The role of belief systems and misperceptions in halal tourism policy: evidences from Indonesia

Abstract

Policy business management and public policy have dominated the discussion on changes and continuity in halal tourism policy formulation. However, similar results across differing cases suggest the need for a novel explanation that accounts for a socio-cultural explanation. This research aims to explore the role of belief systems and misperceptions to explain the success and failure of halal tourism policy sustainability. The case of Indonesia is the perfect laboratory for this research as the country hosts diverse strands of Islam, which are not limited to religious practice. This research utilizes qualitative comparative methodology by sampling two of Indonesia’s top halal tourism destinations, Lombok and Yogyakarta, which are chosen through maximum variation sampling based on their diversity of Islamic belief systems. Furthermore, this research found that while the two areas similarly have a segmented religious community, the institutionalized strands differ. In Yogyakarta, the moderate ruling elite has become the monarchy leading the region’s governance, while in Lombok, purist religious leaders hold political power. The differing belief systems have resulted in a polarised misperception of halal tourism that has hindered its policy implementation in different ways.

Impact Statement

This research breaks new ground in the realm of halal tourism, through the socio-cultural dimensions of policy making. Highlights belief systems, particularly for Indonesia’s diverse landscape. Yogyakarta is a city where diverse identities foster moderate Islam. In contrast, Lombok is a city dominated by pure Islamic ideology, thus forming its local perception regarding halal tourism. These contrasting contexts not only reveal complexities within the tourism sector but also highlight broader societal dynamics.

The findings underscore the important relationship between policy sustainability and communal beliefs. Although political will and decentralization pose challenges, differences in local belief systems often determine the success or failure of halal tourism initiatives. This research suggests a socialization approach that is inclusive and oriented to the socio-cultural landscape. By fostering dialogue and understanding, stakeholders can face these complex challenges, paving the way for a more sustainable and inclusive halal tourism industry in Indonesia.

Keywords:

• Belief systems
• halal tourism
• Indonesia
• Islam
• misperception

Reviewing Editor:

• Robert Read, Economics, University of Lancaster, Lancaster, UK

Subjects:

• Political Economy
• Tourism Planning and Policy

1. Introduction

The discussion on halal tourism policy development is an interdisciplinary arena regarding the explanations given by scholars of various studies. As a rising trend in tourism policy worldwide halal tourism has become an interesting, exciting research niche that intersects the theories of public policy, economy, business management, and political science. The current trend in halal tourism discussion revolves around the gap between theories of effective and efficient policymaking and the success of their implementation. Linear to the trend in its practices, the research on halal tourism primarily highlights the cases found in Muslim-majority countries. For example, Isa et al. (2018) studied the effects of price and social variables on the consumers’ perception of halal tourism destinations in Malaysia. They found that the destinations’ experience value became the main driver behind halal tourism success.

Meanwhile, Uansa-Ard and Binprathan (2018) highlighted the need for coordination and cooperation between stakeholders in Thailand’s halal tourism industry to boost the sector. Most curiously, studies that have observed halal tourism policy development in Muslim-minority countries such as New Zealand (Razzaq et al., 2016), South Korea (Han et al., 2019; Marlinda et al. 2022), and Japan (Kurniawan & Jatmika, 2021) have also resulted in similar findings where there is a low success rate in policy implementation. The similar results in differing countries suggest that a novel explanation of halal tourism policy development and implementation is needed.

2. Literature review

Research in the past year on the issue has suggested the need for novel perspectives in analysing the practice of halal tourism. For instance, Ekka (2024) conducted a literature review of halal tourism research between 2020–2023, finding a lack of halal tourism conceptual advancement in business research. A similar result was found by Al-Ansi et al. (2022), which surveyed a more comprehensive range of study areas, only to find that previous literature could be more extensive in certain theoretical concepts. Studies are focused on exploring the impact of different pre-researched variables instead of expanding to find new ones. This is evident, for example, in the research of Bogan, (2023), Ramadhanti and Marsasi (2023), and Juliana et al. (2022). Another challenge is that previous research only focuses on applying existing hypotheses to new local cases without formulating new knowledge gaps and, thus, new explanations. This research picks up the urgency to introduce a new case to expand the discussion of halal tourism and to present it as a comparative study to test its viability and novelty.

