“If you kill him, you have got to kill me first”: examining individual and collective loyalties during the Memphis Massacre (1866)

ABSTRACT

Traditionally, examinations of Civil War era loyalty have focused on higher-level loyalties to the Union or Confederacy, conflating loyalty with Unionism. This article takes the Memphis Massacre (1866) and examines the expressions of individual and collective loyalties that took place alongside the violence. Although there have been numerous studies of the Memphis Massacre, they tend to focus on tensions between the city’s Irish and African American population, overlooking the fact that loyalties transcended racial boundaries. Collective and individual loyalties played critical roles during the Massacre, blurring the lines between victim and victimizer, ultimately complicating our understanding of this well-studied event.

KEYWORDS:

• Memphis Massacre (1866)
• reconstruction
• loyalty
• racial violence
• Irish

During the Memphis Massacre of May 1866, a little after midnight, freedman and blacksmith William Coe was locked in the store where he worked. Several Black families in the area had been robbed and Coe was wary of the white mobs combing the area. A few minutes later, three white men broke into the store and began splashing oil over his possessions. Two of the men threatened him but the third defended him, stating Coe was a good worker and he would not allow him to be harmed. As the two men vowed to kill Coe if he identified them, the third man allowed him to collect a pair of shoes, a hat and a coat before the oil-soaked store was set alight. Coe testified to the post-Massacre congressional committee that he was certain the third man had saved him from the murderous designs of the other two whites. Whether he recognized the third man or not is unclear, as his testimony before the committee is tentative. However, it is clear William Coe would almost certainly have been killed had it not been for the third man’s intervention.¹

Coe’s experience represents the life-saving influence individual loyalties exerted during the Memphis Massacre. The benevolence shown to Coe also illustrates what George Rable describes as “a phonier kind of paternalism,” where whites abandoned violence in favor of benevolence and social pressures to influence African Americans.² Studies of Presidential Reconstruction and violence, including those on the Memphis Massacre, have not examined this aspect of white–Black relations.³ Memphis scholars have instead primarily focused on the Irish population’s role in the Massacre, their fractious relations with the city’s Black community and the economic composition of the rioters themselves, amongst other things.⁴ This article accepts that Irish-Black conflict was essential in creating an atmosphere conducive to violence, but focusing solely on the violence overlooks the complexities of the Massacre. Focusing solely on violence, for example, erases the nuances of the statement in this article’s title. When Mary Grady told rioters she would have to be killed before she let them kill her Black tenant, she displayed loyalties which crossed ethnic and racial lines, potentially endangering her and her family.⁵ These collective and individual loyalties, from Mary Grady and many others, exercised both life-saving and violent influences during the Memphis Massacre.

The concept of loyalty has been the topic of several Civil War era historical studies.⁶ Despite their varying foci, these studies tend to reflect contemporary Civil War era obsessions with Unionism, treason, and betrayal, with “loyalty” becoming a synonym for Unionism in many cases. Indeed, the whole concept is boiled down to an individual’s allegiance to the federal government, rather than taking account of the individual as a unique person with unique interpersonal loyalties and relationships. Ultimately, one could show loyalty to the Union, but Unionism was not the full extent of an individual’s or collective’s loyalty. For example, William A. Blair’s 2014 study of treason and loyalty is really a study of national loyalty, rebellious disloyalty, and treason.⁷ Although these studies have advanced our understanding, conflating Unionism and loyalty has created a persistently skewed picture of the era. Granted, loyalty to the federal government did have a tangible impact on southern life during Presidential Reconstruction, but everyday loyalties to friends, neighbors, co-workers, and communities should not be overlooked.

In his study of Presidential Reconstruction, Michael Perman stated “disloyalty … was a relative concept,” as Southerners conceptualized their own loyalty differently to their Northern conquerors and critics.⁸ This study will argue the inverse, that loyalty was a relative concept, being both pragmatic and highly personal to the individual and collective. As will be shown, individual loyalties could override collective loyalties, motivating an individual to go against the collective’s wishes. Philosopher Simon Keller has discussed how a person’s loyalties can take many forms, even going directly against their self-interests in the heat of the moment.⁹ A particular emphasis will be placed on loyalties amongst Memphis’s Irish and Irish-descended community and the white rioters. Ultimately, this article will show that collective ethnic loyalties played a key role in the Massacre, although these could be overruled by individual and personal loyalties. In particular, the actions of the local Pendergrast family will be examined to show how a “New South” mindset emerged directly in the wake of Emancipation. The family acted as “phony paternalists,” blending false kindness with violence to encourage loyalty amongst their neighbors, establish a measure of “mastery” (to quote Kidada E. Williams) over Memphis’s Black population and secure the family’s economic security in the uncertain post-war climate.¹⁰ As Williams has most recently observed, the killing “of enslaved people had been unprofitable” but the targeting of free African Americans presented no such issues and the Pendergrasts sought to strengthen their position in the community using violence.¹¹

In 1866, Memphis’s treasury was practically empty. Debts mounted, and the city entered a recession, only surviving thanks to Northern capital and investment.¹² With this background of looming impoverishment in the wreckage of the former Confederacy, tensions brewed. The Black community of Memphis, including the Black Union troops stationed at Fort Pickering (a former Confederate army base before the city’s wartime capture), had a history of fractious and occasionally violent relations with the city’s Irish population.¹³ From the capture of Memphis by Union forces during the Civil War to April 1866, the Black population had rapidly increased, a Black upper class emerged, and Black schools and churches proliferated.¹⁴ With the economy spiraling toward a depression, the expansion of the Black community and their quest for employment caused considerable alarm amongst the thousands of white refugees and unemployed Irish laborers seeking work.¹⁵ Irish-Black conflict began to expand beyond mere economics and employment as the overwhelmingly Irish police force, with the silent acceptance of the city’s government, “invoked a campaign of revenge” and victimization against the developing Black community.¹⁶

The antagonism erupted into violence on May 1, 1866. After receiving their long-awaited backpay and being mustered out of service, several Black veterans began drinking and celebrating on South Street, the unofficial boundary between white and Black Memphis. For the police, the drunken celebration was rowdy, disorderly, and needed to be dealt with. The police attempted to make arrests but were forced to retreat by the Black veterans, prompting the police to seek reinforcements. When the police returned, there was another confrontation resulting in both sides firing shots. But whilst the veterans fired into the air, the spooked police officers (believing they were under attack) fired into the crowd of veterans, freedwomen, and children gathered in the street.¹⁷

Almost instantaneously, the situation spiraled out of control. The veterans returned to Fort Pickering, where many remained for the duration of the violence, whilst the police headed uptown to gather yet more reinforcements. Rumors and exaggerations raced alongside the retreating police, whipping up tensions and encouraging kneejerk reactions from African Americans and whites.¹⁸ A crowd of whites assembled, attacking freedmen as they left their workplaces in downtown Memphis. After terrorizing the immediate area, the mob headed toward the overwhelmingly Black, and completely unprepared, neighborhood of South Memphis.¹⁹

After an initial thrust into South Memphis, the white mob headed northward, targeting any African Americans they could find. Sometime after 10:00 pm on May 1, the white rioters again swept southwards, and civic and police officials failed to control or calm them.²⁰ Throughout the night assaults, sexual assaults, robberies, and home invasions took place across South Memphis.²¹ The bulk of the mob repeatedly evaded, either intentionally or accidentally, the small number of federal troops sent to patrol South Street. Eventually, the patrols ceased due to a lack of manpower.²²

The following night, May 2, after a daytime lull in violence, the mobs unleashed a new wave of hell on South Memphis. By roughly 2:00 am, the sky was aglow as flames consumed numerous Black houses, businesses, and victims. By daybreak on May 3, no Black churches or schools remained standing.²³ Countless terrified Black civilians sought refuge in Fort Pickering, and the city’s Northern-born population fled to Illinois by riverboat, fearful they would be the next target.²⁴

On May 3, some 40 hours after the violence began, Major General George Stoneman declared martial law and requested federal reinforcements from Nashville. Federal troops patrolled the city streets, and peace was restored.²⁵ The military, the Freedmen’s Bureau, and Congress conducted investigations into the Massacre, providing a grim corpus of reading for contemporaries and historians.²⁶ By the time federal troops retook Memphis, 46 African Americans and two whites lay dead. Seventy-five freedpeople had been injured, five freedwomen had been horrifically assaulted and raped, and estimated property damages amounted to more than $130,000.²⁷

