Predictable in Their Failure: An Analysis of Mediation Efforts to End the Palestinian Split

ABSTRACT

This paper asks why mediation efforts between Fatah and Hamas have failed. The analysis of in-depth interviews with Palestinian stakeholders, guided by relevant theoretical frameworks, indicates that: first, Israel and its allies act as systemic contextual barriers to ending the Palestinian split. Second, serious obstacles to reconciliation exist because the split has lasted for nearly 16 years. Third, mediator characteristics did not affect the outcomes. Fourth, increased polarization in the region following the Arab Spring has adversely affected reconciliation. This research points to the futility of mediation efforts in the current circumstances and the need to challenge existing systemic barriers to reconciliation.

KEYWORDS:

• Palestinian internal split
• mediation efforts
• Fatah
• Hamas
• mediation frameworks
• polarization of bureaucracy

Introduction

The internal political split between the two largest Palestinian political parties (Fatah and Hamas) has lasted for more than 17 years and has had dire consequences for Palestinians. Fatah, the older of the two, was established in the 1950s as part of the broader anti-colonial movements of the era. It began as a key force in the Palestinian national movement in the diaspora. The name ‘Fatah’ is a reversed acronym of ‘Harkat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini’, translating to ‘Palestinian National Liberation Movement’. Its ideology, rooted in anti-colonialism, was shaped by the global movement against Western colonialism and hegemony, combining elements of nationalism and secularism.¹

In contrast, Hamas emerged during the first Palestinian Intifada in December 1987, with its origins dating back to the efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza between 1978 and 1986.² Israel initially employed a strategy of supporting Hamas to weaken Fatah, which led to increased resistance against Israel. Over time, Israel’s approach shifted to delegitimizing and demonizing Hamas.³ In the West, Hamas is broadly recognized as a terrorist organization. Baconi⁴ argues that this view overlooks Hamas’s context-specific motivations, seeing its armed resistance as a response to occupation, with no broader confrontational agenda against the West. Baconi⁵ describes Hamas as a movement using Islamic discourse to address the occupation’s specific political and social challenges.⁶

While ideological differences are a common feature of political parties globally, akin to the contrasts between the Republican and Democratic parties in the U.S., the rift between Fatah and Hamas was largely due to their opposing views on the 1993 Oslo Accords. Fatah saw the accords as a practical approach towards achieving Palestinian statehood. On the other hand, Hamas strongly opposed the accords, perceiving them as a threat to the Palestinian quest for freedom. This disagreement over the Oslo Accords, however, did not immediately result in an internal Palestinian split. Fatah, maintaining its position as the ruling party, governed the Palestinian territories under the Oslo framework from 1994 up until the 2006 elections, being acknowledged as the official representative of the Palestinian people during this time.

The Palestinian internal split took place in 2007, following the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. This division led to the formation of two separate governments: the West Bank came under a Fatah-led government, while Gaza was governed by a government led by Hamas. The international community’s rejection of the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election results played the most significant role in deepening the political rift between Fatah and Hamas. The UN Quartet⁷ and broader international community responded to Hamas’s victory by announcing a set of conditions that would have to be met for the election results to be recognized. Hamas would have to renounce violence, recognize Israel’s right to exist, and accept the terms of all previous agreements between the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) and Israel. Hamas rejected these conditions. As a result, the international community imposed a political boycott and crippling economic sanctions on the Gaza Strip.⁸ The Palestinian split occurred when, after a short military confrontation with Fatah-affiliated security forces, Hamas took full control over the Palestinian Authority (PA) apparatus in the Gaza Strip in June 2007.⁹

The US and EU-approved Israeli and Egyptian blockades in place since 2007 have isolated the Gaza Strip politically, economically, and socially. At the same time, international aid flooded into the Fatah-led PA in the West Bank. The international community sought to increase pressure on Hamas in the hope that it would either surrender immediately or weaken and become politically irrelevant in the longer-term.¹⁰ Since then, the political landscape in both the Gaza Strip and West Bank has become increasingly restricted and unrepresentative. As well, and perhaps more significantly, the split between Fatah and Hamas has had significant consequences on efforts for Palestinian freedom and statehood.

This paper does not discuss the root causes of the Palestinian internal division between Fatah and Hamas as this is extensively discussed elsewhere.¹¹ Rather, the paper seeks to understand why mediation efforts, after the split had occurred in 2007, have been unsuccessful, guided by conceptual meditation frameworks and based on in-depth interviews with Palestinian politicians, technocrats, independent policy analysts, and civil society representatives (the Palestinian intelligentsia) to understand their perspectives on mediation efforts to end the split.

In the next Sections I, first, briefly describe past mediation efforts; second, introduce and discuss relevant theoretical mediation frameworks; third, describe qualitative data collection methods; fourth, analyse in-depth stakeholder interviews through the mediation frameworks explored in the second section; and fifth, present a discussion and conclusions. The goal of this work is to understand the reasons behind the repeated failure of past mediation efforts to end the Palestinian split and, in doing so, better inform future mediation efforts and advance literature on the topic.

Background: Past Mediation Efforts

The Palestinian split occurred in 2007 following a short but violent internal conflict between Fatah and Hamas. This conflict was a direct result of the international community’s refusal to accept the outcomes of the 2006 elections, which Hamas won. The Palestinian political house is, therefore, divided: a Hamas-run government governs in Gaza and a Fatah-run government governs in the West Bank.

The intra-Palestinian division is an internal conflict. Before international mediation was sought or accepted, internal actors sought to mediate the conflict. These efforts did not bear fruit. Since then, Saudi Arabia, Yemen, Egypt, and Switzerland have unsuccessfully attempted to mediate the Fatah and Hamas conflict.

The first mediation attempt between Fatah and Hamas was a Palestinian internal effort led by prisoners held in Israeli detention. In May 2006, Palestinian prisoners from Fatah, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), and other organizations mobilized across the political spectrum to develop a plan for reconciliation. It is important to note that the resulting Prisoners’ Document was written following the rejection of the 2006 election results, which was expected to result in violence and disunity.

The 2006 Prisoners’ Document outlines several ways to work towards national reconciliation, including the democratic renewal of the PLO under a new Palestinian National Council representing all Palestinians, including those in the diaspora.¹² This mediation effort failed when Fatah President Mahmoud Abbas declared he would use the document in negotiations with Israel. This decision contradicted the wishes of Islamic Jihad prisoners, pushing them to withdraw.