Previous research has tried to explain the success of halal tourism policy development and implementation. The first cluster of explanations comes from the business management approach. This cluster applies the logic of consumer behaviors to prescribe specific approaches for halal business owners. These scholars studied the effect of destination-specific modalities on tourist consumption behaviors. For example, Rahman et al. (2019) argued that halal tourism providers’ service is the most crucial factor affecting tourist satisfaction. Suhartanto et al. (2021) found that the destination’s uniqueness and quality service led to tourist loyalty. A prior literature review by Rahmat (2021) found that this approach dominated the previous discussions on halal tourism. This explanation is also often used when identifying new market possibilities for halal tourism. For instance, Halkias et al. (2014) used this approach when analyzing the opportunity for halal tourism in Italy. The second cluster of explanations comes from the area of public policy. This cluster of explanations assumes that the success of the halal tourism industry relies on the government’s support of the sector, given how halal tourism is an early emerging economic sector. The research in this cluster is limited to Muslim-majority countries as these countries are the ones that often have a concrete and formalized halal tourism policy and strategy. These studies resulted in similar findings that the government must include all stakeholders in the policy-formulation process to ensure inclusivity and implementation success. The research by Keliat (2022) in Indonesia and Rehman (2020) in Oman are similar in tone.

Nevertheless, as aforementioned, the similar results of these studies show an undiscussed dimension in the discussion of halal tourism. The previous two approaches treated halal tourism as a one-sided process that treated consumers simply as the object of halal tourism policy and business marketing. These approaches neglect the nature of tourism as an inherently participatory economic sector in which social and cultural factors are essential. The tourism sector is a leisure economic area that exploits cultural uniqueness as the central pillar. A critical analysis by Amoiradis et al. (2021) argues that the stability and growth of the tourism sector depend on the support of the local community; thus, understanding the socio-cultural contexts of tourism destinations has become crucial. This idea has become the foundation of the critical concept of sustainable tourism. Sustainable tourism in tourism policymaking implies that the policies in tourism sectors must consider the perspectives and interests of all parties, especially the local communities, and other non-anthropological considerations, including the environment. As underlined by Roman et al. (2020) and Duro et al. (2021), the main pillar of sustainable tourism is the inclusivity of intersectional perspectives, which in turn contribute to the resilience of tourism practices. For instance, both of the aforementioned researches discussed the reconceptualization and application of sustainable tourism against the background of the Covid-19 pandemic.

We offer the case of Indonesia to understand the impact of socio-cultural factors on the success of halal tourism policy development. Indonesia is the world’s largest Muslim country, yet it is not an Islamic state. Indonesia’s national identity in relation to its nation-building has revolved around diversity, tolerance, and universal humanism. The discourse of Islam in the country is based on the dichotomy between political Islam and cultural Islam. As underlined by Firdaus (2019), while political Islam relates more to the core religious idealisms and their grandiose mass implications, cultural Islam is more concerned with the sociological symbols in society and the people’s daily lifestyle. This dichotomy is not often found in other Muslim-majority countries, where they more strongly embrace Islam as part of their nation-building. The development of cultural Islam in Indonesia has become the socio-cultural context of the local communities in Indonesia, affecting public policymaking, especially halal tourism.

We found that the socio-cultural factor is a novel and untapped explanation when analyzing the success and failure of halal tourism policies. In this research, we offer the concept of a belief system as an operational concept that affects halal tourism policymaking. We argue that by ignoring this, misperception exists as the main hurdle in the implementation and sustainability of halal tourism policy. In turn, misperception causes challenges in implementing halal tourism in the form of skepticism and rejection. We use the case of Indonesia to illustrate how the neglect of the belief system has produced misperception and implicated halal tourism policymaking and its sustainability. We use the cases of Lombok and Yogyakarta as the two destinations are designated as two of Indonesia’s top halal tourism destinations with a different Islamic culture context each. We present our discussion in the following structure. We start our discussion by providing our literature review and methodology. We then discuss how the belief system as a socio-cultural factor affects halal tourism policy and in what conditions it produces misperception. In the discussion section, we explain the state of Islam as a belief system in Indonesia, focusing on Yogyakarta and Lombok and how they affect regional policymaking. We then lay out the empirical evidence that we found on how belief systems in Lombok and Yogyakarta produce misperceptions and hurdles in halal tourism policymaking in both regions. We also analyze the implications of our findings towards the study and practice of halal tourism globally. In the last section, we conclude our argument.