In the aftermath, there were no prosecutions or repercussions for the rioters. On May 4, police fired on several African Americans but no further action was taken. Tennessee’s Metropolitan Police Bill removed the overwhelming majority of police officers and firemen, and during subsequent municipal elections, only the City Treasurer and City Register were re-elected.²⁸ The Irish stranglehold on civic Memphis was over. The Black community rebuilt with northern donations, held dances, and campaigned for equal rights and equal suffrage.²⁹

As a result of several conditions unique to Memphis in 1866, the strong collective loyalty of the city’s Irish population – which would later manifest as violence and defense during the Massacre – was already visible to the city’s other residents. In January 1865, the Tennessee state legislature introduced the Franchise Law. All former Confederates and their sympathizers were disenfranchised, resulting in Memphis’s Irish community assuming near total electoral of the city.³⁰ As such, 56% of the city council, 90% of the police force and 87% of the fire service were Irish. In the 1865 mayoral elections, John Park, Irish himself or of Irish descent, was elected to the mayor’s office with roughly 60% of the vote.³¹ Memphis residents recognized that Irish voters favored Irish candidates, with some Southern whites stating the Irish “clan together more than any people in the world.”³² The collective ethnic loyalty of the Irish was, prior to the Massacre, channeled into controlling Memphis’s civic institutions and leadership positions.³³

However, the nature of Irish loyalty and disproportionate amount of control wielded by the community alienated them from the city’s “native” born or non-Irish immigrant white population. The Irish-controlled police committee reinstated substandard officers following their dismissals without consultation, negotiation, or warning.³⁴ As the city government’s effectiveness declined, many non-Irish Southern whites called for the repeal of the Franchise Law so a more “respectable,” socially responsible (and no doubt, socially acceptable) city government could be elected.³⁵ Die-hard Confederates resented how the Irish community acted during the Union occupation.³⁶ Racism also played a role in non-Irish white hostility to the Irish-led city government. A number of whites regarded the Irish population as “not merely inferior but disgusting,” and several witnesses used offensive physical descriptions and voiced intolerant attitudes when describing the community to the congressional investigators.³⁷ These anti-Irish sentiments had deeper roots than the Irish’s recent electoral control. In mid-1854, a rumor “that several hundred … Irish were destined for Memphis … caused considerable alarm” and the city militia was readied should they be required to maintain order and peace.³⁸ Isolated from the city’s white society, it is unsurprising the Irish community developed such a strong collective loyalty.

Indeed, it should be noted this article discusses an Irish collective loyalty rather than a Confederate collective loyalty. As historian David T. Gleeson has observed in numerous works, the Irish were ambiguous and flexible Confederates. After initial reluctance regarding secession, many Irish enthusiastically supported the cause at the Civil War’s outset, but many were not “willing to sacrifice everything on the altar of the new nation as it disintegrated before their eyes.”³⁹ The Irish were good soldiers but also had higher desertion rates than native southern units, and Irish women on the home front were often unfairly maligned and attacked as failing in their patriotic duties or resorting to criminality.⁴⁰ Gleeson observed, as did Ella Lonn, that Irish Confederates fought to defend their comrades or to prove their manliness, not due to “any deep cultural connection to the” Confederacy, and that, ultimately, the Irish in the South were infinitely more sure of their Irishness than their positions as Confederate nationals.⁴¹ Other scholars have highlighted the prejudice, racism, and exclusion faced by the Irish in America.⁴² No wonder, then, they retained their Irishness even when seeking naturalization.

Contemporaries also perceived the mob and its leaders as Irish rather than as former Confederates. Major General George Stoneman reported to Lieutenant General U. S. Grant that “very few paroled confederates were mixed up with the rioters.”⁴³ Doctor J. N. Sharp and Reverend Ewing O. Tade, amongst others, both emphasized the Irish nature of the rioters, with Tade adding he overheard an Irishman calling for murdering or expelling the Black community entirely.⁴⁴ Earlier violence in Norfolk, Virginia, in mid-April 1866 was explicitly linked to the continued existence of Confederate organizations and gray uniforms were donned by the perpetrators.⁴⁵ In the immediate postwar period, former Rebels donned their Confederate military uniforms out of necessity or to explicitly show others where their allegiance and identity lay, particularly if they felt the freedpeople were threatening the supremacy and power of the white community.⁴⁶ In the various reports and investigations following the Memphis Massacre, the donning of Confederate regalia or the resurrection of Confederate regimental structures were simply not mentioned. Altina Waller identified 41 of the named rioters as serving in 8 Confederate army units, with 15 identified men serving together in John Knox Walker’s Second Infantry and five with Nathan Bedford Forrest, being present or participating in the infamous Fort Pillow Massacre.⁴⁷ And yet, despite this, contemporary eye-witnesses and investigators did not consider this a former Confederate mob, but an Irish mob. Overall, then, although former Confederates encouraged, engaged with and benefitted from the violence in Memphis, and indeed were Irish or of Irish descent themselves, Confederate collective loyalty was not on display. Rather, an Irish collective loyalty, crossing the boundaries of those who had fought the war and those who had lived through it, based on shared culture, history, and religion, shaped the course of the Massacre.

However, although non-Irish white hostility encouraged the development of a strong Irish collective loyalty, it was not responsible for that loyalty manifesting as violence. Rather, increasing competition from a steadily rising population of freedpeople contributed to growing tensions within the city. In 1860, the total white population of Memphis outnumbered the Black (both free and enslaved) by nearly five to one.⁴⁸ By 1870, the white population had increased to 24,755 whilst the Black population ballooned, rising to 15,471.⁴⁹ According to an August 1865 Freedmen’s Bureau census, the Black population of the city was just over 16,500, although it is likely this number rose even more prior to the Massacre as Black rural to urban migration increased.⁵⁰ These drastic demographic shifts could not be overlooked by the city’s residents. In 1860, the white community accounted for 83% of Memphis’s total population, falling to 62% in 1870. In 1866, it is possible the Black population held the majority, a brief but significant reversal in the city’s racial balance.

The Irish community was particularly challenged by the growing Black population. In 1860, one-third of Tennessee’s 12,498 Irish population resided in Memphis, almost a quarter of the city’s total residents and just over a quarter of the city’s white population.⁵¹ By 1870 Tennessee’s Irish population had decreased by roughly 4500.⁵² Due to alterations in census categorization and undercounting, it is not possible to accurately quantify the changes in Memphis’s Irish population. However, as the Irish population of the city was 4159 in 1860, it would be safe to presume the vast bulk of Shelby County’s 1870 population of 3371 Irish migrants resided within Memphis’s limits.⁵³ As such, one could estimate the Irish population of Memphis was somewhere between 3250 and 3750 in 1866.

In 1860, the Irish community outnumbered Memphis’s total Black population by only 200 people. Ten years later, the tables had not merely turned but completely flipped. The Black community vastly outnumbered the Irish community by at least 12,000 individuals. Kathleen C. Berkeley stated that, by 1865, 39% of Memphis’s population was Black, with just under 16,000 freedpeople residing within the city’s limits but an unknown number just outside the city boundary.⁵⁴ By 1866, a mere year later, it is likely the Black community had increased in size yet again as more individuals left the countryside for the economic, social, and security opportunities offered by the city. Aside from these demographic shifts, Emancipation heralded another seismic change. Whereas the only competitors to Irish labor in 1860 had been other whites, Memphis’s post-war labor market was inundated with newly arrived African Americans, challenging Irish dominance in several professions.

