Justifying attacks on nuclear facilities

Abstract

The recent Russian military attacks on nuclear facilities in Ukraine raise questions about the normalization of kinetic military operations carried out by states against nuclear facilities. Although doubts persist about their practical efficacy, the first and second amendment protocols to the 1949 Geneva Conventions expressly prohibit kinetic attacks on nuclear facilities. Nonetheless, the practice of targeting nuclear facilities as a tool of statecraft has been gradually normalized. This article seeks to explore the reasons behind this trend through a historical analysis of past instances of attacks on nuclear facilities, with a particular emphasis on the rationale offered by the attacking states and the subsequent political responses of the international community. The analysis reveals that the lax legal regulation of such attacks is not a flaw but rather a feature of the global nuclear-nonproliferation regime. Because these kinds of attacks are seen as playing an important role in that regime, there has been an enduring endeavor to maintain the practice, which has prevented the establishment of a more stringent legal framework. As a consequence, this practice continues to be permissible as a mechanism of coercion inherent in the regime. But it also has been applied outside that context, in Ukraine.

KEYWORDS:

• nuclear facilities
• radioactive dispersal
• international law
• Iran
• Iraq
• Israel
• Russia
• United States
• Zaporizhzhia
• Osirak

Introduction

Attacks against nuclear facilities have occurred since the dawn of the nuclear age. In 1943, Allied forces carried out the first attack of this kind, targeting the Norsk Hydro hydrogen-electrolysis plant, a crucial element of Nazi Germany’s effort to develop nuclear weapons.¹ From 1980 to 1988, Iran, Iraq, and Israel engaged in numerous attacks on nuclear facilities in the contexts of both jus in bello (notably during the Iran–Iraq War)—and jus ad bellum.² In 1991 and 1993, during the Gulf War and in its immediate aftermath, the United States carried out attacks on Iraqi nuclear facilities. In September 2007, Israel secretly attacked a suspected nuclear facility in Al-Kibar, Syria. It is worth noting that the legal context of the latter two cases is more complex than that of the earlier instances of attacks, given the particular circumstances in which the attacks took place.³

More recently, the Russian military attacks on the Chernobyl and Zaporizhzhia nuclear facilities in Ukraine—conducted in the context of jus in bello—sparked global condemnation because of concerns over radioactive fallout, highlighting—once again—the potential security, humanitarian, and environmental ramifications uniquely associated with attacks on nuclear facilities.⁴ Russia’s coercive strategy has involved attacks on nuclear facilities as a part of a wider campaign to obliterate critical national infrastructure in Ukraine. As the Russian invasion demonstrates, risks of mass destruction could potentially accompany such attacks.

The legal landscape governing the protection of nuclear facilities may appear comprehensive, consisting of Article 56 of the first amendment protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Article 15 of the second amendment protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the 2005 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), and the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (A/CPPNM).⁵ However, none of these legal provisions effectively governs attacks on nuclear facilities, nor do they exhaustively impinge on states’ ability to justify such attacks.

These shortcomings have been placed under increased scrutiny following the Russian attacks. Luis Rodriguez and Lauren Sukin have questioned the adequacy of existing legal arrangements, calling for the introduction of improved legal protections.⁶ Other scholars such as George M. Moore,⁷ Matthew Bunn,⁸ Olamide Samuel,⁹ and Rodney C. Ewing¹⁰ have variously explored the efficacy of international law in deterring attacks on nuclear facilities and the consequent weaponization of the threat of radioactive dispersal in conflict.¹¹ Ultimately, these scholars advocate the introduction of new legal mechanisms that explicitly outlaw such attacks. On the other hand, scholars such as Michal Onderco and Clara Egger have posited that legal gaps do not necessarily exist and that the introduction of new legal mechanisms might ultimately be counterproductive, given the failure of current legal mechanisms to deter such attacks.¹²

This study seeks to broaden and deepen this literature. Using historical episodes of attacks against nuclear facilities, it traces the recurring patterns of justification of such attacks and related political responses in the period between 1980 and 2007. It shows that the lax legal regulation of such attacks is not a flaw but rather a continuing feature of the global nuclear-nonproliferation regime.¹³ Over time, there has been an enduring endeavor to maintain this practice as a policy option, thereby preventing the establishment of a more stringent legal framework. As a consequence, this practice continues to be permissible as a mechanism of coercion inherent in the global nonproliferation regime, but also outside it, as the recent case in Ukraine shows. We define an attack on nuclear facilities as the use of kinetic conventional military force by states to damage or destroy civilian nuclear infrastructure for various purposes. By this definition, we exclude attacks carried out by non-state actors, threats of attacks, or nonconventional attacks (for example, cyberattacks, assassinations, and sabotage).

We identify two broad kinds of political responses to these attacks: reactive and proactive. Reactive political responses consist of post hoc deliberations on instances of attacks on nuclear facilities by states in multilateral forums such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN General Assembly, and the UN Security Council. These deliberations consider the circumstances of the attacks as well as the justification offered by the attacking parties. In the absence of concrete multilateral enforcement or punishment mechanisms, the acceptance or rejection of the attacking parties’ justifications in these forums determines whether normative statements of condemnation are issued. Proactive responses, on the other hand, consist of states’ attempts to establish measures (beyond the amendment protocols) capable of forestalling attacks on nuclear facilities in the future. Initially discussed under the auspices of a proposed Radiological Weapons Convention (RWC) in the Committee on Disarmament (CD), and subsequently in the General Assembly and IAEA, these efforts aim to strike a balance between acknowledging the potential utility of attacks on nuclear facilities and prohibiting the weaponization of radioactive dispersal. Moreover, proactive responses address how the normalization of such attacks directly impinges on the inalienable right of states to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful uses, as enshrined in Article IV of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).

This article has four parts. The first section introduces the legal landscape governing attacks on nuclear facilities, in particular Article 56 of Protocol I and Article 15 of Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. The second section focuses on reactive political responses to such attacks by analyzing historical episodes in the period between 1980 and 2007. The third section delves into the evolution of proactive political responses, from 1980 until today. Lastly, the article discusses the findings and raises the question of whether the global nonproliferation order can be sustained without the option of resorting to these attacks.

The legal landscape governing attacks on nuclear facilities

International humanitarian law (IHL)—also known as the law of armed conflict or law of war—governs the conduct of armed conflict, with the objective of “limiting the barbarity of war.”¹⁴ At its core, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their amendment protocols set out the guiding principles and requirements that bind all parties to prescribed standards of behavior during conflict. There are three amendment protocols to the Geneva Conventions.¹⁵ The first amendment protocol of 1977 (Protocol I) strengthens the protections of the victims of international conflict. The second amendment protocol of 1977 (Protocol II) mirrors Protocol I, except that its provisions apply to non-international conflict, and the provisions have been reformulated to reflect this. Protocols I and II are relevant to the issue of attacks on nuclear facilities, as they seek to govern attacks on nuclear power plants in international and non-international armed conflict, respectively.¹⁶ Article 56 of Protocol I and Article 15 of Protocol II both contain the following language:

Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes, and nuclear electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.

Article 56 of Protocol I, due to its jurisdiction over international conflict, further protects other military objectives within the vicinity of nuclear power plants.¹⁷ These provisions are explicitly geared to outlawing the weaponization of radioactive dispersal by focusing on the protection of civilians from the release of “dangerous forces” during armed conflict. The protection of nuclear power plants, therefore, is dependent on whether civilians would be at risk from the release of radioactive material as a result of such attacks.

It is worth noting that, with the exception of the attack against Nazi Germany’s nuclear program, all attacks against nuclear facilities have occurred after the conclusion of Protocols I and II. This raises the question of how so many attacks on nuclear facilities could occur despite the existence of international law prohibiting such attacks.

One credible answer put forward by Burrus Carnahan highlights the inherent inefficacies of Protocol I and II. These protocols do not necessarily consider the complexities involved in protecting nuclear facilities in the theater of war.¹⁸ Protocol I is quite problematic because of the numerous conditions under which the protection of nuclear facilities ceases to apply. For example, protections cease to apply if the facility is used for any function in direct support of military operations. Part 2(b) of Article 56 explicitly states that nuclear power plants cease to be protected if they provide electric power in “regular, significant, and direct support of military operations and if such an attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support.”¹⁹

Much like other IHL provisions, Article 56 permits a great degree of military discretion. After all, IHL serves to limit—not eliminate—the barbarity of conflict.²⁰ The attacking party enjoys discretion, based on its own objectives, in determining the military necessity of its attacks against works or installations.²¹ Furthermore, military targeting experts usually consider attacking individual installations within the context of a broader effort to disrupt or destroy national technical systems. Individual factories can be seen as part of a wider industrial base in support of war efforts; nuclear power plants are part of an electricity-generation system that can be viewed as supporting war efforts.²² It is therefore unsurprising that attackers justify attacks on nuclear facilities on the basis of this logic.²³ Judging whether electricity provision is regular, significant, or direct enough to be considered integral to military operations becomes a discretionary political exercise. Can one argue that attacks on nuclear power plants should be off-limits on the grounds that their connection to war efforts does not meet the Article 56 threshold or that the nature of the connection cannot be determined when the criteria—regularity, significance, and directness—are so poorly defined? Carnahan argues that Protocol I is flawed because it is “written in language that is at once lengthy, complex, vague and incomplete” and therefore “poses formidable obstacles to any military planner attempting to respect it.”²⁴

Additionally, by focusing solely on nuclear power plants, the amendment protocols do not offer protections to other kinds of nuclear facilities. Attacks on spent-fuel interim-storage sites, spent-fuel-reprocessing plants, high-level-waste repositories, and research reactors could also release significant amounts of “dangerous forces.” Yet these remain outside the scope of the amendment protocols.