3. Methodology

This research sampled Lombok and Yogyakarta as two of the top ten halal tourism priority destinations set by the Indonesian government. Furthermore, this research explored how the two regions have distinctive Islamic cultures. This research operationalizes the belief system as the variation of Islamic belief in both regions, which is identified through preliminary research. The result of this preliminary research found that while a homogenous Sunni Islam population dominates the Lombok population, the Muslim population in Yogyakarta is among the most heterogeneous in Indonesia. This is due to the region’s intense acculturation between Islam and Javanese values. By using maximum variation (heterogeneity) sampling (Shaheen et al., 2019), this research can see the impact of belief systems on policymaking by comparing the two models. This research combined primary and secondary data collection. The researchers collected preliminary data in Yogyakarta in May 2021 and Lombok in October 2021. The primary data collection combined two techniques, namely, interview (based on the framework by McGehee et al., 2012) and unstructured observation (based on the framework by Veal, 2018). The interview technique was used to gather the understanding of stakeholders. Meanwhile, structured observations provided an advantage where researchers may clarify the policy implementations beyond the official discourse released by policy-makers. The research then combined the data from these observations with primary and secondary data from library research, such as official documents, stakeholders’ statements, and news.

In terms of data analysis, this research utilized a comparative methodology. This research utilised a cross-cultural qualitative methodology. We equipped the framework as provided by Santos and Shim (2012). Santos and Shim’s framework departed from the understanding that culture plays a vital role in affecting the behaviors of tourism stakeholders. In this methodology, culture is treated not as a ‘possession’ of people but as an independent variable articulating people’s decisions across social settings. They also explained two main ways the methodology may be used. Some research agendas highlighted the cultural context of tourists and how it affects their decision-making.

On the other hand, some others investigate culture’s role in shaping tourist destinations and their communities. This research used the second paradigm, where we tried to examine the interrelationship between the cultural contexts of tourism destinations and their branding. This is done by collecting two primary data types achieved by field research. The researchers conducted interviews with stakeholders central to the branding processes of the destinations while also conducting naturalistic or qualitative observation of the destinations. As pointed out by Veal (2018), this unstructured observation provided an advantage where researchers may clarify the policy implementations beyond the official discourse released by policymakers.

4. Conceptual framework: belief system as a socio-cultural factor of misperception in policymaking

This section explores the theoretical links between belief systems as a socio-cultural factor and halal tourism policymaking. Including socio-cultural variables in politics and policymaking was an essential part of the constructivist turn in the Social Sciences in the 1990s. During the era, scholars pointed out the inability of rational choice theories to explain the being, continuity, and policy changes. The relativity of policy changes to certain specific communities prompted the idea that communities’ social and cultural background as both the subject and object of policymaking is the source of the changes. Several socio-cultural explanations of policymaking and policy changes emerged, one of which was a belief system. One of the earliest attempts at defining the concept of a belief system was made by Converse (1964), who defined it as ‘a configuration of ideas and attitude in which the elements are bound together’. A belief system is a part of one’s identity and refers to the core ideas about existence. Among the other variables constructing identity, belief systems are considered one of the most fundamental and constant. There are several reasons for this. First, the belief system explains the essential reasoning behind an individual’s existence. Second, a belief system is not a product of pure rational thought. Instead, it is shaped by years of intense socialization and a value-diffusion process directed towards an individual, making it a not-so-easily-shattered fragment of identity. Often, belief systems include metaphysical elements in the process, strengthening the ‘belief’ as a system of thought.

Religion falls upon the concept of a belief system. However, the concept of the belief system covers a broader range of phenomena. The concept of religion covers a set of institutionalized ideal values with long historical roots. However, we use the concept of belief system as religion often interacts with other identities in the community, forming new hybrid identities and practices as demonstrated by cultural Islam. This is in line with the argument of Wenzel (1971), who stated that religious belief systems should be viewed by accounting for the socioeconomic and sociological contingencies of the community. An effort to operationalize the concept of a belief system was made by Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva (2016). They argued that a belief system is a psycho-sociological mechanism, a cognitive congruence independent of its committed believers.

Furthermore, it covers various substantial elements of life, with its boundaries often undefined. They identified seven elements to a belief system: values, substantive belief, orientation, language, perspective, prescriptions and proscriptions, and ideological technology. Overall, they pointed out that belief systems are a set of substantial values that are being reinforced, believed, and practiced as an impact of long-standing socialization and detribalisation.

