How and why the Arctic Council survived until now – an analysis of the transition in chairship between Russia and Norway

ABSTRACT

From Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine to the handover of the Norwegian chairship of the Arctic Council, concerns have arisen regarding the Council’s ability to weather this emerging geopolitical challenge. This article provides a chronological overview of the events within and outside the Council from 24 February 2022, until the chairship transition on 11 May 2023. Additionally, the article analyses the legal and political framework that has sustained the Arctic Council until now. Multiple factors have contributed to the Arctic Council’s ability still to be considered relevant: its role as a knowledge producer and facilitator, its strategic significance as a multilateral platform for cooperation, and the inclusion of non-state actors and indigenous peoples in decision-shaping processes. In addition to its incentivising individual states to demonstrate their commitment to Arctic governance when addressing climate and environmental issues in the north beyond the constraints of bilateral relations. By examining these incentives and contextualising the recent developments within the Arctic Council, this paper examines the chairship transition between Russia and Norway and discusses how and why the Arctic Council survived during this time.

KEYWORDS:

• Arctic Council
• Russia
• Norway
• science policy
• climate change

Acknowledgments

This paper was made possible through the project “MARCS: Making Use of Arctic Science – The Case of the Arctic Council.”, project no.334428, funded by the Research Council of Norway. The authors wish to express their gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers for highly valuable input.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

¹ As the current state of the Arctic Council is, to some degree, uncertain, the authors wish to emphasise that our definition of survival is connected to how the Arctic Council managed to endure the transition of chairship between Russia and Norway, and get to the point of resumption of project-level work in its working groups; Arctic Council, ‘Arctic Council advances resumption of project level-work’, February 28^th 2024.

² Interviews were conducted with various key figures who played central roles in Arctic Council operations before and after the events of February 24, 2022. To ensure sensitivity, all respondents’ identities have been anonymised and are referenced solely by assigned numbers.

³ Both authors have actively engaged in public discourse concerning the challenges faced by the Arctic Council. Additionally, the authors organised a side event during the Arctic Frontiers event in January 2023 and have maintained consistent communication with decision-makers and stakeholders within the Council throughout the period covered by this analysis.

⁴ The pleonasm ‘temporary pause’ is a small yet significant descriptor. It was essential to highlight that this interruption was only temporary, indicating that Russia was neither suspended nor expelled from the Arctic Council, but that the seven states paused their participation in the Council. The Arctic Council operates as a platform that influences decision-making rather than directly making decisions. In the aftermath of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, discussions have revolved around the Council’s role as a source of knowledge in international political contexts. For an in-depth exploration of its function as a knowledge provider and the various modes of decision-making, refer to the work by Svein Vigeland Rottem: ‘The Arctic Council – Between Environmental Protection and Geopolitics’, 2019, Palgrave Pivot.

⁵ Nilson, “Arctic Council “in pause mode” as seven of eight member states condemn war.” March 3^rd 2022; Greenwood. “Move Forward Without Russia.” May 4^th 2022

⁶ Forskningsrådet. “Research Cooperation with Russian Authorities is on Hold.” 2022.

⁷ Despite the challenges posed by questions surrounding Russia’s participation, certain areas of the international treaty-based cooperation continued. For a more detailed examination of various forms of international cooperation and the role of Russia, consider the work by Timo Koivurova and Akiho Shibata: “After Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine in 2022: Can We Still Cooperate with Russia in the Arctic?.”

⁸ Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission, “Protocol for the 52nd session of the mixed Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission,” 2022.

⁹ Rogoff, “It is Time for an Arctic Council 2.0.”

¹⁰ Koivurova, Timo. “The Arctic Council Can Continue without Russia.”

¹¹ Korchunov, “Oбсуждение актуальной арктической повестки в интересах жителей региона продолжится в рамках председательства России в Арктическом совете,” 2022.

¹² RIA Novosti, МИД: вступление Швеции и Финляндии в НАТО изменит сотрудничество в Арктике [MID: Finland and Sweden in NATO will affect cooperation opportunities in the Arctic], 2022.

¹³ Edvardsen, “Arctic Council Paused,” April 27, 2022; Economist, “The war in Ukraine is reverberating in the Arctic,” June 9, 2022; Kobzeva, Mariia, “The Need for New Arctic Exceptionalism?” May 23, 2022.

¹⁴ Melchiorre, “The Illusion of the Arctic Exceptionalism,” June 29, 2022.

¹⁵ Interview 3.

¹⁶ Interviews 1, 2, and group interview 1.

¹⁷ Quinn, “Senior Arctic Officials are Working,” May 10, 2022.

¹⁸ Regjeringen, “Fellesuttalelse om Arktisk Råd. Canada, Finland, Island, Danmark, Norge, Sverige, og USA gjenopptar arbeidet uten Russland,” June 8, 2023.

¹⁹ Group interview 1.

²⁰ Holm, “Arctic Council without Russia: A Spearhead for Democracy and Freedom of Expression?” June 10, 2022.

²¹ Barents Observer, “Seven Western Countries,” June 8, 2022.

²² Schreiber, “Arctic Council Nations to Resume Limited Cooperation – without Russia,” June 8, 2022.

²³ Korchunov, “Арктический совет: сценарии будущего международной площадки [Arctic Council: Future scenarios for international arenas],” July 20, 2022.

²⁴ Interview 2.

²⁵ Interview 3 and group interview 1.

²⁶ Schreiber, “China will not recognise an Arctic Council without Russia, envoy says,” October 17, 2022.

²⁷ Egede, “Historic Speech by the Prime Minister of Greenland,” September 13, 2022.