Although the influx of freedpeople enabled some social mobility amongst the city’s Irish population, this was not the case for the entire community, and those who were business owners, clerks, and small-scale entrepreneurs had only become upwardly socially mobile relatively recently.⁵⁵ Indeed, Altina Waller’s thorough investigation reveals some 28% of the 68 named rioters could be classed as entrepreneurial, 10% were clerks and 7% were artisans.⁵⁶ However, the vast majority of the Irish community were manual laborers, with a significant proportion living on the cusp of poverty.⁵⁷ In Memphis, many non-Irish whites preferred to hire African Americans rather than Irish workers, meaning household incomes for many working-class Irish families were seriously endangered by the increasing Black population.⁵⁸ As the city’s job market was transformed by the influx of Black labor, Irish community solidarity grew hand in hand with Irish-Black hostility. With such strong community bonds, the Irish who had achieved some level of upward economic mobility were just as threatened by the influx of African Americans as those who were unskilled laborers. The identified rioters might have been higher up the economic and social ladder than their unskilled brethren, but the threat posed by African Americans to the bulk of the Irish community was too large to ignore. Although more prosperous African Americans lobbied the Freedmen’s Bureau to “rid the city of all idle, vagrant freedmen,” Mayor Park’s administration took no action to deal with escalating Irish-Black tensions.⁵⁹ This hostility led insurance agent J. S. Chapin to testify that Irish-Black hostility was more intense in Memphis than in other cities.⁶⁰

In a similar way to Southern whites, some African Americans in Memphis considered themselves superior to the Irish, whilst some Irish considered the Black community to be their “competitor and natural enemy.”⁶¹ As such, economic competition mixed with racial and ethnic prejudices and resulted in violence. As the Irish community was more established and more cohesive compared to the Black community, a strong collective loyalty already existed amongst the community’s members. With such strong connections between community members, collective loyalty was easily channeled into electoral action and, eventually, mass violence. Despite debates surrounding the socio-economic status of the rioters and their sympathizers, as well as their overall aims, it is clear that the majority of the Irish community rallied to avenge real and imagined grievances committed by the freedpeople.⁶² By generally acting as a coherent, focused group, the Irish rioters were able to select victims, evade law enforcement and federal troops when necessary, and prolong violence until federal reinforcements arrived.

When the Irish community’s economic security was threatened, Irish collective loyalties transitioned from politics and municipal control to violence. Altina Waller concluded that the majority of named rioters acted violently to defend their newfound middle-class status. She added that many lived in the neighborhoods most impacted by the Massacre’s violence.⁶³ Although this study concurs, it contends that the existential threat to the entire Irish community posed by the increasing Black population was also a key factor. If the Irish saloon keepers and emerging professional class tended to be leaders amongst the Irish community, it is logical they would act to defend the entire community from threats, not just their own position.⁶⁴ If they failed to address the threat the majority of their own community was facing, were they really worthy leaders of their own people? Could they be trusted to act if another threat reared its head and threatened the community’s economic stability in times of economic crisis? The majority of the Irish community acted cohesively to protect those who were most threatened by the real and perceived economic problems caused by the growing Black population. Furthermore, the presence of Black soldiers and veterans threatened Irish community power and strength within Memphis. Even though the Black population lacked the vote, the soldiers and veterans persistently undermined the Irish community’s strength by resisting arrest, challenging Black mistreatment and protecting the Black community.⁶⁵ As the Irish community’s base was threatened economically and the community’s institutional power within the city power was increasingly challenged, the community’s collective loyalty was channeled into what was rationalized as defensive violence.

Overall, Irish collective loyalties manifested as violence during the Massacre in response to the challenges facing the community in post-Emancipation Memphis. Although the freedpeople posed no threat to Irish political hegemony, the economic implications of Black migration and the implications of Black resistance were enough of a threat to cause violence. As enough of the Irish community felt threatened, collective loyalties shifted from providing political support to supporting and perpetrating violence against African Americans. Ultimately, the exclusion and vilification of the Irish by white Memphis led to community isolation and introspection, strengthening the already robust connections and loyalties between community members. When it seemed as if the community’s economic, social and political stability was threatened, the community rallied to defend itself, using violence to reassert its position and deter future challenges.

Despite the undeniable strength of collective ethnic loyalties during the Massacre, individual loyalties remained highly influential. Altina Waller has suggested that “[c]lass and personal familiarity took precedence over race” during the violence.⁶⁶ However, despite Waller’s assertion, individual loyalties (Waller’s “personal familiarity”) took precedence over both race and class in motivating individual action. After all, even the poorest white was socially, economically, and politically stronger than the wealthiest African American. Individual loyalties, in many cases, took precedence over collective loyalties. As will be seen, individual loyalties motivated protective interventions even if those expressing those loyalties risked their own lives. For example, when Irish grocer, dance hall operator, and landlady Mary Grady saw “thirty or forty policemen and citizens” abusing her Black tenant David Smith, she physically interposed herself between the mob and Smith, telling the rioters they would only be able to kill Smith if she was killed too.⁶⁷ Grady allowed her loyalty to Smith to place her in harm’s way, completely eclipsing any collective ethnic loyalty she might have felt to the rioters. Unsurprisingly, individual loyalties were unique to the individual, and it is possible those who intervened on behalf of one person might not have intervened for another. Individual loyalties manifested themselves in numerous ways, from upholding oaths to protective interventions and the dispensing of warnings, to the concealment of the endangered. Whilst the manifestation of individual loyalties did directly save lives, they also placed the individuals expressing them into harm’s way.

Loyalty to their oaths of office motivated both Sheriff T. M. Winters and Police Chief Garrett’s actions during the Massacre. Both men attempted, albeit sporadically, to carry out their roles as law enforcement officers during the violence. When Winters first arrived in South Memphis, he cautioned a group of whites to refrain from violent action, stating he “was there as an officer of the peace, and would arrest any man who made [a] disturbance.” Further, Winters threatened rowdy police officers with arrest if they became violent.⁶⁸ On several occasions, he ordered belligerent whites to leave South Memphis and intervened to protect freedpeople from the mob. Freedman Asbury Gibbons credited Winters with saving his life in this manner.⁶⁹

Similarly, Chief Garrett intervened several times to save individuals from the rioters. He told military investigators he frequently rallied officers, marched them to South Memphis and had to repeat the process multiple times as officers continually abandoned their posts.⁷⁰ Doctors Robert McGowan and J. N. Sharp (who both sheltered and protected freedmen) were protected by Garrett on May 1.⁷¹ The two men were surrounded in McGowan’s store by a crowd. McGowan was called a “damned Yankee” before Sharp was dragged outside and threatened by a police officer.⁷² Sharp implored another officer to defend them, asking “if he was going to stand still and see” the two men “murdered right under his eyes.” The officer hurried away and returned with Garrett, who promptly ordered the men be released and left alone.⁷³ Both men believed Garrett was directly responsible for saving their lives.⁷⁴ Garrett was similarly active elsewhere. Doctor Charles S. Lloyd saw Garrett chastising officers for opening fire and failing “to keep the peace.”⁷⁵ Others testified that Garret had ordered the arrest of an armed and drunk white, promised to defend property, and intervened to protect freedmen from the mob and heavily armed officers. In one instance, aided by a former Confederate army surgeon, he defended a severely wounded freedman from his own officers.⁷⁶

Winters’s and Garrett’s actions reflect their loyalty to their roles. Although criticism can, and has, been leveled at both men for avoiding direct confrontations with the mob, they cannot be criticized for attempting to honor their oaths in the face of danger.⁷⁷ Both attempted to maintain peace, Garrett more so than Winters, but their cowardice and reluctance to confront the rioters undermined their efforts. Ultimately, neither man did everything in their power to arrest those involved nor to maintain a secure perimeter in South Memphis. Despite their failure, their loyalty to their oaths should not be overlooked as both men could easily have remained completely inactive or joined the rioters as some civic officials did.⁷⁸

Although the overwhelming majority of the police force was Irish, and although numerous individuals testified to the criminal and murderous conduct of police officers, individual loyalties often sidelined officers’ collective loyalty to the wider Irish community.⁷⁹ Indeed, several officers intervened to protect freedpeople during the Massacre. Officer McGinn rescued a freedwoman and her children from a burning house, stating he could personally vouch for the family’s decency. Freedwoman Hannah Robinson was robbed by a crowd of men, but Officer Roach prevented them from torching her home. Mollie Davis and Ellen Brown received word from Officer Clark that another police officer, John Egan, was determined to kill Mollie for suing him. Clark’s warning allowed both women to reach safety.⁸⁰ Freedwoman Hannah Savage and her husband were warned to seek shelter by Captain Parry as he knew they would be in danger if they remained out in the open.⁸¹ Mathilda Hawley overheard several officers ordering a mob to move on because they had personally promised to ensure a certain neighborhood was protected from destruction.⁸² When Shedrick Riley’s arresting officers turned on him, the stationhouse keeper intervened to ensure his safety.⁸³

Other individuals protected endangered citizens across the city too. Several individuals testified to receiving warnings they would be in danger if discovered by the rioters.⁸⁴ Davis T. Egbert was warned by both his landlord (A. N. Edmunds) and a local grocer (John Metcalf) he was in danger. Egbert believed he was warned out of friendship rather than malice.⁸⁵ Lawyer Barbour Lewis warned any African American he encountered to seek shelter immediately after he witnessed the extent of violence in South Memphis.⁸⁶ Manifestations of individual loyalty were not limited to warnings as many white citizens directly intervened to save lives too. During the post-Massacre investigations, many citizens testified to intervening or witnessing interventions during the violence.⁸⁷