Scholars have researched the impact of belief systems on policy success and failure for a long time. Necessary pioneering research on the matter was conducted by Sabatier (1988). Sabatier’s research premise was that policymaking is ‘sets of value priorities and causal assumptions about how to realize them’. The research countered the basic assumption of prior research on belief systems and policymaking that the most critical variable is the belief systems of the policymakers. Sabatier argued that researchers should focus on ‘policy sub-systems’, a network of non-governmental stakeholders involved. This includes academics, media, interest groups, and communities interested in the policy area. Hann (1995) then proposed a revision of Sabatier’s thesis, arguing that belief systems should be seen as more dynamic and that there is a learning process related to belief systems happening to policymakers. Thus, the impact of a belief system on policies should not be seen as a one-way process. Hann’s argument was influenced by the newer strands of understanding that view identity as relational. This premise was advanced years later by Brandt and Sleegers (2021), who saw belief systems as interconnecting networks of inter-influencing relations. This paradigm became the gateway to the understanding that belief systems can be a shared identity attributed to a specific limited audience of believers.

Belief system plays a role in dictating policy choices in two ways. First is through the belief system of the policymakers. We must not forget that policymakers in the black box of policymaking are often a part of the community to which the policies are applied. In a greater sense, they are also prone to having a relational belief system. However, the unique characteristic through which their belief system affects policy formulation is that it is institutionalized. Lubell (2003) conceptualized the idea of ‘collective-action beliefs’. Collective-action beliefs stray from the traditional conception of institutional rational choice as the rational cost-benefit paradigm in policymaking. Collective-action beliefs explain that the collectivity of the individual belief systems of those in a system establishes a secondary parameter concerning policy effectiveness. Thus, the shared belief system of policymakers dictates what is right or wrong with the policy choices. The second is through the belief system of the other stakeholders. Lubell underlined that this second variable affects policymaking in a specific type of governance called ‘collaborative governance’. This type of governance ensures inclusive stakeholder participation due to its aim and institutional design. In this inclusive policy ecosystem, the belief systems of the sub-policy stakeholders, such as the local community, business owners, academics, and the media, affect the policy input as part of policymakers’ considerations. In the realm of tourism policy, such an ecosystem is idealized through the discourse of sustainable tourism.

The bridging concept between the two belief systems and empirical policy continuity and changes is perception. More importantly, as underlined by Lubell (2003), the most crucial perception of all is the perception of policy effectiveness. Belief systems might distort the understanding of effectiveness regarding rational considerations. This could happen in several ways. First, belief systems might alter policymakers’ understanding by creating segmentation in the policy object of the community. As belief systems are related to a fundamental identity, they might segment the in and out-groups in which the in-group may be prioritized as a policy constituency for the policymaker. In short, policymakers may make policies catering to the legitimacy of those with the same belief. This is especially evident in the case of leaders, where policymakers are complicated by their political interests. This pattern is especially evident in a community with solid identity politics. Second, belief systems, especially in hierarchical institutions, may become the tie-breaking factor when a conflict happens in policymaking. Differences in the process due to belief systems are usually attributed to fundamental differences that force policymakers to choose one over the other regarding choices. The belief system is then prescribed a particular ‘moral responsibility’ direction by the policymakers to encourage them to choose what is considered ‘effective’ or, more importantly, ‘right’ for them. In the case of hierarchical institutions, often, policymakers with higher positions get to enforce their belief system when making policy choices.

5. Findings and discussion

5.1. Cultural and political Islam dialectics in Indonesia: the effect of belief system on policymaking

This research conceptualizes cultural Islam in Indonesia as a belief system. In understanding Islam as a belief system in Indonesia, the discourse on the matter has evolved with time. For instance, an early observation of Indonesian Islam conducted by Dutch Orientalist Snouck Hurgronje (1915 in Van Dijk, 2013) found that Indonesian Islam did not differ from that in the Middle East and South Asia. However, such a paradigm would later be debated. Most notably in the Indonesian Islam trajectory, Clifford Geertz (1968) stressed the uniqueness of Indonesian Islam, taking a cue from Javanese Islam. He found that Indonesian Islam was a product of the acculturation between Islam and what he previously described as ‘the religion of Java’ (1960). He characterized Indonesian Islam through four main elements: adaptive, absorbent, pragmatic, and gradual. He also underlined how Indonesian Islam was ‘remarkably malleable’ and even syncretic. Geertz’s view, however, must be understood in context. Most of Geertz’s generalizations came from his observation of Java, although he did include some minor observations in Sumatra and Bali. Generally, Geertz’s theory applies only when summing up the state of Javanese Islam. In reality, understanding Islam as the belief system of a specific community must be done through a case-by-case approach, as each community is constructed through a different history and social construction.

