Analysing the language of political conflict: a study of war rhetoric of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky

ABSTRACT

This study applies textual analysis and CDA to examine linguistic or discursive structures of war rhetoric with samples selected from war speeches of Vladimir Putin of Russia and Volodymyr Zelensky of Ukraine. In selecting to analyze the current war in Ukraine as a case study, the research results highlight the implications of war rhetoric by the two leaders for global peace, especially by analyzing the structures and transformations of language use broadly conceptualized as ‘discourse’ to serve historical, cultural and political purposes and their implications for future relations of Russia and Ukraine, and its broader consequences in Eastern Europe.

KEYWORDS:

• Discourse
• war rhetoric
• conflict
• Vladimir Putin
• Volodymyr Zelensky

Introduction

A functional approach to discourse analysis will refer to the qualitative process of describing and interpreting language data (i.e. analyzing discourse samples from actual language use in real-life situations) and relating them to the social and political contexts in accordance with certain sets of objectives. The work of a discourse analyst according to Foucault (1981) is that of ‘critique and problematization’ where the analyst undertakes to account for the fact (or object) that it is spoken about by discovering who does the speaking, including ‘the institutions which prompt people to speak about it and which store and distribute the things that are said’ (Adams, 2017, p. 4–5). In the same vein, Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) views language as both a form of language and action (Austin, 1962) through which language users can change the world – a form of action that is socially and historically situated, and in a dialectical relationship with other aspects of the social (Fairclough, 2001). In other words, while discourses contribute to recreating and (re)shaping the social world and its institutions and structures, the social world also recreates and changes the order of discourse through ideologies and social practices (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp. 61–64).

The current study of war rhetoric is anchored on poststructuralist social theory and Halliday’s function-based linguistics with some insights from pragmatics, which views discourse beyond what is said in a verbal conversation but also as what is performed with words expressed as ‘speech act’ (Austin, 1962) or ‘pragmatic acting’ (Mey, 2001). A textual analysis of war rhetoric in this study pays close attention to the discursive character and tendencies of conflict in their specific political contexts and how language is used to frame them. Methodologically, textual analysis is a type of discourse analysis that ‘involves understanding language, symbols, and /or pictures present in text to gain information regarding how people make sense of and communicate life and life experiences’ (Allen, 2017, p. 1). According to Ivie (2016), fairly all conflict resolution or prevention techniques involve some kind of discourse analysis – by ‘uncovering’ the interests behind the bargaining positions. Therefore, researching and analyzing conflict language should reveal the implications of such language for peace and security or the lack thereof. For example, the framing of issues in a particular way during wartime significantly shapes not only public opinion but also choices, whether pertaining to war decisions or public policy (Gross & Ni Aolain, 2014).

Research objectives

This study will describe and analyze the features and structures of the language of political conflict and how such language may affect international relations not only in war situations but also in future bilateral relations among nations, drawing specifically from war speeches of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky in the war between Russia and Ukraine. As the study analyses the character, functions and tendencies of the language of political conflict, it also highlights the implications of such rhetoric for global peace and future relations between Russia and Ukraine and peace in Eastern Europe.

The war between Russia and Ukraine

After World War II, like the other occupied countries in the Soviet Union, Ukraine was subjected to gradual Russification (Cengel, 2022). The ultimate goal was to assimilate Ukrainians – language- and culture-wise – and to strengthen Russian domination. However, Ukraine retained its identity, and since 1991, when it achieved its independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Ukraine has been oriented towards the West, aiming to join both the EU and NATO. The Russian government, in turn, viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as the ‘disintegration of historical Russia’ and as a grave geo-political mistake. Therefore, they have aspired to reverse the new order (Kuzio & D’Anierithe, 2018). Putin and the supporters of his government have often claimed that Russians and Ukrainians are one people – a claim that appears to negate Ukraine’s right to statehood and its long history (Mankoff, 2022). Putin reiterated this narrative in his pre-war speech when he framed Ukraine as ‘an inalienable part of our history, culture and spiritual space’ (The Kremlin, 2022). According to CREST (2019), Ukraine has long been regarded by Russia as a lesser sibling, a member of the broader Russian world, as well as an important strategic asset territorially – as a buffer between Russia and NATO.

As experts point out (e.g. Marples, 2020), part of Putin’s ambition to reverse Ukraine’s political orientation towards the West was his pressure on Ukraine’s pro-Russian president Viktor Yanukovych not to sign an association agreement with the EU in 2013, which led to the Maidan Uprising (or Euromaidan). The protests, which developed into the ‘Revolution of Dignity’, eventually led to the downfall of the Moscow-backed Ukrainian president in February 2014.

Soon after the revolution, as overviewed by the Assessment Capacities Project (ACAPS) (2021), Russia annexed Ukraine’s southern region of Crimea, which resulted in unrest among separatist forces in Eastern Ukraine. This unfortunately developed into a war, which Putin justified as ‘an effort to protect Russian citizens and military assets in Crimea’ (ACAPS, 2021). Since then, the Crimean Peninsula has been administered by Moscow as a subject of the Russian Federation. In the east of Ukraine, the Ukrainian armed forces and the separatist forces (pro-Russian paramilitaries in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine) have been fighting along a contact line separating areas controlled by the Ukrainian government from those controlled by separatists in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. As Mankoff (2022) observes, the invasion of Ukraine on the 24th of February 2022 was not a completely new war; rather, Russia escalated the war of 2014; the difference is that now the ambition was not to seize some regions in Ukraine but conquer the entire country.