Landlords and employers played a critical role in defending their Black tenants and employees. John Hollywood, Mary Grady and Mrs. S. Cooper all defended their tenants, one way or another, from the mob.⁸⁸ After an Irish woman, Mrs. Diggins, threatened to inform the police freedman Frank Lee was lodging with a white woman, the latter arranged for him to shelter with a white family to keep him out of harm’s way.⁸⁹ French Canadian Joseph Pigeon sheltered “five or six” of his Black employees, believing they were safer in the family cellar than in their own homes.⁹⁰ Lawyer and former slaveowner Treadwell S. Ayers stated he, and other former slaveholders, sheltered numerous freedpeople throughout the violence.⁹¹ Freedwoman Ann George worked and cooked for the Irish Wilson family. She confided to Mr. Wilson she was considering moving away after several shanties in her neighborhood had been destroyed. Wilson assured her she was in “no danger” because he was one of the arsonists and had made sure her home was spared. In the short period between the Massacre and the commencement of the congressional investigation, the Wilson family moved to Louisiana and assured Ann, should they return, they would not hesitate to employ her again. Ann told congressional investigators she would never work for people who talked so calmly about destruction ever again.⁹²

Even though numerous individuals, both police and citizen, dispensed warnings and intervened on behalf of imperiled Black and white Memphians, intervention was not without its hazards. Doctors McGowan and Sharp, and Mary Grady, all intervened to defend freedpeople and found themselves in danger until men of authority intervened on their behalf.⁹³ When William Brazier and John Oldridge surveyed the violence and voiced their opposition, they found themselves isolated amongst a hostile mob. The crowd reminded Brazier to be mindful of his own safety whilst Oldridge was advised to stay close to those who knew him to ensure his protection.⁹⁴ When William B. Hood attempted to defend three of his Black employees from a group of firemen, he was struck in the head.⁹⁵

Officer George McGinn told freedman Adam Lock defying the mob was dangerous. McGinn, John Callahan, and a crowd of white men torched several houses in Lock’s neighborhood. When they torched his home, Lock demanded an explanation and McGinn replied “he was compelled to do so or be shot himself.” Lock’s affidavit suggests McGinn and Callahan were leading the arsonists, yet McGinn was sure the crowd would kill him if he attempted to stop them.⁹⁶ Although it is likely McGinn was merely lying, it seems strange he would defend his actions to a freedman when the various mobs had encountered little to no resistance. Other rioters defended the violence as a necessary evil rather than presenting themselves as unwilling participants as McGinn had.⁹⁷

Individual loyalties, whether amongst the police or citizenry, were influential and saved numerous lives. For Winters and Garrett, their loyalties to their oaths of office motivated their attempts to restore peace in South Memphis, even if they repeatedly failed. For Memphis’s police officers and citizenry, intervening to protect specific people, sheltering freedpeople, and providing warnings all revealed individual loyalties to onlookers, sometimes endangering those who expressed them. This raises the question of why people expressed their individual loyalties when there was significant personal risk. Although it would be tempting to suggest individual loyalties are manifestations of a person’s morality, that would be too simplistic. Philosopher Simon Keller has convincingly argued that loyalty and morality tend to be disconnected from one another. Rather, quirks and one-time whims have great control over the expression or suppression of loyalties. Indeed, Keller has shown that people’s loyalties can make them act against their own self-interest depending on a range of factors.⁹⁸

In the case of the Memphis Massacre, the manifestations of individual loyalties generally went against personal self-interests. Although interventions by landlords and employers all reflect some level of self-interest, challenging a volatile and violent mob contradicts all self-preservation impulses. Mary Grady, for example, endangered her own life to protect her tenant, a tenant who was almost certainly replaceable given the ongoing influx of Black migrants. Instead, her actions and the actions of other landlords and employers suggest a loyalty beyond the convenience of economics. That said, their actions could reflect an ingrained paternalistic attitude toward those they intervened to protect. It is possible individual loyalties, strong enough to briefly set an officer or citizen against the collective, were based on a blend of personal attachment and paternalistic notions of guidance and protection. In others, interventions could merely have been spur-of-the-moment whims. Regardless, personal loyalties, no matter what their motivations or expressions, placed individuals directly into danger’s path and should not be overlooked.

Unlike those mentioned above, paternalism and self-interest influenced the actions of one Irish family, the Pendergrasts, to a much greater degree, shaping their decisions, the fates of their victims, and (at times) the direction of the Memphis Massacre itself. For the Pendergrasts, loyalty and potential loyalty were a commodity to be used and exploited. The family ran a grocery store near South Street, on the edge of predominately Black South Memphis. Son John owned and ran the grocery store, but his brother Patrick (sometimes referred to as “Pat”) and father Michael Pendergrast (repeatedly referred to as “Old Man” Pendergrast) were known to both white and Black Memphis.⁹⁹ The family’s actions are worthy of discussion because they are so inconsistent, diverging from benevolent protection to active violence. Indeed, James Gilbert Ryan regarded John Pendergrast as “one of the most sadistic members of the crowd.”¹⁰⁰ In February 1866, John had confronted a gang of uniformed African American men breaking into his grocery store and hounded them away with pistol fire. The incident left John “deeply suspicious of black men in groups” and he was always well armed from then on.¹⁰¹ The family’s actions, as will be seen, reflected their economic self-interest and their aim to control the Black community through expressions of phony paternalism and outright violence.

On several occasions, the Pendergrasts protected their Black neighbors from the mob and intervened on behalf of an endangered white at least once. When Mary Grady confronted the mob, it was Patrick Pendergrast who broke the stalemate. Patrick sent the crowd on their way, promising the Gradys and their tenants they would not be harmed.¹⁰² Patrick’s intervention diffused the situation, though his motivation is a little puzzling. Grady’s business would, most likely, have been in competition with the Pendergrasts’ grocery. The Pendergrasts could not have expected the Gradys to merely fall under their control as part of a quasi-dependent community. Perhaps Patrick’s actions reflected a genuine personal loyalty to the Gradys, a random whim he acted on, or maybe even some notion of chivalry. However, Mary’s business was “a favourite spot for black soldiers,” centering her as a visible – and presumably popular – figure in the Black community.¹⁰³ Potentially, then, Patrick’s actions reflected a degree of personal loyalty but also a recognition that protecting the Gradys would reflect well on him amongst the Black community.

During the Massacre, freedman Henry Porter and his family saw flames rising into the air and went out to ascertain whether their own home was in any danger. The Pendergrasts’ grocery store was opposite Porter’s home so he asked the men gathered at the store whether his family would be safe. They assured him they would, prompting the Porters to return home as flames devoured their neighbors’ properties.¹⁰⁴ When a large group of men came to freedman Thomas Moseby’s home, he managed to flee and hide nearby. After the group departed, he returned home. The mob returned and mistook Moseby for a different man. A number of men drew their pistols and, as Moseby pleaded for mercy, Officer Callahan demanded they kill him. John and Patrick Pendergrast intervened, telling the crowd Moseby was “a good boy and one of the best neighbors” the family had. Despite Callahan’s protests, Moseby was spared.¹⁰⁵ Freedwoman Cynthia Townsend was also informed by one of the Pendergrasts she would be safe because he could personally vouch for her.¹⁰⁶ These protective actions mirror those of other whites during the Massacre. What sets the Pendergrasts’ actions apart is that these protective, almost honorable, acts were often juxtaposed and combined with acts of extreme violence and aggression.

