Republican violence in Northern Ireland: a comparative case study of County Tyrone

ABSTRACT

Ireland has a long history of political violence emanating from Irish republicans’ desire to be free from British rule. The focus of this article is on the use of such political violence in one particular area, namely County Tyrone using a comparative analysis to interrogate republican violence during the Anglo-Irish War (1919–1921) and the period known as the Troubles (1969–1997). Drawing upon archival sources, interviews with ex-security force members and republicans with direct experience of the conflict in County Tyrone and the extant literature, the article examines whether successive generations of republicans drew upon or deviated from established templates of political violence. In doing so, it considers the practical and lethal effect of the exchange of memories, grievance, justifications, tactics and patterns of past episodes of violence. By comparing and analysing differences in the political violence employed by successive generations of republicans, similar strategies and tactics are identified. These include the use of guerrilla warfare, attacks on security forces, the local economy and infrastructure, the creation of security force-free zones and the fostering of sectarian and representative violence. The research has contemporary relevance to improve our understanding, challenge misinterpretations and myths of past events and legacies in County Tyrone.

KEYWORDS:

• Political violence
• County Tyrone
• Irish Republican Army
• representative violence
• sectarian violence

Introduction

The struggle for Irish independence from British rule culminated in the late 19th/early 20th centuries with the campaign for Home Rule (self-government from Britain) and 1916 witnessed the Easter Rising¹ in Dublin in which Irish nationalists proclaimed the establishment of an Irish republic. Although the uprising was short-lived, it had a profound effect on Irish republicans at the time and in later years (English, 2003; Sanders, 2011). Prior to his execution on the 3^rd May 1916, Thomas Clarke, one of the leaders of the uprising exclaimed:

I and my fellow signatories believe we have struck the first successful blow for Irish freedom. The next blow, which we have no doubt Ireland will strike, will win through. In this belief we die happy. (quoted in An Phoblacht, 2006)

The importance of historical precedents regarding a previous generation’s war is used both as an example and justification for subsequent republican violence. For example, leading republican Brian Arthurs on commemorating Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) members killed by the Special Air Service² (SAS) at Clonoe, Coalisland, County Tyrone (hereafter Tyrone) in 1992 stated: ‘They were revolutionary soldiers  …  victory some day will be ours. These volunteers were the Tom Barrys and Dan Breens of our generation. These men are our heroes’ (An Phoblacht, 2007).³

It has been argued elsewhere, that the culture, narratives and lessons of previous republican violence are passed through the generations creating an ideology of violence (English, 2003; Magee, 2011; Moloney, 2002). This article’s main research question is thus, did templates of republican political violence such as strategies, structures, tactics, and methods of violence exist in Tyrone? Derived from it, two secondary questions are examined: (1) Did the Irish Republican Army (IRA)/PIRA create/exacerbate conflict between the local communities? (2) Was there a form of representative violence in operation? That is to say, individuals were targeted as they were seen to represent certain groups of people such as republicans, loyalists or members of the security forces (Wright, 1987).

The following article is a regional case study, focusing on one county on the island of Ireland, namely Tyrone, which was chosen due to its significance and role in the struggle for Irish freedom.⁴ It draws on archival sources located in the National Archives (London), Northern Ireland Political Archives of the Linen Hall Library (Belfast), Father Louis O’Kane Collection⁵ held at the Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich⁶ Memorial Library and Archive (Armagh), the Bureau of Military History, 1913–21⁷ at the Military Archives (Dublin) and semi-structured interviews (n = 30) with ex-members of the security forces⁸ and republicans with first-hand knowledge of the local conflict in Tyrone.⁹ Where possible such original interview data was triangulated against primary sources including oral histories and archival documents including government records and personal letters.

The thematic structure of this article involves a comparative analysis of two distinct timelines, namely the Anglo-Irish War¹⁰ period (1919–1921) and the Troubles (1969–1997). The comparative analysis focuses on two areas: (1) the structures, strategy, tactics and methods employed by republicans. This section compares templates deployed in each time period including the scale and effectiveness of attacks on security forces, their barracks/bases¹¹ and attacks on the local economy/government infrastructure. (2) The conflict between local communities in East Tyrone. This section explores if the IRA/PIRA created/exacerbated a conflict between the local communities and if the violence could be considered ‘representative’. It identifies the triangular relationship of violence between Tyrone republicans, the British state and loyalists.¹² Finally, the conclusion offers an analysis that has contemporary relevance to types of political violence employed by successive generations of republicans.

In doing so, the article offers three main contributions. Firstly, it offers new learning with respect to political violence in Tyrone in two distinct periods, namely during the Anglo-Irish War and the more recent Troubles. Secondly, by exploring strategies and tactics used by successive generations of republicans it identifies similarities and differences in their campaigns of political violence. Lastly, such work has relevance to understanding past events and their legacies in Tyrone and rural Ulster.¹³ Figures 1 and 2 show the location of Tyrone and also the key towns in the county.

Figure 1. Location of Tyrone on the island of Ireland.³⁵

Figure 2. Map of Tyrone.³⁶

Previous research

The extant literature on republican violence has tended to focus on a number of areas including a specific time period, a particular feature of the conflict, a certain group or type of violence. For example, McCleery, in his analysis of violence by the PIRA conducted against civilians between 1969 and 1975 concluded that a ‘consistent pattern of deliberate sectarian murders carried out by PIRA shows that these attacks  …  were tolerated by the organisation …  sectarian murders were probably also sanctioned by the movement’ (McCleery, 2021, p. 17). For McCleery (2021, p. 4) sectarianism was ‘any action or environment that harms a civilian because they are representative of a social, political, ethnic, or religious group; or indeed any combination of these’.

Other scholars have studied a particular feature of the conflict such as republican politics, intelligence gathering and the area of actions. For example, McCluskey (2011) studied the development of republican politics in East Tyrone from 1898 through to 1918 and assessed the attempt by nationalists and republicans to create a popular ideology in the area. Leahy (2020) focused on the intelligence war against the PIRA during the Troubles and discussed the nature of the conflict in urban and rural settings including Tyrone. Some studies have focused on either the IRA or PIRA in general and have included discussion of their activities in certain areas in Ulster. Examples include Harnden’s (1999) work on the history of PIRA in South Armagh, which explored the local conflict and its drivers and Moloney’s (2002) history of the PIRA (including a chapter on Tyrone), which exposed the inner workings of the republican group through the course of the Troubles.