On February 21, 2022, right before the fresh war began, Putin recognized the independence of the controversial People’s Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and ordered Russian troops into Ukrainian territory as ‘peacekeepers’ (ACAPS, 2021).

Language, war and politics

The study of the war rhetoric of Putin and Zelensky viewed in this study as ‘conflict discourse’ examines the systematic patterns of vocabulary and grammatical structures that encode the propensities of language to incite conflict, aggravate existing ones or language use that reflects or portends conflict in itself, such as linguistic violence or language aggression among others (Chiluwa, 2022). At the level of syntax, for example, Galtung (1987, p. 2) advised that

we would look at the internal structure of sentences and texts, trying to see whether in that structure, in the deeper code of the language, there is a hidden message tilted in favor of peace, or in favor of war … 

In this study, ‘conflict’ and ‘war’ are used interchangeably and are defined in terms of opposing interests and positions that inevitably advance from disagreement to hostility or aggression between groups such as those between Russia and Ukraine. Conflict in this context is viewed as having not only a regional focus but also global consequences in terms of its objectives and economic or political outcomes (Chiluwa, 2021b; 2022). Violent conflicts often begin with verbal war and graduate to a physical confrontation between (political) groups or states over values and claims to status, power and resources (Chiluwa, 2021a; 2021b; Jeong, 2000).

The relationship between language and politics is so strong that it is impossible to think about politics without considering language, and the medium through which political ideas, intentions and sentiments are expressed and transmitted. Studies that were inspired by social theories like Marxism, considered language as a resource for analyzing relations of power. And since politics is concerned with power, the study of political language and the features of language that politicians use and their implications for peace and conflict have been of interest to language scholars for a very long time. The connection between conflict and politics is partially captured in the view that politics is ‘a struggle for power, between those who seek to assert and maintain their power and those who seek to resist it’ (Chilton & Schaffner, 2002, p. 3). However, political conflicts are not always negative. On the one hand, constructive conflicts are those that engender positive outcomes and generate solutions to problems in the long run – where opportunities exist for understanding, and forming a catalyst for change or becoming the basis for problem-solving (Kriesberg, 1998). On the other hand, negative or destructive conflict is when it produces negative outcomes, destroys relationships and develops into a war of weapons. War in this context becomes a direct outcome of ‘radical disagreement’, when conflict resolution fails (Ramsbotham, 2021). Ramsbotham argues that language also plays a crucial role here because radical disagreement is at the heart of ‘linguistic intractability’ – ‘the feature that chiefly resists attempts at conflict resolution in the communicative sphere’ (p.19).

Language in war rhetoric

Studies of war speeches by world leaders have described the power of language to frame situations (emergency or war) and defined in terms of its influence on frames, images, narratives, metaphors, and emotions (see Gross & Ni Aolain, 2014). In their study of the rhetoric and legality of war, Gross and Ni Aolain (2014) link the functions of language with the complexity of decision-making for American policy makers following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2002, and concludes that ‘the adoption and adaptation of the language of emergency and war by presidents’ is ‘a significant political and legal tool’ (p. 244). Campbell and Jamieson (1990) describe a President as a ‘choice architect’, and ‘skillful presidents not only adapt to their audiences; they engage in a process of transforming those who hear them into the audiences they desire’ (p. 244). The study further argues that ‘the language used in the framing of the relevant events and issues is not only shaped and informed by reality, but also, in itself, constitutive of what that reality may be … ’ Thus, ‘meaning is not discovered in situations, but created by rhetors … the president being the chief storyteller … ’ (p. 245).

Literature in rhetorical studies has further established the character of war rhetoric especially those that describe the features of American presidential speeches. For example, Rzepecka (2017) analyzing the ‘continuity and shifts in war messages of George H. W. Bush in 1991 and George W. Bush in 2002’, identifies some characteristics of presidential war speeches such as thoughtful consideration, narration of events, and a call to unanimity and dedication. According to Benjamin (1991 cited in Rzepecka, 2017, pp. 226–7), presidential war messages perform two basic functions; firstly, they give the historical outline of the justification for war, and secondly, they offer a description of the president’s aims and objectives. Lordan (2010) suggests six predictable discursive features of presidential war rhetoric as follows: (i) the enunciation of self-protection (ii) the representation of the enemy as the aggressor (iii) the just war theory (iv) the moral superiority of the war option (v) the inevitability of conflict and (vi) the guarantee of victory. Indeed, while these features are common in presidential speeches and also exist in the Putin-Zelensky rhetoric, our study identifies other features that perhaps may have responded to the peculiar situation of the Ukrainian war and those that belong to the war of words or linguistic violence.