In February 2007, in response to continued violence in Palestinian territories in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah led the first international mediation efforts between Fatah and Hamas. Saudi Arabia was motivated to mediate in part by a genuine belief that upholding Palestinian rights requires solidarity with Palestinians.¹³ Saudi Arabia was also driven by the value it placed on Arab consensus.¹⁴ The resulting 2007 Mecca Agreement, signed by leading members of both Hamas and Fatah, called for an end to violence between the two parties and the development of a national unity government that included all sides. Significantly, the agreement appeared to favour internal reconciliation over the Quartet’s demands.¹⁵ The agreement, however, failed with the renewal of violence between the two groups, and the rejection of the agreement by both Israel and the Quartet. There is also evidence that Egypt’s absence played a role.¹⁶

In March 2008, Yemen mediated a short-lived agreement between Fatah and Hamas. The 2008 Sanaa Declaration adopted the framework proposed in the Mecca agreement; however, the two parties interpreted the framework differently. Hamas considered the declaration a starting point for negotiation and dialogue, while Fatah viewed the declaration as a directive, with dialogue only possible once all aspects of the agreement had been implemented.¹⁷ As a result, the mediation effort failed to yield lasting results.

Three years later, in April 2011, Fatah and Hamas signed the Cairo Agreement, brokered by the Egyptian government. Both parties agreed to hold national elections organised by a central interim government within a year.¹⁸ Elections, however, were not held, possibly as a result of both security concerns and the failure to outline a plan to form an independent electoral committee and transition government.¹⁹ Hence, like other agreements before it, the Cairo Agreement resulted in little change on the ground.

European powers have not led or engaged in mediation efforts because of the No-Contact with Hamas policy. However, unlike most other European states, Switzerland has made no attempt to isolate Hamas. This was especially true following Hamas’s electoral victory when actors such as the US, EU, and Israel advanced positions that contributed to the polarization of Palestinian politics and territory.²⁰ In 2015, Switzerland sponsored a series of meetings with Hamas, Fatah, and other factions. These efforts resulted in the Swiss Paper. The Swiss Paper coincided with a decline in Egypt’s prominence in intra-Palestinian mediation as a result of the failure of the 2011 Cairo Agreement, the 2013 shift in politics in Egypt, and an Egyptian judge’s 2015 recognition of Hamas as a terrorist organization.²¹

The primary goal behind the Swiss Paper was to secure the approval of the PA and assistance from international actors to rectify the employee and salary crises in Gaza.²² The Swiss Paper also laid out a basis for working to resolve questions related to the security sector. The key issue was how to integrate Hamas’s security forces into the structure of the PA and include them on the PA payroll after re-unification. This was a serious issue because the PA is financed by donors who refuse to engage with Hamas and have labelled it a terrorist organization. The Swiss government engaged in dialogue with Hamas and Fatah to find a solution to problems related to reforming and restructuring the entire PA, including the security sector apparatus, to achieve unity and reconciliation. More specifically, the Swiss sought to pave the way for integrating Hamas’s civil servants, including its police and security forces, into the PA and to address the concerns of international donors’ who consider Hamas a terrorist organization. Despite the many obvious merits of the Swiss Paper, it did not lead to any significant changes, in part because of concerns raised by Israel and the US.

Hamas’s position had shifted by 2017 when Egypt once again sought out a mediator role. The situation had changed considerably since 2015. In 2017, Hamas was regionally isolated and in financial crisis. Egypt now viewed Hamas as an ally in the fight against terrorism and so Egypt softened its stance towards Hamas, hoping to steer fidelity away from Qatar (Shaban 2017).²³ Egypt’s decision to periodically open the Rafah crossing and supply fuel to Gaza’s sole power plant were proof of Egypt’s more open attitude (Shaban 2017).²⁴ In exchange, Hamas agreed to assist Egypt in securing its borders and fighting terrorism (Shaban 2017).²⁵ Hamas also agreed to dissolve its administrative committee, the creation of which had pushed the PA to retaliate by reducing the salaries of PA employees in Gaza and decreasing electricity subsidies (Shaban 2017).²⁶ This move signalled an opening for a consensus government in Gaza (Shaban 2017).²⁷ The terms of the agreement, however, have not yet been met.

In Cairo in February 2021, Hamas and Fatah announced plans for upcoming legislative and presidential elections, to be held in May 2021 and July 2021, respectively. The two parties also declared that they had reached agreements on mechanisms for holding these elections. These developments happened soon after President Biden’s election and seemed to be at least partly motivated by a wish to respect the democratic process in an effort to engage with the new American administration. However, according to the official news agency, WAFA, President Abbas issued a presidential decree postponing the May 22 parliamentary and July 31 presidential elections. Numerous meetings have been convened over the years in countries such as Egypt, Qatar, Turkey, Lebanon, and Russia, all with the objective of resolving the Palestinian divide. However, these efforts have yielded minimal progress. Most recently in 2022, a meeting was held in Algeria that included 14 Palestinian factions. The central goal of this event was to restore a sense of national unity and reinvigorate collective organizations like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and the Palestinian Authority (PA). The Algeria initiative also failed to achieve its intended goals.

Theoretical Perspective: Factors Influencing the Success and Failure of Mediation Efforts

According to Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille,²⁸ mediation refers to ‘a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept an offer of help from, an individual, group, state, or organization to settle their conflict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the authority of the law’. Bercovitch²⁹ states that the variety of strategies that fall under the umbrella term mediation can serve the interests of preventative diplomacy, preventing further conflict escalation, and/or reducing the politicization of conflict altogether.

The notion of mediation success is not readily understood or clear; analysts set their own criteria for what they consider a successful mediation process. Success in mediation can be defined as accepting mediation or as reaching an agreement. According to Walter³⁰, resolving a civil war or internal conflict successfully involves a three-step process: initiating negotiations or accepting mediation efforts, engaging in these efforts to compromise on goals and principles, and then implementing the terms of the treaty. Therefore, the success of such a resolution hinges not only on reaching an agreement but also crucially on the effective implementation of the agreed-upon treaty terms. Walter then argues that third-party enforcement or verification during the post-treaty implementation phase is a key determinant of success in implementing agreements.³¹

In this case, Fatah and Hamas have agreed to accept mediation several times and have indeed signed agreements with each other. However, all these agreements remained ink on paper. I have opted for a goal-based approach to defining success similar to the one proposed by Walter.³² Success in mediation, in this paper, means success in ending the Palestinian split and forming a unity Palestinian government, that is, no longer having one government in Gaza and another in the West Bank.