With respect to the type of violence at play in Northern Ireland, Wright (1987) in his comparative analysis of the conflict argued that such violence was representative violence in which those targeted were identified as representing certain groups within the conflict. He argues,

This condition of representative violence is very simple. If anyone of a great number of people can be ‘punished’ for something done by the community they come from, and if the communities are sufficiently clearly defined, there is a risk that anyone attacking a member of the other community can set in motion an endless chain of violence. (Wright, 1987, p. 11)

East Tyrone, then, is arguably a prime example of Wright’s analysis whereby local communities, as we shall see, were clearly defined both by geography and religion. Wilson (2010) has argued that the nature of this religious divide can make a crucial difference in the patterns of the conflict and requires less grotesque and intense violence to maintain communal deterrence and division. Moreover, White (2007) argues that the PIRA’s struggle was one of national liberation and not motivated by anti-Protestantism. However, Patterson (2010, p. 3), in his critique of White, suggests that he ‘appears to let the PIRA construct its own definition of itself and their activities which he merely confirms’.

In contrast, there has been little scholarship comparing patterns of violence in Ulster in the early and late 20th centuries. An exception to this is Lewis and McDaid (2017) in their comparison of violence during the 1920s and 1970s where they examined reprisal activity; namely attacks on security forces and the targeting of the Protestant economy for evidence of ethnic cleansing in the border area. Their conclusion discounts a strategy of ethnic cleansing and offers a concept of violence best understood as ‘functionally sectarian’. This concept explains that ‘republican violence was, in particular cases, overwhelmingly experienced by members of the Protestant community, but was not directed at them simply because they were Protestants’ (Lewis & McDaid, 2017, p. 647). Thus, this article builds on this work by focusing exclusively on the case study of Tyrone in two distinct time periods, namely during the Anglo-Irish War and the Troubles.

Establishing the templates of political violence: the Anglo-Irish War period

The following section discusses the establishment of templates of political violence in Tyrone and identifies republican structures, strategy, tactics and methods in the county. Historically, there was already a strong history of opposition to British rule from the clan of O’Neill¹⁴ and from the Irish Republican Brotherhood¹⁵ (IRB), from the mid-nineteenth century onwards (Townshend, 2013). During the 1890s, the IRB maintained a cell structure around the urban areas of Dungannon, Cookstown and Stewartstown with cells in Clogher, Pomeroy and Carrickmore. As explained by Coogan (1993, p. 28)

[i]n each parish there was a circle of nine men, one known as the centre or leader. The county centres were elected from the parish centres and the idea was that only the centres knew each other or knew who the members of each circle were.

The structure has always been important to the IRA as it afforded a mechanism to control the growth of volunteers, operational discipline, and a hierarchal form of leadership. The IRA has, across Ireland, traditionally mirrored the British Army structures of a brigade, battalion and companies. Prior to the onset of the Anglo-Irish War, the IRA formed a battalion in East Tyrone in 1918 with most of Tyrone being organised into one brigade area, however, there was a structural reorganisation in both 1921 and 1922. In July 1921, the IRA had some 838 members across all ranks and the 1^st Brigade 2^nd Northern division consisted of three battalions covering East Tyrone. The following year it had 678 members across all ranks with three brigades. East Tyrone was incorporated into the 1^st and 3rd Brigades with the 3rd Brigade stretching to Bellaghy in South Derry (Kelly, 1953; Military Archives, 2023). Captain James McElduff, 2^nd Northern Division, 1st Brigade IRA explicitly stated, ‘that his community’s history informed his position in fighting the English’ (McCluskey, 2011, p. 164).

The first IRA General Head Quarters (GHQ) strategy involved the use of guerrilla/low-intensity warfare, which was seen as the best way to exhaust, exacerbate and gain an advantage over a much more powerful opponent (Hart, 2003). Such efforts were designed to realise their long-term goal of removing Britain from Ireland. Tyrone tended to follow the GHQ direction and therefore followed the national pattern where seizing arms was the number one priority. However, as McCluskey (2014, p. 89) notes ‘[t]he failure of the Tyrone IRA to achieve this partially explains why the county did not register activity during the transition from arms raids to attacks on RIC¹⁶ barracks  …  in the winter of 1919–20’.

Tactically republicans employed a variety of methods in their operations including ambushes, assassinations, bombing campaigns, raids to acquire weapons, booby trap bombs, attacks (including the burning/bombing of Government buildings) and the bombing of local infrastructure. On the 10^th of April 1920, 150 coordinated attacks took place across Ireland. In terms of Tyrone, two attacks were launched against RIC barracks in Broughderg and Trillick and a year later in April 1921; attacks took place throughout the county in Coalisland, Carrickmore, Mountfield, Drumquin, Dromore and Pomeroy (Magee, 2011). Between April 1920 and June 1922, there were 46 operations in Tyrone involving 12 attacks that destroyed RIC barracks, 26 ambushes on RIC personnel, 5 raids on mail trains (mainly to obtain intelligence), one arms raid in Gortin, one income tax office attack in Dungannon, and a reprisal attack at Doons creamery in Dunamore. Fatalities were suffered on both sides and operations soon spread into quiet areas (Magee, 2011; McCluskey, 2014).

Republicans have a long history of attacks on commercial business and trade. During the Anglo-Irish War (1919–1921) and the brief Northern offensive in 1922, there again was a commercial aspect to many IRA operations. The Belfast trade boycott was initiated following the expulsion of Catholic workers from the Belfast shipyards in the summer of 1920. The Irish Parliament (Dáil Éireann) imposed a boycott on Belfast foods and firms, which saw members of the IRA intercepting and destroying products that originated in the north-east, and southern traders were banned from doing business with their northern counterparts (Moore, 2019). IRA operations in Tyrone involved destroying trains carrying goods between Belfast and Derry/Londonderry and attacking local businesses.

