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ABSTRACT
It is often assumed that Epicurean happiness can be achieved by everyone alike. This paper offers a corrective to this view. While it is true that the Epicureans abolish traditional differences among people like those between the sexes, social classes, and so on, they also maintain that there are people who are incapable of achieving happiness because they lack a certain bodily make-up or because they do not have the right ethnic or cultural origin.
Acknowledgements
Thanks to the audience at the 2023 Society of Ancient Greek Philosophy meeting, the participants of the 2023 Penn Ancient Workshop, and two anonymous referees for their suggestions for improvement on earlier versions of this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).
Notes
1 See also Diogenes of Oenoanda, frr. 29.III.13–14+207.I.12-III.13 Smith.
2 On women in the Epicurean school (including further references), see Capasso, “Un albero per Leonzio”; Erler, “Epikur”, 287–288; Föllinger, Differenz und Gleichheit, 239–255; Gordon, “Remembering the Garden”; Daroca and Martìnez, “Communauté épicurienne”; Gordon, Gendering of Epicurus, 72–108; Di Fabio, “Donne epicuree”; and Arenson, “Ancient Women Epicureans”. For the claim that Epicurean philosophy is explicitly addressed to women, see, for instance, Plutarch, Against Colotes 1126f and Is “Live Unknown” A Wise Precept? 1129a. For Epicurus’ letters to women, see Angeli, “La scuola epicurea”, as well as the collection of Epicurus’ letters in Erbì, Epicuro: Lettere. For a brief discussion of the Epicurean view on slavery (and further references), see Hessler, “Epikur/Epikureismus”. On slaves in the Garden and the claim that slaves practiced philosophy with Epicurus, see Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers X.10. For the extant remains of letters that Epicurus wrote to his slave Mys, see frr. 152–155 Usener.
3 Emphasis added. Asmis, referring to Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of the Philosophers X.117 (= fr. 226 Usener), recognizes in footnotes of her papers that there are two restrictions to her claim, but dismisses these without commenting on all relevant textual evidence. Asmis, “Epicurean Economics”, 134, observes that “Epicureanism is not addressed to the masses”, but the paper does not state that the reason for this is the cognitive limitation of the many, as will be argued below.
4 Other scholars who endorse the thesis that Epicureanism is open to everyone include Susanne Bobzien who claims that on the Epicurean view “everyone can morally improve and get a life of true pleasure and tranquility” (“Moral Responsibility”, 222; emphasis added). Likewise, Francisco Javier Aoiz and Marcelo Boeri maintain in their 2023 monograph on Epicurean social and political philosophy that Epicurus “suggests wisdom is a property of every human being that is neither strange, difficult nor impossible to acquire. In other words, wisdom and its benefits are accessible by all human beings willing to understand and practice Epicureanism and to appreciate the link between friendship (correctly understood according to Epicurean patterns) and wisdom” (Theory and Practice, 109; emphasis in the original). And Sean McConnell writes concerning the virtue of greatness of soul: “In line with Epicurus’ declaration that the rewards of philosophy are accessible to all people (Ep. Men. 122), including slaves, women, the young, and the old, the Epicureans maintain that everyone has the chance to develop and express fully the virtue of μϵγαλοψυχία” (“The Epicurean Virtue”, 176; emphasis added). McConnell, “Epicurean Education”, 117, note 15, acknowledges that there may exist a class of people who “lack the requisite capacities to do philosophy successfully”. In light of On the Nature III.307–322 (which is discussed below), this possibility is however quickly dismissed. Roskam, “Epicurean Philosophy”, 151 et passim, as well as Nijs, “Contemplating Diogenes”, 256–258, defend the more limited claim that the Epicurean inscription of Diogenes of Oenoanda addressed everyone and so that Diogenes held that everyone can achieve happiness. For the claim that Epicurus is not elitist, see also, more recently Austin, Living for Pleasure, 6.
5 Nevertheless, the paper will also make clear pace Isnardi Parente, Epicuro: Opere, 62–66, that the limitation that Epicurus and his followers place on the achievability of happiness does not amount to an aristocratic view; there are many people who can achieve happiness according to the Epicureans.
6 Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers X.117 (= fr. 226 Usener). Trans. mine.
7 Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers Χ.136 (= fr. 2 Usener), and Letter to Menoeceus 128.