In her thorough review of the literature available at the time, Kleiboer³³ offers a comprehensive and organized overview of the factors that potentially influence mediation success or failure. The set of factors Kleiboer³⁴ identified are grouped into (a) mediation context and (b) mediation process factors. Mediation context includes four sets of factors: (1) dispute characteristics (conflict ripeness, level of intensity, and nature of the issues), (2) conflicting parties and their relationship (identification of parties, cohesiveness of each party, type of regime, motives for accepting mediation, previous relationship between the parties, and balance of power between the parties), (3) mediator characteristics (partiality/motives, leverage, and status) and (4) international context. Mediation process factors include the different strategies and activities mediators use to achieve their goals. Mediator processes include the roles, strategies, tactics, and activities that mediators choose; in other words, what they decide to do.

Bercovitch³⁵ outlines four groups of factors that potentially influence the success or failure of mediation, which categorize the factors differently from Kleiboer.³⁶ The first group of factors is mediator characteristics, which he labels mediator personal factors. This group is concerned with who the mediator is. Bercovitch³⁷ finds that the identity of the mediator has an impact on the success or failure of mediation because mediators differ in terms of ‘interests, perceptions, and resources’. Hence, they differ in the degree of leverage they have to influence disputants’ behaviour, for example. Echoing themes found in meditation texts, Walter³⁸ highlights the crucial role of an intermediary in settling internal disputes. This third party is important due to their capacity to ensure compliance and serve as assurance for each involved party’s commitment.

Bercovitch’s³⁹ second group of factors is situational factors. These are ‘physical, social, reputational and power relations between the parties’. He finds, for example, that power parity between the disputants is more conducive to success in mediation. The third group of factors is international factors, explained as the parties’ overall understanding of the conflict as ‘either a zero-sum understanding  … or a co-operative understanding where each party recognizes that gains may be made by all’.⁴⁰ Other factors international factors are the history of the relationship between the two parties. Bercovitch predicts that if the two parties had good relations in the past then mediation could be successful since it can build on past relations. Other important international factors are the political and economic contexts. For Bercovitch, conflicts that take place in democratic contexts and developed economies are easier to resolve than those in non-democratic and less developed contexts. Finally, the fourth set of factors is motivational factors. These concern the parties’ willingness to seek, accept, and commit to mediation. The expectation here is that if both parties have the same motivations for ending the conflict, a successful outcome is more likely.⁴¹

Vuković⁴² expands on the discussion of context as an important determinant of mediation success by stressing the importance of the context and conditions that surround the conflict. He identifies three sets of contextual factors: systemic factors, which include ‘all those geopolitical aspects that might affect the outcome of the mediation process’; internal factors related to the conflicting parties’ characteristics; and the nature of the conflict itself. In addition to context, Vuković⁴³ discusses mediators’ role and the strategies they employ as the other set of factors relevant to mediation success or failure. He labels these behavioural factors.

In summary, according to Kleiboer, a successful mediation effort would require a favourable context (although not conclusively as the evidence is mixed in some areas, for example the dispute is ripe for resolution, the parties are cohesive and motivated to mediate, the mediator is impartial and has leverage, and the international context is supportive) and effective process factors (i.e. the mediator uses effective strategies and tactics). Bercovitch also proposed that successful mediation efforts would require a mediator with the right personal characteristics, a supportive situational context (including power parity), an opportune international context, and parties that are motivated to seek a resolution. Vuković’s 2014 study on success factors in international mediation emphasizes the critical role of external factors in increasing the chances of a successful outcome. Finally, Walter⁴⁴ raises the issue of implementing agreements post-negotiation and emphasizes the role of third parties in successfully resolving internal conflicts.

Hence, there is agreement in the literature that there are factors related to the context and process of mediation efforts which affect mediation success. The contextual factors include internal factors such as the nature of the conflict, mediator characteristics, and external factors such as international context. The process factors are concerned with the strategies and tactics used by mediators. These factors are not assumed to operate in isolation and their interaction with each other can lead to mediation success or failure.

In this paper, the focus is not on mediation process. Since all past mediation efforts have ended in agreements which remained ink on paper to this day, it is highly unlikely that anything any mediator could have done would have resulted in success, and therefore the details of each agreement and the mediation processes are not the focus on this analysis. This study investigates why have all the past mediation efforts failed and hence is concerned with mediation context (internal and external).

Methods

This study employs a qualitative, phenomenological approach to explore the perceptions/views of Palestinian politicians, technocrats, independent policy analysts, and civil society representatives (i.e. the Palestinian intelligentsia) on the Palestinian split and past mediation efforts. The purpose of this qualitative approach is to better understand events as seen through the eyes of relevant stakeholders. The stakeholders were intentionally selected to gain a wide perspective on the barriers to successful mediation.

I used purposive sampling; I identified different perspectives that needed to be represented based on potentially differing views on the issue and included participants that could reflect them in the sample to best achieve this research’s objectives. Thus, the sample included politicians (Fatah, Hamas, and other parties), civil society actors, technocrats, and independent policy analysts to get the broadest perspective possible. Ten participants were included in the final sample (see Appendix 1).

A snowball/networking approach was employed to connect with participants. I leveraged my social networks to identify and reach out to the intended participants. A semi-structured interview guide was developed based on a review of the theoretical and empirical literature on mediation. The interview guide was used in all interviews. Each interview lasted 45–90 minutes. The next section analyses the in-depth interviews through the lens of relevant conceptual frameworks to identify factors that have led to the failure of past mediation efforts and factors which could potentially lead to successful efforts in the future.

Analysis: Why and How did Past Palestinian Reconciliation Mediation Efforts Fail?