Successful IRA attacks often required local assistance. Kelly¹⁷, in his witness statement in 1953 to the Bureau of Military History 1913–21 provided details of IRA operations including an attack on Cookstown RIC barracks on the 18^th June 1920. This attack involved Kelly meeting with a friendly RIC officer, who offered his assistance to facilitate the barrack’s attack. Cookstown was regarded as an orange (Protestant) town, therefore, no local men knew of the attack of a lack of trust. Subsequently, this left the attack party with no local guidance. In addition to the acquisition of weapons and ammunition, the attack claimed the life of the first IRA volunteer (Patrick Loughran) following an exchange of gunfire.

Local communities were often identified by their geography and religion. Kelly (1953) highlighted the mixture of orange and green (Catholic) in most areas of Tyrone. This interplay of geography and religion was a restricting factor in the risk to IRA operations. Kelly’s recollections display the need and ability of the IRA to acquire intelligence where possible. He also highlighted an absence of good communication between companies, an overall lack of organisational skills and poor IRA leadership in the area between 1917 and 1920. This was compounded by an abortive effort to organise and provide weapons for a Tyrone-based flying column (a highly mobile unit). Commentators note that the ‘Northern IRA was much weaker and more disorganised’ (McAnallen, 2016, p. 35). A view supported by Eoin O’Duffy upon his appointment as Commandant of the 2^nd Northern Division in March 1922. O’Duffy was not impressed with his men’s lack of discipline and subsequently dismissed ‘every officer in the offending battalion’ (McGarry, 2005, p. 75). This action may have been due to fear of retribution by loyalists but the repeated reorganisation of republican structures underlines poor organisational skills and leadership especially in Tyrone.

1920s IRA activity in the south far outstripped Tyrone’s activity and the IRA were faced with hostility and apathy from the civilian population in the county. This was due to fear of violent reprisals from the counter-insurgency pursued by the RIC and the Ulster Special Constabulary (USC).¹⁸ Between June 1920 and July 1921, the IRA was responsible for 22 incidents of violent intimidation against 76 incidents from the security forces. Around 100 local volunteers were poorly armed compared to the superior equipment and numerical strength of around 3000 RIC/USC ‘A’ and ‘B’ specials. A British Army rifle brigade and a battalion from the North Staffordshire Regiment were also based in Tyrone. Thus, Tyrone had a poor Anglo-Irish War compared to many other counties with only Antrim and Down registering less revolutionary IRA violence than Tyrone with nearby Monaghan registering the highest levels of IRA violence. Hart’s (2003) statistical analysis revealed that between 1917 and 1923, there were 3.7 conflict-related deaths per 10,000 of the population in Tyrone, 11.8 in Monaghan and 6.2 in Fermanagh. Compounded by a new northern police offensive that interned 282 republicans/nationalists in May 1922 (McCluskey, 2014), poor leadership together with pro-treaty government legitimacy, ruthlessness, superior weaponry and supplies ensured the IRA were defeated in 1923.

Templates of political violence: the troubles period

Prior to the onset of the Troubles, Tyrone had experienced sporadic episodes of violence including the border campaign of 1956–1962 (Operation Harvest). There was an inbuilt and fairly well-established IRA and republican clubs’ network and structure in the county (Magee, 2011). According to a republican research participant, ‘Tyrone always had a strong IRA brigade with a good political base’ (Republican 3, interview, 2012). Several of those released from the Crumlin Road Gaol after the border campaign rejoined the IRA. Volunteers in Tyrone retained a general loyalty to the Goulding IRA leadership faction, soon to be known as the Official IRA (OIRA) or the ‘Stickies’.¹⁹ Local leadership was always important and ‘a steady transition occurred from the old to the new leadership’ (Magee, 2011, p. 125). Kevin Mallon, an East Tyrone leader during the border campaign was reported by British Army intelligence as ‘an O/C of PIRA Operations in the UK’ in 1973 (Ministry of Defence, 1973a).

As with other rural areas of Ireland, the context and circumstances within Tyrone were considerably different from what was happening in Belfast or Derry/Londonderry. In 1969, there was not the same level of immediate threat to the nationalist and republican community, which made up the majority of the overall population in the county. Subsequently, there was not a desperate sense of urgency to gather up weapons from all over Ireland for the purposes of defence as elsewhere (Magee, 2011).

The PIRA emerged from the spent force that was the old southern led IRA of the 1950s and 1960s (English, 2003). As Republican 2 recalls, ‘[t]here was only one IRA then, and the reason we broke away from the Stickies was because they just wouldn’t hand out weapons or defend people or anything’ (Interview, 2012). Structurally then the East Tyrone brigade in the early 1970s had two battalions. The first covered Dungannon, Coalisland, Lough Shore, Moy (B Company), Aughnacloy and Monaghan. The second battalion covered Omagh, Cookstown, Pomeroy, Cappagh, Plumbridge and Carrickmore (O’Callaghan, 1998). In the 1970s, the PIRA moved away from the larger conventional (1920s style) military organisational principle owing to its perceived security vulnerability with operations now carried out by Active Service Units (ASUs). These were small, tight-knit cells, usually consisting of five to eight members. This new design and tactic was to improve operational effectiveness but most of all to improve internal security (Bowyer Bell, 1997; English, 2003). This was required as a result of improved success by the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) Special Branch²⁰ in infiltrating the ranks of the PIRA at all levels. Although a republican research participant felt this was less an issue in Tyrone than in Belfast: ‘It is difficult with any certainty to hold informers to account. At an operational level, East Tyrone could have been infiltrated at some level, but in Belfast, political and leadership figures were infiltrated’ (Republican 3, interview, 2012).

By January 1970, the PIRA Army Council had ordered a full-scale offensive against the British Army. As English (2003, p. 128) notes this entailed a guerrilla campaign to free Ireland contextualised within the ‘richness of a tradition validated by contemporary experience’. Examination of British Army (Infantry Brigade) intelligence (MOD, 1973b) summaries reveal East Tyrone PIRA tactics over a three-month period (Table 1).

Table 1. East Tyrone PIRA tactics between July and September 1973.