Finally, the question of universal adherence must be considered. The 1949 conventions are universally applicable, as they have been ratified by all states. However, the amendment protocols are not universal instruments. Protocol I has been ratified by 174 states, while Protocol II has been ratified by 169. Comparing the universalization records of the amendment protocols with the list of states that have conducted attacks on nuclear facilities produces some interesting results. The United States and Iran have signed but not ratified Protocol I, while Israel has not signed it. The list for Protocol II is similarly interesting.²⁵ The United States and Iran have yet to ratify Protocol II, while Iraq, Syria, and Israel have not yet signed it. As a result, Russia and Iraq are the only parties to the amendment protocols to have conducted such attacks (Iraq being a party only to Protocol I). It is clear that the spatial and thematic scopes of the amendment protocols make them ineffective instruments, unable to constrain the ability of states to attack nuclear facilities.

Responding to attacks on nuclear facilities: reactive political responses

This section delves into the reactive political responses to attacks on nuclear facilities, specifically focusing on historical episodes occurring between 1980 and 2007. During this period, the frequency of attacks on nuclear facilities increased, as did states’ attempts to justify them. In analyzing reactive political responses to these attacks, we consider the post hoc deliberations on individual incidents by states in multilateral forums, taking into account the circumstances as well as the justifications offered by the attacking parties. As a result, we are able to determine, based on the issuance of normative statements of condemnation, whether the justifications were accepted or rejected. Despite the claim by Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps that concerns about international condemnation do not serve as salient deterrents of attacks on nuclear facilities, we observe that attacking states have increasingly emphasized compelling and sophisticated rationalizations as international responses have become more pronounced.²⁶ Early explanations indicate that states merely justified attacks by citing their national interests, as seen in the Iranian, Israeli, and Iraqi attacks between 1980 and 1988. The 2007 Israeli attack was the latest example of the same trend. In contrast, the United States sought to leverage its position within the international system to characterize its actions as essential to the maintenance of the global nonproliferation regime.

The political responses to these attacks also noticeably evolved during this period, ranging from no response (or interest) at all to the near-absolute condemnation of individual attacks.

Iran (1980)

On September 30, 1980, four Iranian F-4E Phantom jets attacked Iraq’s Tuwaitha nuclear research center, causing damage to various piping and plumbing systems in the water-cooling tower and several research laboratories and training facilities.²⁷ The attack caused minor damage to the Osirak reactor, which appeared to be under construction—and therefore not operational—at the time of the attack.²⁸

Iran’s attack was the first of this kind since the 1940s and occurred in a legal landscape vastly different from that of the Norsk Hydro incident. Protocol I of the Geneva Conventions had come into force almost two years earlier, in December 1978. However, neither Iran nor Iraq was a signatory to the amendment protocols at the time.²⁹ Similarly, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) was adopted in 1979, though it did not enter into force until February 1987.³⁰ Thus, there was a budding legal framework at the time of the Iranian attack. Yet, the attack did not provoke any significant international condemnation or reactive political response.

Presumably, such a weak response could be attributed to the minimal damage caused to the reactor, which did not raise concerns about radioactive dispersal. In this regard, Article 56 concerns about the release of “dangerous forces” were not raised by any parties adhering to the protocol to the Geneva Conventions. It is also important to note that Iran was a signatory but not a party to the first and second amendment protocols. Additionally, the objective of the Iranian attack remained unclear: some evidence suggests that Iran had considered the potential radiological risks associated with attacking the Iraqi nuclear facility and that this prompted it to strike research laboratories and training facilities instead of the reactor itself.³¹ Other reports suggest that the attack was not premeditated and that the Iranian pilots were unaware of the nature of the target.³² We find that the analyses concluding that the attack was an opportunistic one are more persuasive, as the Iranian aircraft struck the nuclear-research laboratories and training facilities only while returning from another bombing raid.³³

On a more practical note, the lack of condemnation of the Iranian attack may have been influenced by the timing of the strike, as appropriate forums for political responses were inactive during that period. Sweden had raised concerns about potential dangers posed by possible attacks on nuclear facilities during the 69th session of the CD, which would have been an appropriate forum in which to address the Iranian attack. However, the CD meeting took place in March 1980—months prior to the attack.³⁴ The issue of radiological weapons was subsequently raised in November 1980 at the 35th session of UN General Assembly—a few weeks after the attack. Even then, the General Assembly did not take up the issue of the attack during its deliberations, despite states’ efforts to negotiate an RWC.³⁵ Furthermore, the IAEA also failed to issue statements condemning the Iranian attack. But, most notably, Iraq—the target state—did not raise this issue in any of the multilateral forums in 1980.

Israel (1981)

On June 7, 1981—nine months after being struck by Iran—the Tuwaitha nuclear research center was attacked by Israel. The attack occurred during the ongoing Iran–Iraq War, in which Israel was not directly involved. As a result, the attack was technically the first instance of attack on nuclear facilities in the context of jus ad bellum. The attack ultimately destroyed the reactor, which was not operational and was under IAEA safeguards at the time.³⁶

Israel justified its attack by claiming that it had acted in absolute certainty that the Iraqi nuclear reactor “was on the verge of going operational, with a view to producing nuclear weapons, the principal target of which would have been Israel.”³⁷ In an official statement, Israel’s prime minister, Menachem Begin, said that the reactor was set to become operational within months and that, under those circumstances, a similar operation “would have blanketed Baghdad with radiation.”³⁸ “Under such circumstances,” he said, “no government of Israel could contemplate bombing the reactor.”³⁹ Legally, Israel invoked its right to self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter, characterizing its operation as an “elementary act of self-preservation.”⁴⁰

It did not take long for the first signs of a reactive political response to emerge. IAEA Director General Sigvard Eklund issued a statement on the same day, indicating the gravity of the Israeli action and its severe repercussions for the credibility of the agency’s safeguards.⁴¹ The Board of Governors explicitly condemned Israel’s actions in Resolution 2040 on June 12, 1981. Similarly, the IAEA General Conference characterized the bombing as an “attack against the Agency and its safeguards regime” and suspended the provision of any IAEA assistance to Israel.⁴² Resolution 381 clearly defined Israel’s attack as an attack against the agency’s credibility and thus on the entire nonproliferation regime.⁴³ Subsequent inspections carried out by the IAEA on safeguarded facilities found Iraq to be compliant with its safeguards agreement, thereby disproving (at the time) Israel’s claims about the existence of an Iraqi nuclear-weapons program.⁴⁴

A parallel process of condemnation unfolded in the UN Security Council. From June 8 to June 18, 1981, the president of the Security Council, Porfirio Muñoz Ledo of Mexico, received letters from more than 20 governments expressing regret and concern regarding the attack.⁴⁵ On June 19, the Security Council adopted Resolution 487 condemning attacks on nuclear facilities that were under IAEA safeguards.⁴⁶ Notably, the United Kingdom (on behalf of the European Community) rejected Israel’s interpretation that it had acted within its rights of self-defense under the UN Charter.⁴⁷ The United Nations subsequently commissioned a study assessing the consequences of the Israeli attacks.⁴⁸ The study, which was published in 1983, underscored the attack’s “potentially serious damage to international norms and institutions,” which “involved Israel’s direct disrespect for, and challenge to, the Nonproliferation Treaty and the IAEA safeguards system; undermined international legal constraints on acts of aggression[, and] introduced new risks and uncertainties posing a threat to further peaceful nuclear development and cooperation.”⁴⁹

The US reaction to Israel’s attack was of particular importance to the effectiveness of the broader political response.⁵⁰ While the State Department announced the administration’s condemnation of the attack, President Ronald Reagan’s national-security team was internally split between those who supported strong punitive measures against Israel and those seeking to downplay the issue so as to protect the US–Israel relationship.⁵¹ Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger argued for punitive measures, including “demanding international oversite [sic] of Dimona”—Israel’s unsafeguarded nuclear reactor—“demanding Israel sign the NPT,” “condemning Israel at the UN,” and “compensating Iraq.”⁵² Ultimately, however, the United States chose an ambivalent strategy. On the one hand, it endorsed the international condemnation of Israel at the United Nations and even temporarily suspended the delivery of four F-16 jets. On the other, it sought to “draw the line on punishment,” warning that “if Israel is expelled from the UN General Assembly or any other UN body, U.S. participation would be jeopardized.”⁵³ The United States also objected to any proposal to suspend or exclude Israel from the IAEA,⁵⁴ threatening that such a move might prompt a review of US policy toward the IAEA. As a result, when the motion to suspend Israel from the IAEA was put to a vote on September 24, 1982, several European countries opposed it or abstained, leading to the rejection of the draft resolution.⁵⁵ The United States was influential in limiting more extensive collective sanction, and, ultimately, global condemnation merely resulted in the adoption of a resolution rejecting Israel’s credentials to participate in the IAEA General Conference session in question. The decision was further confirmed by Eklund in a letter to the US government, in which he stated that “Israel remains a member state and can continue to participate in agency activities.”⁵⁶

The Iraqi political response is perhaps the most significant factor to consider. Iraq utilized its considerable diplomatic influence and pre-existing hostility toward Israel to condemn Israel’s justification of the attack. In 1981, Iraqi policy elites engaged in a multifaceted diplomatic offensive, taking advantage of several forums to condemn the Israeli action and gain some political capital out of it.⁵⁷ In the 1981 CD, Iraq characterized Israel’s attack as a dangerous escalation of tensions in the Middle East and a disruption of any progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the region.⁵⁸ On August 12, 1981, the 36th session of the General Assembly included a pivotal agenda item titled “Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security” at the behest of a large number of states.⁵⁹ Iraq capitalized on the momentum to condemn Israeli aggression and raised numerous agenda items condemning Israel’s attack as part of any discussions relating to a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East.⁶⁰ Iraq also sought to frame the Israeli action as an attack on the NPT and IAEA. To this end, Iraq introduced a draft resolution (36/87B) on behalf of the Group of Arab States in the First Committee of the General Assembly, which was subsequently adopted. The preamble of the resolution contains the following passage:

Deeply concerned that the future of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in the region has been gravely endangered by the attack carried out by Israel, which is not a party to the Treaty, on the nuclear installations of Iraq, which is a party to that Treaty, ….⁶¹

Even the origins of the rhetorical linkage between the Israeli attack and the survival of the NPT could be attributed to the sustained diplomatic efforts of Iraq. The resolutions and amendments proposed by Iraq to keep attention on the Israeli attack in 1981 are too numerous to be fully discussed in this paper.⁶² Nevertheless, it can be stated that Iraq’s response played a significant role in shaping the global response to the attack.