8 On the assimilation to the divine in Epicureanism, see Hahmann and Robitzsch, “Epicurus’ Divine Hedonism” (including references to older literature).
9 For the claim that a sage will unlikely lose the disposition he has, see Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers X.117. For the claim that the highest form of happiness (of the gods and – one should add – of sages) does not allow the increase or decrease of pleasure, see Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers X.121a (= fr. 407 Usener).
10 Stromata I.15 (= 130.37–38 Sylburg). Trans. mine. Clement is a hostile source and as such may be misrepresenting the Epicurean view. However, since the importance of Greek is also emphasized by Philodemus (who had frequent contact with Latin speakers; see below), Clement’s comment should not be dismissed out of hand.
11 For some discussion of this claim, see Robitzsch, Epicurean Justice, 78–79.
12 Accordingly, the Syrian Mithres, whom Epicurus considers a friend, can be considered Greek insofar as he speaks Greek. Pace Nijs, “Contemplating Diogenes”, 258.
13 Note here the parallel issue that Lucretius writes a poem, but that according to Diogenes Laërtius the sage will not write poems himself. See Lives of Eminent Philosophers X.120.
14 For the distinction between factors that are up to us (δι᾽ ἡμᾶς) due to our volitions, the result of our natural constitution (διὰ τὴν φύσιν), and the product of the environment (διὰ τὸ πϵριέχον), see On Nature XXV, fr. 34.33 Arrighetti = Laursen, “On Nature, 25th Book”, 48. For an excellent discussion of these different causal factors, see Bobzien, “Moral Responsibility”.
15 Letter to Herodotus 63–64, Plutarch, Against Colotes 1118d-e (= fr. 314 Usener), Aëtius IV.3.11.388d (= fr. 315 Usener), and Lucretius, On the Nature of Things III.231–245. On the Epicurean conception of the soul, see Kerferd, “Doctrine of the Soul”; Rist, Epicurus: An Introduction, 74–80; Diano, “La psichologia di Epicuro”; Annas, Hellenistic Philosophy of Mind, 123–199; Everson, “Epicurean Psychology”; Moreau, Lucrèce: L’âme; Repici, “Il pensiero dell’anima”; Gill, “Psychology”; Verde, “Monismo psicologico”; Verde, “La psicologia di Epicuro”; Verde, “Partition of the Soul”; and Scalas, Théorie épicurienne du vivant.
16 The exact relationship between the bodily and the mental in Epicureanism is difficult to determine. In some cases, macroscopic properties like the sweetness of honey are explained in terms of the properties of microscopic atoms. See Lucretius, On the Nature of Things I.398–407. However, Alexander of Aphrodisias reports that in the case of mixtures, the macroscopic properties are not straightforwardly reducible to the properties of the component parts of the mixture. See Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Mixture 214.28–215.8 Bruns (= fr. 290 Usener). Accordingly, there has been some debate on whether Epicurus is committed to a reductionist theory. For discussion, see Sedley, “Two Conceptions of Vacuum”; Sedley, “Epicurean Anti-Reductionism”; Furley, “Epicurus on Sensible Qualities”; and O’Keefe, “Ontological Status of Sensible Qualities”. Epicurus’ own view on the relationship between the bodily and the mental is preserved in On Nature XXV. For a discussion of this very difficult text in regard to Epicurean moral psychology, see Bobzien, “Moral Responisbility”.
17 See, for instance, Letter to Herodotus 40, 42, et passim; Philodemus, On Death, col. VIII. 32 Henry; On Piety I.40–41 (et passim) Obbink; and Diogenes of Oenoanda, frr. 10.II.13., 13.IV.9, and 121.I.8–9 Smith. Smith’s reading (see also note 6 on p. 436 of his edition) is in line with that of other editors of Diogenes’ inscription. See William, Diogenis Oenoandensis Fragmenta, 72, and Chilton, Diogenes: The Fragments, 29. Grilli, “I frammenti”, 370, reports the different readings, but does not endorse one over the other.
18 Diogenes of Oenoanda, frr. 111 and 112 Smith, suggest that achieving happiness is only a matter of having the right διαθέσις (disposition). This disposition is distinct from the atomic make-up of an individual. But the correct way to understand these fragments is that happiness is only a matter of disposition once one already has the right atomic make-up, not that there are no atomistic prerequisites for happiness. After all, Diogenes is addressing only those people who have the right atomic make-up (that is, the ϵὐσυνκρίτοι). On the meaning of this technical term ‘διαθέσις‘ in Epicurus, see Grilli, “Διαθέσις”.