Type of incident	Number of incidents	Targets
Shooting	15	Directed against security forces and civilians.
Deaths – PIRA	5	Members of PIRA killed by malfunctioning explosive devices during operations
Deaths – Security forces	2	1 RUC reserve officer 1 UDR soldier
PIRA robberies	5	Banks and Post Offices

Additionally, during this period, two civilians from Moy were killed by loyalist terrorists (a renewed struggle between communities) and 16 arrests were made for terrorist activity. This included the arrest and charging of PIRA leader Kevin Mallon by the police in the Republic of Ireland for membership of PIRA. Furthermore, there were 10 finds of explosives, weapons and/or ammunition, which netted rifles, mortars, RPG²¹ warheads, a 500 lb landmine at Donaghmore and a 400 lb bomb at Coalisland. During one week in August, there was one major terrorist incident every day within 5 miles of Dungannon town (MOD, 1973b).

The similarities between previous campaigns are evident in this three-month period in 1973. The use of ambushes, bombing campaigns and attacks on both police and army, including attacks on barracks, local businesses and government buildings. PIRA suffered major setbacks during this period losing men and munitions. This curtailed the viciousness and intensity of operations and they resorted to using PIRA members based in and from Monaghan and Dublin in their cross-border operations into Tyrone and Fermanagh before returning safely to the south (MOD, 1973b).

The PIRA’s conflict included a covert war against RUC and Army intelligence, a media/propaganda war, a prison war involving hunger strikes invoking the traditions of the rebels of 1916–1921 and eventually an internal war after the 1994 and 1997 ceasefires (English, 2003; Leahy, 2020; O’Rawe, 2016). Secondly, there was the struggle between communities, between Catholics and Protestants. Conflict, therefore, developed on three levels: control of the state, a struggle for power between communities (inter community violence), and a struggle for control within those communities (intra community violence). These actions against other civilians included internal discipline, punishment of informers, intimidation and murder of state functionaries (e.g. building contractors and civilian workers in the police and at army bases), petty criminals and exacting retribution from rural hostile loyalist paramilitary groups such as the Ulster Volunteer Force. There was a dynamic of conflict within local areas and East Tyrone was a typical example of one conflict among perhaps 16/17 different local conflicts across Northern Ireland. Leahy (2020, p. 6) refers to this as the ‘under appreciated regional nature of the conflict’.

Discrimination in the East Tyrone area had produced a sequence of events involving civil rights protests and a violent state response. English (2003, p. 90) states unequivocally that ‘there was a direct, causal, practical and ideological connection between the 1960s IRA and the civil rights initiative’. It is probable; therefore, that a pre-split IRA could have benefited from a civil rights campaign. The involvement of Tyrone republicans in the civil rights campaign produced a strategic vehicle from which the PIRA grew and gained strength via a culture of grievance. Subsequently, a relationship of violence between republicans, the British state and loyalists developed, which helped to create and strengthen the PIRA as an organisation. The PIRA created its own ‘green book’ on strategy and tactics highlighting its long-term objective to establish a democratic socialist republic with a short-term objective of ‘Brits out’ by use of a guerrilla strategy. As a republican research participant explained, ‘It’s about the four Ms: men, money, management and material’ (Republican 2, interview, 2012).

The PIRA also needed to find a balance between the use of political violence and politics. Cobain (2020, p. 64) contends that

for generations, the central tenant of physical force republicanism had been that only through armed struggle could the British be ejected from Ireland: many republicans would want to be sure that increased political activity would not mean any reduction of their armed campaign.

Republicans in the late 1970s rolled out their so-called Long War strategy. As Republican 2 comments,

[t]here was no justification for violence, but in the circumstances, we had no other avenue to propagate what we were all about. Violence breeds a violent response, which is what we wanted, a reaction from the state. It played completely into our hands. (Interview, 2012)

During the Troubles, PIRA attacked the local economic and business infrastructure. The established template of boycotting businesses also took place. From 1970 onwards, they put direct economic pressure on the British government. This strategy employed the new propaganda value afforded by the modern television era. Additionally, innovative tactics such as the car bomb were utilised following the creation of a nitrobenzene explosive mix by PIRA engineers. This was to become the most devastating of all tactics and increased the number of civilian deaths and injuries due to either inadequate warnings or no warning attacks. Severe damage was inflicted on local economies. Magee (2011) notes that between 1971 and 1993, Dungannon experienced 108 bombings. The sheer scale of this economic war was to have a devastating effect on the economy of Northern Ireland and the often, indiscriminate nature of the bombing campaign alienated the general public. However, the PIRA saw such a strategy as tantamount to winning.

The East Tyrone Brigade’s primary targets in Tyrone during the Troubles were remote police stations and off-duty members of the security forces. There were 24 rural police stations in Tyrone, many run by four or five officers during the daytime only. Mortar and bomb attacks on RUC stations were backed by intimidation against contractors called in to repair the damage (Holland & Phoenix, 1996; Moloney, 2002). The campaign against Tyrone RUC stations peaked in late 1985 with the attack on Ballygawley RUC station led by Paddy Kelly, the East Tyrone Brigade commander (Holland & Phoenix, 1996). The pattern of republicans attacking security force members and their barracks/bases is the strongest template of attack carried through the generations. This can be seen in a PIRA statement following the Ballygawley attack: ‘Nationalists can clearly see the connection between these attacks and the IRA Tan War operations in the 1919–1921 period which led to a British withdrawal from the Twenty-Six Counties’ (quoted in Magee, 2011, p. 203). The aim to destroy bases coupled with killing security force members therein and seizing munitions and information remained the favoured republican military tactic. Some attacks were viewed as successes (e.g. Ballygawley and The Birches RUC station in 1986) as they resulted in the destruction of the stations but others resulted in the loss of volunteers (e.g. the Loughgall RUC station attack in May 1987²²). As an ex-RUC officer explained: ‘[Loughgall] was probably the most significant and successful operation throughout the Troubles against East Tyrone PIRA’ (Ex-RUC officer 3, interview, 2013). The strategy to create security force-free zones or no-go areas remained a high priority for republicans. As a republican research participant recounts how Jim Lynagh (a key member of the East Tyrone Brigade of the PIRA) created military strategy:

He wanted flying columns of around 15–25 men. He wanted gun battles. He was prepared to make casualties but also to take casualties. He wanted to take areas and hold areas, like a no-go zone. This started in 1985. As soon as he was released from prison in 1986, he started the project …  Lynagh was very well respected and was a thinker and a strategist. The Birches and Loughgall ASUs were, in fact, flying columns. It was called the ‘Tet Offensive’. (Republican 1, interview, 2011)

Attacks on security force members (i.e. British Army, RUC, RUC Reserve, ‘B’ Specials and Ulster Defence Regiment²³) were another high priority for republicans with personnel consistently targeted. Many attacks occurred when personnel were off duty and for part-time members while performing their day jobs as bus drivers, postmen or refuse collectors. Tommy McKearney (a leading member of the East Tyrone Brigade of the PIRA) justifies killing part-timers off duty by identifying them as local militia gathering intelligence (cited in Taylor, 1997). The PIRA had intimate familiarity with accents, the pattern of life in their district and knowledge of who was who and a member of which family. As Patterson (2010) notes this war of attrition was a slow grind and any attack was viewed as being sectarian.