In sum, despite Israel’s defense of them, there was unprecedented global consensus opposing attacks on nuclear facilities. Allies and adversaries of Israel coalesced around the shared belief that nuclear facilities should not be subject to attacks. The general narrative around the Israeli attack was eventually summarized as follows: a non-NPT state attacked an NPT state’s peaceful nuclear facilities—which were in compliance with the state’s IAEA safeguards agreement—outside the context of a war. Consequently, the Israeli justification was judged to be fundamentally at odds with the rules and norms of the nonproliferation regime.⁶³

Iraq (1984–88)

Between 1984 and 1988, Iraq conducted at least seven air strikes against Iran’s Bushehr reactors.⁶⁴ The attacks ultimately destroyed and disabled large parts of the nuclear facility, thus significantly damaging the Iranian nuclear program.⁶⁵

In stark contrast to the Israeli attacks of 1981, the increasing severity and accuracy of the Iraqi attacks failed to provoke any significant international response or condemnation.⁶⁶ International concern regarding the wider Iran–Iraq conflict appeared to take precedence instead. The UN Security Council passed resolutions that only “[d]eplore[d] the initial acts which gave rise to the conflict,”⁶⁷ expressed continuing concern over the ongoing conflict,⁶⁸ and called for an immediate ceasefire between Iran and Iraq.⁶⁹ From 1981, all UN and IAEA resolutions considering the issue of attacks on nuclear facilities (and those regarding the RWC) referred to three issues—none of which included any direct or sustained condemnation of Iraqi attacks on nuclear facilities. Resolutions focused on the need to negotiate general protections for nuclear facilities, the need to condemn Israeli aggression in this regard, and the salience of NPT Article IV provisions on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.⁷⁰ Even when Iran issued alarming statements concerning the possible release of radioactive material as a result of the Iraqi attacks, Tehran’s appeals seemingly fell on deaf ears.⁷¹ Similarly, Iranian appeals concerning the Bushehr attacks did not elicit concrete action from the IAEA. IAEA Director General Hans Blix said that the nature and amount of nuclear material was not “a significant hazard to the public.”⁷²

Throughout the Iran–Iraq War, Iraqi diplomats engaged in a proactive diplomatic campaign against Israel, aimed at sustaining attention to the 1981 attack while simultaneously downplaying narratives of its own attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities. This tactic proved to be successful in shaping the political reactions to the different events, as famously evidenced by the outcome of the 1985 NPT Review Conference. “Protection of peaceful nuclear installations against attack” was one of the substantive matters addressed by the review conference’s various bodies. The general debates briefly discussed reports of Iraq’s attacks on Iranian nuclear facilities but only after having intensely debated the 1981 Israeli attacks.⁷³ In Main Committee III, the issue of protecting nuclear facilities against attacks was a major point of contention, obstructing progress toward an agreed outcome document. Iraq introduced a draft resolution condemning Israel’s 1981 attack; if adopted, the resolution would have become part of the draft outcome document and thereby threatened to put the entire outcome document to a vote because the Iraqi language would have made it impossible for the outcome document to attract consensus support. Jordan and Morocco publicly supported the Iraqi resolution, while the United States and Israel vehemently opposed it.⁷⁴ Iran opposed the Iraqi resolution and proposed revisions to it; these revisions expressed Iran’s concern about Iraqi attacks on Iranian facilities. Ultimately, the parties reached a compromise whereby the Iraqi resolutions and the Iranian revisions to them would appear as statements appended to the final document rather than as part of the document itself.⁷⁵

This episode demonstrated that the automaticity of global condemnations of attacks on nuclear facilities could not be assumed—even if the attacked state appealed to the international community. Iraq’s rhetorical dominance of the issue, as a result of Israel’s 1981 attack, was very difficult for Iran to dislodge.

US (1991–93)

The 1990–91 Gulf War featured attacks on Iraqi nuclear facilities, spearheaded by the United States. In January 1991, the US commander of the Allied campaign, General Norman Schwarzkopf, stated that strikes had “thoroughly damaged” Iraq’s nuclear complex and delivered “a considerable setback if not a total setback” to its nuclear capabilities.⁷⁶ The Tuwaitha research facility was subject to repeated aerial bombings, as were many other sites associated with Iraqi uranium-enrichment capabilities, such as the enrichment plants at Tarmiya and Ash Sharqat.⁷⁷ The United States claimed that its attacks on Iraqi nuclear facilities were enabled by the mandate stemming from UN Security Council Resolution 678, according to which states would use “all necessary means” to force Iraq out of Kuwait.⁷⁸ Although the United States did not explain how the attacks could be considered intrinsic to the fulfillment of the Security Council mandate, the US justification was clearly expressed by General Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, during a news briefing at the Pentagon on January 23, 1991:

We’ve gone after the factories where Iraq has produced chemical and biological weapons, and until recently, continued working on nuclear weapons.  …  First, with respect to nuclear weapons, we have targeted that nuclear facility they have very carefully, I have looked at the bomb damage assessment myself with trained analysts, and I think I can confirm for you that the two operating reactors they had are both gone, they’re down, they’re finished, and the one that the Israelis took care of some years ago remains down.⁷⁹

At the IAEA, the United States sought to refrain from providing an official explanation for the attacks; a US official said, “The U.S. might be willing to discuss this at the United Nations, but not at the IAEA.”⁸⁰ Legal scholars still question the relationship between attacking Iraq’s nuclear facilities and the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait.⁸¹ Nevertheless, it was clear that the United States was carrying out a systematic campaign against Iraq’s nuclear capabilities.⁸² UK Prime Minister John Major attempted to contextualize the attacks within the Security Council mandate:

The first priority of the multinational force has been to engage and destroy military targets in Iraq and Kuwait through a massive air campaign. The targets in Iraq are chosen for one of two reasons—either because they are supporting the military occupation of Kuwait, or because they are of strategic importance. They include the Iraqi command and control system, communications, airfields, aircraft, missile sites, nuclear, chemical and biological sites, and other targets that enable Iraq to make war.⁸³

In the immediate aftermath of the US-led attacks, and in contrast to Iraq’s past stance, the Iraqi strategy was one of reticence and discretion. There was a significant delay in informing the IAEA whether any safeguarded facility had been bombed.⁸⁴ The Iraqi embassy in Vienna, which would have been the entity to make such a formal notification, remained mute on the subject. Iraq’s ambassador to the IAEA stated that Iraq “will not inform the IAEA about the status of nuclear material under safeguards in Iraq as long as air attacks continue on Iraqi targets.”⁸⁵ By January 31, 1991, the IAEA had still not been informed about the attacks⁸⁶ despite efforts by Blix to obtain a statement from Iraq about the status of nuclear material under safeguards.⁸⁷

This lack of transparency and the general silence surrounding the attacks disrupted the typical pattern of reactive political responses to attacks on nuclear facilities. Neither the IAEA nor the United Nations is known to have received complaints from any member state regarding the attacks. Iraq was not inclined to confirm the extent of damage as a result of the attacks, and the United States was not inclined to offer a justification. US officials stated that Washington had “made no commitments” to abstain from attacking nuclear facilities,⁸⁸ and emphasized that the United States was not a party to Protocol I. Any lingering doubts about the US view of the legitimacy of attacks on nuclear facilities were laid to rest in the aftermath of the Gulf War when the United States launched attacks against several Iraqi nuclear facilities in January 1993.⁸⁹ It is worth noting that bombing “weapons reactors” and related facilities has long been an element of US nonproliferation policy if alternatives fail.⁹⁰

When one considers the foundational role played by the United States in the development of the nuclear nonproliferation regime, it seems particularly significant that Washington deemed it necessary to defy the established regime and attack Iraq’s nuclear facilities.

The US decision to resort to attacks on nuclear facilities raised questions about the possible need for military action to supplement the nonproliferation regime, challenging the belief that IAEA safeguards alone could guarantee that nuclear activities would remain peaceful. It was not until four years after the last of the US attacks, in May 1997, that the Model Additional Protocol was approved to enhance the IAEA’s detection capabilities.⁹¹ In many ways, the increasing frequency of attacks on nuclear facilities galvanized the IAEA to design measures to strengthen the safeguards system by enhancing the agency’s ability to detect undeclared facilities.