Some persuasive strategies of war messages identified by Rzepecka (2017, p. 227) include the argument structure, fear tactics, techniques used to reinforce the good intentions and morality of the message, simplification (of message content in certain situations) and a shift in emphasis. Gross and Ni Aolain (2014) further adds that presidential rhetoric addresses two socially constructed target populations (i.e. ‘us’ and ‘them’) – ‘us’ who need protection and the ‘dangerous others’ who threaten us (p.250). Thus, war rhetoric recognizes the ‘united community of patriots’ and identifies and names the enemy (see also Oddo, 2011)

Galtung (1987) argues that there is a link between language and war and that it is almost obvious to identify what words stand for at the semantic level even though some remain in euphemism. However, the internal structures of war texts usually betray hidden messages tilted in favor of war or peace. During the war, non-palatable truths are distorted and suppressed through language in order to protect the sensibilities of the war or rationalize and justify acts of war such as pride, hatred, self-esteem or contempt for others. Elgin (1995) further adds that often, violence exerted by individuals or nations is preceded by some form of violent language (see also Chiluwa & Ajiboye, 2016).

Analyzing the language that promotes war, Oddo (2011) compares George H.W. Bush’s language techniques to convince the populace of the war in Iraq with Roosevelt’s legitimation strategies as well as the thematic formations to win support for the US involvement in the Second World War. By analyzing polarizing lexical items that constituted ‘us’ and ‘them’, as ‘thematic categories that covertly legitimized the war’, the study shows that the two leaders not only manipulated the public but also highlighted how they defined group membership in order to discredit the opponents of the war at home, and legitimized violence against non-aggressors abroad (p. 287).

These interesting studies highlighted some of the rhetorical features that are common to most presidential war speeches. For instance, the ideological polarization of group membership identified as US and THEM and the negative construction of the outgroup, which usually forms the basis for their demonization and the justification of war against them is clearly noticeable in the Putin-Zelensky war rhetoric. As highlighted above, while these issues are very important for the current study, questions that bother the character of conflict language will be examined more closely in the current study. Rex (2011) began this line of research by analyzing the language that promotes war and making conclusions about ‘the strong and potentially harmful influence that modern presidents have in setting the agenda for war’ (p.93). In the current study, the presidents did not set an agenda for war, Putin declared ‘a special military operation’, which Western observers generally consider as unprovoked and ill-motivated. It was also not clear whether Putin carried out any serious public consultation before embarking on his ‘military action’ in Ukraine, warranting mass anti-war protests in Russia. According to reports, several months into the war, hundreds and thousands of Russian protesters were arrested and detained following Putin’s announcement of partial mobilisation in September 2022 (The Guardian, 2022).

Theoretical framework

A textual analysis of linguistic texts or symbols and CDA are rooted in the functional approach to the study of language, which is theoretically explained in Halliday’s Systemic Functional Linguistics (SFL). Halliday (1978; 1985; 1994), identified three functions of language as follows (i) ideational – how language is used to represent the world of experience (ii) interpersonal – how language is used to construct social roles, relationships and identities, and (iii) textual – how language is used to construct coherent texts in their social contexts – ‘text’ representing a socially constructed instance of the social system. Michael Halliday emphasized the role of language as a resource for constructing meaning and argued that individuals make choices on how to make and understand meaning; thus, language becomes a symbolic expression of the world (or ‘social semiotic’) (Halliday, 1978). In the SFL perspective, every act of language is an act of meaning and ‘to mean is to act semiotically’ (1976, p. 3). Halliday further argued that ‘the internal organization of language is not arbitrary but embodies a positive reflection of the functions that language has evolved to serve in the life of the social man (p.4)’. In other words, language must be explained as expressing meaning that is created within a social system – how it describes and explains social and political realities in terms of acting symbolically on people (p. 5–6). From this theoretical background, it is clear that language goes beyond communicating messages and is a major creative tool in the hands of man, not only to construct himself but also to construct others through a process of linguistic representation. Language becomes an instrument that can both ensure and sustain peace and or an instrument of conflict and war.

Methodology

The data for this study are the translated English versions of the war speeches of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky. The first main address by Putin to the Russian people on the rationale of the war, which he called a ‘special military operation’ on Ukraine was delivered from The Kremlin on 24th February, 2022 when the war began. It is a 3751-word text on YouTube entitled: ‘Vladimir Putin’s Speech on Ukraine and US Foreign Policy and NATO’.¹ This speech (i.e. Speech Sample 1, or S1) is also entitled: ‘No other option’: Putin’s speech declaring war. The co-author of this article, who is a Russian speaker confirms the accurate translation of the speech. Two comparatively short addresses by the Ukrainian leader were also chosen for the study: one was delivered on the same date – 24th February 2022, entitled: ‘Address by the President of Ukraine’ (684 words – S2). The second address was delivered the next day – 25th February 2022, entitled: ‘Address by the President to Ukrainians at the end of the first day of Russia’s attacks’ (663 words – SS3). Zelensky’s speeches were retrieved from the Official Website of the President of Ukraine where the original speech recordings are uploaded in Ukrainian. Their translations into English are provided by the Presidential Office of Ukraine and thus offer a reliable source for analysis.

As highlighted above, textual analysis (i.e. interpreting language forms or symbols in order to gain more insights into how people make sense of life experiences) and CDA, the latter which adopts a radical approach to analyzing the relationship between language, ideology and power (Fairclough, 1995) and theoretically affiliated to SFL are applied in the analysis of the lexical and discursive features of the language of conflict in order to answer the questions: how may the language of conflict be conceptualized? What are the lexical and discursive orientations of the language of conflict that are discernable in the war speeches under study?