The Pendergrasts played a key role in the Massacre practically from the outset. On May 1, Penny LeMier saw John Pendergrast pass her home with his pistol drawn and followed him out of curiosity. As she watched, he calmly shot and killed a Black soldier. Minutes later, Black soldier Corporal John Robinson fled into the street to escape two other white men. When he was close enough, Pendergrast shot him then beat him over the head with his pistol. After Pendergrast left the area, LeMier hurried over to Robinson only to find he was already dead.¹⁰⁷ On the same day, freedman and discharged soldier James Cannon Mitchell saw John Pendergrast on Rayburn Avenue and – along with several other witnesses – watched as Pendergrast mistakenly shot and killed a white fireman. Pendergrast paused, declared he had mistaken the white man for a “yellow” freedman and then departed, leaving the man’s body in the street.¹⁰⁸ After leaving the body, he called to a Black soldier fleeing the area and promised not to hurt him. When the soldier was close enough, Pendergrast shot and killed him.¹⁰⁹ Later the same evening, Lucy Tibbs saw a group of whites, including John Pendergrast, shoot and kill four Black soldiers.¹¹⁰

The following day and night, the Pendergrasts continued to play a prominent role in the ongoing violence and illegal activity. “Old Man” Pendergrast assisted a police officer in stabling a stolen mule moments after the officer had murdered a soldier in the street.¹¹¹ Freedwoman Henrietta Cole was robbed of $75 worth of clothes by all three Pendergrasts and a large party of men.¹¹² Freedman Henry Porter witnessed many of the Pendergrasts’ actions on the night of May 2. Just before dawn, Porter saw a large group of men gathering on the Pendergrasts’ property before encircling a nearby Black residence. As Porter watched, three women and several children escaped from the house and fled through the crowd. Patrick Pendergrast spun and fired wildly at them, hitting one of the women in the arm and breaking his pistol in the process. He quickly replaced his weapon and continued to fire. Once the terrified women and their children were out of range, “Old Man” Pendergrast and Patrick led the crowd in torching the now empty building.¹¹³

On the following night, Porter watched as “Old Man” Pendergrast and Patrick began indiscriminately torching nearby Black-owned or occupied buildings. As they set an old freedman’s house alight and the man fled, young freedwoman, neighbor, and promising scholar Rachel Hatcher attempted to save some of the man’s belongings.¹¹⁴ “Old Man” Pendergrast shot her in the mouth, killing her. Within minutes, the flames spread to Rachel’s home and reduced her corpse to ashes. The Pendergrasts prevented all attempts to save the houses and departed when only blackened ruins remained.¹¹⁵ Cynthia Townsend saw one of the Pendergrasts attempt to trap a freedwoman and her son in a burning house. The imperiled mother and son were spared when Officer McGinn intervened to vouch for the woman. The pair were permitted to run to safety, leaving their home and possessions to burn. Tragically, others were not so lucky and were killed in the blazes set by the family and their followers.¹¹⁶ These acts of wanton brutality show the extent to which the apparently benevolent Pendergrasts contributed to the murders of soldiers, the torching of houses, and the hounding of freedwomen and children. Moreover, it is clear the Pendergrasts were not mere participants swept up in the fevered frenzy of the Massacre but calculating leaders.

The crowd of arsonists had all been drinking at the family’s store before carrying out their deadly work, with the Pendergrasts keeping them well-stocked with ammunition and alcohol throughout the Massacre.¹¹⁷ Cynthia Townsend later expressed her shock at hearing the family boast of rallying the mob as they had been well regarded by the Black community.¹¹⁸ Despite being protected by John and Patrick, Thomas Moseby was robbed by whites being led by the two men in the first place.¹¹⁹ Lucy Tibbs told Bureau investigators Officer Roach fired the Massacre’s first shot near the family’s grocery store. She swore John Pendergrast “stated that he was the man that brought the mob there, and if the colored people behaved themselves, he would take them away again.”¹²⁰ Even after the violence ended, the Pendergrasts threatened violence in an attempt to control the freedpeople. Tibbs, who impressed the congressional committee “with the truth and fairness of her testimony” as well as her intelligence, told the committee the Pendergrasts had threatened to kill her should she testify at the congressional hearing.¹²¹ Before the committee arrived, John and Patrick both went into hiding and “Old Man” was arrested for concealing their whereabouts, perhaps emboldening Lucy to testify before the committee knowing the family could not reach her as easily.¹²²

However, despite assertions that the Pendergrasts rallied and led the mob, it would be inaccurate to suggest they were in control of the situation. Both Cynthia Townsend and Mary Grady were robbed and abused by rioters after the Pendergrasts assured them of their safety.¹²³ Although the family were influential leaders during the violence, their influence and control did not extend far beyond their grocery store or personal presence. When they did not exercise a direct, in-person presence in an area, other groups committed their own depredations in ignorance of the family’s promises. Scholars have noted that city-wide disturbances are really multiple neighborhood disturbances with little to no communication between rioting groups. As such, each group remains ignorant of activities in other neighborhoods unless two groups cross paths.¹²⁴ Altina Waller has highlighted that the violence in Memphis was practically concentrated in one neighborhood, with very little spillover to other areas. Waller also highlighted that, of the 68 rioters she successfully identified, almost a third lived in the areas where violence was most intense.¹²⁵ Despite this, as groups moved around the area, whether hostile, neutral or endangered, it would have been difficult, if not impossible, to communicate with other groups in the area. The Pendergrasts may have held considerable influence over their immediate vicinity, but their assurances meant nothing outside this limited zone of control.

Within their immediate neighborhood and zone of control, the Pendergrasts blended benevolence and violence to project their authority and construct a quasi-dependent community. To say the Pendergrasts were acting with true benevolence toward their African American neighbors would be inaccurate. Rather, they defended the freedpeople they thought they could control, perhaps deliberately ensuring those they protected recognized and appreciated who had protected them. Indeed, when John and Patrick Pendergrast intervened to protect Thomas Moseby, they referred to him as “a good boy” in the same way one would refer to a well-behaved and obedient dog.¹²⁶ The family felt no loyalty to Moseby – he was robbed by the two brothers and their cronies after all – but rather saw him as obedient and therefore malleable to their designs. If Moseby was spared, he might patronize the family store to show his gratitude, defend them in conversation or speak highly of them in the Black community. Moseby’s treatment falls between the benevolence shown to the Porters and the threats communicated to Lucy Tibbs. The family blended the two, benevolence and violence, whenever it suited them best. In Moseby’s case this resulted in a violent home invasion and robbery followed by direct protection from death; aggression followed by benevolence.

George C. Rable has termed this kind of behavior “a phonier kind of paternalism” as whites perceived themselves to still be essential figures of education, guidance, and protection in the Black community even after Emancipation. However, the phony paternalists came to favor using acts of false kindness and social force rather than violent compulsion.¹²⁷ How do we account for the Pendergrasts’ violent action as well as their apparent benevolence? It seems wise to divide phony paternalism into two categories – soft phony paternalism and hard phony paternalism. Soft phony paternalism was the kind of behavior described by Rable, compulsion and social force, often in the home or business, a non-violent but present expression of white supremacism. Hard phony paternalism incorporates violent action. In a way, hard phony paternalism was expressed when soft phony paternalism stopped being effective; when the benevolent could be benevolent no more, the apparently reasonable man reasonable no longer. Soft phony paternalism worked domestically, while hard phony paternalism was a reaction to the sectional, political, economic and social pressures of the world outside. As Hannah Rosen highlighted, many of the Massacre’s perpetrators and victims lived side by side, and the Pendergrasts took advantage of this situation.¹²⁸ They acted benevolently to some but unleased violence and destruction against others. In doing so, the family demonstrated the benefits of their patronage to the freedpeople. In the maelstrom of the Massacre, it must have seemed to the freedpeople their only guarantee of safety was dependence, deference, and loyalty to the Pendergrast family.

By taking an active and visible role in the Massacre, the Pendergrasts were sending a clear message they were not to be disrespected, underestimated, or crossed. The Porters were never disturbed, yet their neighbors were terrorized, burned out of their homes, and (in some cases) murdered by the Pendergrasts and their allies. It would not be unreasonable to presume the Porters and other surviving neighbors may have looked upon the situation and convinced themselves only loyalty and deference to the family would ensure their future safety. By casting themselves in the dual role of protector and vanquisher, the Pendergrasts were able to sow the seeds of both hope and terror amongst the Black community.

By taking a considered approach to violence and mercy, the Pendergrasts were attempting to develop a deferent community that could be exploited for their own gain. The family channeled their personal family loyalty and ambitions into laying the foundations of their economic future. Indeed, scholars have emphasized how New South boosters preached that there was opportunity around every corner. Although the family’s actions took place long before boosters such as Henry W. Grady gave speeches, they were still using their family loyalty to take advantage of an opportunity to line their own pockets.¹²⁹ Planters might have required workers, but the family required customers. By using their connections to the Irish community in Memphis and funneling these ethnic loyalties and solidarities into targeted action, the Pendergrasts were able to successfully cast themselves as vanquishers and protectors, selecting who was useful and who was undesirable. In this way, by attempting to create a loyal, fearful, quasi-dependent community of freedpeople in the immediate neighborhood, the Pendergrasts were planning for the future of their business and their family. There was no guarantee the Black community would fall under the family’s influence, but by targeting “troublesome” African Americans and protecting those whom the family already interacted with, there was a possibility a sense of loyalty – even if based on fear – could be fostered. By the end of May, when it became clear there were going to be no repercussions for the rioters, John was back working at the grocery store, once again rubbing shoulders with freedpeople he had terrorized and spared in equal measure.¹³⁰ We can only speculate what reactions were to his return amongst the Black and Northern population.