Israel (2007)

On September 6, 2007, Israel attacked the Al-Kibar site in Syria.⁹² This large cubical structure was discovered around 2004, when it was still under construction.⁹³ But it was not until early March 2007 that the Israelis discovered strong evidence that the structure was a plutonium-production reactor and categorized it as “intended for military purposes only.”⁹⁴

In the aftermath of the Israeli attack, the relative absence of international condemnation was quite telling. On the one hand, Syria, a member of the NPT, had been conducting nuclear activities clandestinely in clear violation of its IAEA safeguards obligations. On the other hand, Israel’s attack lay in a gray area of international law, given the technical ambiguity concerning the state of conflict between the two countries. In contrast to the strike against Osirak in 1981, Israel refused to comment on the allegations that an attack had occurred, and it sought to ban Israeli journalists from reporting the event.⁹⁵

Publicly, only three states—Iran, Russia, and North Korea—delivered initial comments essentially condemning Israel.⁹⁶ Arab League Secretary-General Amr Moussa defined the Israeli intrusion as “unacceptable maneuvers,” but the Arab world largely remained silent.⁹⁷ Three days after the attack, Syria’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Bashar Jaafari, addressed two letters to the UN secretary-general and the president of the Security Council condemning Israel for breaching Syrian airspace and dropping munitions. However, Jaafari claimed that there were no “human casualties or material damage.”⁹⁸ Interestingly, the letters made no mention of the target, nor did they request a Security Council meeting or a discussion of the issue at the General Assembly.⁹⁹ In fact, the Syrians tried to cover up the nature of the facility by rapidly destroying existing infrastructure and constructing new buildings in its place.¹⁰⁰ It took several weeks for Syria to declare that the target Israel had hit was a military building under construction.¹⁰¹ On October 1, 2007, at the General Assembly, Syria only vaguely mentioned the Israeli strike, stating that “the failure of the international community, including the Security Council, to condemn that act of aggression will encourage Israel to persist in that hostile pursuit, and will lead to the exacerbation of tensions in the region.”¹⁰² On October 2, 2007, Israel broke its silence and confirmed that it had attacked Syria, without specifying the nature of the target or of the operation.¹⁰³ Later that October, independent reports began to suggest that the target struck by Israel had been a nuclear facility. A New York Times article stated that the Al-Kibar nuclear facility had been modeled on a North Korean nuclear reactor, but the article did not confirm any North Korean involvement in the Syrian project.¹⁰⁴ In response, the IAEA declared that it had no knowledge of any Syrian undeclared nuclear facility.¹⁰⁵

At a background briefing on April 24, 2008, US intelligence officials said that the target was a “gas-cooled graphite-moderated nuclear reactor” that had been “constructed for the production of plutonium with the assistance of North Koreans” and was “nearing operational capability.”¹⁰⁶ The officials also specified that the attack occurred before the reactor “was charged with uranium fuel.” At the same briefing, a senior administration official said that “Israel had taken military action because it considered a Syrian nuclear capability to be an existential threat to the state.”¹⁰⁷ This official added, “We understand the Israeli action. We believe this clandestine reactor was a threat to regional peace and security, and we have stated before that we cannot allow the world’s most dangerous regimes to acquire the world’s most dangerous weapons.”¹⁰⁸ A subsequent statement by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei criticized the United States for not having provided the agency with any information “in a timely manner,” and Israel for undermining “the due process of verification that is at the heart of the non-proliferation regime.”¹⁰⁹ While expressing apprehension about the implications of the Israeli military action for the NPT and the IAEA, ElBaradei’s statement refrained from directly contesting Israel’s utilization of anticipatory self-defense rights in this particular instance.

Ultimately, the Israeli attack attracted little condemnation, in stark contrast to the consensus reached in 1981 by the UN Security Council, the General Assembly, and the IAEA Board of Governors, which collectively criticized the Osirak raid. Indeed, the Security Council, which had an opportunity to discuss the event at its meeting on April 25, 2008, discussed nonproliferation issues but made no mention of the event.¹¹⁰ Similarly, the attack did not attract criticism during the 2008 meeting of the Preparatory Committee for the 2010 NPT Review Conference.¹¹¹ Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen observed that the silence surrounding this event may have owed to the nontransparency of the incident.¹¹² This argument aligns with ours that the lack of information regarding these types of attacks impinges on the ability of states to offer concrete responses. Syria was reluctant to disclose information on the strike and barely protested in diplomatic forums. Similarly, Israel maintained utter silence. Most interestingly, despite having credible intelligence on Israeli intentions, the United States failed to share details with the international community. Thus, there appeared to be widespread indifference—whether deliberate or not—regarding this attack, and this indifference endured even when further information was subsequently made available. ElBaradei argued that he was “horrified by how little protest the military action in Syria has triggered.”¹¹³

Responding to attacks on nuclear facilities: proactive political responses

Having conducted an analysis of reactive political responses, we now turn our attention to the evolution of proactive political responses—namely, repeated attempts of states to develop stronger legal protections for nuclear facilities (beyond the amendment protocols to the Geneva Conventions). Proposals for a prohibition were first introduced in the CD under the auspices of a proposed RWC from 1980 to 1993. Subsequently, similar measures were introduced in the UN General Assembly and the IAEA with the aim of outlawing the weaponization of radioactive dispersal and preserving the inalienable rights of states to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful use. Although the CD is no longer considering the RWC, other proactive political responses remain under consideration in the General Assembly and the IAEA, especially after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

The proposed Radiological Weapons Convention

The RWC was introduced jointly by the Soviet Union and the United States in the CD in 1979. In 1980, Australia, Belgium, and others proposed that a working group be established to negotiate the RWC’s provisions.¹¹⁴ The Iran–Iraq War and the Gulf War demonstrated states’ disregard of the risk of radioactive dispersal. Following Israel’s 1981 attack on Iraq, Sweden called for an open discussion on the risks of mass destruction associated with attacks on nuclear facilities and argued for a comprehensive prohibition of radiological warfare.¹¹⁵ Several (mostly non-aligned) states, including India, Nigeria, and Pakistan, supported the proposal, viewing the 1981 Israeli attack on Iraq as reinforcing the need for such a proposal.¹¹⁶

However, significant opposition arose to the idea of providing broad protections for nuclear facilities within the RWC. Belgium objected on procedural grounds, suggesting that such protections would alter the scope of the RWC and raise legal and verification issues,¹¹⁷ and therefore should be addressed in a separate convention.¹¹⁸ Disagreement persisted on distinguishing between attacks on nuclear facilities and other methods of weaponizing radioactive dispersal (which could include the use of a dirty bomb, for example). The Netherlands argued that certain attacks, not “specifically designed to use released radiation, would be admissible—for instance, the capturing of such installations with a view to halting the production of energy.”¹¹⁹

Even among supporters of a ban, divergences persisted regarding the scope of protections such a ban should provide. Discussions in the 1982 CD focused on the outcomes of attacks on different types of nuclear facilities (nuclear power reactors, reprocessing plants, and storage facilities containing irradiated material and waste), highlighting that the type of facility targeted could influence the probability of mass destruction.¹²⁰

Another axis of disagreement concerned the differentiation between civilian and military nuclear installations. Pakistan and most developing countries advocated a ban without such distinctions, fearing an implicit legitimization of attacks against nuclear facilities that the convention did not cover. This apprehension stemmed from the possibility that such distinctions could produce loopholes similar to those contained in Protocol I.¹²¹

The Netherlands and Sweden maintained that some sort of distinction had to be retained. They argued that failing to do so would jeopardize the nonproliferation regime—for example, by implicitly legitimizing the nuclear-weapons programs of some states outside the NPT. To overcome this concern, Japan proposed that the prohibition of attacks on nuclear facilities should protect only nuclear facilities that were subject to IAEA safeguards, arguing that this approach would alleviate apprehensions about giving protection to non-peaceful nuclear activities.¹²²

Throughout the RWC negotiation period, proposals regarding the protection of nuclear facilities were unsuccessful; this situation sheds light on the complexities associated with protecting nuclear facilities.¹²³ The issue lingered in multilateral forums wherever there was consideration of the RWC, from 1981 until 1993, but gradually lost priority, ending up under “new types of weapons of mass destruction” in the 1992 CD and receiving no consideration under “other related nuclear issues” in 1993.¹²⁴ This period was characterized by the gradual deprioritization of a potential ban on attacks on nuclear facilities, even as such attacks were becoming more frequent.