Templates of political violence

From the discussion so far, we can observe a number of patterns within republican political violence in the two time periods under study. McKearney (2011, p. 53) states that ‘the pattern of violence in the 1920s  …  impacted ominously on the generation of 1969; the victims of that onslaught were determined that they would not be left so vulnerable again’. Provocation, reprisals and revenge became the cornerstone of an attack strategy for motivation and justification for attacks against the British and civilians. This was facilitated by the continuous state reaction to anti-state violence, which deepened the very disaffection it was intended to quell. The PIRA benefitted strategically from mass radicalisation and recruitment following a number of incidents including the violent reaction to the civil rights campaign, riots in Derry/Londonderry and Belfast, loyalist attacks, the introduction of internment (detention without trial) in 1971²⁴, Bloody Sunday in 1972²⁵ and the blanket protests and hunger strikes²⁶ in the Maze prison in 1980/81. As English (2003, p. 128) notes this reaction ‘fitted a long standing republican framework’ (English, 2003, p. 128) of organisational continuity from the IRB, the 1916 rebels and the first Dáil through to 1969/70. Contemporary experiences updated traditional tactics and early provocative attacks by the PIRA helped them to grow and flourish in a war of attrition with the British Army. Local support, leadership, contingency and initiative gave renewed momentum to the PIRA in Tyrone throughout the Troubles. The major difference between the two campaigns is their intensity. Local support was essential for the safety of the PIRA volunteers on the run and boosted the morale of the organisation (McNulty, 2014). Patterns of IRA violence and the British response showed violent similarity between the 1920s IRA, the East Tyrone PIRA brigade and their British enemy. SAS activity from 1983 reacted to the East Tyrone PIRA’s escalation strategy until it stopped in 1992 (Hart, 2003). The change in activity levels in both campaigns had a wider impact on the national conflicts raging at their respective times. Circumstances during the Troubles were, therefore, very different towards making a successful military impact compared to the 1920s Tyrone IRA.

It is clear in this first area of focus that the IRA and PIRA adapted their structures to improve their strategy to defeat the British and unite Ireland. Traditional, British military-style structures of brigades, battalions and companies in the 1920s were replaced in the late 1970s with smaller brigades and ASUs to improve operations and internal security (Leahy, 2020). The overall strategy involved the use of assassinations, ambushes, bombing campaigns, sporadic attacks on police including the destruction of barracks (to create liberated zones), booby trap bombs, raids to acquire weapons, attacks on (including burning/bombing) government buildings and the bombing of local infrastructure. Similar tactics were replicated during the Troubles but on a much bigger scale. We can compare the template of creating security force-free zones or no-go areas in the 1920s to the East Tyrone PIRA brigade’s strategy to create a liberated zone west of the River Bann.²⁷ A number of RUC stations in Tyrone and north Armagh were attacked and destroyed during the 1980s including Ballygawley, The Birches and Loughgall. Building contractors were targeted for murder to prevent attacked stations being repaired and rebuilt.

This difference in scaling is important. The PIRA acquired munitions from international sources including the United States and Libya as well as becoming experts in the use of technology and engineering such as creating its own nitrobenzene explosive mix (Magee, 2011). This development led to much larger more powerful vehicle bombs (e.g. the MK15 ‘barrack buster’²⁸) that devastated targets including town centres (Magee, 2011).

Themes of family, tradition and locality in Tyrone are evident within the violent republican strategy and the tactics employed with particular republican families present in the two campaigns (e.g. the Kellys – discussed later). Tradition, fed by expertise, sacrifice, community, commemoration, religion, sectarianism and territory spanned both time periods under scrutiny and locality was additionally vitally important in that, within the county, terrorist activity can be construed as local. Hanley (2022) offers a compelling comparison between the IRA and the PIRA,

The ‘old’ IRA was a mass movement of over 100,000 volunteers, though very poorly armed. The modern IRA was much smaller but by the late 1980s at least, exceptionally well equipped. The Tan War²⁹ achieved more with less  …  Partition ensured the modern IRA represented a minority of a minority.

The PIRA became a very militaristic and hierarchical movement. Neither the methods nor the overall objectives changed. The PIRA continued with their Long War even when it seemed that what they were doing was not capable of achieving the goal of a united Ireland. A Republican research participant when asked, was it all worth it? Replied ‘No’ (Republican 1, interview, 2011). The PIRA opted to make the six counties ungovernable and make a political settlement impossible until the development of the peace process when they stopped ‘maintaining tactics for traditional reasons’ (Leahy, 2020, p. 238) and their new political strategy emerged.

Conflict between local communities in East Tyrone

For generations in East Tyrone, there has been a struggle for power between the communities, Protestant and Catholic (inter community violence) and a struggle for control within those communities (intra community violence). In terms of the latter struggle, both the IRA and later the PIRA required both support from, and control of, the local nationalist community. As an ex-RUC officer explained: ‘[PIRA] … had a tremendous community network of eyes and ears, they knew where everyone was, and it was a cat-and-mouse game. They are all married into each other[’s families] and outsiders are not trusted’ (Ex-RUC officer 2, interview, 2012). Examples of intra community violence include the abduction and murder of Columba McVeigh, who was a member of a group of people known as ‘the disappeared’³⁰ and the murder of Assistant Public Prosecutor Rory O’Kelly from Coalisland. The PIRA stated his murder was ‘part of our continuing attacks against British imperialism’s judiciary and administration’ (quoted in Currie, 2004, p. 287).