For this study, I asked participants to comment on why they thought all mediation efforts between Fatah and Hamas had failed. I did not ask them to focus on a specific mediation effort or to discuss any in detail. Thematic analysis combining deductive and inductive coding was conducted.⁴⁵ The analysis was informed by the literature on mediation but not constrained by it. Four major themes emerged from my analysis of this in-depth interview data. First, the Israeli occupation and the resultant dependency on foreign aid act as systemic contextual barriers to success in mediation. Second, the nature of the conflict and how long it lasted leading to changes to that realities on the ground for both parties, making the compromises and costs necessary for reconciliation high for both parties. Third, different types of mediators have attempted and failed to end the split; nevertheless, success in mediation may be more likely if a mediator with high leverage were involved. Fourth, increased polarization in the region following the Arab Spring has had a negative impact on Palestinian reconciliation efforts.

Mediation Under Occupation: What Does Israeli Occupation Have to do with the Palestinian Split?

Study participants thought that the most significant barriers to Palestinian reconciliation were systemic and external. Mediation efforts have taken place in the unique context of an occupied Palestine. In this context, we must question how much real control Palestinian political parties have. Do they really get to decide? Study participants believed that the Israeli occupation was a major barrier to success in mediation in two ways: directly and through its influence on international donors.

According to study participants, as the occupying power, Israel holds enormous power over political (and all other) aspects of life in Palestine and often puts pressure on the PA/Fatah not to reconcile with Hamas. Dana⁴⁶ explains why the PA has become so susceptible to Israeli pressure over time. Hence, as the interview data indicate, Israeli and US disapproval seems to be the rock on which past reconciliation ships have been wrecked. Dr. Ahmed Yousef, senior member of the Hamas Political Bureau and the Head of the Bait El-Hekama Center, commented on an all too familiar problem:

After the Mecca agreement, we formed a unity government after about 2 or 5 months  … then we proceeded to discuss the political program, but the Americans had to agree for the PA to proceed and they did not. Most importantly, the American rejection complicated things and all efforts crumbed and failed in June. Any agreement has to be cleared by the Americans and the Israelis (pers. comm.).

Dr. Alaa Aldin Al-Rafati, a former Minister of Economy in the Gaza Strip Government, agreed:

Israeli and American pressure on Fatah/PA is the key barrier to reconciliation. They pressure the president with cutting aid and Israel blackmails us with our own money transfers (pers. comm.).

Dr. Ayed Yaghi, an official in the Palestinian National Initiative in the Gaza Strip and a member of the Central Council of the PLO, stated that ‘The US has apparently placed a veto on the issue of Palestinian reconciliation’ (pers. comm.).

In addition, the Israeli occupation imposes crippling economic conditions on Palestinians, making the Palestinian economy dependent on foreign aid. As a result, international donors play a central role in Palestinian political life. Either because of an unwillingness to challenge Israel or because they view Hamas as a ‘terrorist’ organization, most international donors maintain their distance from Hamas. This makes it nearly impossible to achieve success in mediation efforts because any Palestinian government that includes Hamas will be automatically rejected by the international community. A key consequence of this rejection relates to donor funding, which is the main source of livelihood for Palestinians.

The current Palestinian split is largely the outcome of the intentional community’s reaction to Hamas’s victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections.⁴⁷ When Western countries (i.e. the US and EU), which are also the largest foreign donors, boycotted Hamas and embraced Fatah after the elections, they deepened the political divide between the two parties, and enabling the Palestinian split. El Kurd offers a nuanced account of how international involvement in Palestine has led to polarization and de-politicization in Palestine.⁴⁸ The interview data support her findings concerning the instrumental and significant role international donors play in polarizing Palestinian politics.

A major issue that was highlighted by all participants is the challenges of merging bureaucracies and particularly challenging in this area is the issue of security forces. Marten⁴⁹ discussed how the international attention and funding given to reform and train the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF) since the Oslo Accords process in 1993 and intensifying after 2007, which many donors and supporters claimed it as a success story, resulted in ‘patronage-based violence’ within the security forces due to unresolved political conflicts and the fractured approach of the international community. Since the PA is financed by donors who refuse to engage with Hamas and have labelled it a terrorist organization, it is not clear how Hamas members could be included on the payroll after re-unification, this particularly problematic for Hamas’ security forces.

In 2015, the Swiss government engaged in dialogue with Hamas and Fatah to find a solution to problems related to reforming and restructuring the entire PA, including the security sector apparatus, to achieve unity and reconciliation. In part because of Israel’s unparalleled military superiority in the region, study participants questioned the credibility viewing Hamas as a ‘security threat’. Indeed, as Hijazi Al-Qurashi, advisor to the Chief of the General Personnel Council in Gaza, pointed out,

The Swiss screened and vetted 30,000 of Hamas’s civil servants hired after the split in the Gaza Strip. Almost all 30,000 passed the security screening process, meaning that the accusations of terrorism are unfounded and are not a valid reason to halt the reform and integration process. Thirty employees did not pass because of mistakes in their identity numbers (pers. comm.).

Rather than a security threat, participants believe that the Palestinian split is convenient for Israel and serves its interests as an occupying force. Islamic Jihad Movement leader and the director of the Atlas Center for Israeli Studies, Mr. Abdul Rahman Shihab, noted that ‘Israel is not interested in reconciliation but in prolonging and maintaining the split … . Even if it pretends it does not get involved’ (pers. comm.). Other participants added that Palestinian disunity allows Israel to appropriate more land/expand settlement activity even further and change the reality on the ground. With Fatah and Hamas divided, Israel can claim that no party represents all Palestinians, so ‘who is Israel supposed to make peace with?’ Mr. Mohsen Adnan Abu Ramadan, president of the Palestinian NGOs Network and a member of the Central Council of the PLO, elaborated on why he believes Palestinian disunity serves the interests of Israel:

If reconciliation and Palestinian unity were to be successful, it would be a blow to the Israeli project which is based on completely severing Gaza from the West Bank … fragmenting Palestinians and the cause (pers. comm.).

Dr. Meriam Abu-Daqa, member of the Political Bureau of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, related this to Israel’s status as a settler colonial power:

Palestinian division is caused by a long-term systematic process engineered by the Israeli occupation … Palestinian disunity is exactly what [Israel] wants (pers. comm.).