The 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism

From 1997 onward, the issue of prohibiting attacks on nuclear facilities remained under consideration by the IAEA under the auspices of its nuclear-security mandate. Initial proposals on the fundamental principles of the physical protection of nuclear material and nuclear facilities in 1975 evolved into the recommendations on those issues contained in Information Circular 225 (INFCIRC/225) and its subsequent revisions.¹²⁵ Although INFCIRC/225 is nonbinding, its provisions greatly influenced the drafting of the 1979 CPPNM.¹²⁶ Interestingly, the first review conference for that convention, in 1992, judged that it was sound and acceptable in its current form, although the protections offered by CPPNM had no bearing on the decade of attacks prior to the review conference.¹²⁷ It was not until 1999 that substantive work to modify the CPPNM commenced, ultimately expanding the scope of the original convention to include the protection of nuclear facilities from sabotage.¹²⁸

Both the A/CPPNM and ICSANT were negotiated during the period between 1999 and 2016. The A/CPPNM was adopted in July 2005 and entered into force in May 2016. In parallel, the General Assembly adopted ICSANT via Resolution 59/260 in April 2005. This convention made it possible for states to define and criminalize acts of nuclear terrorism and to provide for extradition arrangements if domestic prosecution was not feasible. ICSANT entered into force on July 7, 2007.¹²⁹

Both conventions contain provisions that expressly outlaw attacks on nuclear facilities. Article 1A of the A/CPPNM reads as follows:

The purposes of this Convention are to achieve and maintain worldwide effective physical protection of nuclear material used for peaceful purposes and of nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes; to prevent and combat offences relating to such material and facilities worldwide; as well as to facilitate co-operation among States Parties to those ends.¹³⁰

ICSANT’s Article2(1)(b) specifies that it is an offense if any person

uses or damages a nuclear facility in a manner which releases or risks the release of radioactive material: (i) with the intent to cause death or serious bodily injury; or (ii) with the intent to cause substantial damage to property or to the environment; or (iii) with the intent to compel a natural or legal person, an international organization or a state to refrain from doing an act.¹³¹

These conventions were a positive initial step in the governance of attacks on nuclear facilities, in part because they were able to introduce definitions of “nuclear facility.” The absence of such a definition during negotiations on the RWC, for example, hindered agreement on the distinction between civilian and militarily significant nuclear facilities. The A/CPPNM defines “nuclear facility” broadly to encompass facilities within the wider nuclear fuel cycle. Additionally, it distinguishes between civilian and military facilities by explicitly granting protections to nuclear facilities used for peaceful purposes.¹³² ICSANT, on the other hand, being more tailored to the criminalization of nuclear terrorism, does not differentiate between civilian and military facilities and includes a more comprehensive definition of “nuclear facility” that encompasses nuclear-propulsion reactors and “any plant or conveyance being used for the production, storage, processing or transport of radioactive material.”¹³³

These conventions were supported by the wider frameworks contained in UN Security Council Resolution 1371 on combating international terrorism and Resolution 1540 on the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems by terrorists.¹³⁴ Protecting nuclear facilities became an intrinsic part of combating nuclear terrorism, and it became more politically palatable to a broader range of states as attention shifted to the possibility of attacks carried out by non-state actors.¹³⁵ The political momentum behind the issue of nuclear safety and security in light of the possible threat of nuclear terrorism also resulted in the nuclear-security summits that were held biennially from 2010 to 2016.¹³⁶

However, it is noteworthy that both conventions contain provisions that effectively exempt from their jurisdiction the most prevalent type of attacks—those carried out by states. Article 2(4) of the A/CPPNM states that the “activities of armed forces during an armed conflict, as those terms are understood under international humanitarian law, which is governed by that law, are not governed by this convention.”¹³⁷ Article 4(2) of ICSANT mirrors that language.¹³⁸ Interestingly, the limitation of ICSANT remained despite the sustained efforts of some states to expand the scope of the convention to cover acts committed “by States or their armed forces, which would leave the way open for State terrorism,” according to the UN summary of the Iraqi delegation’s remarks.¹³⁹ This dynamic was largely replicated in the A/CPPNM. The IAEA open-ended group of legal and technical experts to prepare a draft amendment to the CPPNM submitted its final report in March 2003. Although the group was able to reach agreement on several pertinent issues, the exclusion of activities of states’ military forces was the most divisive issue for the group.¹⁴⁰ Some experts wanted the explicit exclusion of state activities and military personnel in the conduct of official duties. Others argued that states were already governed by other rules of international law. A third camp raised concerns that excluding states and their military personnel would leave gaps where activities might not be covered by rules of international law. Ultimately, the need to produce a convention that outlawed acts of nuclear terrorism overrode these concerns in 2005, and negotiations on the amendment concluded without language addressing attacks on nuclear facilities.¹⁴¹ As a result, despite the adoption of both ICSANT and the A/CPPNM, jurisdiction over state-led attacks on nuclear facilities in armed conflict remains exclusively under the porous Article 56 of Protocol I. One legal scholar observed that deference by ICSANT and the A/CPPNM to law governing armed conflicts appeared to be a constant feature of anti-terrorist instruments adopted at the time.¹⁴²

Regional and bilateral agreements

A slightly different picture emerges when one considers the proactive political responses at the regional and bilateral level. Noteworthy examples are the India–Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement and the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaty (Pelindaba Treaty). The former is a unique example of a bilateral agreement reached by two hostile countries in the context of the physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities. It prohibits the parties from “undertaking, encouraging or participating in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.”¹⁴³ Furthermore, it broadens the scope of Articles 56 and 15 of the first and second protocols to the Geneva Conventions by including “nuclear power and research reactors, fuel fabrication, uranium enrichment, iso-topes separation and reprocessing facilities as well as any other installations with fresh or irradiated nuclear fuel and materials in any form and establishments storing significant quantities of radio-active materials” in the definition of “nuclear installation or facility.”¹⁴⁴ Similarly, but on a wider geographical scale, Article 10, “Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials and Facilities,” and particularly Article 11, “Prohibition of Armed Attack on Nuclear Installations,” of the Pelindaba Treaty require each party to “maintain the highest standards of security and effective physical protection of nuclear materials, facilities and equipment to prevent theft or unauthorized use and handling” but also “not to take, or assist, or encourage any action aimed at an armed attack by conventional or other means against nuclear installations in the African nuclear-weapon-free zone.”¹⁴⁵

Conclusion

In asking why so many instances of attacks on nuclear facilities could occur despite the existence of international law prohibiting such attacks, we have sought to understand the reasons for the continuing permissibility of these attacks.

Over time, the justifications for attacks on nuclear facilities and the related political responses have evolved, modulated by two factors: whether the attack occurs during wartime or peacetime and the diplomatic and political influence of the involved states. Attacks on nuclear facilities were initially viewed, in the 1980s, as provocative but a matter that each state could justify on the basis of its own interests. By the 1990s, however, the international community had adopted a less negative view of these attacks, increasingly seeing them as a mechanism of coercion required to maintain the global nonproliferation regime. This is evidenced by the simultaneous evolution of political responses resulting in outcomes that consistently preserve the ability of states to conduct such attacks. The nonproliferation justifications for attacks, and the varied circumstances under which the attacks occurred, led to a reluctance in the global nonproliferation regime to effectively outlaw them. The US response to the IAEA in the aftermath of the 1993 US attacks against Iraq highlights the fact that most states—more specifically, states that are not parties to the India–Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement or the Pelindaba Treaty—have not made a commitment to refrain from attacking nuclear facilities. As a consequence, this practice continues to be permissible as a mechanism of coercion inherent in the global nonproliferation regime—but also outside of it, as a coercive strategy in the context of war, as the recent case in Ukraine shows.

Carnahan’s argument about the practical inefficacy of Protocol I and Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions remains valid. The basic laws governing these attacks have not changed since Iran’s first attack more than four decades ago, and nuclear facilities remain unprotected in international law. The requirement for justification persists because of the potential release of “dangerous forces” that would cause “severe losses among the civilian population.” However, the acceptance or rejection of such justification continues to be contingent on the specific circumstances of each attack and is assessed on a case-by-case basis.

The 2022 Russian attacks prompted widespread condemnation in various diplomatic forums. Because these attacks involved the largest operational nuclear installation in Europe, the risks of catastrophic radioactive dispersal were exceptionally high. The inadequacies of Article 56, ICSANT, and the A/CPPNM have necessitated a combination of reactive and proactive responses to mitigate a potential radioactive catastrophe, such as the intermittent shutdown of Ukrainian nuclear facilities under threat. UN Secretary-General António Guterres has also called for ad hoc measures and encouraged parties to establish a demilitarized perimeter to secure the area.¹⁴⁶ The IAEA conducted an assessment in August 2022, concluding that Russian actions have “compromised the Seven Pillars of nuclear security and safety.”¹⁴⁷ In parallel, the agency proposed a combat exclusion zone and other ad hoc stabilization initiatives.

Regardless of the outcomes of these stabilization efforts, it is very likely that Russia’s attacks will lead to a comprehensive reassessment of the current state of protections of nuclear facilities against state attacks. However, any proactive political responses to such attacks will face many of the same unresolved technical and political complexities that have hindered past efforts. One of these vexing complexities remains the implicit legitimation of attacks on military nuclear facilities if increased protection is extended only to civilian ones.¹⁴⁸ Another challenge is the understanding, as proposed by the Netherlands, that merely occupying a nuclear facility remains a legitimate recourse available to states.¹⁴⁹

In contrast with the existence of some regional restrictions (such as those contained in the Pelindaba Treaty), the continuing reluctance of states to propose global restrictions on these attacks limits actors such as the IAEA to formulating ad hoc strategies to ensure the safety of nuclear facilities in conflict zones (and conflict-prone areas). This underscores the likelihood that the future governance of attacks on nuclear facilities will continue to rely on bespoke solutions and negotiated settlements as conflicts occur.¹⁵⁰ While these specific solutions, as proposed by the IAEA, possess inherent imperfections and may not effectively deter future attacks on nuclear facilities, the complexities associated with establishing comprehensive multilateral frameworks for governing such attacks make it very likely that tailored solutions will continue to be the most feasible approach. Ultimately, despite conflicting with the IAEA’s revamping of its principles of nuclear safety and security in response to the Russian attacks in Ukraine, attacks on nuclear facilities endure as a feature of the global nonproliferation regime because the international community—or at least some of the most influential members of the community—deem them a necessary option for the maintenance of that regime.¹⁵¹

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Correction Statement

This article has been corrected with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

The authors' work on this article was funded by the European Research Council under grant number 866155.