Some significant grammatical and discursive structures of war rhetoric are also analyzed in terms of the referential and predicational strategies that named political actors and actions attributed to them (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). The study then demonstrates how language is systematically used by Vladimir Putin for example to legitimize the war, garner support, and persuade the Russian people in spite of its huge human and economic losses; as well as how Putin is trying to diplomatically sustain allies in a war that has been viewed by the international community as both morally and ethically unjustifiable.

Analysis and discussion

Interestingly, most presidential speeches, like those of Putin’s and Zelensky’s reflect ideological meaning and are organized alongside an information structure that enunciates ingroup preference and outgroup rejection. Van Dijk (1998) identifies features of ideological discourse such as self-identity description and the descriptions of activity, goal, norm and values. Others include the descriptions of resources, position and relations. Most of these in their entirety are discernable in the war speeches of Putin and Zelensky. Van Dijk (2005) suggests that the analysis of such ideological discourse should involve actor descriptions of ‘who we are’ – comprising (i) the neutral or positive portrayal of the in-group and the negative depiction of the outgroup and (ii) argumentation, which often highlights the formal presentation of ‘our’ case (e.g. Russia’s systematic account and justification of the attack on Ukraine) and citing certain ‘authority’ to legitimize ‘our’ actions. Argumentation narratives also often include comparisons between ‘us’ and ‘them’ (e.g. Russia and Ukraine), and (iv) ‘contrast’ – dissociating ‘ourselves’ (e.g. Russians, Ukrainians) from ‘them’ (e.g. Russians, Ukrainians, NATO, USA, Europe and Western allies). In some cases, there might still be (v) exaggerations of some negative attributes of the enemy; thus, reflecting the language of conflict.

The analysis of the texts begins with examining the preamble of the texts, including the openings or salutations, as well as the recognition of the addressees. Afterwards, actor description and argumentation; comparison and contrasts are analyzed. Excerpts from the speeches are reproduced in the analysis, numbered S1–S5.

(i) Opening, greeting formula and recognition of addressee

The opening of speeches through greetings – often with some informal cultural fillers that recognize the addressees like certain senior members of the audience, or some special persons and groups like soldiers/fighters (in a war situation) often set the tone and content of the message. According to Waldvogel (2005) greetings and closing remarks generally establish the basis for future communication and often reflect cultural traits and traditional understanding.

On the one hand, Vladimir Putin started his speech with a brief opening: ‘citizens of Russia, friends’. Then towards the end, he specifically identifies certain addressees namely: ‘comrade officers’, ‘citizens of Russia’, and ‘dear compatriots’. His choice of words in these greeting formulas is deliberate in order to establish a sense of nationhood and patriotism in the contest of a supposed threat to their nation. ‘Comrade’, ‘citizen’ and ‘compatriot’ are synonyms that identify Putin with his listeners, and he uses them to appeal to a sense of collective consciousness and solidarity. For instance, ‘comrade’, used throughout the Soviet period as a universal Communist form of address eliminating social ranking, is still often used in the Russian army to establish oneness among members of a military formation, especially to bolster commitment to a common course. Perhaps due to the urgency of the moment – the tense atmosphere of war, pleasantries are usually unnecessary. But to Putin, it is different. Whether in pretense or in sincerity, he calls his listeners ‘dear compatriots’ as someone who loves his fellow Russians. This differs from when George H.W. Bush addressed the American people on his invasion of Iraq – there was no formal opening. He simply began his speech with: ‘Just 2 h ago, allied air forces began an attack on military targets in Iraq and Kuwait. These attacks continue as I speak … ’²

Because Putin was addressing a rather divided audience, (many of whom completely were opposed to the war and others who remained neutral), he has to apply some resemblance of flattery in his salutations as he recognizes the ‘friends of Russia’. The soldiers are addressed as ‘comrade officers’ and his war policy supports those he wittingly refers to as ‘dear compatriots’. As part of the introduction of this speech, he hints in retrospect at an earlier speech about ‘the tragic events in Donbas’, referring to the pro-Russian and anti-govt separatist agitations in Donbas. Russia had recognized the DPR and LPR secessionist as independent republics on February 21, 2022 – thereby setting the tone of the content of his war rhetoric.

On the other hand, Volodymyr Zelensky’s goal was to establish his consolidating role to garner the support and sympathies of the domestic audience and, equally importantly, internationally. He also emphatically framed the war as ‘unprovoked’ to establish the interpretation of the invasion from Ukraine’s perspective and to counter Russia’s legitimisation of the war. Also, because the war has been widely condemned by the international community, Zelensky confidently appeals for global support. He simply begins his speech with ‘citizens of Ukraine’, a short and straightforward opening, which includes a highly conventional address form and is maximally inclusive.