5.1.1. Javanese Islam belief system in Yogyakarta

Geertz’s (1960) The Religion of Java is still a classically relevant observation of Islam’s state in Java. Geertz observed that the Javanese community was segmented into three categories. First is the abangan community an indigenous community adhering to spiritual beliefs of animism and dynamism, which Geertz symbolized through their core ritual of slametan. Second is santri a group of Puritan Islamic students attending Islamic institutions whose teachings came from overseas Islam. Third is prijaji traditional Javanese Elites caught up in the middle of the abangan-santri debate and ultimately reconciling the two beliefs. Yogyakarta, to this day, is a central display of this segmentation. Yogyakartan Javanese Elites are institutionalized under the Yogyakartan Keraton, which was given special rights as the regional ruler of Yogyakarta by the Indonesian national government. However, the authority that the Yogyakartan Keraton had over its society was beyond that of power, also extending to morality and religion. Through its historical role in mediating abangan versus santri competition, the Keraton, led by a king/Sultan, is seen as the righteous leader of the Yogyakartan community. This issue was central to Woodward’s (2011), which described the intersection between religion, society, and politics in Yogyakarta. Yogyakartan Sultan is acting as Head of the Monarchy, whose existence depends on conserving traditional Javanese values while also catering to the Islamic community of Yogyakarta that has been accustomed to Javanese Islam. Meanwhile, he also acted as the Governor of Yogyakarta, which navigated regional policy-making.

Yogyakarta then became an institutionalized multicultural region. It acknowledged the various strands of Islamism developing in its non-Islamic identities. While Yogyakarta is indeed dominated by Muslims, accounting for over 92% of its total population (Indonesian Statistic Agency, 2021 in Kusnandar, 2021b), the general public perceives its region to be a multicultural region that is tolerant. Yogyakarta is also a city of migrants. The Indonesian Statistic Agency (2021 in Karnadi, 2022) reported that Yogyakarta is the region with the highest rise in migration rate in Indonesia, amounting to 4.1%. Yogyakarta’s identity is intertwined with its low economic cost and status as ‘a city of students’. Yogyakarta’s most defining identity as a ‘special region’ has also shaped Yogyakarta’s public perception of the domination of a single religion. Its communal belief system is also shaped by the existence of two major relatively moderate Islam organizations Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU). Muhammadiyah is the most prominent Islamic organization in Yogyakarta, originating from the region. Even though it is more Puritan than NU, both are still considered moderate organizations promoting diversity and tolerance; thus, they are the two most embraced by the national government.

5.1.2. Puritan Islam belief system in Lombok

Interestingly, there is also a segmentation of the religious community in Lombok. As underlined by Latifah (2019), the segmentation was rooted in the initial response of the Lombok indigenous community towards the Islamization wsave in the 16th century, which came from Java. Latifah identified three main categories of religious community based on their belief system in the Lomboknese community, also known as the Sasak community. First is the Sasak Waktu Lima, which includes those adhering to strict Islamic day beliefs and practices, symbolized by the core practice of five daily prayers. Second is the Sasak Wetu Telu, whose beliefs are already altered from the original Islamic practices, symbolized by a ‘burden-sharing mechanism’ with religious leaders. In this belief system, clerics are deemed responsible for their followers’ sins and wrongdoings, in opposition to their being responsible for themselves. Third is the Sasak Bodha, who adhere to their indigenous beliefs, especially Buddhism.

Mutawali (2016) stated that most Lombok people eventually adhered to the Waktu Lima belief, signifying the Puritan leaning of Lombok. Mutawali explained that the Puritan leaning was due to the rise of several Islamic organizations and charismatic leaders in the region. One of, if not the most prominent figure, was Tuan Guru Kyai Haji (TGKH) Zainuddin Abdul Madjid, who founded the Nadlatul Watan (NW) in 1953. Mutawali found that the NW rose through ‘continuous preaching…towards the community of Wetu Telu’, thus putting the group as a minority. The peripheralization of the Wetu Telu community could be seen in the writing of Asnawi (2005), which biasedly portrayed the community as one with ‘incomplete Islamic teaching’. Hamdi and Smith (2012) found that NW is Lombok’s largest and most prominent Islamic organisation and its more moderate counterparts, Muhammadiyah and NU.

There is an intersection where Puritan Islamic organizations in Lombok affect policymaking and rely on their leaders. These Islamic organizations are led by clerics and public figures known as Tuan Guru. Such a practice of Islamic leadership is also seen in other regions, such as Teungku in Aceh and Kyai in Java. The terrific research of Jeremy Kingsley (2012) and that of Alkaf et al. (2022) uncovered the true power behind Tuan Guru in Lombok. Kingsley found that Tuan Guru is a hybrid position of religious teacher (ustadz) and Islamic mass leader (ulama), giving their legitimacy as a political leader. Their multifaceted role allows the Puritan belief system to affect policymaking in Lombok.