Notes on contributors

Ludovica Castelli

Ludovica Castelli is a doctoral researcher at the University of Leicester within the Third Nuclear Age project, funded by the European Research Council, where she focuses on the nuclear history of the Middle East. She previously worked as a policy analyst at the Centro Studi Internazionali in Rome and as a research assistant at the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. She holds a master’s degree in European and international studies from the University of Trento and a bachelor’s degree in international economics from Ca’ Foscari University of Venice.

Olamide Samuel

Dr. Olamide Samuel is a policy fellow at the European Leadership Network, where he works on arms control, nuclear politics, and international security. He previously was a postdoctoral research associate in nuclear politics at the University of Leicester and a senior teaching fellow at SOAS University of London. In 2020, he was appointed to the Vatican COVID-19 Security Task Force inaugurated by Pope Francis. Since 2023, he has served as special envoy of the executive secretary of the African Commission on Nuclear Energy and has worked closely with various states, the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, and the Managing the Atom Project at Harvard University on nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament.

Notes

1 At the time, it was the only commercial processor of heavy water in the world. See Claus Helberg, “The Vemork Action: A Classic Act of Sabotage,” Studies Archive Index, Vol. 36, No. 3, Center for the Study of Intelligence, May 8, 2007, <https://www.cia.gov/static/ccf14df21af9e69433e3341d281fa52c/The-Vemork-Action.pdf>; Robert Furman, Kurt Diebner, Werner Heisenberg, “Operation Gunnerside,” Atomic Heritage Foundation, July 28, 2017, <https://www.atomicheritage.org/history/operation-gunnerside>.

2 For a concise explanation of the two terms, see “What Are Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello?” International Committee of the Red Cross, January 22, 2015, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/what-are-jus-ad-bellum-and-jus-bello-0%EF%BB%BF>.

3 Burrus M. Carnahan, “Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack: Prospects after the Gulf War,” American Journal of International Law, Vol. 86, No. 3 (1992), p. 529.

4 See Luis Rodriguez and Lauren Sukin, “Russian Actions at Zaporizhzhia Show Need for Better Legal Protections of Nuclear Installations,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, October 28, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/10/russian-actions-at-zaporizhzhia-show-need-for-better-legal-protections-of-nuclear-installations/>; Dawn Stover, “How the IAEA Can Help Nuclear Power Plants in Ukraine’s War Zone,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 31, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/how-the-iaea-can-help-nuclear-power-plants-in-ukraines-war-zone/>; Jessica McKenzie, “Grappling with Environmental Risks in the Fog of War,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 10, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/grappling-with-environmental-risks-in-the-fog-of-war/>; Dan Drollette, “A Close Call at Ukraine Reactor: On Luck and Nuclear Disasters,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 4, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/a-close-call-at-ukraine-reactor-on-luck-and-nuclear-disasters/>.

5 For reasons explained below, we use the term “amendment protocols” for the instruments that are generally known as “additional protocols” (to the 1949 Geneva Conventions).

6 Rodriguez and Sukin, “Russian Actions at Zaporizhzhia Show Need for Better Legal Protections of Nuclear Installations.”

7 George M. Moore, “How International Law Applies to Attacks on Nuclear and Associated Facilities in Ukraine,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 6, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/how-international-law-applies-to-attacks-on-nuclear-and-associated-facilities-in-ukraine/>.

8 Matthew Bunn, “The Largest Danger at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant: Intentional Sabotage,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, July 6, 2023, <https://thebulletin.org/2023/07/the-largest-danger-at-the-zaporizhzhia-nuclear-power-plant-intentional-sabotage/>.

9 Olamide Samuel, “Putin’s War Might Be Destroying the Global Nuclear Order,” Inkstick, March 31 2022, <https://inkstickmedia.com/putins-war-might-be-destroying-the-global-nuclear-order/>.

10 Rodney C. Ewing, “Nuclear Reactors in a War Zone: A New Type of Weapon?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March 7, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/03/nuclear-reactors-in-a-war-zone-a-new-type-of-weapon/>.

11 “Weaponization of radioactive dispersal” refers to the dispersal of radioactive substances in a target area to cause injury to persons independently of a nuclear explosion. In this article, we primarily refer to the attacking of an enemy’s nuclear facility as a method of weaponization of radioactive dispersal.

12 Michal Onderco and Clara Egger, “Why a New Convention to Protect Nuclear Installations in War Is a Bad Idea,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, December 5, 2022, <https://thebulletin.org/2022/12/why-a-new-convention-to-protect-nuclear-installations-in-war-is-a-bad-idea/>.

13 We are grateful to one of the anonymous reviewers for this casting of the issue.

14 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols,” January 1, 2014, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols>.

15 We use the term “amendment protocols” as opposed to the ICRC’s preferred “additional protocols,” to avoid confusion with the IAEA’s additional protocols to states’ comprehensive safeguards agreements.

16 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), June 8, 1977, Article 56, para. 1 (hereafter “Protocol I”). See also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), June 8, 1977, Article 15 (hereafter “Protocol II).”

17 Protocol I, Article 56, para. 1.

18 Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack.

19 Protocol I, Article 56, para. 2.

20 “Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries—Additional Protocol (I) to the Geneva Conventions, 1977,” <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/INTRO/470>; “The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Their Additional Protocols,” March 8, 2016, <https://www.icrc.org/en/document/geneva-conventions-1949-additional-protocols>.

21 Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack, p. 529

22 For a broader overview of the targeting of national electrical-power systems in wartime see, J.W. Crawford, “The Law of Noncombatant Immunity and the Targeting of National Electrical Power Systems,” Fletcher Forum of World Affairs, Vol. 21, No. 2 (1997), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/45289003>. See also ICRC, “ICRC Commentary of 1987 to the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977,” <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-56/commentary/, https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/en/ihl-treaties/api-1977/article-56/commentary/1987>.

23 See Kjell Hausken, “Protecting Complex Infrastructures against Multiple Strategic Attackers,” International Journal of Systems Science, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2011), pp. 11–29, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/00207720903434789>

24 Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack, p. 533

25 Moore, “How International Law Applies to Attacks.”

26 Matthew Fuhrmann and Sarah E. Kreps, “Targeting Nuclear Programs in War and Peace: A Quantitative Empirical Analysis, 1941–2000,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 54, No. 6 (2010), pp. 831–59.

27 Nate Jones, “When Iran Bombed Iraq’s Nuclear Reactor,” Unredacted, March 9, 2012, <https://unredacted.com/2012/03/09/document-friday-when-iran-bombed-iraqs-nuclear-reactor/>.

28 See Barry R. Schneider, “Radical Responses to Radical Regimes: Evaluating Preemptive Counter-Proliferation,” McNair Paper 41, National Defense University, <10.21236/ADA421973>. See also Jed C. Snyder, “The Road to Osiraq: Baghdad’s Quest for the Bomb.” Middle East Journal, Vol. 37, No. 4 (1983), pp. 565–93, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4326666>.

29 Iraq would go on to accede to Protocol I in April 2010, while Iran currently remains outside the amendment protocols. See ICRC, “Treaties, States Parties, and Commentaries—Iraq,” <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/vwTreatiesByCountrySelected.xsp?xp_countrySelected=IQ&nv=4>.

30 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, October 26, 1987, Article 2(1).

31 Tom Cooper and Farzad Bishop, “Target: Saddam’s Reactor,” Air Enthusiast, March/April 2004, <https://www.angelfire.com/art2/narod/opera/>.

32 Felix Kessler, “Iraq to Keep Getting French Atomic Fuel Despite Iran’s Attack on Nuclear Facility,” Wall Street Journal, October 17, 1980, p. 35.

33 See Jones, “When Iran Bombed Iraq’s Nuclear Reactor.” See also Sarah E. Kreps and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom: Does Bombing Nuclear Facilities Affect Proliferation?” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 34, No. 2 (2011), p. 22, <doi:10.1080/01402390.2011.559021>.

34 United Nations, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 5 (New York, 1980), p. 289.

35 United Nations, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 5 (New York, 1980), p. 291.

36 David Ivry, former Air Force chief and commander during the 1981 raid, was quoted saying, “In every attack like this there is a red line. In 1981, we decided that inserting the uranium into the reactor was the red line.” See Yaakov Katz, Shadow Strike: Inside Israel’s Secret Mission to Eliminate Syrian Nuclear Power (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2019), p. 70; Peter S. Ford, “Israel’s Attack on Osiraq: A Model for Future Preventive Strikes?” INSS Occasional Paper, No. 59, July 2005, <https://www.science.co.il/Ilan-Ramon/Osiraq.pdf>.

37 United Nations, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6 (New York, 1981), p. 171.

38 David K. Shipler, “Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor; Attack Condemned by U.S. and Arab Nations,” New York Times, June 9, 1981, <https://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/09/world/israeli-jets-destroy-iraqi-atomic-reactor-attack-condemned-us-arab-nations.html>.

39 Shipler, “Israeli Jets Destroy Iraqi Atomic Reactor.”

40 United Nations, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6, p. 171.

41 Sigvard Eklund, “Attack on the Iraqi Nuclear Research Center,” June 7, 1981, in Achille Albonetti’s Personal Papers, Box 200, Roma Tre University, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/attack-iraqi-nuclear-research-centre-7-june-1981-statement-director-general>.

42 IAEA, “Military Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre and Its Implications for the Agency,” GC(XXV)/RES/381, October 19, 1981, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc25res-381_en.pdf].