19 See for instance, SV 44; Philodemus, On Anger, col. XXXIX.7–8 Armstrong and McOsker; and On Poems V, col. XVI.3 Magnoni.
20 See Usener, “Epikureische Schriften auf Stein”, 431, and William, Diogenis Oenoandis Fragmenta, 72. See also the comments in Chilton, Diogenes: The Fragments, 29, in agreement with William’s argument. Smith, The Epicurean Inscription, 368, also translates as William does, but does not refer to the debate about the meaning of the word.
21 Plutarch, That Epicurus Actually Makes A Pleasant Life Impossible 1100a (= fr. 178 Usener). Trans. mine. Plutarch is a hostile source and so might be thought to misrepresent the Epicurean view. However, note that his testimony is in alignment with the totality of the textual evidence.
22 Scholz, “Ein römischer Epikureer”, 213–214 and 223–224, offers yet another reading of the term ‘ϵὐσυνκρίτος’. He maintains the ϵὐσυνκρίτοι are those who have not received a certain formal education, that is, have not acquired the ability to express themselves in Greek. This is an attempt to assimilate the term to cultural and linguistic criterion of sagehood in fr. 226 Usener, which is not convincing. Accordingly, it is best to understand the term ‘ϵὐσυνκρίτος’ in the sense of having a certain atomic make-up, as was argued above. Geert Roskam (“Epicurean Philosophy”; see also Nijs, “Contemplating Diogenes”, 250–251 and 256–258) accepts the interpretation of the term ‘ϵὐσυνκρίτος’ offered here, but argues in his paper on the readership of Diogenes that the Epicurean inscription at Oenoanda addresses different groups. Accordingly, Roskam would likely dismiss the present argument by maintaining that certain parts of the inscription are more specialized and aim at more advanced readers, while others aim at less advanced students. Put differently, since the inscription, according to Roskam, has some Epicurean teachings to offer to everyone, one cannot rely on the occurrence of the term ‘ϵὐσυνκρίτος’ to argue that Epicurean philosophy is not aimed at everyone. Roskam makes his case by observing that ‘ϵὐσυνκρίτος’ is only used twice in frr. 2 and 3, that is, in what he takes to be the introduction to the section on physics. He deduces from this that this section only addresses those who are ϵὐσυνκρίτοι, while the ethics addresses those who are στόμα κοσμίοι, that is, those who are ‘civil-spoken’ as Smith translates the term. (The third occurrence of ϵὐσυνκρίτος at fr. 119.III.1–2 is due to Smith’s emendation, which Roskam rejects). Those who are στόμα κοσμίοι may be identical with the ϵὐσυνκρίτοι, but perhaps are also distinct from them. In any case, since other fragments of the inscription do not contain a reference to the στόμα κοσμίοι or the ἐυσυνκρίτοι, but seem to address everyone (for instance, frr. 29.III.12–13+207.I.12-III.13), Roskam infers that the inscription in its totality addresses everyone, with different sections geared towards more and less advanced readers. Roskam’s thesis that only certain parts of the inscription address the ϵὐσυνκρίτοι relies on (1) an argument from silence, since, as he himself observes (“Epicurean Philosophy”, 162), probably only 20–25% of the Diogenes’ inscription is extant, and on (2) the idea that frr. 2 and 3 are only part of the introduction of the physics section, not of the inscription as a whole, as some scholars maintain. Accordingly, one could accept that there is a variety of intended readers of the inscription, while still maintaining that a precondition for all readers is that they need to be able to be happy in the relevant way, which means that they have to be ϵὐσυνκρίτοι. Finally, while Diogenes’ position on who is able to be happy may be different from that of other Epicureans, it seems more prudent from an interpretive perspective to assume a break in tradition and innovation only when certain passages cannot be reconciled. In light of evidence in Hermarchus, Philodemus, and Epicurus that will be discussed shortly, this will mean that it is better to assume that Diogenes, like other Epicureans, acknowledges that not everyone can achieve happiness.