According to mediation theoretical frameworks, the international context or international factors play an important role in mediation outcome.⁵⁰ Vuković⁵¹ elaborates on how the international context is part of what he calls systemic features, which include ‘different forms of pressure (such as economic and political)’. These are ‘used by outside parties that have an interest in the conflict [and] may have both constructive and destructive effects on conflict management efforts’. In the case of occupied Palestine, it is not surprising that study participants highlighted the occupation context as the most important barrier to ending the Palestinian split, raising questions about the futility of mediation efforts in a context where external systemic barriers to reconciliation exist.

The Nature of the Conflict: Costs and Consequences of Ending the Long Lasting Palestinian Split

According to mediation theoretical frameworks, the nature of the conflict matters. The root causes of Palestinian internal division – and more specifically the split after the 2006 elections – are extensively discussed in a recent study. The study documents that the division between Fatah and Hamas had started long before the 2007 Palestinian split and can be dated back to the differing positions each party took regarding the 1993 Oslo Accords. While Fatah saw the Accords as the only way forward, Hamas believed it to be a trap for the Palestinian people.⁵² Hamas was against the peace negotiations and opposed the creation of the Palestinian Authority, which was established as a result of the Accords. In 1996, Hamas boycotted the first Palestinian Legislative Council elections because it refused to recognize the legitimacy of the Oslo Accords.⁵³ The failure of the peace negotiations and the outbreak of the Second Palestinian Intifada meant that the Oslo Accords lost their relevance leading to Hamas’s decision to participate in the PLC elections in 2006.⁵⁴

Despite the major disagreement between Fatah and Hamas on the key Palestinian question of statehood since 1993, the two parties were able to operate as two opposing political parties, which embrace different ideologies, not dissimilar to opposing political parties in any other context, until the results of 2006 elections were declared and the international community’s decision to refusal to respect the elections results.

The refusal to accept election results created conflict concerning which party had the legitimacy to govern post elections. Internal violence and the fragmentation of the Palestinian Authority into two governments ruling in two distinct territories followed the international community’s refusal to accept the results. Turner⁵⁵ highlighted the significance of violence, specifically the use of ‘shock and awe’, in creating a failed Palestinian quasi-state. The military campaign, Operation Defensive Shield, imposed sanctions and blockades after Hamas’ election in 2006, and the violence on Palestinian streets caused the fragmentation of the Palestinian Authority. Seen from a historical institutional lens, these two events (the Oslo Accords and the 2006 elections) were critical junctures at which both institutions (Fatah and Hamas), in the context of a settler colonialism, made decisions that created path dependence making it exceedingly more difficult for them to achieve reconciliation as time went on.⁵⁶

Closely connected to the concept of path dependence in Historical Institutionalism is the idea that the longer a conflict lasts, the harder it becomes to resolve. Conflict duration is a key factor affecting the likelihood parties will accept mediation and that it will be successful, highlighted by most mediation theoretical frameworks. According to Kleiboer,⁵⁷ some researchers follow what she calls ‘the logic of clock time’. Analysts following this logic believe that a conflict must last long enough for the parties to realize that they cannot solve the dispute on their own and so are ready to seek or accept mediation.⁵⁸

Other analysts find that the longer a conflict lasts, the harder it becomes to solve the underlying issues because they become more entrenched.⁵⁹ Vuković⁶⁰ also finds that intractable conflicts are the ones that tend to endure for a long time. Echoing this literature, study participants highlighted that the length of the Fatah-Hamas conflict is one of the factors behind the failure of past mediation efforts, for Fatah and Hamas have adapted to the reality of the situation. This makes it exceedingly difficult to have a united government.

Since assuming power in Gaza in 2007, Hamas has sought out ways to establish and maintain itself as a legitimate government, largely by taking control of various local institutions.⁶¹ Berti⁶² describes the public servant strikes Fatah President Abbas ordered right after Hamas took over in Gaza as creating an opportunistic vacuum that Hamas stepped into by hiring its supporters. The Fatah-led PA did not, and still does not, recognize them as employees of the PA. They are not integrated into the PA and Fatah continues to seek ways to replace them with Fatah-hired workers who were employed in Gaza before 2007.⁶³

Abu Ramadan elaborated further on the complexity on the ground after so many years of conflict:

There are now security and civil institutions fully affiliated with Hamas in the Gaza Strip and this is difficult to address administratively and immediately; it needs to be addressed gradually. Hamas wants to keep all its employees who were appointed during the period of the split. At the same time, the Palestinian Authority believes that this is unreasonable; part of Fatah wants to regain complete control of the Gaza Strip without taking into consideration new developments, the existence of institutions, employees, and legal, institutional, structural, and security realities on the ground because the Palestinian Authority did not carry out its responsibilities for more than 11 years (pers. comm.).

Yaghi introduced the concept of a stabilized conflict:

If we look neutrally at the local reality, speaking frankly, after more the ten years of ‘stabilized’ division, it has become difficult to reach genuine Palestinian reconciliation. We have centres of power in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Some people’s personal interests are linked to the state of division, and therefore they pose a challenge (pers. comm.).

Other study participants also highlighted the politicization and inflation of the bureaucracy as important barriers to reconciliation. Mr. Nafez Al-Madhoun, Secretary General of the Legislative Council of Gaza, echoed the view that one of the main reasons it is difficult to end this split is the difficulty of integrating two immense bureaucratic entities after so long:

Ending the split and integrating Fatah and Hamas-appointed public servants into a single government body is not going to be an easy process and requires significant financial investment in training and restructuring, and [it] will take commitment, time, and effort (pers. comm.).

According to study participants, the longer the Palestinian split lasts, the harder it becomes to resolve and the more symbolic these mediation attempts have become. This adds to the body of evidence highlighting the importance of the duration of a conflict as a factor impacting the likelihood of success in mediation efforts. Study participants introduced the concept of ‘stabilized Palestinian internal conflict’ in this study. Both parties can survive in this situation for a long time, and, from their perspective, it may be more advantageous to do so than to risk an unfavourable mediated compromise.

Not all researchers accept the logic of clock time. Many analysts do not think the duration of a conflict as measured in the number of months and years matters. These researchers introduce the concept of conflict ripeness.⁶⁴ Conflicts can become ripe because of either external events or internal changes within one or both parties. According to Zartman,⁶⁵ ‘The concept of a ripe moment centers on the parties’ perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe’.