In many areas, the conflict between the IRA and the ‘B’ specials (inter community conflict) was essentially between the two communities in that the former were comprised of republicans/Catholics and the latter loyalist/Protestants (Wright, 1987). This has relevance to the use of intimate violence within a system of communal deterrence. As Wright (1996, p. 6) highlights, ‘people do not have to agree with violence, they only have to understand what is happening and to be frightened by it’. In an interview with Father Louis O’Kane in 1967, Alice McSloy (an ex-member of Cookstown Cumann na mBan³¹), produced a letter sent to her father in 1922 from the Cookstown and Coagh district No 42 Ulster Black and Tan Association. The letter stated,

[t]his is to warn you that if any harm befalls any of his Majesty’s police now serving, or who have served in your district; you and your family and relatives will be held personally responsible. We remain, Sir, for retribution. (quoted in McAnallen, 2016, p. 92)

This suggests a direct threat from one community to the other, as the Ulster Black and Tan Association was overwhelmingly Protestant in composition. With respect to the Ulster Special Constabulary’s ‘B’ Specials, Tyrone had in 1923 the largest number in Northern Ireland with some 4,273 members (Farrell, 1983).

Much of the inter community violence in Tyrone was as a result of retaliatory action by the Crown Forces. McCluskey (2014, p. 126) notes that, between June 1920–1922, both the Crown Forces and the IRA 2^nd Northern Division killed 17 people each. Crown Forces’ casualties and fatalities stood at 46 against 41 for the IRA. Moreover, four-fifths of the killings/casualties attributed to the Crown Forces were reprisals against republicans or civilians against one-third of IRA attacks. Half of the IRA’s killings were against the military. According to McCluskey (2014, pp. 126–127), Crown Forces were more likely to undertake reprisals,

[as] the inclusive republican ideal appears to have actually checked retaliation  …  the stated objectives driving republican violence were more egalitarian and inclusive than unionism or loyalism  …  the structures of the unionist bloc in fact encouraged conceptions of Protestant superiority and Catholic inferiority, thereby justifying violence  …  Above all, the unionist claim on Tyrone rested on force.

Moreover, IRA military action that sought to provoke retaliatory action by the Crown Forces was intended to win further support for the republican cause. Sometimes this backfired with the deaths of local IRA men. For example, in April 1920 a RIC sergeant shot and wounded Eileen O’Doherty in Dromore. Eileen’s brother, Daniel, a member of the IRA found the sergeant responsible and killed him. The following night, the ‘B’ Specials in Dromore, entered three locals and took three suspected local IRA men (including Daniel) to the outskirts of the town where they killed them. This was followed by the local IRA ambushing the police on the 14^th of May with a bomb and gunfire attack in retaliation. On this occasion, four RIC officers were wounded and Volunteer Eddie McCusker was shot dead (Lawler, 2011). Indeed, the Irish and British governments’ counter-terror tactics of arrests, internment and executions while devastating to the IRA did not quell the initial violence rather they resulted in more violence (English, 2003). This fits with Wright’s (1987) idea of ‘an endless chain of violence’ (p.11).

The geography of sectarianism is extremely important in the relationship between the PIRA’s local conflict in East Tyrone with the British state and loyalists, as it was to the IRA’s local war in 1920. English states that ‘sectarian influences played a vital part in moulding the thinking of the Provisionals’ (English, 2003, p. 123). An ex-UDR officer contended that: ‘We had a very clear sense that this was some sort of ethnic cleansing. They were targeting male Protestants who were landowners. If they happened to be UDR then that gave them a better excuse’ (Ex-UDR officer 1, interview, 2012). According to a former security force research participant:

Sectarian hatred was fuelling a lot of what was happening in East Tyrone. On both the PIRA front and loyalism, murder and mayhem was fuelled by personal hatred and vendettas …  Personal revenge was evident on both sides. Coagh was part of the local war. It wasn’t an Adams and McGuiness strategy, it was an East Tyrone strategy. While they were pushing to achieve PIRA goals, they were also pushing to achieve their own goals, as in revenge for family members they perceived were murdered by security forces or murdered by loyalists. (Ex-RUC officer 4, interview, 2013)

This is in contrast to the views espoused by PIRA members in the county interviewed by Toolis (1995, p. 60) who denied sectarianism was their motivation for killing targets:

Tyrone had always been a ‘fighting county’  …  and always would be until the Brits left’  …  We have our aim. Our aim is to get the British out of Ireland and we will not be deflected into a war with Protestants …  Ideally, we want to hit the British Army  …  they are harder to hit now …  so we have to settle for RUC and UDR men. But religion has nothing to do with it …  we have no problem with Protestants.

Henry Brothers [local contractors who build and repair security force bases] are collaborating in the oppression of the nationalist people by taking part in that work …  They have been warned countless times to stop  …  If you shoot them, they will stop, just like UDR sergeant Mr Jameson.³² We are constantly misrepresented.

Whether the PIRA, and specifically the East Tyrone PIRA, were motivated towards sectarian violence primarily depends not on the victim’s identity, but the attacker’s intent. Were off-duty UDR soldiers killed because they were soldiers or Protestants? The answer to both is probably yes. Elliott contends that ‘sectarianism always has a religious element’ (Elliott, 2009, p. 4) and this was evident on both sides in East Tyrone. Sectarian-motivated killings satisfied the East Tyrone PIRA’s need to be seen to be defending their community. They also had the availability of soft targets, namely part-time UDR soldiers, and the ability to target Unionist politicians with Ken Maginnis, ex-South Tyrone Member of Parliament, Protestant and part-time UDR major, being targeted more than once. Sectarian killings also had the effect of provoking loyalists (Shanahan, 2000).