43 IAEA, “Military Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Research Centre.”

44 United Nations, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6, p. 201. See also Målfrid Braut-Hegghammer, “Revisiting Osirak: Preventive Attacks and Nuclear Proliferation Risks,” International Security, Vol. 36, No. 1 (2011), pp. 124–26, <https://www.jstor.org/stable/41289690>.

45 For the texts of these letters, see UN Security Council, Documents S/14511; S/14512; S/14513; S/14514; S/14515; S/14516; S/14517; S/14518; S/14520; S/14522; S/14523; S/14526; S/14527; S/14530; S/14533; S/14535; S/14536; S/14542; S/14543; S/14549; S/14552; S/14559; S/14560, June 1981, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/search?ln=en&p=Concerns%20Israeli%20attack%20on%20Iraqi%20nuclear%20reactor&f=&c=Resource%20Type&c=UN%20Bodies&sf=&so=d&rg=50&fti=0>.

46 UN Security Council Resolution, “On the Israeli Military Attack on Iraqi Nuclear Facilities,” S/Res/487, June 19, 1981, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/22225?ln=en>.

47 United Nations, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6, p. 201.

48 See UN Secretary General, “Study on the Consequences of the Israeli Armed Attack against the Iraqi Nuclear Installations Devoted to Peaceful Purposes,” A/38/337, October 7, 1983, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/49724?ln=en>.

49 UN Secretary General, “Study on the Consequences.”

50 Richard V. Allen, “Reagan’s Secure Line,” New York Times, June 7, 2010, p. A23, <https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/07/opinion/07allen.html>.

51 See Richard V. Allen, “Reagan’s Secure Line”; Giordana Pulcini and Or Rabinowitz, “An Ounce of Prevention—A Pound of Cure? The Reagan Administration’s Nonproliferation Policy and the Osirak Raid,” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 23, No. 2 (2021), pp. 20–21, <https://doi.org/10.1162/jcws_a_01007>. State Department Director of Policy Planning Paul Wolfowitz and Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle expressed delight with the attack, defining it as “a great act of anti-proliferation” and “a blow on behalf of nonproliferation.” See Rodger Claire, Raid on the Sun: Inside Israel’s Secret Campaign that Denied Saddam the Bomb (New York: Random House, 2005), pp. 219–220.

52 Telegram from Washington embassy to Foreign Office, June 10, 1981, file 4341/3-א, Israel State Archives, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/270542>.

53 Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., “U.S. Strategy for UN Security Council Meeting on the Israeli Raid on the Iraqi Nuclear Facility,” June 12, 1981, Country File: Israel–Iraq, Box 37 (Box 69), Ronald Reagan Presidential Library (RRL), <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/270553>.

54 Memorandum for the President [Ronald Reagan] from Alexander M. Haig, Jr., September 15, 1981, Executive Secretariat: Agency File, RAC Box 6, RRL, <https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/270557>.

55 Roger Kirk, “The Suspension of U.S. Participation in the IAEA,” in International Atomic Energy Agency, Personal Reflections (Vienna: IAEA, 1997), pp. 101–03, <https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1033_web.pdf>. See also IAEA, “Record of the Two Hundred and Forty-Fifth Plenary Meeting,” GC(XXVI)/OR.245, May 1983, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gc/gc26or-245_en.pdf>.

56 Kirk, “The Suspension of U.S. Participation in the IAEA,” pp. 98–103.

57 UN General Assembly, “Letter dated 5 August 1981 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General. Corrigendum,” A/36/421/Corr.1, September 17, 1981, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/23559?ln=en>.

58 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6, p. 159.

59 UN General Assembly, “Request for the inclusion of a supplementary item in the agenda of the 36th session. Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful use of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security,” A/36/194, August 12, 1981 (hereafter “UNGA A/36/194”), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/22354?ln=en>.

60 UN General Assembly, “Armed Israeli aggression against the Iraqi nuclear installations and its grave consequences for the established international system concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and international peace and security,” A/RES/36/27, November 13, 1981 (hereafter “UNGA A/RES/36/27”), <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/27621?ln=en>.

61 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6.

62 UN Secretary General, “The Situation in the Middle East: Note,” June 23, 1981, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/21605?ln=en>.

63 UNGA A/36/194.

64 Iraq attacked the Bushehr nuclear installations on the following dates: March 24, 1984; February 12, 1985; March 5, 1985; July 12, 1986; November 17, 1987; November 19, 1987; July 19, 1988.

65 IAEA, “Statement Made by the Resident Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the Board of Governors,” INFCIRC/341, February 20, 1987, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/infcirc341.pdf>; UN Secretary General, “Note by the Secretary General,” S/17157, March 26, 1985, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/82437?ln=en >.

66 Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack, p. 535.

67 UN Security Council, “Calling for Cease-Fire and Exchange of Prisoners between Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” S/RES/582, February 24, 1986, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/116401?ln=en>.

68 UN Security Council, “On Implementation of Resolution 582 (1986) on the Armed Conflict between Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” S/RES/588, October 8, 1986, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/121998?ln=en>.

69 UN Security Council, “Requesting the Secretary-General to Dispatch Observers to Supervise the Cease-Fire between Iraq and the Islamic Republic of Iran,” S/RES/598, July 20, 1987, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/137345?ln=en>.

70 See UN General Assembly, “Intensification of Efforts to Remove the Threat of a Nuclear War and Ensure the Safe Development of Nuclear Energy,” A/DEC/37/423, January 26, 1983, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/47576?ln=en>; UNGA A/RES/36/27. See also United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vols. 6–13.

71 For all the Iranian appeals see, UN Security Council, “Letter dated 10 August 1988 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” S/20108, August 10, 1988, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/43868?ln=en>; UN Security Council, “Letter dated 26 April 1985 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” S/17133, April 26, 1985, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/80699?ln=en>; UN Security Council, “Letter dated 19 July 1988 from the Acting Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council,” S/20035, July 19, 1988, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/42583?ln=en>; UN Security Council, “Letter dated 20 November 1987 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” S/19288, November 20, 1987, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/149307?ln=en>; UN Security Council, “Letter dated 14 February 1985 from the Permanent Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General,” S/16956, February 15, 1985, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/76245?ln=en>; For details on the IAEA reaction, see UN Security Council, “Note by the Secretary-General,” S/17157, May 6, 1985, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/82437?ln=en >; IAEA, “Request by the Resident Representative of Iraq to the International Atomic Energy Agency,” INFCIRC/319, September 1984, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1984/infcirc319.pdf>.

72 Mark Hibbs, “Bushehr Construction Now Remote after Three Iraqi Air Strikes,” Nucleonics Week, November 26, 1987, pp. 5-6.

73 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 10 (New York, 1985), p. 180.

74 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 10, p. 161

75 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 10, p. 184; Final Documents of the Third Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, NPT/CONF.III/64, 1985, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/124504?ln=en>.

76 Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack, p. 524.

77 Eliot A. Cohen, ed., Gulf War Air Power Survey, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of the Air Force, 1993), p. 153. <https://media.defense.gov/2010/Sep/27/2001329802/-1/-1/0/AFD-100927-062.pdf>.

78 See UN Security Council, “Authorizing Member States to Use All Necessary Means to Implement Security Council Resolution 660 (1990) and All Relevant Resolutions,” S/RES/678, November 29, 1990, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/102245?ln=en>.

79 New York Times International, “War in the Gulf: Military Briefing; Excerpts from Briefing at Pentagon by Cheney and Powell,” January 24, 1991, <https://www.nytimes.com/1991/01/24/world/war-gulf-military-briefing-excerpts-briefing-pentagon-cheney-powell.html>.

80 Mark Hibbs, “US Says Iraqi Reactors Hit, No Confirmation from Baghdad,” Nucleonics Week, January 24, 1991, p. 1.

81 Carnahan, Protecting Nuclear Facilities from Military Attack, p. 526

82 Cohen, Gulf War Air Power Survey, p. 153.

83 John Major, statement to the House of Commons, “The Gulf: Hearing Before the Commons Chamber,” January 21, 1991, <https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1991-01-21/debates/c80bc5e0-03fd-49fb-a838-62f4c66958e1/TheGulf>.

84 Ann MacLachlan and Margaret Ryan, “Allied Bombing of Iraqi Reactors Provokes No Safeguards Debate,” Nucleonics Week, January 31, 1991.

85 Mark Hibbs, “Iraq Won’t Report to IAEA About Nuclear Material During Bombing,” Nucleonics Week, February 14, 1991.

86 MacLachlan and Ryan, “Allied Bombing of Iraqi Reactors.”

87 Hibbs, “US Says Iraqi Reactors Hit.”

88 Hibbs.

89 Kreps and Fuhrmann, “Attacking the Atom,” p. 24.

90 See Department of Defense, Office of General Counsel, “Department of Defense Law of War Manual,” July 2023, <https://media.defense.gov/2023/Jul/31/2003271432/-1/-1/0/DOD-LAW-OF-WAR-MANUAL-JUNE-2015-UPDATED-JULY%202023.PDF>; Robert S. Litwak, “Iran’s Nuclear Challenge and the Military Option: Nonproliferation Precedents and the Case for Containment,” Wilson Center, January 19, 2022, <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/article/irans-nuclear-challenge-and-military-option-nonproliferation-precedents-and-case>.

91 IAEA, “Additional Protocol,” n.d., <https://www.iaea.org/topics/additional-protocol>.

92 UN Security Council, “Security Council Extends ‘1540 Committee’ for Three Years to Halt Proliferation of Mass Destruction Weapons, Encourages States to Map out Implementation Plans,” SC/9310, April 25, 2008, <https://press.un.org/en/2008/sc9310.doc.htm>.