The family’s loyalty to itself, and to their business, as well as their attempts to create a quasi-dependent community through various means, are unique compared to other individual and collective actions in this study. Although self-interest certainly motivated some landlords and employers, none blended their benevolence with outright violence. The family used their position within the Irish community to coordinate violence against the freedpeople whilst at the same time constructing a system of patronage and protection throughout their immediate neighborhood. C. Vann Woodward has commented that shopkeepers were often perceived as sober and decorous, and yet still operated in a society pervaded by violence, and Gaines M. Foster has also discussed how shopkeepers and small businessmen “became increasingly influential” as the South developed throughout the latter nineteenth century.¹³¹ The family embraced “the tenets of the marketplace” whilst simultaneously drawing on the South’s tradition of white supremacist violence to further their aims and hopefully build a loyal, financially beneficial community.¹³² Indeed, aside from the violence and protection during the Massacre, the threats made toward Lucy Tibbs were also attempts to coerce and force Black individuals to conform to the family’s wishes. If she had, she would have become part of the Pendergrasts’ constructed community out of fear for her life. Tibbs’s removal, either through flight or death, would have strengthened the family’s position by reaffirming their dual position within the neighborhood. For many, it would have confirmed that only compliance and deference to the Pendergrasts guaranteed safety.

The manifestations of loyalty shown by the Pendergrasts are by far the most calculated and nuanced of all the loyalties shown during the Massacre. Their actions suggest the family perceived Emancipation as an economic opportunity, allowing them to expand their client base whilst also allowing them to wield power over the Black community in a way previously unavailable to them. Therefore, the Pendergrasts’ loyalty was primarily to their own family and their business, and then to their ethnic group. Their neighbors, and many of their Irish brethren, were mere pawns in their long-term strategy.

Overall, the Irish population of Memphis acted in a largely cohesive and focused manner. The vast majority of the Irish police force and fire service joined the ranks of the rioters, often playing key roles in the violence. Considering the hostility from both American and non-Irish immigrant whites and African Americans toward the Irish community, as well as the strong bonds of shared culture and history, the strong ethnic loyalty binding the Irish community is unsurprising. Furthermore, the increasing economic competition and positional challenges from the growing black population resulted in the Irish community’s adoption of a defensive stance, allowing them to channel their loyalty into focused attacks.

However, the Irish community’s collective loyalty was not strong enough to prevent individual loyalties and self-interests from manifesting. Individual officers intervened to protect freedpeople, neighborhoods, and property whilst elsewhere, non-Irish whites also endangered themselves to protect the imperiled. The Pendergrasts’ actions throughout the Massacre showed their self-interest and individual loyalties. The family used their position within the Irish community to coordinate violence, terrorizing and protecting in equal measure to construct a potentially financially beneficial quasi-dependent community within their immediate neighborhood. Even the post-Massacre threats made by the family were attempts to better assert control over the Black community and to reinforce their self-image as vanquisher-protectors.

Unsurprisingly, then, the Pendergrasts’ actions and loyalties are the most calculated, nuanced (and perhaps the most interesting) shown during the Memphis Massacre. Although, traditionally, the emergence of the marketplace, merchants, and entrepreneurs has been seen as a post-Reconstruction occurrence, the Pendergrasts exhibited the same market-oriented, white supremacist traits. The Pendergrasts represent the transition of old to new, the murky mid-point between the immediate post-war South and the post-Reconstruction New South. Even as phony paternalists, they used calculated benevolence with terroristic violence. They were businessmen, interested in customers and economic gain as much as they were interested in exercising a level of control over the Black community, no matter the cost in property or lives. They recognized Emancipation as an opportunity to wield power over the Black community in a way that was previously unavailable. Both protectors and destroyers, the family bridged the point between Old South violent control and New South paternalistic benevolence. Whilst the nature of loyalty drove some individuals to risk their lives in the protection of others, the Pendergrasts utilized collective and individual loyalties, blending old methods with new mindsets, in pursuit of prosperity in the ruins of the economically fragile post-war South.

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Additional information

Notes on contributors

Lewis Kimberley

Lewis Kimberley was awarded his PhD in January 2024 by Northumbria University for his work examining the relationship between rumors and racial violence in the United States from the Civil War to the Great War. His MA dissertation won the British American Nineteenth Century Historians’ Peter J. Parish Prize in 2019, and this article has been adapted from this work. Kimberley is the first Parish Prize winner from a New University, and the first Northumbria History student to have been awarded, and completed, a PhD funded by AHRC’s Northern Bridge Consortium. He currently works as a Senior Research Assistant in Humanities at Northumbria University.

Notes

1 Testimony of William Coe, U.S. House of Representatives, House Report No. 101, 39th Congress, 1st Session, 1866 (Washington, DC: 1866), hereafter MRaM.

2 Rable, Civil Wars, 258–9.

3 For examples, see Rable, But There Was No Peace; Carter, When the War was Over; McKitrick, Andrew Johnson; Hope Franklin, Reconstruction; Rosen, Terror; Egerton, Wars of Reconstruction; Foner, Reconstruction; Fitzgerald, Splendid Failure; Hollandsworth, An Absolute Massacre.

4 See Lovett, “Memphis Riots”; Holmes, “Underlying Causes”; Gilbert Ryan, “Memphis Riots”; Holmes, “Effects”; Walker, “White Man’s Day”; Ash, Massacre; Waller, “Community”; Hardwick, “Dead and Damned”; Carriere, “Irresponsible Press.”

5 Testimony of Mary Grady, MRaM, 187.

6 For examples, see Mathisen, “Freedpeople”; Storey, Loyalty; Nagler, “Loyalty and Dissent”

7 Blair, With Malice Toward Some.

8 Perman, Reunion Without Compromise, 149.

9 Keller, Limits of Loyalty, VII, 16.

10 Rable, Civil Wars, 258–9; Williams, I Saw Death Coming, XVI.

11 Williams, I Saw Death Coming, XVII.

12 Holmes, “Underlying Causes,” 202–3.

13 See Lovett, “Memphis Riots”; Holmes, “Underlying Causes”; Walker, “White Man’s Day”; Hardwick, “Dead and Damned.”

14 Lovett, “Negro’s Civil War,” 39; Lovett, “Memphis Riots,” 12–13; Rable, But There Was No Peace, 33; Berkeley, “Like a Plague of Locusts,” 168–169 and 173–4.

15 Lovett, “Memphis Riots,” 13.

16 Ibid., 18.

17 Ash, Massacre, 97–8; Lovett, “Memphis Riots,” 20–21.

18 Ash, Massacre, 98–9; Hardwick, “Dead and Damned,” 119–20; Gilbert Ryan, “Memphis Riots,” 247–8.

19 Ash, Massacre, 100–2.

20 Ibid., 124–5; Gilbert Ryan, “Memphis Riots,” 250–2; Walker, “White Man’s Day,” 41.

21 For a detailed exploration of the specific events of the riot, see Ash, Massacre.

22 Ash, Massacre, 145.

23 Lovett, “Memphis Riots,” 23; Gleeson, Irish in the South, 177; Ash, Massacre, 153.

24 Ash, Massacre, 162–4.

25 Gilbert Ryan, “Memphis Riots,” 251–2; Ash, Massacre, 163.

26 The testimony and affidavits collected by the military commission is compiled in MRaM. Affidavits collected by the Freedmen’s Bureau will hereafter be listed as FBA, with some transcribed affidavits from Freedmen’s Bureau Online referred to as FBO. Full links will be provided in the bibliography.

27 Rable, But There Was No Peace, 39; Gilbert Ryan, “Memphis Riots,” 243; Holmes, “Underlying Causes,” 195; Holmes, “Effects,” 58.