To hype the reality of the war, he introduces his speech with a question, which he answers by immediately highlighting the negative action of the enemy: ‘What do we hear today? It’s not just rocket explosions, battles, the roar of aircraft. It is the sound of a new Iron Curtain lowering and closing Russia away from the civilized world … ’ Unlike Putin, who recognizes his ‘comrade officers’, Zelensky knew he was addressing not just the ‘citizens of Ukraine’ but the entire world. But whether or not his opening remarks pass for salutation, Zelensky successfully captures the mood of the moment and like most discursive war rhetoric, the language of war that begins the speech announces the actions of the enemy and the global implications of such actions. ‘Rocket explosions’ and the ‘roar of aircraft’ are metaphorically described as ‘a new iron curtain’ that closes Putin’s Russia from the rest of modern civilization. So, while the opening salutations of the two presidents appear to address the citizens of their nation states, their targets and implications differ significantly. While Putin’s speech observes common social and cultural dynamics of the domestic audience, Zelensky’s has more implications for the future as it appeals to the souls of mankind even though at the surface level it addresses only the Ukrainians.

(ii) Identity-actor description

The main actors in the Russia-Ukraine war and how their actions are named are clearly illustrated in Putin’s speech as he lucidly draws a demarcation between Russia (i.e. We; US), whose actions he positively constructs in response to ‘the fundamental threats’ to Russia, and Russia would not repeat the ‘mistake’ of the disintegration of the former Soviet Union. According to Putin, Russia had ‘patiently’ tried to reach an agreement with NATO and made ‘entreaties’ and humble ‘requests’ against its eastward expansion and formation of its military infrastructure at the Russian border. While their so-called friendly appeal and entreaty are highlighted, the negative actions of ‘pressure’ and ‘blackmail’ of the enemy are amplified. Hence, Putin unequivocally identifies the outgroup – the ‘enemy’, who are the United States and their Western allies, NATO and the ‘irresponsible Western politicians’, (i.e. They; Them), whose actions are constantly represented negatively; for instance, the outgroup is associated with ‘cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail’. In response to Russian assumed unpretentious proposals, the enemy had exhibited ‘insolence’ and demonstrated ‘contemptuous and disdainful attitude to our interests and absolutely legitimate demands’.

Putin consistently follows this polarized method of action attribution to describe Russia’s diplomatic relations with the outgroup in order to establish ‘our case’. Russia is framed as the threatened and the deprived and as a nation in danger of destruction.

Then he went on to adopt a system of linguistic implication to describe the supposed actions of the United States and their European partners. Implications generally encode propositions that are not expressed explicitly, some of which may be untrue or may overtly promote negative outgroup evaluation. An object or idea may be implied from a narrative or an opinion which may be understood as saying something true or false or even dangerous (Chiluwa, 2012). As a pattern of negative ‘Other’ representation, Putin frequently does this in constructing the actions of the United States. For example, the US is implied as ‘the dominant state’, ‘the power that be’ and ‘ … those who aspire to global dominance’. Because ‘at the same time, everything it regards as useful is presented as the ultimate truth and forced on others regardless of the cost, abusively and by any means available. Those who refuse to comply are subjected to strong-arm tactics’. The US is also among ‘those who declared themselves the winners of the Cold War’. Putin also accuses the US and its allies of acting illegally in the practice of international relations following the end of WWII, but he does not mention specific names, but refers to ‘a state of euphoria created by the feeling of absolute superiority, a kind of modern absolutism, coupled with the low cultural standards and arrogance of those who formulated and pushed through decisions that suited only themselves’. But it is clear that ‘themselves’ here refers to ‘Them’.

In paragraph 12 of his speech, Putin comes very clear to associating the USA with ‘terrorism and extremism’ and the US and the whole ‘so-called Western bloc’ are metaphorically referred to as ‘the empire of lies’. According to him, ‘it appears that nearly everywhere, in many regions of the world where the United States brought its law and order, this created bloody, non-healing wounds and the curse of international terrorism and extremism’. Also, by implication, the outgroup consists of ‘liars’ as evidenced in sample 1 below:

S.1.

This array includes promises not to expand NATO eastwards even by an inch. To reiterate: they have deceived us, or, to put it simply, they have played us. Sure, one often hears that politics is a dirty business. It could be, but it shouldn’t be as dirty as it is now, not to such an extent. This type of con-artist behaviour is contrary not only to the principles of international relations but also and above all to the generally accepted norms of morality and ethics. Where is justice and truth here? Just lies and hypocrisy all around.

The ‘enemy’ is described in terms of their destructive activities. ‘They sought to destroy our traditional values … ’ Here, Putin tends to engage in defamatory propaganda that reviles and insults foreign states, their institutions, leaders or other agents; perhaps with the aim of disrupting peaceful relations between them, and to feel the heart of the people with hate in order to normalize violence. Putin also questions the very possibility of truth, which is a common strategy in propaganda as it helps to create an unsettling climate and a convenient ground to establish beliefs as truths or facts.

Thus, the language of conflict consisting of blame-game, name-calling, demonization, and accusation of the outgroups are frequented and expected in war situations, but it is dangerous in the sense that its effects usually linger even after the war. Such language reflects the false assumptions, suspicions and fear that the speakers have had over the years. The war simply created a platform to express them.

While constructing Ukraine as a puppet in the hands of the ‘neo-Nazis’ (i.e. the US, Western allies and the Ukrainian government), Putin still views Ukraine as a part of Russia requiring annexation. Ukraine is represented as a ‘hostage’ of Western allies and is being used against Russia. For instance, he addresses the Ukrainian people and reminds them of Russia’s initial efforts to ‘protect’ Crimea and Sevastopol who made a choice to reunite with their ‘historical homeland’. Then Putin addresses the Ukrainian Armed Forces, while not mentioning Zelensky, and refers to ‘the Junta’, (i.e. the Ukrainian government), who according to him are ‘the people’s adversary’ said to be plundering Ukraine and humiliating the Ukrainian people. He urges the soldiers to shun the ‘criminal orders’ of the Ukrainian government, again implying that Zelensky’s government is made up of criminals.