The interviews did not make any reference to ripe moments or conflict ripeness. In this study, ‘conflict ripeness’ did not create openings, as the literature suggests. Rather, the interview data support the view that the longer a conflict lasts, the harder it is to resolve.

Different Mediators and Mediation Circumstances but the Same Outcome

Participants in this study thought that past mediation efforts had failed not because of the type of mediators or what they did during the mediation process, but because there are external systemic contextual barriers to reconciliation. Past mediators varied in terms of impartiality and leverage from the Swiss (most impartial and relatively low leverage) to Egypt (least impartial and relatively high leverage); all ended in failure.

Study participants were asked to reflect on what characteristics would be desirable in a mediator; most participants in this study regarded mediator impartiality as a desirable characteristic. As Shihab stated,

Only some EU countries qualify to serve as mediators for the Palestinian split, unlike the US which has consistently sided with Israel and adopted a stand which resulted in widening the Palestinian divide. Other countries with known biases should not be mediators in this dispute (pers. comm.).

As a result, the efforts of the Swiss government, seen as an impartial mediator, were highly regarded by many participants. This includes Mamoun Bseiso, an international finance advisor and a representative of the Kuwait Fund for the Reconstruction of Gaza. Bseiso commented,

The Swiss Initiative was built on a strong foundation for reconciliation and represented a successful framework for understanding the public personnel integration process between the Fatah and Hamas. It could have addressed many of the contentious issues fairly and reasonably (pers. comm.).

Interestingly, even though most participants stated that an impartial mediator would be desirable, they also thought that Egypt – recognized as a partial actor – would be best positioned to mediate. At the very least, Egypt ‘must be involved’ (Abu-Daqa, pers. comm.).

Wael Baaloosha, director of the State Transparency Office and the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity Office in Gaza, stated that

Egypt has played the most important role so far in the mediation file, and I think Egypt should continue playing this role. Turkey and Qatar also intervened to mediate directly and indirectly. The issue with all local powers is that they all have different views and interests that affect mediation efforts (pers. comm.).

Yousef elaborated on why he thinks Egypt must continue being a mediator. His views are echoed by almost all participants in the study:

Egyptian mediation or Egypt’s involvement in any mediation effort is important because of our geography and history. Egypt has always fought for our cause, but we could not implement the Cairo 2005 or 2011 agreements (pers. comm.).

For Abu-Daqa,

Egypt must be involved in reconciliation efforts. Egypt is our biggest neighbour. Egypt’s national security is our national security … .The Cairo 2011 agreement can be adopted as a start (pers. comm.).

The evidence on the influence of mediatory im/partiality is mixed. The traditional view is that impartiality is a desirable characteristic because it allows the mediator to have the confidence of both parties and fosters an impression of fairness in the process.⁶⁶ However, other researchers found that while trust is important, impartiality is not; on the contrary, mediator partiality (especially if connected to leverage) could increase the chances of successful mediation in many cases.⁶⁷ While participants in this study regarded impartiality as a desirable characteristic in a mediator, it is insufficient. Switzerland, for example, is viewed as impartial, but the Swiss Paper initiative failed nevertheless.

Unlike mediator impartiality, all participants agreed that ‘mediator leverage’ is desirable. They expressed the view that, since dependency on foreign aid gives donors so much power, some donors are well-positioned to be effective mediators. Some participants explicitly stated that if certain donors genuinely wanted to achieve reconciliation, it would happen tomorrow. Shihab, for example, commented on the potential role donors can play:

International donors who are concerned with the unification of Palestinians can put pressure on the Palestinian Authority to find ways to reach an understanding with Hamas to form a representative body for the Palestinian people that the Europeans can engage with (pers. comm.).

Bseiso was more specific:

The US can put pressure on all parties to maintain or end the split … but instead the US puts pressure on Egypt and the Palestinian leadership to suspend reconciliation efforts when it wants to (pers. comm.).

He continued, echoing the view that donors could play a positive role in Palestinian politics using carrots and sticks to move the reconciliation file forward:

Donors are very influential, and they have the power to push both Fatah and Hamas to get serious about reconciliation because they control funds needed for their survival (pers. comm.).

Most participants believed that a mediator who is impartial with high leverage would be desirable but at the same time also believed that Egypt should be involved which is inconsistent with what they believed to be desirable qualities of a mediator. However, the idea that a mediator must have power or leverage was highlighted by all participants.

The Arab Spring and the Palestinian Split

The Arab Spring has coloured everything in the regional context in the last 13 years, inadvertently and inevitably prolonging the Palestinian split. On the one hand, the Arab Spring has created more urgent issues across the region, which means less attention has been paid to the Palestinian issue in general. Simply put, the Palestinian split is no longer a pressing issue for regional or international powers and has been relegated to the back of the agenda. On the other hand, the Arab Spring and the failure of most of the related revolutions have further polarized the region and regional powers have become more focused on their own agendas. This has meant supporting one side of the Palestinian conflict over the other because it serves the interests and agendas of different regional powers.

Yaghi pointed to the role of regional powers in sustaining the split, saying that,

It is difficult to achieve reconciliation because of the regional situation and because some regional parties support one party vs. the other to serve their own interests in the region (pers. comm.).

Abu-Daqa commented on another way the Arab Spring has influenced Palestinian disunity:

Israel does not respect any agreement with the Palestinians and never acts as agreed. The fragility in the Arab World caused by the ‘Arab Spring’—which proved to be a project for systematically dismantling the Arab region—allows Israel to get away even more easily with not respecting its agreements (pers. comm.).

Kriesberg⁶⁸ predicts that, ‘as other fights become of greater importance for one or more of the adversaries, de-escalation is more likely to occur’. The Palestinian case proved the opposite to be true. The Arab Spring meant that energy and resources were diverted away from Palestine and, worse still, that conflicting regional parties used the internal Palestinian conflict to serve their own interests in the region.

Discussion and Conclusions

Past mediation efforts to end the Palestinian split have been predictable in their failure and the longer the Palestinian split has lasted, the more symbolic these mediation attempts have become. The interviews with study participants offer insights into the web of factors behind the failure of past mediation efforts to achieve Palestinian reconciliation. Even though these factors are presented as separate themes, these factors interact and together make mediation failure predictable.