Furthermore, Cederroth (1981 in Kingsley, 2012) underlined how the perception of Tuan Guru as ‘a person above ordinary human beings, closer to god, and cannot do anything wrong’ advanced their political legitimacy. Most notably and most recently, a Tuan Guru, Muhammad Zainul Majdi (nicknamed Tuan Guru Bajang), took the position of Governor of West Nusa Tenggara from 2008-2018. Furthermore, Anwar (2017) also underlined that while not all Tuan Guru have campaigned for public service positions, almost all have been involved in navigating the mass opinion and perception of the Lombok community in political years. They acted as vote-getters, and their power rests in the Islamic educational institutions (pesantren) they lead. Ultimately, Kingsley found that these Tuan Gurus may become opinion dividers and polarisers about the policies that touch on religious issues, thus either acting as peacemakers or peacebreakers. In contrast to Yogyakarta, the institutionalized Islam in Lombok is purist and assertive compared to other beliefs.

5.2. Belief system as a source of misperception in halal tourism: evidence from Indonesia

Indonesia’s first leading document on halal tourism development in 2019, the Indonesian Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy established 10 leading destinations for halal tourism in Indonesia, including the Provinces of West Nusa Tenggara (Lombok), Aceh, West Sumatra, Riau Islands, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, and South Sulawesi. Determining the leading destinations based on each tourist destination is ranked among the top 10 in the Indonesia Muslim Travel Index (IMTI), which indirectly shows the potential of tourist objects through facilities and services that meet the needs of Muslim tourists in each tourist destination. The IMTI rating is supported by the fact that the majority of the population in each leading destination is part of Muslim communities, meaning that the facilities and accommodations for Muslim tourists can be more fulfilled.

The Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy has grouped Indonesia’s 10 leading halal tourism destinations into three significant areas: Great Bali, Great Jakarta, and Great Batam. Great Bali covers the areas of South Sulawesi and West Nusa Tenggara (Lombok). Great Jakarta includes DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, and East Java. Great Batam covers Riau, the Riau Archipelago, Aceh and West Sumatra. The approach of the three Great Regions is based on a tourism area development strategy that integrates the dimensions of accessibility and connectivity to optimize the benefits and positive impacts of halal tourism for the community, regional development, and the business climate.

5.2.1. Misperceptions to do with the halal tourism policy in Lombok

The government of Nusa Tenggara Barat (NTB) which regulated most halal tourism policies in Lombok Island already has regional regulatory instruments that regulate provisions and legal umbrellas regarding the implementation of halal tourism, namely Regional Regulation Number 2 of 2016 concerning Halal Tourism. This regional regulation is intended to provide safe and comfortable services to tourists and covers several provisions related to halal tourism, namely: (1) destinations, (2) marketing and promotion, (3) industry, (4) institutional, (5) guidance and supervision, and (7) financing. The NTB Provincial Government is also actively carrying out branding activities for halal tourism in Lombok through the ‘Friendly Lombok’ logo and tagline. This branding is intended to create a tourism image showing that Lombok is friendly and welcoming to the needs of all tourists, including Muslim tourists, by meeting their needs for mosques and prayer rooms for prayer and halal food (Faozal, 2018).

In 2019, the NTB Provincial Government signed a halal tourism collaboration with the Provincial Government of Bukhara, Uzbekistan. The two parties agreed to promote various halal tourism potentials in NTB and Bukhara mutually. The first stage of this collaboration was for the Bukhara Provincial Government to study the management of halal tourism in NTB as the world’s best halal tourist destination (Imansyah, 2019). To expand the recognition and promotion of Lombok as a halal tourist destination at both the national and global levels, the NTB Provincial Government carried out marketing activities by regularly participating in the Arabian Travel Market tourist exhibition held in Dubai annually, participating in the Muslim Travel Mark and Solo Halal Travel Mart, and holding Lombok Travel Mart every year.