23 Porphyry, On Abstinence, I.8.4 (= Hermarchus, fr. 34 Longo Auricchio). Trans. mine. Emphasis added.
24 Porphyry, On Abstinence, I.8.2–3. Trans. Clark, modified. Emphasis added. ‘χρησίμον’ and ‘συμφέρον’ seem to be used as synonyms in the passage. Epicurean authors are divided on the evaluation of whether the fear of the gods is a good way to make people behave in certain ways. While Diogenes of Oenoanda, for instance, does not seem to think that divine fear is an effective instrument (see frr. 167 II.4-III.14 + 126.I.1-III.4 Smith), Philodemus seems to believe in its efficiency (see PHerc. 1251 (= Philodemus, On Choices and Avoidances?), col. XII.4–19 Indelli and Tsouna).
25 At Letter to Menoeceus 126–127, Epicurus rejects the view that it is better not to be born and that those who have been born should die early, which is, for instance, defended in Theogenis 425–428. (On this passage, see also the more detailed discussion in Hessler, Epikur: Brief an Menoikeus, 221–224.) Philodemus’ position in On Death, if advanced in earnest, would thus be at odds with the view advanced by Epicurus in the Letter to Menoeceus.
26 The referent of ‘it’ is unclear.
27 Trans. mine. For similar claims, see Philodemus, On Death, col. XVIII.1–5 Henry, and PHerc. 346, col. V.13–14 Capasso.
28 Similar claims are also found in later Epicurean authors. See, for instance, Polystratus, On Irrational Contempt, cols. XXVIII.7, XXX.5 and 17 Indelli; PHerc. 1251 (= Philodemus, On Choices and Avoidances?), col. XII.4–19 Indelli and Tsouna; and Diogenes of Oenoanda, frr. 13, 44, 139 Smith.
29 Gnomolgium Parisinum 1168 f. 115 r. (= fr. 187 Usener). Trans. Inwood and Gerson. See also the philological commentary on this passage in Grilli, “Διαθέσις”, 103–104, and Grilli, Vita contemplativa, 61–62, note 7, as well as the parallel passage in Seneca, Moral Epistles 29.10.
30 Seneca, Moral Epistles 7.11 (= fr. 208 Usener); Diogenes Laërtius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers 120; and PHerc. 1231, fr. 8, col. I (= Clay, Paradosis & Survival, 80–82).
31 See Seneca, Moral Epistles 25.6 (= fr. 209 Usener). The location of the Epicurean Garden in Athens also illustrates this point insofar as it was likely located within the city walls (in contradistinction to the Academy and the Peripatos, which were outside the city walls, in the banlieue, (Wycherly, “The Garden of Epicurus”, and Jones, Associations of Classical Athens, 230–234). As a result, Epicurean communities became communities within already existing cities: “The school of Epicurus seems like a true polity, free from faction, having one common mind and judgement, of which there was and is and, as it seems, will be followers [ἔοικέ τϵ ἡ Ἐπικούρου διατριβὴ πολιτϵίᾳ τινὶ ἀληθϵῖ, ἀστασιαστοτάτῃ, κοινὸν ἕνα νοῦν, μίαν γνώμην ἐχούσῃ· ἀφ' ἧς ἦσαν καὶ ϵἰσὶ καί, ὡς ἔοικϵν, ἔσονται φιλακόλουθοι]” (Eusebius, Preparation for the Gospel XIV.5. Trans. mine).