First, the analysis of interview data and a review of relevant literature suggest that Israel, in its role as the occupying power, wields significant control over the outcomes of any mediation efforts between Fatah and Hamas. The interview data unequivocally show that the most substantial obstacle to reconciliation is the Israeli occupation, supported chiefly by the United States. Palestinians are also completely reliant on conditioned foreign aid by donors as a direct result of occupation. Turner⁶⁹ argues that the ‘partners for peace’ discourse gave a common purpose to the two sides of the ‘colonial equation’ which are the occupying power (Israel) and Western peacebuilding which predictably resulted in the status quo of being nowhere near achieving Palestinian self-determination and has been used to justify many practices ‘including the arrest and detention of Palestinian politicians, military action, the withdrawal of aid and regime change’. Hence, Turner⁷⁰ sees Peacebuilding as a colonial practice in the Occupied Palestinian Territories’. This analysis confirms this view as donors (closely connected to the Peacebuilding project) were primarily responsible for causing the Palestinian split and for preventing reconciliation according to study participants.

Since Israel and its allies consider Hamas a terrorist organization, they have and will continue to find any unity government/arrangement that includes Hamas unacceptable due to what they describe as security concerns. Given Israel and the US’s disapproval of past mediation efforts simply because they included Hamas, the path to reconciliation is treacherous at best. Even if an agreement were to be reached between Fatah and Hamas, it is highly doubtful that it could be implemented given near complete reliance on foreign aid to implement it. Since the international community, including donors, has shown little interest in challenging Israel, the politics of foreign aid also play a central role in this dispute.

Second, participants in this study thought that the nature and length of time the Palestinian split has lasted makes it harder to end because the two parties have reached a suboptimal equilibrium. As for the nature of the conflict, it is about which party has the legitimacy to govern. Even though the international community, and most importantly donors, has clearly picked their side by accelerating their support to the Fatah PA in the West Bank and boycotting Hamas after the Palestinian split occurred in 2007, donors’ support had not resulted in the success they claimed.⁷¹ Tartir⁷² using ethnographic data shows that ‘Fayyadism’ which refers to the political and economic policies of Salam Fayyad, who served as the Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority from 2007 to 2013 and have not made a significant impact on the basic rights of Palestinians. Those who are most affected by these policies express criticism of the detrimental effects they have had on their resistance against Israel’s occupation and on their own security.⁷³ Hamas, on the other hand, boycotted by the international community, ‘learned by doing’ to govern in the Gaza Strip.⁷⁴

Both Fatah and Hamas have adapted to the reality of the split in a way that might make it riskier for them to end it, especially given the fact of the Israeli occupation and strong influence of regional powers pursuing their own interests. Adapting to the reality of the split also has meant the ballooning of the bureaucracy and the near complete politicization of government, which started well before the Palestinian split but was exacerbated after 2007. This is one of the reasons why many participants viewed many past mediation efforts as symbolic or insincere. The prolonged nature of the internal split presented significant challenges to reconciliation, as divisions became increasingly entrenched and institutionalized.

Third, mediators in this conflict have ranged from partial mediators with high leverage such as Egypt to more impartial mediators such as Switzerland. However, it did not seem to matter who mediated the conflict because the barriers to reconciliation lie elsewhere. That said, participants thought mediators who are impartial (and so inspire trust) but have leverage (and so can use carrots and sticks) would be ideal mediators in this conflict and that some donors are in a better position than others to do just that. Most participants thought Egypt must be included in any successful mediation effort, which is inconsistent with their view that good mediators should be impartial. Nonetheless, given the systemic barriers to reconciliation, it is hard to imagine how any mediator can be effective in this situation. Walter⁷⁵ notes the importance of a third party in ensuring successful implementation post-agreement. However, in a situation where a third party already dominates a territory facing internal conflict, it seems challenging for a fourth party to serve effectively as an mediator with influence. This difficulty arises because they cannot offer guarantees without the consent of the dominating third party, which holds coercive and economic power over the territory and its borders. Essentially, their assurances are contingent upon what is effectively an Israeli/American veto.

Fourth, the international context of mediation was also found to be very important. The failure of most Arab Spring revolutions and the resultant neglect of the Palestinian issue and increased polarization in the region have influenced mediation efforts. Regional powers such as Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar have played a role in the Palestinian split. The degree to which these roles were regarded as positive or negative depends on who was being interviewed. Regardless of specific regional powers’ views, all interviewees agreed that the influence of regional powers cannot be overestimated.

This research did not examine each mediation effort separately and hence did not explore ‘mediation process’ in terms of the strategies and activities each mediator adopted. My goal was to understand why all attempts at mediation have failed, which goes well beyond what each mediator did or did not do. As is clear from the analysis, the barriers to successful mediation lie elsewhere in the mediation context.

The theoretical contributions of this paper are, first, that systemic contextual factors where the parties’ agency is highly restricted – such as the extreme case of mediation efforts taking place in the context of an occupied Palestine – can be detrimental to successful mediation. The occupier in this context functions as a powerful third party with veto authority, leaving minimal space for a mediator (another third party) to effectively play their role. Even though the Israeli occupation of Palestine is an extreme case in terms of context, the idea that both parties to mediation can be in a situation where they have little decision-making power is common in many conflicts. This paper highlights the issue of restricted agency of conflicting parties: can they really make decisions in this context? What choices do they have?

Second, this paper contributes to the body of research indicating that the longer duration of a conflict makes its resolution more challenging. Developing an understanding of why past mediation efforts have failed can only serve to plan better for the future.

Ethics Approval and Consent to Participate

The study received Institutional Review Board (IRB) approval. All participants in this study signed consent forms prior to conducting the in-depth interviews. Consenting participants were offered the opportunity to withdraw at any stage.

Acknowledgments

The author thanks Ghassan Abumandil, Marwa Farag, Sonia D’Angelo, and Rachel Hatcher for their support. Last, the author is grateful for interviewed participants’ time and willingness to share their knowledge and ideas. Open Access funding provided by the Qatar National Library.