²⁸ Jonassen, “Arctic Indigenous Leaders Claim the World Stage,” October 14, 2022.

²⁹ Breum, “Though Official Arctic Contacts,” October 19, 2022.

³⁰ Interview 2 and 3.

³¹ Russian research participation within the Arctic Council has played a crucial role in enhancing understanding of climate and environmental challenges in the Northern regions. The absence of such participation has impacted several aspects of research collaboration within the Council. For a more comprehensive exploration of how research cooperation conditions have evolved after Russia invaded Ukraine, refer to Andreeva, ‘Science at Stake – Russia and the Arctic Council’, 2023.

³² Nature, “Arctic Science Cannot Afford a New Cold War,” 2020.

³³ Gaind et al, “Seven Ways the War in Ukraine is Changing Global Science,” 2022.

³⁴ Nature, “For the Climate’s Sake, Keep Arctic Communication Open,” 2022.

³⁵ Vad Petterson, “Nordområdene i en ny sikkerhetspolitisk situasjon,” December 1, 2022.

³⁶ Ibid.

³⁷ Huitfeldt, “Statement at the Arctic Frontiers Conference 2023,” January 31, 2022.

³⁸ Jonasssen, “Arctic Council Chairmanship – Norway Knows How to Do it,” January 31, 2023.

³⁹ Regjeringen, “Prioriteringer for Norges lederskap I Arktisk råd,” March 28, 2023.

⁴⁰ Arctic Encounter, “Arctic Encounter 2023 March 29–31 Agenda,” 2023

⁴¹ Interview 1.

⁴² Interview 2 and 3.

⁴³ Arctic Council, “Arctic Council Statement on the Occasion of the 13th Meeting of the Arctic Council,” 2023.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Interview 3.

⁴⁶ Korchunov, “Завершение председательства России в Арктическом совете [Press conference during the chairmanship takeover between Russia and Norway],” 2023.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ These guidelines were shared with the authors upon request, but are not yet officially accessible; Arctic Council (2023). Guidelines for the resumption of Working Group/Expert Group work through the use of written procedures.

⁴⁹ Ottawa Declaration, 1996, art. 7.

⁵⁰ Rottem, 2019.

⁵¹ Agreement on Cooperation on Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic. May 12, 2011. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States; Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and Response in the Arctic. May 15, 2013. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States; Agreement on Enhancing International Arctic Scientific Cooperation. May 12, 2017. Canada, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United States; Svein Vigeland Rottem has examined the negotiation processes around the emergence of these agreements, and one could read further about them in “A Note on the Arctic Council Agreements.” Ocean Development & International Law 46, no. 1 (2015): 50–59. https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320.2015.988940

⁵² Svein Rottem, “The Use of Arctic Science.” and Froukje Maria Platjouw, Eirik Hovland Steindal, and Trude Borch Platjouw, “From Arctic Science to International Law: The Road towards the Minamata Convention and the Role of the Arctic Council.” Arctic Review 9 (2018): 226.

⁵³ Christensen, “The global path,” 2006.

⁵⁴ Arctic Council, “Working Group Common Operating Guidelines,” 2018.

⁵⁵ Rules of Procedure, 2013, art. 18.

⁵⁶ Rules of Procedure, 2013, art. 3.

⁵⁷ These participant lists are available in the Arctic Council’s archives and can be viewed here: The 1st Arctic Council’s Ministerial Meeting in Iqaluit, Canada, September 17–18, 1998. Participant list. (https://oaarchive.arcticcouncil.org/handle/11374/2048); List of Participants. Barrow Ministerial Meeting. October 10–13, 2000. (https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1578); The 3rd Arctic Council’s Ministerial Meeting in Inari, Finland, October 9–10, 2002. Participant list. (https://oaarchive.arctic-council.org/handle/11374/1580).

⁵⁸ Arctic Council, “Arctic Council Statement on the Occasion of the 13th Meeting of the Arctic Council,” 2023.

⁵⁹ Andreeva, S. & Hønneland, G., “Arctic research and its Actors,” 2023

⁶⁰ The immediate consequences in the Arctic Council following the Russian annexation of Crimea were the United States and Canada boycotting working group meetings, and the Russian Foreign Minister not attending the ministerial meeting in Iqaluit, Canada, in 2015.

⁶¹ U.S. Department of State, “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” 2022; Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs “The Norwegian Government’s Arctic Policy,” 2020.

⁶² Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Iceland, “Iceland’s Policy on Matters Concerning the Arctic Region,” 2021.

⁶³ Regjeringskansliet, “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” 2020; Regjeringskansliet “Sweden’s strategy for the Arctic region,” 2011.

⁶⁴ U.S. Department of State, “National Strategy for the Arctic Region,” 2022, p. 14.

⁶⁵ Kremlin, “Внесены изменения в Основы государственной политики в Арктике на период до.

2035 года [Amendments have been made to the Fundamentals of State Policy in the Arctic for the period up to 2035],” 2023.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ Steinberg and Dodds, “The Arctic Council after Kiruna.”

⁶⁸ Rottem, The Arctic Council.

⁶⁹ Interview 2.

⁷⁰ D. Medvedev, “Основы государственной политики Российской Федерации в Арктике на период до 2020 года и дальнейшую перспективу’ (утв. Президентом РФ 18.09.2008 N Пр-1969) [‘Fundamentals of the state policy of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period up to 2020 and beyond,” 2008.

⁷¹ Gorbachev, “Murmansk Speech.”

⁷² Arctic Council, “Arctic Council advances resumption of project level-work,” February 28, 2024.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Research Council of Norway under Grant no. [334428].