On his own part, Volodymyr Zelensky not only introduces his speech with the realities and descriptions of the war and what it portends for Russia as ‘the enemy’, the Ukrainian armed forces are said to have stopped the enemy’s attacks. The announcement begins with an emotional appeal to Ukrainians on how to interpret the actions of the enemy. Throughout his speeches, Zelensky emphasizes ‘we’, ‘us’, ‘our’ as ingroup markers. He also emphasizes ‘the enemy’, and each time he does so, he promptly highlights the positive actions of ‘our armed forces’ or ‘our heroes’ as very important elements of his ideologically polarized rhetoric. In the first three paragraphs of his speeches, he cleverly de-emphasizes, and in fact, shifts the attention of his people from the activities of the enemy or the supposed strength of Russia to the strength of Ukrainian troops and their progress in the war. By emphasizing the progress of Ukrainian soldiers, Zelensky attempts to build hope and resilience in the Ukrainian public. Also, by repeatedly referring to ‘the enemy’ rather than ‘Russia’ as the rhetoric of war demands, he constantly reiterates the successes of the Ukrainian troops and at every point immediately asserts how the Ukrainian troops countered the Russian attacks – still in order to build confidence and hope in his hearers (see Sample 2).

S2.

The Ukrainian army, our border guards, police and special services stopped the enemy’s attacks … In Donbas, our Armed Forces are doing great, the Kharkiv direction is very difficult, the forces for the defense of the city are working, they are reliable, they are our men. The most problematic situation today is in the south. Our troops are fighting fierce battles in the suburbs of Kherson. The enemy is pushing out of the occupied Crimea, trying to advance towards Melitopol. In the north of the country, the enemy is slowly advancing in the Chernihiv region, but there are forces to hold it. Reliable defense is built in the Zhytomyr region. Enemy paratroopers in Hostomel are blocked, troops are ordered to destroy them.

Unlike Vladimir Putin, Zelensky does not use vitriolic language such as labeling or insults; rather his ideological representation strategy largely rests on the negative constructions of his enemy’s supposed strength. Zelensky deliberately downplays and deemphasizes the progressive attacks of the Russian soldiers and highlights the weakness of the Russian soldiers. He claims that the Ukrainians as well as the Russian public were already denouncing the war.

Zelensky asks questions frequently – rhetorical questions such as ‘what do we hear today’, or ‘what do we see at this hour?’ These questions serve as a hearer-involvement technique, which enables him to appeal to public sympathy; he also celebrates the ‘victory’ of his armed forces. He recurrently refers to Ukraine as the victim of military attacks and stresses its innocence. ‘Ukraine did not choose the path of war. But Ukraine offers to return to peace’. According to Ivie (1980) people who see themselves as strongly committed to the ideal of peace, but are simultaneously faced with the reality of war, feel the need to ascertain that the fault for any such disruption lies with others.

This emotional appeal obviously emphasizes Russia’s guilt and responsibility before the citizens and the international community and calls on all citizens to join the war and defend themselves.

(iii) Argumentation and formal justification of the war

Vladimir Putin started early in his speech to announce the purpose of the war and present his argument in clear sequences. The war according to him was to ensure the security of Russia against NATO’s incursion. It is in pursuit of ‘justice and truth’ and to ‘preserve the cultures of well-being, values, experiences and traditions’ of the Russian people that have come under attack. In sample 3, he explains that NATO’s expansion in eastern Ukraine was a perennial threat that had to be resisted by all means.

S3.

It is a fact that over the past 30 years we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic Alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.

The language of conflict is evident here from the perspective of constructing distant or imaginary threats as though they were real and close. This is equivalent to Cap’s (2013) ‘proximization strategy’. Cap defines proximization as ‘a discursive strategy of presenting physically and temporally distant events and states of affairs as directly consequential to the speaker’ (p. 3). Building this concept on three dimensions of space – the actual physical threat; time – the conflict being presented as imminent and needs immediate response, and value – home vs. alien values, Cap argues that Presidents often report distant dangers as imminent threats. Referring to the US’s supposed wars on terror, Cap further argues that Presidents can convince the nation to go to war on the assumption that danger is closer than ever imagined, when in actual fact, there are no dangers. Again, applying the blame-game tactics, Putin stresses that the war is in the aftermath of NATO’s eastward expansion and ‘moving its military infrastructure’ to the Russian border. Putin thus exaggerates NATO’s activities and the threat to Russia.

Putin further constructs Russia as a victim of Western ‘deception and lies’ – and also as a victim of collective Western bullying. Playing the victim, and appealing to emotion, he claims that the collective West tried to put ‘the final squeeze on us, finish us off, and utterly destroy us’ following the ‘unprecedented openness of the new modern Russia, and its readiness ‘to work honestly with the United States and other Western partners’.

S4.