Based on the Indonesia Muslim Travel Index (IMTI), Lombok is a halal tourist destination that has fulfilled all four IMTI indicators: Access, Communication, Environment, and Services. Lombok fulfills the access indicator because it has two domestic airports and one international airport with various airline services. It also has a port serving cruise ship terminals and based on the Indonesian Statistic Agency data for the NTB Province, 63% of the roads in NTB are in good condition. Meanwhile, regarding communication indicators, Lombok has published two tourist guidebooks for Muslim tourists (Muslim Visitor Guidebook) in Indonesian, English, and Arabic formats which have published as many as 40,000 copies. It has four tourist brochures in English and Arabic, of which 20,000 copies have been printed. There are also tour guides who speak English and Arabic. Lombok also has a website and social media accounts promoting halal tourism in NTB. The Regional Government of Lombok and local tourism industry players conducted 30 workshops in 2019. Regarding the environmental indicators, the airports and most areas of NTB already have sufficient and adequate Wi-Fi connections. The services indicator shows that there are 319 restaurants and food and beverage outlets that are officially halal-certified, 1,026 restaurants claiming to be halal restaurants, and 316 restaurants that do not provide processed food containing pork and alcohol. There are 50 mosques and proper purification areas at destinations like airports and hotels. The efforts made by the NTB Provincial Government and other stakeholders in the development of halal tourism in Lombok have earned Lombok a position in the top Indonesia Muslim Travel Index (IMTI) index rankings in 2018 and 2019.

As seen above, implementing a halal tourism policy in Lombok is an upgrade and exploration of Lombok’s pre-existing tourism potential. As a general tourism destination, Lombok has been known as one of Indonesia’s leading tourism destinations. It has become the epitome of some of Indonesia’s tourism industry persona, including natural destinations and cultural heritage.

Lombok has developed to become Indonesia’s ‘second and halal Bali’ with Bali being Indonesia’s top tourism destination. However, Lombok has developed a comparative advantage and has taken on a niche segment of tourists. While its geographic proximity to Bali has made it highly accessible, Lombok offers a Muslim-friendly option to foreign tourists.

Lombok’s population is dominated by Muslims, accounting for over 96% of its total population (Indonesian Statistic Agency 2021 in Kusnandar, 2021a). Furthermore, Lombok has a longstanding history of Islamic religion and culture immersion, with Islam already penetrating the region before Indonesian independence. This pre-existing fact has made the Islamic culture a modality that the government of Lombok would later explore. For instance, Lombok’s leading destination branding related to its halal tourism is ‘Lombok: an island of a thousand mosques’ (as highlighted by Lombok’s Head of Tourism Office, H. L. M. Faozal, as reported by the Office of Communication et al., 2018). The official went as far as branding mosques as ‘Lombok’s source of civilization’.

Lombok’s halal tourism destination branding is designed to be an infrastructural upgrade of its pre-existing community-based tourism. Before Lombok’s halal tourism policy was formulated in 2015, Lombok’s general destination branding had been sensitive towards the cultural context of the Islamic community on the island. They developed it as a specialization strategy, and there was a comparative advantage concerning Bali as their destination competitor due to the close geographical proximity. Lombok offers a halal option for Muslim tourists regarding food and culture. While Bali’s destination branding has revolved around its sparkling city life which includes non-halal practices such as alcoholic beverages and exotic Hindu culture which also includes other non-halal products such as pork meals Lombok portrays itself as having the same beautiful landscapes of beaches and mountains as Bali but with halal options. Furthermore, Lombok offers amenities for religious Muslims to practice their beliefs by providing worship infrastructures and amenities. In an interview with a Lombok tourism non-governmental organization (NGO), the organization justified this argument by saying, ‘You can get Bali in Lombok, but you can’t get Lombok in Bali’.

This conception of halal tourism in Lombok as a service and amenities upgrade policy is not contradictory to its previous destination branding. Before 2015, Lombok’s destination branding revolved around the tagline ‘Primitive Lombok’, which put forward Lombok’s natural wonders and conserved cultural heritage. This tagline championed destinations that combined natural beauty and indigenous community life, such as Gili Trawangan and Senggigi. Lombok’s halal tourism policy still champions these destinations. However, Lombok’s government has built mosques and improved halal certifications in these destinations to improve the ability to find services and lodgings for Muslim foreign tourists. While there has not been any publicly available data on the origin of Lombok’s tourists, our source stated that the halal tourism policy was specially designed to focus on tourists coming from the Middle East.

To understand the central conception regarding the halal tourism policy in Lombok, the researchers interviewed one of Lombok’s tourism activists and ex-policymakers who had been the initiator of Lombok’s halal tourism policy. He stated that the policy took the low-hanging fruit situation that year in which none of the other tourism destinations had taken on halal tourism destination branding. He clearly stated that the idea of a halal tourism policy in Lombok was based on extended tourism and lifestyle, not Islamization. However, through this interview, it could also be concluded that Lombok’s halal tourism policy is still highly top-down. The initiation process came solely from the government, which took the opportunity to look at the state of its already predominantly halal tourism industry. This means that the tourism businesses and community accepted the policy as a given process. He stated that the main driver of Lombok’s halal tourism was the government’s strong political will. He acknowledged that for this reason, Lombok’s community is still prone to misperceptions regarding the policy.