Disclosure Statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Tamer Qarmout

Tamer Qarmout is Assistant Professor in Public Policy and the Program Head of Public Administration Graduate Programs at the Doha Institute for Graduate Studies. Prior to joining academia, Dr Qarmout worked for the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in several management positions. His research focuses on public policy analysis and formulation, institutional reform, foreign aid, and conflict resolution. He also has significant programme management experience dealing with stakeholders in planning and implementing large programmes aimed at building institutional and governance capacities of public and not-for-profit organisations, and post-conflict early recovery and reconstruction schemes. He sits on the Programme and Research Advisory Committee (PRAC) for the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS), and he chairs its working group on ‘Public Administration in Conflict-Affected and Fragile Situations’.

Notes

1 Frode Løvlie. “Questioning the Secular-Religious Cleavage in Palestinian Politics: Comparing Fatah and Hamas,” Politics and Religion 7, no. 1 (2014): 100–121.

2 Zaki Chehab, Inside Hamas: The Untold Story of Militants, Martyrs and Spies (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2007).

3 Mark Muhannad Ayyash, “Hamas and the Israeli State: A ‘Violent Dialogue’,” European Journal of International Relations 16, no. 1 (2010): 103–23.

4 Tareq Baconi, Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance (Stanford University Press, 2018).

5 Baconi, Hamas Contained, 226–27.

6 Ibid.

7 The Quartet is ‘comprised of the European Union, Russia, United Nations, and United States [and] was established in 2002 to facilitate the Middle East Peace Process negotiations’ (‘The Quartet’, UNISPAL, n.d., https://www.un.org/unispal/the-quartet/).

8 Hilal, “Palestinian Political Field,” 24–39.

9 Ibid.

10 Brown, “Religion and Politics.”

11 Qarmout, “Palestinian Split”; Brown, “Religion and Politics”; Baconi, “Demise of Oslo,” 503–20; Sayigh, Armed Struggle, page number; Khalidi, The Hundred Years’ War, page number; Kristianasen, “Challenge and Counterchallenge.”

12 Ageel, “A Palestinian Uprising.”

13 Rieger, Saudi Arabian Foreign Relations, page number.

14 Ibid., 155.

15 IICC, “Initial Analysis.”

16 Seyam, “Continued Failure.”

17 Alsaa, “Sana’a Declaration.”

18 Munayyer, “Prospects for Palestinian Unity,” 21–31.

19 Ibid.

20 Mockli, “Controversial Middle East Policy.”

21 “Swiss Role.”

22 Melhem, “Switzerland Gets Active.”

23 Shaban, “Unlocking the Gaza Strip.”

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid.

27 Ibid.

28 Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille, “Some Conceptual Issues,” 8.

29 Bercovitch, “Understanding Mediation’s Role.”

30 Barbara F. Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton University Press, 2002).

31 Walter, Committing to Peace, 40–43

32 Ibid., 3–4.

33 Kleiboer, “Understanding Success.”

34 Ibid.

35 Bercovitch, “Mediation Success or Failure.”

36 Kleiboer, “Understanding Success.”

37 Bercovitch, “Mediation Success or Failure,” 299.

38 Walter, Committing to Peace, 40–43.

39 Ibid.

40 Ibid., 300.

41 Bercovitch, “Mediation Success or Failure.”

42 Vuković, “International Mediation,” 64.

43 Vuković, “Three Degrees of Success,” 966–76.

44 Walter, Committing to Peace, 40–43.

45 Joffe, “Thematic Analysis.”

46 Tariq Dana, “The Prolonged Decay of the Palestinian National Movement,” National Identities 21, no. 1 (2019): 39–55.

47 Qarmout and Béland, “Politics of International Aid.”

48 El Kurd, Polarized and Demobilized, 1–18.

49 Marten, “Reformed or Deformed.”

50 Bercovith 2005; Kleiboer, “Understanding Success.”

51 Vuković, “International Mediation,” 68.

52 Qarmout, “Palestinian Split.”

53 Baconi, “Demise of Oslo,” 503–20.

54 Ibid.

55 Turner, “Shock and Awe,” 562–77.

56 Qarmout, “Palestinian Split.”

57 Kleiboer, “Understanding Success,” 362.

58 Frei, “Conditions Affecting the Effectiveness,” 67–84; Northedge and Donelan, International Disputes, page number.

59 Edmead, Analysis and Prediction, page number.

60 Vuković, “International Mediation.”

61 Berti, “Non-State Actors,” 9–31.

62 Ibid.

63 “Swiss Role.”

64 Zartman, “Timing of Peace Initiatives,” 8–18; Haass, Beyond the INF Treaty, page number; Haass, Conflicts Unending, page number.

65 Zartman, “Ripeness.”

66 Bercovitch and Gartner, International Conflict Mediation, 137.

67 Wehr and Lederach, “Mediating Conflict.”

68 Kriesberg, “Formal and Quasi-Mediators,” 20.

69 Turner, “Completing the Circle,” 1.

70 Ibid.

71 Tartir, “Securitised Development”; Dana, “The Symbiosis.”

72 Tartir, “Securitised Development.”

73 Ibid.

74 Qarmout, “Palestinian Split.”

75 Walter, Committing to Peace, 40–43.

Appendix 1:

List of participants

Table

Name	Title
Dr. Nafez Yassin Al Madhoun	Secretary General of the Legislative Council of Gaza
Mr. Hijazi Al Qurashi	Advisor to the Chief of the General Personnel Council
Dr. Alaa Aldin Al Rafati	Ministry of Economy in the Gaza Government 2011–2014
Dr. Meriam Abu-Daqa	Member of the Political Bureau of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
Mr. Mohsen Adnan Abu Ramadan	President of the NGOs Network and a member of the Central Council of the PLO
Mr. Wael Baaloucha	Director of the State Transparency Office and the Coalition for Accountability and Integrity Office in Gaza
Mr. Mamoun Bseiso	International finance advisor and a representative of the Kuwait Fund for the Reconstruction of Gaza
Mr. Abdul Rahman Shihab	A leader in the Islamic Jihad Movement and a director of the Atlas Center for Israeli Studies
Dr. Ayed Yaghi	Palestinian National Initiative official in the Gaza Strip and a member of the Central Council of the PLO
Dr. Ahmed Yousef	Member of Hamas’ Political Bureau and Head of the Beit al-Hikma Center, which represents the Foreign Minister of the Hamas Government