28 Holmes, “Effects,” 66–9.

29 Lovett, “Memphis Riots,” 30–1.

30 Hahn, A Nation Under Our Feet, 103–4; Ash, Massacre, 59.

31 MRaM, 369, 371; Testimony of Lewis R. Richards, MRaM, 210; Testimony of Martin Gridley, MRaM, 299; Testimony of Channing Richards, MRaM, 310–1; Gleeson, Irish in the South, 178; Lovett, “Memphis Riots,” 18; Holmes, “Underlying Causes,” 198–9; Walker, “White Man’s Day,” 37; Berkeley, “Like a Plague of Locusts,” 319, 328. Between 1865 and 1869, of the 19 men elected to a municipal office within Memphis, just over 42% were foreign born, 21% northern born and just under 39% native born southerners, see Berkeley, “Like a Plague of Locusts,” 328. For more on Irish political engagement, see Shannon, American Irish.

32 See the testimonies of John Martin (136–7), Charles S. Cameron (283–6) and Martin Gridley (298–9) in MRaM; Testimony of William F. Irwin, MRaM, 132. Matthew Frye Jacobson has highlighted that ethnic homogeneity easily transformed into decisive political control and influence, see Frye Jacobson, Barbarian Virtues, 183–4.

33 For more on the Irish involvement with civic institutions and politics both in Memphis and elsewhere in the United States, see Walker, “White Man’s Day”; Shannon, American Irish; Gleeson, Irish in the South.

34 Testimony of B. G. Garrett, MRaM, 327.

35 Testimony of Ira Stanbrough, MRaM, 245; Testimony of Treadwell S. Ayers, MRaM, 286; Testimony of Henry G. Smith, MRaM, 295. Dennis C. Rousey observed that, as policing was a low-skill occupation, it attracted low-skilled Irish immigrants, who then worked together to tighten their control over the system to ensure their employment was safe. As such, Memphis’s civic institutions were perceived as deteriorating as the Irish consolidated their control. See Rousey, Policing the Southern City.

36 Gleeson, “Irish Rebels, Southern Rebels,” 146–7.

37 Ash, Massacre, 37; See the testimonies of Ellen Dilts (63–7), John E. Moller (86–7) and William F. Irwin (130–3) in MRaM for examples. John Higham has also discussed how the Irish were looked down upon as “rowdy ne-er-do-wells, impulsive, quarrelsome, drunken and threadbare,” see Higham, Strangers, 26. For more on the problem of whiteness facing Irish immigrants in the US, see Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White; Roediger, Wages of Whiteness; Frye Jacobson, Whiteness.

38 Berkeley, “Like a Plague of Locusts,” 22.

39 Gleeson, The Green and the Gray, 146; Gleeson, “Irish Civilians,” 147–8.

40 Gleeson, The Green and the Gray, 141–5, 221; Gleeson, “Faugh a Ballagh!,” 157; Lonn, Foreigners, 55, 92, 228–4; Gleeson, “Irish Civilians,” 145–8.

41 Gleeson, The Green and the Gray, 221–2; Lonn, Foreigners, 92. For more on why men fought the Civil War, see McPherson, For Cause and Comrades.

42 See Higham, Strangers; Ignatiev, How the Irish Became White; Roediger, Wages of Whiteness; Gossett, Race; Frye Jacobson, Whiteness; Shannon, American Irish; Kenny, American Irish; Walker, “White Man’s Day”; Berkeley, “Like a Plague of Locusts.”

43 U.S. House of Representatives, House Executive Document No. 122, 39th Congress, 1st Session (Washington, DC: 1866), 3. Hereafter RaM.

44 Testimony of J. N. Sharp, MRaM, 157; Testimony of Reverend Ewing O. Tade, MRaM, 89. See also the testimonies of William H. Brazier (118–21), Vesta E. Littlefield (135–6), Charles W. Anderson (170–1), Frances Thompson (196–7), Matthew Wardlaw (233–4), Treadwell S. Ayers (285–6) and L. J. Du Pre (303–5) in MRaM; Affidavit of Silas S. Garrett, FBO; Wells Brown, Negro in the American Rebellion, 349–50; Ewing O. Tade’s edited letter in Richardson, “Memphis Race Riot,” 64. Stephen Ash has also commented on the fact southern-born whites did not join the rioters in significant numbers, even if they were sympathetic. See Ash, Massacre, 192.

45 U.S. Senate, Senate Document No. 209, 57th Congress, 2nd Session (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1903), 108–9. For more on violence in Norfolk, see Rable, But There Was No Peace; Wertenbaker and Schlegal, Norfolk; Parramore et al., Norfolk; Hammond Moore, “Norfolk Riot”; Newby, All Before Them; Meek Hennessey, Live and Die in Dixie.

46 Cimbala, Veterans, 96–7.

47 Waller, “Community,” 240.

48 Population of the United States in 1860, 467. Hereafter US Census 1860.

49 A Compendium of the Ninth Census, 338. Hereafter US Census 1870.

50 Lovett, “Memphis Riots,” 10.

51 US Census 1860, XXIX, XXXII; Berkeley, “Like a Plague of Locusts,” 23.

52 US Census 1870, 396.

53 US Census 1860, XXXII; US Census 1870, XVIII. In the 1870 Census, “Great Britain and Ireland” replaced all other categories covering the British Isles. It is also estimated that the 1870 Census missed as many as 1.26 million people in the South alone, and newspapers in Memphis estimated that at least half of the city’s residents had gone uncounted. See Giesberg, “A Muster-Roll.”

54 Berkeley, “Like a Plague of Locusts,” 153, 168–9.

55 Waller, “Community,” 237; Gleeson, Irish in the South, 173.

56 Waller, “Community,” 237.

57 Ash, Massacre, 53–4. Kathleen C. Berkeley stated that 77.8% of the Irish residing in ward one in 1860 performed unskilled labor. This number potentially could have decreased by 1866, but it is unlikely given the dislocation experienced by the city due to the Civil War and Union occupation. See Berkeley, “Like a Plague of Locusts,” 49–50.

58 Testimony of Marland H. Perkins, MRaM, 288.

59 Berkeley, “Like a Plague of Locusts,” 173–4, 319.

60 Testimony of J. S. Chapin, MRaM, 192–3.

61 Testimony of Prince Moultrie, MRaM, 306; Testimony of H. G. Dent, MRaM, 166; Letter from James B. Bingham to Andrew Johnson (May 17, 1866), Papers of Andrew Johnson, 513; RaM, 2; Walker, “White Man’s Day.” Lawrence W. Levine has highlighted that African American folk thought was full of negative images of the Irish and suggested that, by ridiculing the Irish, Black Americans were joining the white majority and embracing a level of superiority over the Irish community, Levine, Black Culture, 301–2.

62 See Ash, Massacre; Waller, “Community,” 233–46; Hardwick, “Dead and Damned,” 109–28; Walker, “White Man’s Day.”

63 Waller, “Community,” 235, 237.

64 See Waller, “Community.”

65 Black troops played a critical role during the Civil War and Reconstruction in causing whites considerable anxiety. See Ash, When the Yankees Came; Lang, In the Wake of War; Smith, Black Soldiers in Blue.

66 Waller, “Community,” 239.

67 Testimony of Mary Grady, MRaM, 187. Stephen Ash considered Mary Grady one of the few members of the Irish community to be genuinely lacking in prejudice toward the Black community, and that she was one of few Irish community members not to be despised by the Black community. See Ash, Massacre, 53, 66, 86.

68 Testimony of T. M. Winters, MRaM, 80, 82.

69 See T. M. Winters (80–4), D. W. Turner (151–2), and M. C. Galloway (325–6) in MRaM; Testimony of Asbury Gibbons, MRaM, 339; Affidavit of Asbury Gibbons, FBA.

70 See note 34 above.

71 For the actions of McGowan see the affidavit of R. M. McGowan, FBO, and MRaM testimonies of Robert McGowan (125–8) and David Dawkins (170). For the actions of Sharp (sometimes spelled Sharpe) see MRaM testimonies of J. N. Sharp (154–9) and Allen Summers (171) and the affidavit of J. W. Sharpe, FBO; Testimony of Charles S. Lloyd, MRaM, 151.

72 Testimony of Robert McGowan, MRaM, 126; Affidavit of J. W. Sharpe, FBO.

73 Testimony of J. N. Sharp, MRaM, 154; Testimony of Robert McGowan, MRaM, 126; Testimony of Charles S. Lloyd, MRaM, 151.

