Selling security to Africa: Private Military and Security Companies (PMSCs) and the fate of African intrastate security

ABSTRACT

The increasing demand for privatised security has rekindled significant attention to private military and security companies (PMSCs) in international relations and security discourse. Focusing on the Wagner Group, the overarching purpose of this work is to explore PMSCs in Africa to examine the consequences of their operations on the fate of the continent’s security. How may PMSCs such as Wagner’s operations and competitions with the traditional powers influence Africa’s security environment? We attempt to demonstrate how Wagner’s expanding footprint in Africa may create conditions for political violence and civil conflicts in Africa. Situating this analysis in the existing literature, we argue that the growing that the growing foothold of the Group and their readiness to compete with Western powers in Africa on behalf of Russia may reinforce states-citizens tensions, widen existing gaps between governments and citizens and radicalise and militarise citizens to drive political violence and civil conflicts. We base the methodological analysis on the qualitative technique and situate the theoretical argument in the contentious politics theoretical framework.

KEYWORDS:

• Africa
• the Wagner Group
• PMSCs and mercenaries
• contentious politics
• African security
• political violence and civil conflict

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Joachim and Schneiker, “All for One,” 246–67; Kruck, “Theorising,” 112–41.

2. Herbst, “Searching for Legitimacy,” 280–93; and Prem, Private Military and Security Companies, 50–62.

3. Kinsey, “Problematising the Role,” 584–614.

4. Cameron and Chetail, Privatizing War, 10–530; and Torroja, Public International Law, 8–147.

5. Kinsey, “Problematising the Role,” 592–96.

6. Gerring, Case Study Research, 65.

7. Palik et al., Conflict Trends, 7.

8. McFate, The Modern Mercenary, 14–17.

9. Ibid., 15–18.

10. Ibid., 17.

11. Ibid., 9–11; McFate, Mercenaries and War, 6; and McFate, The New Rules of War, 86–7.

12. Spearin, Private Military and Security Companies, 58.

13. ICRC [International Committee of the Red Cross], Protocol additional to the Geneva Conventions, 35.

14. Singer, Corporate Warriors, 8.

15. Mandel, Armies without States, 55–69.

16. Singer, “Corporate Warriors,” 186–220; and Singer, Corporate Warriors, 88–145.

17. McFate, The Modern Mercenary, 14–17.

18. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Securing the City,” 237–53.

19. Joachim and Schneiker, “All for One,” 246–67.

20. Carmola, Private Security Contractors, 28.

21. Cusumano, “Private Military and Security Companies,” 136.

22. Ibid., 137.

23. Prince, “The MacArthur Model,” paragraphs 4–8.

24. McFate, Mercenaries and War, 35–37; and McFate, “I was a Mercenary,” paragraphs 5–12.

25. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Selling Security,” 135.

26. Cusumano and Kinsey, “Bureaucratic Interests,” 594–96.

27. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Selling Security,” 136.

28. Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 57–59.

29. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Selling Security,” 137; and McFate, Mercenaries and War, 18–22; McFate, The New Rules, 91–93.

30. Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 57–59.

31. Kinsey, “Problematising,” 585.

32. Zedeck, “Private Military/Security Companies,” 98–101.

33. Fuchs, “Searching for Resources,” 105–20; and Francis, “Mercenary Intervention,” 319–38.

34. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Selling Security,” 160.

35. Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 170–83.

36. Ibid., 7.

37. Florea, “Theories of Civil War,” 22; and Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 120–124.

38. Florea, “Theories of Civil War,” 15; and Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 127–131.

39. Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance,” 563–95; Hoeffler, “’Greed’ versus ‘Grievance’”, 274–84.

40. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, Inequality, Grievances, and Civil War, 11–99; and Hillesund et al., “Horizontal Inequality and Armed Conflict,” 463–480.

41. Powell, “Bargaining Theory,” 17–27; and Reiter, “Exploring the Bargaining Model,” 28–33.

42. Florea, “Theories of Civil War,” 16–28.

43. Tilly and Tarrow, Contentious Politics, 29.

44. Florea, “Theories of Civil War,” 22.

45. della Porta, Clandestine Political Violence, 24.

46. Hedström and Ylikoski, “Causal Mechanisms,” 50.

47. Florea, “Theories of Civil War,” 22.

48. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraphs 2–4; Lechner and Gabidullin, “Why the Wagner,” paragraphs 4–6.

49. Neethling, “Russian Para-Military,” 1; and Rampe, “What is Russia’s,” paragraph 2.

50. Mathew and Moolakkattu, “Russia in the Horn of Africa,” 538–43; and Kohnert, “The Impact of Russian,” 2–10.

51. Kohnert, “The Impact,” 3–10.

52. Clarke, “What Happens,” paragraphs 6–8.

53. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraph 2; and Pokalova, “The Wagner,” 5–14; Rampe, “What is Russia’s,” paragraph 2.

54. Rampe, “What is Russia’s,” paragraph 2.

55. Pokalova, “The Wagner,” 3–5, 16–17.

56. Ibid., 12.

57. Ibid., 13; Clarke, “What Happens,” 2–3; and US Department of the Treasury, “Treasury Targets,” 6–8.

58. Arieff et al., Russia’s Wagner, 1–2.

59. Arieff et al., Russia’s Wagner, 2; and Lechner and Gabidullin, “Why the Wagner,” paragraph 4.

60. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraph 3.