The East Tyrone PIRA and the local UVF were deeply involved in a bloody sectarian conflict. In April 1988, the PIRA killed Edward ‘Ned’ Gibson, an off-duty part-time member of the UDR. As a former RUC officer explained ‘[i]t was to be Ned Gibson’s murder that began to attract the hunger for revenge among the local loyalists located mainly in the Coagh, Cookstown area’ (Ex-RUC officer 1, interview, 2013). Following Gibson’s murder, the homes of the few remaining Catholic families in Coagh were targeted by a Protestant mob and subsequently abandoned. As Toolis (1995, p. 60) notes ‘[i]t was inevitable that Tyrone’s Protestant community saw the [P]IRA campaign as a sectarian warfare against them’. This Coagh/Ardboe/Stewartstown experience typifies Wright’s analysis that victims of violence (i.e. Ned Gibson) are identified as representing particular groups of people (i.e. loyalists in Coagh village). When the PIRA attacked members of the Coagh community, they attacked the entire community provoking an endless chain of violence.

East Tyrone portrays the intimacy of local violence, which saw 75 people killed between 1987 and 1994. As a former security force research participant explained

[t]he hard republicans and loyalists practically live in each other’s pockets; they are neighbours. They walk past each other in the street. They will not acknowledge one another but the hatred is hanging out of them. This was a very localised war. (Ex-RUC officer 4, interview, 2012)

The Coagh/Ardboe/Stewartstown areas of East Tyrone provide us with examples of inter-community conflict between republicans (PIRA) and loyalists (UVF). The Irish News reported that four Protestants³³ and four Catholics³⁴ were killed in the Coagh/Stewartstown area within a two-year period (cited in McKittrick et al., 2004). This is further evidence of the representative violence and intimacy during the local conflict.

Were the IRA tactics in the 1920s also sectarian? Although the conflict between the IRA and the ‘B’ Specials was essentially between two communities, the research and statistics suggest that they were more egalitarian with the republican ideal restricting retaliation and that their tactics backfired due to Crown Forces and Unionist retaliatory force. This retaliatory action was supported by coercive legislation such as the Special Powers Bill 1922, which permitted search, arrest and detention without warrant, flogging and capital punishment for arms offences and the suspension of civil liberties. This is a form of what Wright describes as ‘representative violence’ where individuals are targeted for attack as a result of actions/attacks carried out by the community they come from. Religion and geography identified the different communities and as Wright contends, ‘[o]nce the cycle is underway, some acts of violence done by our side are seen by us as self-defence, reprisal, pre-emptive strike or deterring actions. And we fear “them” – the violent people on the other side’ (Wright, 1996, p. 6). This fear and mistrust facilitated the use of violence within a system of communal deterrence. The research for this article suggests that East Tyrone PIRA was more sectarian than the 1920s IRA due to a stronger UVF campaign directed at them locally. Sectarian violence would therefore be viewed as a tactic to destabilise communities and provoke retaliatory violence.

Conclusion

The case study of republican violence in Tyrone in two distinct historical periods has revealed that a template of violence established during the Anglo-Irish War was replicated during the Troubles. The historical and traditional legitimisation of violence in the county is rooted in Irish nationalism, local grievances and the specificities of its geographical location. Father Dennis Faul speaking about Tyrone, commented:

Here it is about land. People talk about the Protestants having taken their field, even though it happened three hundred years ago. They still feel a sense of belonging to that bit of land and being entitled to have it back. (quoted in O’Doherty, 1998, p. 131)

Moreover, the IRA during the Anglo-Irish War created a local conflict that the PIRA exacerbated through its campaign of violence, which was often perceived by its victims as sectarian in nature. The violence in Tyrone perpetrated by republican and loyalists alike can be understood as representative violence as theorised by Wright. Moreover, within the context of Northern Ireland, the representative violence undertaken by republicans had a sectarian aspect to it in that UDR soldiers were targeted because they were both soldiers and Protestants and for loyalists Catholics were considered members/supporters of the PIRA. Thus, the case study of Tyrone presented in this article has provided an understanding of local conflict within a wider terrorist campaign. Themes of nationalism, sovereignty, self-determination and the existence of grievances that often give rise to vengeance and retribution are common not only in Northern Ireland but elsewhere in the world.

Acknowledgements

The author expresses thanks to Dr Ed Burke of the University of Nottingham for sharing and discussing research and ideas, and for commenting helpfully on earlier drafts. Thanks to all the interviewees whose contributions are included here; and to the anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by Arts and Humanities Research Council: [Grant Number AH/T003944/1].

Notes on contributors

Neale Gregg

Dr Neale Gregg is a visiting research fellow in Political Violence at the University of Nottingham.

Notes

1 The Easter Rising was an armed insurrection by Irish nationalists against the British government of Ireland. For more details, see Bew (2007) and McCluskey (2014).

2 The SAS is a special forces unit in the British Army, which was deployed in Northern Ireland during the Troubles.

3 Tom Barry and Dan Breen were volunteers in the Irish Republican Army in the Anglo-Irish War. Barry was the Commander of the 3rd West Cork Flying Column.

4 Tyrone became a centre of disaffection due to its historic association with the O’Neill clan who were so long the opponents of British rule (McCluskey, 2011). For more details, see McCluskey (2014) and Magee (2011). Between 1969 and April 1993 52 PIRA members died in Tyrone (McKittrick et al., 2004). This is the highest number recorded as dying from any PIRA brigade area during the Troubles.

5 The Father Louis O’Kane Collection holds some 80 interviews with veterans of the Anglo-Irish War recorded between 1963 and 1970. The interviews explored the veterans’ experiences up until the truce of 1921. The majority of interviewees were from Ulster, primarily from the counties of Antrim, Armagh, Derry/Londonderry and Tyrone.

6 Cardinal Tomás Ó Fiaich served as the Catholic Primate of All Ireland and Archbishop of Armagh from 1977 until his death in 1990.

7 The Bureau of Military History was tasked by the Irish Government to collate primary source material (i.e., witness statements, photographs and audio recordings) for the period 1913–1921 with respect to the history of the movement for Irish independence.

8 The term ‘security forces’ includes members of the police (e.g., Royal Irish Constabulary and the Royal Ulster Constabulary) and the army (e.g., the British Army and the Ulster Defence Regiment).

9 The study received ethical approval from the University of St Andrews (Ethics Ref IR 8095). All interviewees received a participant information sheet and signed a consent form. All interviews were truncated to ensure only relevant data is quoted in articles arising out of the research.