93 Amos Harel and Aluf Benn, “No Longer a Secret: How Israel Destroyed Syria's Nuclear Reactor,” Haaretz, March 23, 2018, <https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/2018-03-23/ty-article-magazine/no-longer-a-secret-how-israel-destroyed-syrias-nuclear-reactor/0000017f-e518-d9aa-afff-fd58293e0000>.

94 David Makovsky, “The Silent Strike: How Israel Bombed a Syrian Nuclear Installation and Kept It Secret,” New Yorker, September 17, 2012, <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/silent-strike-how-israel-bombed-syrian-nuclear-installation-and-kept-it-secret>.

95 Tim Butcher, “Israelis Impose Blackout over Syria Airstrike,” Daily Telegraph, September 20, 2007, <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1563684/Israelis-impose-blackout-over-Syria-airstrike.html>.

96 Iran accused Israel of “spreading insecurity in the region.” Russia expressed “extreme concern” over the matter. See Richard Weitz, “Israeli Airstrike in Syria: International Reactions,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, November 1, 2007, <https://www.inss.org.il/he/wp-content/uploads/sites/2/systemfiles/Israeli%20Airstrike%20in%20Syria%20%20International%20Reactions%20-%201.11.pdf>; North Korea said it “strongly denounces the abovesaid [sic] intrusion”; Yoav Stern, “N. Korea Condemns Israeli Provocation,” Haaretz, September 12, 2007, <https://www.haaretz.com/2007-09-12/ty-article/n-korea-condemns-israeli-provocation/0000017f-df22-d3a5-af7f-ffae0e710000>

97 Andrew Garwood-Gowers, “Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Al-Kibar Facility: A Test Case for the Doctrine of Pre-emptive Self-Defence?” Journal of Conflict & Security Law, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2011), pp. 263–91, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/26295336>.

98 UN General Assembly, “Identical letters dated 9 September 2007 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,” A/61/1041, September 10, 2007, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/606575?ln=ru>.

99 Leonard S. Spector and Avner Cohen, “Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime,” Arms Control Today, July/August 2008, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008-08/features/israel’s-airstrike-syria’s-reactor-implications-nonproliferation-regime>.

100 Nuclear Threat Initiative, “Syria Nuclear Overview,” April 23, 2018, <https://www.nti.org/analysis/articles/syria-nuclear/ >.

101 It was reported that Israel’s target may have been a shipment of nuclear materials from North Korea. See David E. Sanger and Mark Mazzetti, “Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project, Analysts Say,” New York Times, October 14, 2007, <https://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/washington/14weapons.html>.

102 Statement by Walid Al-Moualem, Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations UN General Assembly, General Debate, A/62/PV.12, October 1, 2007 <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/610855?ln=en>.

103 BBC News, “Israel Admits Air Strike on Syria,” October 2, 2007, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7024287.stm>.

104 Sanger and Mazzetti, “Israel Struck Syrian Nuclear Project.”

105 IAEA, “Recent Media Reports Concerning Syria,” October 15, 2007, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/recent-media-reports-concerning-syria>.

106 Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), “Background Briefing with Senior U.S. Officials on Syria's Covert Nuclear Reactor and North Korea's Involvement,” April 24, 2008, <https://irp.fas.org/news/2008/04/odni042408.pdf>.

107 ODNI, “Background Briefing.”

108 ODNI.

109 IAEA, “Statement by IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei,” April 25, 2008, <https://www.iaea.org/newscenter/pressreleases/statement-iaea-director-general-mohamed-elbaradei>.

110 UN Security Council, “Security Council Extends ‘1540 Committee.’”

111 Oliver Meier, “NPT Meet Buoys Hopes for 2010 Conference,” Arms Control Today, June 2008, pp. 35–37, <https://www.armscontrol.org/taxonomy/term/91/0?page=34>.

112 Spector and Cohen, “Israel’s Airstrike on Syria’s Reactor.”

113 Spiegel International, “If We Fail, Humanity's Survival Will Be on the Line,” June 11, 2008, <https://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-iaea-boss-mohamed-elbaradei-if-we-fail-humanity-s-survival-will-be-on-the-line-a-559085.html>.

114 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 5 (New York, 1980), p. 289.

115 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6, p. 251.

116 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6, p. 251.

117 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 7 (New York, 1982), p. 354.

118 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6, p. 201.

119 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6, p. 252.

120 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 7.

121 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 7, p. 285.

122 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 7, p. 285.

123 Working paper submitted by Sweden to the Conference on Disarmament, “Proposals for Parts of a Treaty Prohibiting Radiological Weapons and the Release or Dissemination of Radioactive Material for Hostile Purposes,” CD/RW/WP.52, August 3, 1984, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/67826?ln=en>.

124 United Nations, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 18 (New York, 1993), p. 139.

125 Jessica Bufford, “Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the 2005 Amendment: Past, Present, and Future,” n.d., p. 3, <https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/01.-History-and-Development-of-CPPNM-and-A.pdf>.

126 Bufford, “Convention on the Physical Protection.”

127 Mohamed ElBaradei, “Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” IAEA Bulletin, Vol. 39, No. 4 (1997), p. 2, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/magazines/bulletin/bull39-4/39402080203.pdf>.

128 IAEA, “The International Legal Framework for Nuclear Security,” IAEA International Law Series No. 4, 2011, <https://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/Publications/PDF/Pub1486_web.pdf>.

129 Sam Kane and Kingston Reif, “Fact Sheet: The 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT),” Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, June 13, 2013, <https://armscontrolcenter.org/fact-sheet-the-2005-amendment-to-the-convention-on-the-physical-protection-of-nuclear-material-cppnm-and-the-international-convention-on-the-suppression-of-acts-of-nuclear-terrorism-icsant/>.

130 IAEA, “Amendment to the Convention in the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, (A/CPPNM)” INFCIRC/274/Rev.1/Mod.1 Corrected, October 18, 2021, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/publications/documents/infcircs/1979/infcirc274r1m1c.pdf>.

131 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT), April 13, 2005, Article 2, para. 1 (b), <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/2005/04/20050413%2004-02%20PM/Ch_XVIII_15p.pdf >.

132 See A/CPPNM, Article 1, para. (d); Article 2, para. 5.

133 See ICSANT, Article 1, para. 3.

134 See UN Security Council, “On Implementation of the Framework Agreement in the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia,” S/RES/1371, September 26, 2001, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/448951?ln=en>; UN Security Council, “On Non-Proliferation of Nuclear, Chemical and Biological Weapons,” S/RES/1540, April 28, 2004, < https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N04/328/43/PDF/N0432843.pdf?OpenElement>.

135 This political will owed in part to the 2004 report of the High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change and the UN secretary general’s 2005 report. See Nuclear Threat Initiative, “International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,” updated/last reviewed September 22, 2023, <https://www.nti.org/education-center/treaties-and-regimes/international-convention-suppression-acts-nuclear-terrorism/>.

136 Laura S.H. Holgate, “The Enduring Challenge of Nuclear Security Coordination,” Arms Control Today, January/February 2018, pp. 14–19, <https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2018-01/features/enduring-challenge-nuclear-security-coordination>.

137 A/CPPNM, Article 2, para. 4.

138 ICSANT, Article 4, para. 2.

139 UN General Assembly, “Summary Record of the 28th Meeting: 6th Committee,” A/C.6/55/SR.28, November 14, 2000, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/444737?ln=en>.

140 Maria de Lourdes Vez Carmona, “The International Regime on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material,” Nuclear Law Bulletin, Vol. 2005/2, No. 76 (2005), p. 37, <https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_14044#page=7>.

141 See Nuclear Threat Initiative, “International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism.”

142 Odette Jankowitsch-Prevor, “International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism,” Nuclear Law Bulletin, Vol. 2005/2, No. 76 (2005), p. 19, <https://www.oecd-nea.org/jcms/pl_14044#page=7>.

143 Agreement between India and Pakistan on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities (India–Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement), December 31, 1988, <https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/india_pakistan_non_attack_agreement.pdf>.

144 India–Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement.

145 UN General Assembly, “Text of a Treaty on an African Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone,” A/50/426, September 13, 1995, <https://www.iaea.org/publications/documents/treaties/african-nuclear-weapon-free-zone-treaty-pelindaba-treaty>.

146 UN News, “Ukraine: Guterres Calls for Safety and Security of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Plant,” September 6, 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/09/1126131>.

147 For a list and discussion of the seven pillars, see IAEA, “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine: 2nd Summary Report by the Director General, 28 April–5 September 2022,” September 2022, pp. 7–8, <https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/22/09/ukraine-2ndsummaryreport_sept2022.pdf>.

148 IAEA, “Nuclear Safety, Security and Safeguards in Ukraine,” p. 255.

149 United Nations, The United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Vol. 6, p. 252.

150 These principles are: (i) no attack from or against the plant; (ii) no use of the plant as storage or as a base for heavy weapons or military personnel; (iii) no placement of off-site power at risk; (iv) the protection of all essential structures, systems, and components from attacks or sabotage; and (v) no action that undermines these principles. See United Nations Security Council, “International Atomic Energy Agency Director Outlines Five Principles to Prevent Nuclear Accident at Zaporizhzhia Power Plant in Ukraine,” SC/15300, May 30, 2023, <https://press.un.org/en/2023/sc15300.doc.htm>.

151 Michael Eisenstadt, “America’s Failing Iran Nuclear Policy: Time for a Course Adjustment,” War on the Rocks, October 20, 2023, <https://warontherocks.com/2023/10/americas-failing-iran-nuclear-policy-time-for-a-course-adjustment/>.