32 To the already long list of passages that show that not everyone can achieve happiness on the Epicurean view, one might also add Diogenes’ so-called Golden Age fragment that describes a scenario in which some societal institutions such as the laws will no longer be necessary: “[So we shall not achieve wisdom universally,] since not all are capable of it. But if we assume it to be possible, then truly the life of the gods will pass onto men. For everything will be full of justice and mutual love, and there will come to be no need of fortifications or laws and all the things which we contrive on account of one another. As for the necessaries derived from agriculture, since we shall have [no slaves at that time] (for indeed [we ourselves shall plough] and dig and tend [the plants] and [divert] rivers and watch over [the crops]) … [[τὴν μϵ̀ν οὐ̃ν σοφίαν οὐ πανταχου̃ κομι]οῦμϵν, ἐπϵὶ πάντϵς μὴ δύνανται. δυνατἠν δϵ̀ αὐτὴν ἂν ὐποθώμϵθα, τότϵ ὡς ἀληθω̃ς ὁ τω̃ν θϵω̃ν βίος ϵἰς ἀνθρώπους μϵταβήσϵται. δικαιοσύνης γὰρ ἔσται μϵστὰ πάντα καὶ φιλαλληλίας, καὶ οὐ γϵνήσϵται τϵιχω̃ν ἤ νόμων χρϵία καὶ πάντων ὅσα δι ̓ ἀλλήλους σκϵυωρούμϵθα. πϵρὶ δὲ τῶν ἀπὸ γϵωργίας ἀνανκαίων, ὡς οὐκ ἐσομένων ἡμ[ϵῖν τότϵ δούλων] καὶ γὰρ ἀ[ρόσομϵν αὐτοὶ] καὶ σκάψ[ομϵν, καὶ τῶν φύ]τῶν ἐπιμϵλ[ησόμϵθα], καὶ ποταμο[ὺς παρατρέ]ψομϵν, καὶ τὰ[ς φορὰς] ἐπιτηρή[σομϵν …]]” Diogenes of Oenoanda, fr. 56.I.1-II.7 Smith. Trans. Smith. The just quoted text is that of the most recent reconstruction and translation of Smith’s edition of Diogenes’ inscription. (See also the earlier reconstruction in Smith, Thirteen New Fragments, 21–25.) Unfortunately, the text does not specify what ‘it’ (αὐτὴν) refers to, that is, what not all are capable of, but the traditional reading assumes, as in Smith’s reconstruction, that ‘it’ refers to the capacity of being a sage. (See Barigazzi, “Un pensiero avveniristico”, 12–17, pace Arrighetti, “Il nuovo Diogene”, 169–170). On this reading, the passage would claim that not all people have the requisite capacities for sagehood and so the life of gods will not pass on to men. However, the reconstruction of the passage has been recently challenged by Nijs, “Contemplating Diogenes”, who argues pace Roskam, Live Unnoticed, 134–135, and Morel, “La terre entière”, 236–240, that the Golden Age Fragment need not be read as an unfulfillable hypothetical, but as one that can be fulfilled. Such a reading would be prima facie at odds with the conclusions of this paper insofar as then everybody could achieve happiness in Epicureanism on this understanding of Diogenes’ text. Due to space constraints, a detailed discussion of Nijs’ alternative reading is not possible here, although we should note that Nijs observes that Diogenes’ view may be unorthodox. Due to the political realities of the second century CE, that is, “the unification and Romanization of almost the entire known world, Diogenes had far more reason for optimism about the plausibility of a universal divulgation of Epicurean philosophy than the Athenian city-state citizen Epicurus ever had” (Nijs, “Contemplating Diogenes”, 258). (Changed political realities could also account for Lucretius’ comments on who can achieve happiness insofar as these are taken to differ from the mainstream Epicureanism. See note 34 below.)
33 For the Letter to Menoeceus as a protreptic treatise, see Hessler, Epikur: Brief an Menoikeus, 40–99.
34 The same is true of Lucretius’ optimistic remark at On the Nature of Things III.320–322 that “the surviving traces of our natural dispositions, which philosophy is unable to erase, are so very faint that there is nothing to prevent us from living a life worthy of the gods [usque adeo naturarum vestigia linqui | parvula quae nequeat ratio depellere nobis, | ut nihil inpediat dignam dis degere vitam].” Trans. Smith. If the late Epicurean Lucretius does not diverge from school orthodoxy, he must already address those who have the right nature to be susceptible for Epicurean teachings.
35 See Bobzien, “Moral Responsibility”, and McConnell, “Epicurean Education”, as well as the brief comments on Epicurean rhetoric in O’Keefe, “Is Epicurean Friendship Altruistic”, 302.
36 See, for instance, Lactantius, Divine Institutes III.25.7 (= fr. 227a Usener). Note, however, that Lactantius is a hostile source.
37 See also Plutarch, On the Tranquility of the Mind 465f (= fr. 555 Usener) along with the discussion in McConnell, “Epicureans on Kingship”, for another possible exception to the general paradigm: people who have a nature to lead a political life.
38 See also Porphyry, On Abstinence I.9 (= Hermarchus, fr. 34 Longo Auricchio). See also the discussion in McConnell, “Epicurean Education”, 129–134.
39 Epicurus makes similar claims about animals at On Nature XXV, fr. 34.21 and 24 Arrighetti (= Laursen, “On Nature, 25th Book”, 19 and 28).
40 See McConnell, “Epicurean Education”, 117–128, for a detailed discussion and further references.