74 Testimony of Robert McGowan, MRaM, 126; Testimony of J. N. Sharp, MRaM, 155.

75 Testimony of Charles S. Lloyd, MRaM, 150–1.

76 Testimony of Andrew Reyyonco, MRaM, 170; Testimony of A. N. Edmunds, MRaM, 140; Testimony of D. W. Turner, MRaM, 151; Testimony of J. M. Keller, MRaM, 133.

77 Sheriff Winters, Chief Garrett, and Deputy Sheriff Sanford were presented as being completely overwhelmed, outnumbered or too cowardly to act in Ash, Massacre. The congressional majority (MRaM, 1–36) and minority reports (MRaM, 37–44) were similarly harsh in their verdicts. The Freedmen’s Bureau praised Winters’ good intentions but highlighted that he was thwarted by more incendiary men, T. W. Gilbreth, Freedmen’s Bureau Report, full link and access in bibliography. Hereafter Bureau Report.

78 For the actions of other civic officials, see Bureau Report, Majority Report (1–36), Minority Report (37–44) and the testimonies of Major General George Stoneman (pp. 50–60), T. M. Winters (pp. 80–4), Reverend Ewing O. Tade (88–96), William H. Brazier (118–21), John Oldridge (122–4), Allen Stirling (173–6), J. T. Lanford (227–9), Captain A. W. Allyn (245–8), Walter Clifford (250–2), Erastus Cornelius (309–10) in MRaM.

79 For police conduct, see the affidavits of Aaron Smith, Adam Jones, Adam Lock, Albert Butcher, Albert Harris, Alexander McQuatters, Allen Summer, Anna George, Anthony Simmons, Becky Pleasant (first and second affidavits), Bridget Londer, Burton Davis, Charles Harris, Clary Johnson, Coleman Defalt, Columbus Riley, Cynthia Townsend, R. McGowan, R. W. Creighton, Ellen Brown, Emeline Wilson, Francis Johnson, Fred Tolis, G. C. Worsel, George Jones, George McCord, George Todd, H. N. Rankin, H. R. Simmons, Hannah Robinson, Henry Bond, Henry Rambert, J. K. Stillman, James Cannon Mitchell, Jerry Williams, John Cole, John Manson, John Oldridge, Jordan Bufford, Joseph Colwell, Kellum Moon, Lauzie Gillain, Lavinia Gooddel, Lemuel Premier, Lucy Tibbs (second affidavit), Major Jones, Martha Hais, Matilda Hawley, Mollie Davis, Monroe Davis, Mose Porter, Mrs. S. E. Dilts, Ned Young, Norris Davis, Patsy Tolliver, Penny LeMiere, Peter Jones and Gabriel Cummins, Phillis Premier, Pugg Cartwright, Robert R. Church, Shedrick Smith, Sheppard Artist, Silas S. Garrett, Solomon Hall, Solomon Pickett, Thomas Moseby, Walton Wright, Wesley Hais, William Smith, and William Vaughn, FBA. Numerous individuals also commented on the conduct of the city’s firemen during the riot, see the affidavits of Kit Temple, Major Jones, Richard Lane, and Sam Brooks, FBA.

80 Testimony of Cynthia Townsend, MRaM, 163; Testimony of Hannah Robinson, MRaM, 193; Testimony of Ellen Brown, MRaM, 200; Testimony of Mollie Davis, MRaM, 200.

81 Testimony of Hannah Savage, MRaM, 234.

82 Testimony of Mathilda Hawley, MRaM, 189, 339.

83 Testimony of Shedrick Riley, MRaM, 351; Affidavit of Shedrick Smith, FBA. Although the surnames are different, the events described are identical.

84 Testimony of D. P. Beecher, MRaM, 145–6; Testimony of Ira Stanbrough, MRaM, 243–4; Affidavit of Wiley Mason, FBA.

85 Testimony of David T. Egbert, MRaM, 121; Testimony of A. N. Edmunds, MRaM, 139–40.

86 Testimony of Barbour Lewis, MRaM, 237

87 See Affidavit of R. M. McGowan, FBO; Testimony of Robert McGowan, MRaM, 125–8; Testimony of David Dawkins, MRaM, 170; Testimony of J. N. Sharp, MRaM, 154–9; Testimony of Allen Summers, MRaM, 171; Affidavit of J. W. Sharpe, FBO; Testimony of Charles S. Lloyd, MRaM, 151; Testimony of Henry Porter, MRaM, 168; Testimony of Anthony Simmons, MRaM, 221; Testimony of Walter Clifford, MRaM, 251; Testimony of George Williams, MRaM, 259; Testimony of W. B. Greenlow, Jr., MRaM, 316.

88 Testimony of John Hollywood, MRaM, 100; Testimony of Mary Grady, MRaM, 186–8; Testimony of Mrs. S. Cooper, MRaM, 219–20.

89 Testimony of Frank Lee, MRaM, 141.

90 Testimony of Joseph Pigeon, MRaM, 190.

91 Testimony of Treadwell S. Ayers, MRaM, 286. Lawyer Marcus J. Wright also testified that former enslavers sheltered freedpeople during the riot, see testimony of Marcus J. Wright, MRaM, 296–8. Charles Crowe has suggested that the paternalistic rescue of former enslaved peoples and workers was a characteristic of southern race riots, Crowe, “Racial Massacre in Atlanta,” 151.

92 Testimony of Ann George, MRaM, 258–9.

93 Affidavit of R. M. McGowan, FBO; Testimony of Robert McGowan, MRaM, 125–8; Testimony of David Dawkins, MRaM, 170; Testimony of J. N. Sharp, MRaM, 154–9; Testimony of Allen Summers, MRaM, 171; Affidavit of J. W. Sharpe, FBO; Testimony of Charles S. Lloyd, MRaM, 151; Testimony of Mary Grady, MRaM, 186–8.

94 Testimony of William H. Brazier, MRaM, 120; Testimony of John Oldridge, MRaM, 123.

95 Testimony of William B. Hood, MRaM, 320–1.

96 Affidavits of Adam Lock (1st and 2nd), FBA; Testimony of Adam Lock, MRaM, 116.

97 See the testimonies of William H. Brazier (118–21) and John Oldridge (122–4) in MRaM.

98 Keller, The Limits of Loyalty, 219, 9, 16.

99 Ash, Massacre, 53; Walker, “White Man’s Day,” 41; Affidavits of Henry Porter (1st and 2nd), FBA; Affidavit of Henrietta Cole, FBA; Testimony of Cynthia Townsend, MRaM, 162–4.

100 Gilbert Ryan, “Memphis Riots,” 248.

101 Ash, Massacre, 66.

102 See note 5 above.

103 Holmes, “Effects,” 220.

104 Testimony of Henry Porter, MRaM, 167; 2nd Affidavit of Henry Porter, FBA.

105 Testimony of Thomas Moseby, MRaM, 342; Affidavit of Thomas Moseby, FBA.

106 Testimony of Cynthia Townsend, MRaM, 163.

107 Affidavit of Penny LeMier, FBA.

108 Testimony of James Cannon Mitchell, MRaM, 308–9; Affidavit of James Cannon Mitchell, FBA.

109 Affidavit of James Cannon Mitchel, FBA.

110 Affidavit of Lucy Tibbs, FBA.

111 1st Affidavit of John Robinson, FBA.

112 Affidavit of Henrietta Cole, FBA.

113 1st Affidavit of Henry Porter, FBA.

114 Ash, Massacre, 156–8; Richardson, “Memphis Race Riot,” 66.

115 2nd Affidavit of Henry Porter, FBA.

116 Testimony of Cynthia Townsend, MRaM, 162–3.

117 2nd Affidavit of Henry Porter, FBA; Testimony of Cynthia Townsend, MRaM, 163.

118 See note 106 above.

119 Affidavit of Thomas Moseby, FBA.

120 2nd Affidavit of Lucy Tibbs, FBA.

121 Majority Report, MRaM, 15; Testimony of Lucy Tibbs, MRaM, 160.

122 Ash, Massacre, 168–9.

123 Testimony of Cynthia Townsend, MRaM, 162–4; Testimony of Mary Grady, MRaM, 186–8.

124 See Fine and Turner, Whispers, 32.

125 Waller, “Community,” 233, 235.

126 See note 105 above.

127 See note 2 above.

128 Rosen, Terror, 61.

129 See Rabinowitz, First New South; Ayers, Promise; Vann Woodward, Origins.

130 Ash, Massacre, 176.

131 Vann Woodward, Origins, 158; Gaines, Ghosts, 80.

132 Prince, Stories, 100–101.