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ABSTRACT
Many scholars consider Avicenna’s theory of cognitive forms a theory of representation, which raises two questions. First, why does a cognitive form represent a particular object instead of another? This issue is known as the determination problem. Second, what is the nature of intentionality of the cognitive form? This is known as the nature problem. This paper examines Avicenna’s theory of cognitive forms and focuses on how he would address the two problems. I argue that Avicenna offers a pluralistic approach to the determination problem: depending on the type of representation, the object of representation is determined differently. Additionally, Avicenna views the nature of intentionality as a referential relation towards the object that can be attributed to the representation in virtue of the object somehow existing in the subject immaterially.
Acknowledgements
I would like to express my gratitude to Tony Street and Jari Kaukua for their helpful comments at various stages of this research. I am also profoundly grateful to the two anonymous referees from the British Journal of the History of Philosophy for their thoughtful and constructive feedback, which significantly helped improve this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 For example, Dag Hasse has argued that, for Avicenna, sensation and estimation are not intentional (Avicenna’s De Anima, 132–6).
2 For a more detailed outline of Avicenna’s faculty psychology, see López-Farjeat, Classical Islamic Philosophy, 167–71.
3 I translate maʿnā as ‘meaning’. However, my intention is not to say that, in the context of cognitive psychology, maʿnā should be understood as ‘what is signified by expressions’. Instead, in the context of cognitive psychology, I take maʿnā to mean the cognitive meaning that is grasped either by the estimative power or the intellect. For a recent study on Avicenna’s concept of maʿnā, see Mousavian, “Avicenna”.
4 Translations are my own. For a detailed discussion on Avicenna’s theory of sensation, see Kaukua, “Avicenna”.
5 Text 1 clearly shows that Avicenna holds that the remote sensible is represented by the sensible form within us, which means that our sensation, insofar as it can represent the remote sensible, is intentional. Therefore, Hasse’s claim that sensation is not intentional is incorrect (Avicenna’s De Anima 132–3). Hasse further argues that estimation is not intentional because it is modelled on sensation. However, his argumentative strategy is flawed because, for Avicenna, sensation is intentional in certain aspects.
6 Throughout the paper, I assume that quiddity can be instantiated in the mind or in the external world without positing a substantial metaphysical position about the ontological status of the quiddity itself. For a recent study on the ontological status of quiddity, see Janos, Avicenna; Benevich, “The Essence-Existence Distinction”; Bertolacci, “The Distinction of Essence and Existence in Avicenna’s Metaphysics”.
7 “Every intellectual apprehension is a relation to the form separate from matter and its material accidents in the mentioned way” (Avicenna, al-Nafs, 244, lines 4–6).
8 It is relatively clear that the intellect can directly grasp the quiddity of a thing insofar as it is in the intellect. However, it is unclear whether Avicenna believes that the intellect can have a direct cognitive relation to the quiddity itself. Zarepour argues that the intellect can directly grasp the quiddity itself (“Avicenna on Empty Intentionality”, 8), but Kaukua has noticed that Avicenna may have ultimately abandoned this view (“Avicenna’s Outsourced Rationalism”, 231). I leave the question about the quiddity itself open because my primary concern is with the quiddity-in-the-intellect as a representation.
9 For the similarity reading of Avicenna’s theory of representation, see Lagerlund, Representation and Objects, 22, especially note 38 and Üçer, “From Identity”, 32. Lagerlund limits the similarity account to external and internal senses. However, Üçer extends it further to explain intellectual cognition. It is also worth noting that some authors from the post-Avicennan traditions, such as Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī, understood Avicenna as explaining representationality through similarity, see Benevich, “Representational Beings”.
10 For a well-known critique of the similarity account, see Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, 2.
11 The general problem, which is usually called the ‘disjunction problem’, for the causal account is determining how to separate content-determining causes from non-content-determining causes. For a general introduction to the disjunction problem, see Adams and Aizawa, “Causal Theories of Mental Content”, especially Part 3.
12 Avicenna develops his theory of light in al-Nafs Book 3, chapters 1–3. For a detailed outline of Avicenna’s theory of light, see McGinnis, Avicenna, 101–10.
13 By ‘abstract form’, I mean the form that is abstracted (mujarrada) from matter to some extent. So, this sense of ‘abstract’ characterizes the way in which the form exists in cognition; it is not used to talk about the abstract function of the cognitive power regardless of how we interpret the theory of abstraction, a theory that aims to explain how the cognitive power performs its function of abstraction.
14 For a detailed study on Avicenna’s doctrine of estimation, see Black, “Estimation (Wahm) in Avicenna”.
15 The wolf case may be reminiscent of Papineau’s monkey case in which the monkeys have different alarm calls in response to different risky circumstances (“Teleosemantics”). However, since Avicenna clearly knew nothing about natural selection, I am only pointing out the similarity between estimation and the teleosemantic idea of biological function. I am not suggesting that we should interpret Avicenna’s theory of estimation in light of the teleosemantic approach.
16 A cogitative power occurs when the intellect guides the active imagination. For a detailed study of cogitative power, see Black, “Rational Imagination”.
17 For some recent studies of Avicenna’s conception of dreams, especially prophetic dreams, see Lizzini, “Representation and Reality” and Bennett, “Avicenna’s Dreaming”.
18 There is a long debate among Avicenna scholars about how to understand emanation and abstraction in the context of concept-acquisition. I acknowledge this debate but have tried, throughout the paper, to not commit to any substantial interpretation of emanation and the abstraction as the function of the cognitive power. For some recent studies on abstraction, see Black, “How Do We Acquire Concepts?” and Alpina, “Intellectual Knowledge”; for a recent survey of the abstraction-emanation debate, see Ogden, “Avicenna’s Emanated Abstraction”.
19 By isomorphism, I mean the identity of quiddity between different forms. For Avicenna, similarity between forms might be ultimately explained by the identity of quiddity between different forms. In the case of the sensation and estimation, isomorphism can partly contribute to the determination of the represented object. In the case of the intellectual cognition, isomorphism is sufficient for the determination of the represented object.
20 Saber and Yangabadi recently proposed that the intentional relation, for Avicenna, is always mediated by judgement (they consider quiddity as something existing in some ways) within a conscious intentional act (“Intentionality in Avicenna”, 10). In my reading, I only require that the knowledge of the form’s being actually or possibly referring to something external is mediated by judgement.
21 Unlike Saber and Yangabadi’s emphasis on consciousness, namely that intentionality is a built-in relational feature of the conscious act (“Intentionality in Avicenna”, 11), my account emphasizes the immaterial existence of representation. In my reading, immateriality does not amount to conscious being. The forms stored in the receptive imagination are somehow abstract from matter, but this does not mean that all these forms are consciously there. More importantly, even representations are not consciously apprehended, they are still representations because they can establish the relevant relation based on the way in which they exist, namely their immaterial existence. For Saber and Yangabadi, Avicenna’s notion of intentionality is grounded by consciousness, whereas, in my reading, a representational relation is grounded in immaterial existence.
22 The contemporary debate around direct and indirect realism is centred on perception. For a brief clarification about direct and indirect realism concerning perception, see Bonjour, “In Search”. However, it is also worth noting that medieval philosophy scholars debate whether intellectual cognition can be understood in terms of direct or indirect realism. For a historically relevant study on this issue, see Benevich, “Perceiving Things in Themselves”.