10 Within the literature, the Anglo-Irish War is also referred to as the Irish War of Independence and the Tan War. For the purposes of consistency, the Anglo-Irish War is used throughout the article unless a direct quote is used and an alternate name employed.

11 A barracks is an historical term describing a building that holds a group of soldiers or police officers. Base is the more modern term to describe the same building and surrounding land within a secure wall or fence.

12 Loyalists refers to those individuals who support the continued existence of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom (UK) and are opposed to a united Ireland. See McAuley (2016) for more details on loyalism and loyalists.

13 Ulster is one of the four ancient provinces of Ireland, the others being Leinster, Munster and Connacht. Six of Ulster’s nine counties including Tyrone are in Northern Ireland with the remaining three in the Republic of Ireland.

14 The clan of the O’Neills were the sovereign kings of Tyrone from 1232 to 1616. The second Earl of Tyrone, Hugh O’Neill was defeated by the British and forced to leave Ireland in what is known as the ‘Flight of the Earls’ (1607) effectively ending the Gaelic order in Ireland.

15 They were formed in 1858 with the aim of establishing an independent democratic republic in Ireland and ceased operations in 1924.

16 The Royal Irish Constabulary was the police force in Ireland until 1922, when all of the country was part of the United Kingdom. Established in 1836 as the Constabulary of Ireland, the force received its royal prerogative in 1867 and became the Royal Irish Constabulary.

17 Kelly was a member of the Irish Volunteers from 1913 onwards and was O/C (officer commanding) for the Dungannon Battalion and for the 1st Brigade, 2^nd Northern Division in 1921.

18 The Ulster Special Constabulary (USC) were established in 1920 and had three sections, namely ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’ and ‘C1’. The ‘A’ Specials were a full-time paid auxiliary force and authorised to number around 2,000. The ‘B’ Specials were part-time, unpaid and undertook the operation of road blocks, patrolling and guarding buildings at night with authorisation for around 19,500 members. The ‘C’ Specials were a reserve force authorised to number around 7,500 members only and were intended for use in emergencies including the ‘C1’ force who could be mobilised at short notice to anywhere in Northern Ireland. By 1922, the ‘A’ and ‘C’ Specials had been stood down and the ‘B’ Specials were replaced in 1970 by a new part-time security force, the Ulster Defence Regiment. For more details, see Farrell (1983).

19 The term ‘sticky’ came from the adhesive Easter lilies members of the Official IRA wore as a symbol of the Easter Rising.

20 The RUC was the police force in Northern Ireland from 1922 to 2001. It was founded on the 1st June 1922 as a successor to the Royal Irish Constabulary following the partition of Ireland. Special Branch was an elite agent handling unit, which specialised in intelligence-led investigations and covert operations.

21 RPG stands for rocket-propelled grenade; these are a shoulder-fired rockets launcher. They were easy to use and were capable of piercing the armour of military vehicles and police Land Rovers.

22 The attack on Loughgall RUC station was compromised by the security forces, who had accurate pre-emptive intelligence. The SAS supported by the RUC lying in wait attacked the PIRA ASU as it set off a bomb to commence its attack on the station. As a result, eight PIRA volunteers and one civilian lost their lives.

23 The RUC Reserve were enlisted to support the RUC with their duties but were mainly tasked with security duties to protect RUC stations, The Ulster Defence Regiment replaced the Ulster Special Constabulary (‘B’ Specials) in 1970 and were a locally raised force within the British Army structure.

24 For more details on internment leading to widespread recruitment by the PIRA, see for example, Alonso (2007) and Moloney (2002).

25 Bloody Sunday saw 14 civilians killed by the British Army during a civil rights demonstration. For more details, see O’Dochartaigh (2005) and Hennessey (2007).

26 For more details on the prison protests see Beresford (1997) and O’Rawe (2016).

27 A strategy led by Jim Lynagh from Monaghan and Padraig McKearney from Moy.

28 This bomb was developed by the PIRA to be used in attacks against army and police barracks. The bomb placed in a beer keg or similar container, was set on a base plate on the back of a lorry or a van with its roof cut out. The vehicle was then driven close to the perimeter of the target and the bomb initiated by the driver (who had escaped) via a delay timer. The bomb was then be propelled over the barrack’s wall and exploded on impact.

29 As previously noted, the Tan War is another term for the Anglo-Irish War and is a reference to the ‘Black and Tans’, which was the nickname given to the 13,732 new police recruits added to the then 10,000 members of the old and increasingly demoralised RIC in 1921. An initial shortage of complete bottle green constabulary uniforms resulted in the temporary use of military khaki uniforms, hence the nickname ‘The Black and Tans’. For more details, see Bew and Frampton (2012).

30 Over the course of Troubles in Northern Ireland, 17 people were ‘disappeared’ (abducted and killed) by republican paramilitaries although the republican movement does not admit responsibility for all of them. To date, the remains of thirteen of the ‘disappeared’ have been recovered. McVeigh’s body is still missing. For more details, see the website of the Independent Commission for the Location of Victims Remains (https://www.iclvr.ie/en/iclvr/pages/thedisappeared).

31 The Cumann na mBan or ‘League of Women’ were an Irish republican women’s paramilitary organisation formed in Dublin in 1914, which became an auxiliary of the Irish Volunteers. For more details, see Foster (2014).

32 Thomas Jameson, a part-time UDR sergeant and worker for Henry Brothers, was ambushed by the PIRA as he drove a lorry between Donaghmore and Castlecaulfield in March 1990.

33 The four Protestants murdered by the PIRA were Ned Gibson (April 1988) and Leslie Dallas, Austin Nelson and Ernest Rankin (March 1989). All four were from the Coagh area.

34 The four Catholics murdered by the UVF were Phelim McNally (November 1988), Pete Ryan and Michael Devlin (November 1989) and Malachy McIvor (November 1990). All four were from the Ardboe/Stewartstown area.

35 This map is provided by Mabuska (18 June 2010) and is freely available from the Wikimedia Commons (https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Location_of_County_Tyrone_on_island_of_Ireland.png). Tyrone is in red and the pink counties constitute Northern Ireland.

36 This file is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-Share Alike 1.0 Generic license and is freely available (https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Tyrone_map.png).