61. Arieff et al., Russia’s Wagner, 2; and Rampe, “What is Russia’s,” paragraph 3.

62. Lechner and Gabidullin, “Why the Wagner,” paragraph 4; and United Nations Security Council, “Political Agreement,” paragraphs 1–8.

63. Lechner and Gabidullin, “Why the Wagner,” paragraphs 4–5.

64. Arieff et al., “Russia’s Wagner,” 2–3.

65. Gain, “Shifting Sentiments,” paragraphs 4–12; and Posthumus, “Analysis,” paragraphs 4–22.

66. Pokalova, “The Wagner,” 9.

67. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraph 3; and Lechner and Gabidullin, “Why the Wagner Group,” paragraphs 4–5; Pokalova, “The Wagner,” 12.

68. Reuters, “Central African Republic,” paragraphs 1–9.

69. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraph 5–6; and Rampe, “What is Russia’s,” paragraph 5.

70. Czerep, “Russia’s Wagner,” 1–2; and Rampe, “What is Russia’s,” paragraph 5.

71. Czerep, “Russia’s Wagner,” 2; and Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraphs 4–5.

72. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraph 7.

73. Pokalova, “The Wagner,” 14.

74. Ibid., 14–15.

75. Arieff et al., “Russia’s Wagner,” 2–3; and Pokalova, “The Wagner,” 14–15.

76. Gain, ‘Shifting Sentiments,” paragraph 4.

77. Kohnert, “The Impact,” 4–9.

78. Talmazan, “Prigozhin Appears” paragraph 5.

79. Joachim and Schneiker, “All for One,” 257–58; and McFate, Mercenaries and War, 13.

80. McFate, The Modern, 47; McFate, The New Rules, 93.

81. Herbst, “Searching for Legitimacy,” 282.

82. McFate, Mercenaries and War, 20.

83. de Carvalho, “Private Force,” 11–19.

84. Marques, Operation Kissonde, 28–77.

85. Jansen, “In Defense of Mali’s Gold,” 1–36.

86. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Selling Security,” 133–35; and Herbst, “Searching for Legitimacy,” 281; and Leander, “The Paradoxical,” 481–84; and Kinsey, “Problematising,” 585.

87. Herbst, “Searching for Legitimacy,” 287–8.

88. Singer, “Corporate Warriors,” 186–220; and Singer, Corporate Warriors, 88–145; McFate, The Modern, 14–17.

89. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraph 7; and Pokalova, “The Wagner,” 12–13.

90. Pokalova, “The Wagner,” 12–13.

91. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraph 9.

92. Rampe, “What is Russia’s,” paragraph 3.

93. Zedeck, “Private Military/Security,” 99.

94. See, for example, Ibid., 98–103.

95. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Buhaug, Inequality, 57–160; and Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed”, 577–87.

96. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Selling Security,” 159–161; and Fuchs, “Searching for Resources”, 110–12.

97. ADF [Africa Defense Forum ADF], “Wagner Group,” paragraphs 4–7.

98. Gain, “Shifting Sentiments,” paragraphs 3–7.

99. Arieff et al., “Russia’s Wagner,” 2–3; and Vines, “Wagner in Africa,” paragraphs 25–27.

100. Arieff et al., “Russia’s Wagner,” 3; and Gavin, “The United States,” paragraphs 1–3; and Rampe, “What is Russia’s,” paragraph 6.

101. Felbab-Brown, “How the Niger Coup,” paragraph 4.

102. Arieff et al., “Russia’s Wagner,” 2–3; and Lechner and Gabidullin, “Why the Wagner,” paragraph 6.

103. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Selling Security,” 160.

104. Ibid., 139.

105. McFate, The Modern, 37.

106. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Selling Security,” 132; and McFate, The Modern, 37.

107. Abrahamsen and Williams, “Selling Security,” 132.

108. Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency,” 80.

109. Posthumus, “Analysis,” paragraphs 4–22; and Gain, “Shifting Sentiments,” paragraph 3–7.

110. Fasanotti, “Russia’s Wagner,” paragraph 5–9.

111. Arieff et al., “Russia’s Wagner,” 1–3; and Pokalova, “The Wagner,” 9–16.

112. Lechner and Gabidullin, “Why the Wagner,” paragraph 1.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Thomas Ameyaw-Brobbey

Thomas Ameyaw-Brobbey is a Research Fellow, Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College, Accra, Ghana. His research interest is interdisciplinary, spanning international relations, security, civil conflicts and wars, human security, domestic governance institutions of developing countries, China-African public relations, and sports politics. He is a current member of the following professional societies: ISA, IPSA, and ASAA. His recent publications have appeared in World Affairs, Journal of International Studies, Africa Review, National Interest, Global Policy, Small Wars and Insurgencies, and Insight on Africa.

Vladimir Antwi-Danso

Vladimir Antwi-Danso is the Dean and Director of Academic Affairs of the Ghana Armed Forces Command & Staff College (GAFCSC), Accra. He is experienced researcher and consultant to many international organizations in the field of International Relations, specializing in International Security, Geo-politics, and Regional Economic Cooperation and Integration.