… In December 2021, we made yet another attempt to reach agreement with the United States and its allies on the principles of European security and NATO’s non-expansion. Our efforts were in vain. The United States has not changed its position. It does not believe it necessary to agree with Russia on a matter that is critical for us. The United States is pursuing its own objectives, while neglecting our interests.

He justifies the war because NATO is perceived as serving the US foreign policy and according to him ‘Russia cannot stay idle and passively observe these developments … The ongoing efforts to gain a military foothold of the Ukrainian territory are unacceptable for us’.

Putin explicitly expresses concern about the increasing hostility towards Russia in the neighboring territories, and the consequent influx of NATO armed forces with cutting-edge weapons. Since he views the perceived threat from the US and its Western allies as the primary threat to Russia’s sovereignty and survival, he argues that protecting Russia’s sovereignty is a matter of utmost importance, even ‘a matter of life and death’.

Putin claims that for eight years Russia has done ‘everything possible’ to settle the situation in Donbass by peaceful political means. During that time, the West and leading NATO countries, according to him, were busy supporting separatism and ‘gangs of mercenaries in southern Russia’ as well as helping ‘the far-right nationalists and neo-Nazis in Ukraine, those who will never forgive the people of Crimea and Sevastopol for freely making a choice to reunite with Russia’.

While Putin asserts that he has no intention to occupy Ukraine, he accuses Ukraine of promoting ‘Nazism’ and humiliating and perpetrating genocide against the Donetsk People’s Republic and the Lugansk People’s Republic. He argues that he seeks ‘to demilitarize and denazify Ukraine’ and interprets his military action in terms of promoting freedom of people and the right to self-determination of the DPR and LPR. But at the same time, he places the responsibility of the war on the Ukrainian regime.

Volodymyr Zelensky does not have to justify the war, as he is left with no option but to defend his country. Throughout his speeches, he assures his people that they would defend their sovereignty, their independence and their freedom. Here, he implicitly demands patriotism and statesmanship from both civilians and soldiers. In his speeches, he gives updates on the war by offering the statistics of the dead and the wounded and maintains that Ukrainian soldiers are heroes. He still reports on the defensive progress of the soldiers, which he views as satisfactory. In S5 below, he reminds his people of the support of Western countries who have already begun to implement sanctions on Russia. However, In this speech, he appears dissatisfied with the support of world leaders because ‘we are left alone to defense of our state’.

S5.

No matter how many conversations I had with the leaders of different countries today, I heard a few things. The first is that we are supported. And I am grateful to each state that helps Ukraine concretely, not just in words. But there is another – we are left alone in defense of our state. Who is ready to fight with us? Honestly – I do not see such. Who is ready to guarantee Ukraine’s accession to NATO? Honestly, everyone is afraid.

Zelensky continually highlights the negative actions of the enemy such as strikes at military facilities and the killing of civilians in order to further attract support. He actually succeeded because volunteer foreign fighters did join the war on the side of Ukraine. About 20,000 foreign fighters and mercenaries were said to have joined the Ukrainian armed forces since the start of the war (Mehra & Thorley, 2022). Zelensky refutes ‘fakes news’ of his fleeing to exile, as he magnifies his patriotism, statesmanship and sacrifice by insisting that ‘my family is not traitors’. By identifying himself as the main target of the Russian invasion, and confirming that he remains in the government quarters, he demonstrates fearlessness and by implication invites trust and courage from his people.

By asking rhetorical questions, such as ‘Who is ready to fight with us?’ and ‘Who is ready to guarantee Ukraine’s accession to NATO’, for the first time, he refers to NATO, which he had applied to join, but his country’s application met with the hurdle that all 30 members must vote in favor of admitting a new member.

Comparisons and contrasts

In argumentation narratives, comparisons (or parallels between the outgroup and ingroup) and contrasts (or dissociations and dissimilarities between the groups) are fused together thus forming a coherent texture of ideologically underpinned representations of ‘the self’ and ‘the other’. For instance, comparing Russia with other developed countries, Putin boldly declares their readiness to confront any external intervention or aggression. ‘Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history … ’ Though a feature of the language of conflict, this assertion sounds more like a muscle flexing propaganda. By announcing Russia’s military power as ‘one of the most powerful nuclear states’ and proclaiming its ‘advantage in several cutting-edge weapons’, Putin follows the usual war black propaganda, which undoubtedly exaggerates their military might. Black propaganda generally distorts reality and magnifies a military capacity in order to cripple the enemy’s will to fight or deter a stronger adversary (Samoilenko, 2017).

S6.

No matter who tries to stand in our way or all the more so create threats for our country and our people, they must know that Russia will respond immediately, and the consequences will be such as you have never seen in your entire history. No matter how the events unfold, we are ready.

Putin reminds his soldiers that their strength and readiness to fight ‘are the bedrock of independence and sovereignty and foundation for building a reliable future’.

In order to further dissociate themselves from the perceived viciousness of the United States and their allies – and to denounce their ‘evil’ actions, Putin uses contrasts or disclaimers by further tracing the US ‘war on terror’ and the implied belligerence, futility, and lies of such wars. He describes the US war efforts as ‘fake’ and ‘sham’, especially the war on Iraq, Libya and Syria. In comparison with Russia in their ‘protection’ campaign in Donbas and Crimea, Putin describes the ‘ … illegal use of military power against Libya … ’ This is in contrast with Russia’s ‘defensive’ campaigns. According to him, the US-led military expeditions have created far more catastrophe – a ‘tremendous loss in human life, damage, destruction, and a colossal upsurge of terrorism’.

