China-Central and Eastern Europe Cooperation in a Divided World: Narratives and Scenarios

ABSTRACT

China launched the 16 + 1 initiative 10 years ago to facilitate interaction and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The paper argues that the geopolitical landscape has dramatically changed since 2012 when the initiative was announced, and this seriously affects the possibilities for further deepening of the relations between the CEE countries and China. Nowadays, the world is deeply divided, with growing competition for influence and exacerbating relations not only between Russia and the West but also between China and the Western countries. The rising geopolitical confrontation between the major powers in the international system (in the current situation with the war in Ukraine) strongly affects China’s relations with the CEE countries. Applying the instruments of the geopolitical analysis, the paper will seek to explore the impact of the changing international environment on China’s engagement in Central and Eastern Europe and draw conclusions about the prospects of China–CEE cooperation.

KEYWORDS:

• 14/17+1 format
• China
• CEE
• geopolitics

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

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Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Bulgarian National Science Fund to the Ministry of Education and Science [grant number FNI - KP-06-H55/15, 22.11.2021; project title: “China’s One Belt One Road Initiative in the Black Sea Region: An Analysis of Opportunities and Risks for Bulgaria”].