building Effort, 1927-1937 (Stanford University, 1971).

75 Scaroni Silvio. Missione militare aeronautica in Cina (Rome: Ufficio Storico Aeronautica Militare, 1970). Silvio Scaroni (1893–1977), a military pilot during the First World War, was decorated with the gold medal for military valor. He was military attaché at the London and Washington embassies. After the experience of Nánchāng, he served as a general of the air force divisions during World War II. He died in Milan in 1977.

76 Ibid., 18.

77 ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), pro-memoria to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated July 1936, which mentions the interferences of American negotiators and negotiations with British and French representatives.

78 Labanca Nicola, Oltremare. Storia dell’Espansione Coloniale Italiana (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2020).

79 The episode happened in December 1936. The Generalissimo was arrested by one of the “warlords”, Chiang-hsue-liang, and released only after accepting the compromise to unite the front with the Communists against the Japanese invaders. Chang Kai-shek described the episode as the greatest humiliation of his life.

80 The author explains that in December 1936, Captain Cigerza was the pilot, who brought back the Generalissimo from Xian to Nanjing. Scaroni Silvio, 29.

81 Buchan Eugenie, A Few Planes for China: The Birth of the Flying Tigers (ForeEdge, 2017); Ford Daniel, Flying Tigers: Claire Chennault and his American Volunteers, 1941 – 1942 (New York: Smithsonian Books/Collins, 2007), 29; Young Arthur, China Nation-Building Effort, 1927-1937 (Stanford University, 1971), 355.

82 ASMAE, China archive, Affari Politici (1931-1945), folder 75, report dated 30.3.1936.

83 Chapman W.M.A. Dance on Eggs: Intelligence and the ‘Anti-Comintern’, Journal of Contemporary History, Apr. 1987, Vol. 22, No. 2, Intelligence Services during the Second World War.

84 The mission is also presented and discussed in the article of Hedinger Daniel, The Spectacle of Global Fascism: The Italian Black shirts mission to Japan’s Asian empire, Modern Asian Studies 51, 6 (2017), 1999–2034.

85 Documents and speeches in ASMAE, Japan Archive, Affari Politici (1931-1945), folder 11.

86 Report: domestic situation, in ASMAE, Japan Archive, Affari Politici (1931-1945), folder 6.

87 Srivastava Neelam, Italian Colonialism and Resistances to Empire, 1930–1970 (Imperial and Post-Colonial Studies Series, Palgrave, 2018); Mori Renato, Mussolini e la Conquista dell’Etiopia (Firenze: Le Monnier, 1978).

88 More explanations about the relations between Italy and Japan in Ishida Ken, Japan, Italy and the Road to the Tripartite Alliance (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

89 Ferretti Valdo, Il Giappone e la politica estera italiana 1935 – 41 (Milan: Giuffrè publisher, 1995).

90 Ibid. 9 and 60.

91 Ibid. 29.

92 Garzilli Enrica, Mussolini e Oriente (Torino: Utet, 2023).

93 Message from Prime Minister Konoe to the Italian Delegation departing from Japan on 2 April 1938, ASMAE, Japan Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 11.

94 Coco Orazio, Sino-Italian Political and Economic Relations. From the Treaty of Friendship to the Second World War (Abingdon: Routledge, 2024), 40–85, DOI: 10.4324/9781003143260.

95 ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 70.

96 The message of Alberto de’ Stefani to Chiang dated 23 October 1937 in ASBI AdS, China, folder 16. De’ Stefani was Chiang’s choice to prepare the country to mobilization with economic and administrative measures to sustain the incoming status of war. About de’ Stefani mission in China, Orazio Coco, Italian Advisors in Nationalist China: The Mission and Work of Alberto de’ Stefani, High Commissioner of Chiang Kai-Shek, The International History Review, 43:5 (2021), 951–965, DOI: 10.1080/07075332.2020.1857292.

97 A note dated 24 March 1938 sent to Ciano refer to the content of the meeting in ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 70.

98 Telegram to MAE from Shanghai dated 23 March 1938 in ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 70.

99 Telegram from Italian embassy in Berlin reported by Ciano on 5 December 1937 in in ASMAE, China Archive, Affari Politici (1931–1945), folder 70.