President Zelensky’s argumentation very explicitly expresses dissimilarities between the incivility of Russia and the bravery of Ukraine’s defenders through parallel syntactic structures: ‘Today Russia attacked the entire territory of our state. And today our defenders have done a lot’. Such parallelism used for comparisons dissociates Ukraine from Russia by echoing a very similar syntactic pattern (‘Today X did Y’) but stressing very different goals of the fighting actions. His comparisons and contrasts focus more on opposite value systems rather than differences in the ‘muscle strength’.

Conclusion

Conceptualizing the language of political conflict from the war rhetoric of Vladimir Putin and Volodymyr Zelensky shows that conflict language accentuates the polarization of identities and social actors through constant magnification of the ‘evils’ of the outgroup. In the Russia-Ukraine war situation, the enemy and the aggressor are constantly captured in the Russian identity in the speeches of Zelensky. It also follows the same structure when the warring parties compare their positions, values and goals. From the identity-actor description and formal presentation of their case against Ukraine, the USA and their Western allies, Putin’s use of language depicts how the discourse of conflict functions in a war situation. For example, Putin’s language for most part is as much defensive as it is vindictive. It is also malicious in terms of how it exaggerates the assumed negative actions of the outgroup, especially NATO and the United States. Zelensky’s war rhetoric to a lesser degree is characterized by blame-game and labelling with language forms sometimes realized by metaphors and rhetorical questions. However, Putin’s regular association of US and Western allies with deception and lies, aggression and promotion of terrorism around the world is not altogether surprising given the war situation. This narrative permeated Putin’s pre-war speech³ and other narratives in Russia for years.

War rhetoric as a type of polarizing ideological discourse heightens ethnic and national consciousness, explicitly highlighted through the construction of We, Us, They and Them dichotomies. Polarization in general is a basis of hostile narratives, propaganda and disinformation as it conveniently simplifies the complexities arising in unsettling periods and crises and creates the illusion of stable categories. Besides, having an enemy (Them) helps to mobilize the audience. The paradigms in the speeches of each president constitute an elaborate ecosystem of narratives, which are used for different purposes by each president. Putin’s narratives mainly form a network of legitimating discourses that frame the war as a necessity and rationalize it for foreign and especially internal audiences. His narratives are long-lasting, well-established and widely disseminated. The repeated use of them can be expected to lead to processing fluency and illusory truth effects (Fazio et al., 2015). Zelensky’s goal is to develop successful competing narratives that would deny Russia’s claims and inspire internal and international audiences since the support of both is crucial in this war. His speeches are thus marked by a larger diversity of persuasive strategies and a higher degree of interactivity.

This study argues that Vladimir Putin’s war rhetoric reflects a deep-rooted ignominy against Ukraine, which may never go away until Ukraine is partly or entirely re-annexed into Russia, which Russia considers its ‘historical homeland’. The more Ukraine is oriented toward the West and NATO, the angrier Putin will become, as this, according to Putin, will increase more security threats along Russian borders. Zelensky is not going to concede to Putin as this would mean Russian occupation and thus devastating political, economic and cultural consequences as well as persecution of civilians in occupied areas (this has already happened in Ukraine’s earlier and current history (e.g. Temnycky, 2022)). The consequences of the war are already obvious in terms of its economic political impacts. It disrupted and reshaped global economies and trade, caused a crisis in energy supplies, and a surge in consumer prices. The end of Europe’s peace opened a new era of uncertainty, with a new arms race, new threats of an atomic war, and the development of existing and new alliances. But Ukraine’s experience has re-kindled Sweden and Finland’s quest for NATO membership, and it appears that nothing short of full membership of NATO can consolidate Ukraine’s position as a sovereign state. This study adds to insights into and literature on studies in language and politics and how topics that traditionally belong to international studies may be researched with methods in linguistics.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Innocent Chiluwa

Innocent Chiluwa is a Professor in Applied linguistics (discourse studies), media and communication studies. He is a visiting professor at the Department of Languages and Intercultural Studies, Heriot-Watt University. His research interests include discourse studies, media and conflict; social movement studies; social media and society; online activism and protest, terrorism and political violence. He is on the Editorial Boards of Discourse & Society (SAGE), Journal of Multicultural Discourses (Routledge), Journal of International and Intercultural Communication (Taylor & Francis), and Humanities and Social Sciences Communications (Springer Nature).

Jurate Ruzaite

Jūratė Ruzaitė is a Professor at the Department of Foreign Language, Literary and Translation Studies and a Senior Researcher at the Centre of Intercultural Communication and Multilingualism at Vytautas Magnus University, Kaunas, Lithuania. She is the Associate Editor of the Lithuanian Applied Linguistics Journal and a Board Member of the Lithuanian Association of Applied Linguistics. Her research interests include sociolinguistics, pragmatics, discourse analysis, language and ideology, hate speech, propaganda, and disinformation.

Notes

1 The text may be found on this link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1qS6J-WbTD8)

2 https://millercenter.org/the-presidency/presidential-speeches

3 Putin’s Address, February 21, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67843