The misperception problem in Lombok’s halal tourism policy happened due to two main factors. First, there is a lack of effort by the government to define the policy as an extended service policy. This means that the policy aims to upgrade the pre-existing tourism infrastructures by upgrading the amenities and services. The policy itself does not touch the religious practices of the public. Second, as was acknowledged by the source, there was minimal socialization process of the policy towards the general public, significantly beyond tourism business owners. This exclusion of the general public indicates the solid top-down nature of the policy. The growing misperception in Lombok of the policy strongly relates to the conservative Islamic background of the Lombok community. Furthermore, the lack of definition found in Lombok’s halal tourism policy has caused misperception problems among the public and regional governments. For example, the Regent of East Lombok, Ali Bin Dachlan (in Rasyid, 2018), stated that the policy harms the Islamic purity of Lombok. He went as far as deeming the halal tourism policy haram (the opposing concept of halal in Islamic teaching, which refers to sinful practices). He stated that the idea of halal tourism does not exist in the original teaching of Islamism and that the ‘halal’ designation opposes the general idea of the tourism sector in the first place. Bin Dachlan’s statement is a prominent example of the misperception problem in Lombok’s halal tourism due to its top-down nature.

5.2.2. Misperceptions of halal tourism policy in Yogyakarta

The Regional Government of the Special Region of Yogyakarta Province and the city and regency governments within the Yogyakarta Province area do not yet have regional regulatory instruments that specifically regulate halal tourism. However, in various tourist spots, there are already available holy facilities, mosques or prayer rooms, and separate bathrooms for men and women to meet the needs of Muslim tourists in worship and purification. In addition, halal-certified food and beverages are easy to find in tourist areas and places to shop for souvenirs, minimarkets, supermarkets, and several large restaurants. The Indonesian Council of Ulama (Majelis Ulama Indonesia/MUI) of Yogyakarta—the regional branch of the national cleric organization of Indonesia which handles halal certification for restaurants, beverages, food, and lodging facilities—has made several efforts to accelerate the distribution of halal certification in the Yogyakarta Province area. First, it has organized socialization and training for business actors regarding the importance of pocketing a halal certificate. One of the debriefings carried out by the Indonesian Council of Ulama Yogyakarta was the Halal Business Gathering attended by 108 entrepreneurs. Culinary entrepreneurs are encouraged by MUI DIY to pocket MUI halal certificates so then the culinary products sold are increasingly in demand by consumers (Halal MUI, 2019).

Meanwhile, for lodging and hotels, only two hotels have sharia certificates from the National Sharia Board-Indonesian Council of Ulama. MUI Yogyakarta conducts continuous education and promotion with hotel managers to encourage more lodgings to apply for Sharia certification because Sharia hotels are in line with the adoption of the concept of halal tourism in Yogyakarta. Even though there are not many Sharia-certified lodgings, the Yogyakarta Tourism Office is trying to limit lodgings that provide alcoholic beverages to provide a sense of security and comfort for all tourists traveling in Yogyakarta (Halal MUI, 2019).

Until this article was written, no initiative was undertaken to include the concept of halal tourism in Yogyakarta’s city branding. Since 2015, the Yogyakarta Provincial Government has set the logo and tagline ‘Jogja Istimewa’ as a branding instrument to attract tourist visits to Yogyakarta. This tagline implies that Yogyakarta has unique features in terms of its area, people, bureaucrats, traders, campuses, and others and that it contains a spirit of togetherness for superior progress and development. The branding effort through Jogja Istimewa, which has been made into a song, mural, and used on t-shirt products sold in souvenir shopping centers, has attached this tagline to the identity of Yogyakarta. It has become widely known to the public. This is why Jogja City branding with Jogja Special is difficult to replace.

Yogyakarta fulfills access indicators due to one international airport, railroad tracks and commuter trains connecting each district in the Yogyakarta area, and highways connected to the national highways to and from other provinces. From the communication indicator, Yogyakarta has published 34 copies of the Muslim Visitor Guidebook in English, and there are tour guides who speak English and Arabic. Although they do not yet have regional regulations governing the development and management of halal tourism, the Yogyakarta provincial government is actively holding workshops and seminars on halal tourism. From 2018 to 2019, six workshops and seminars were held regarding Yogyakarta’s preparation, challenges, and opportunities as a halal tourist destination. From the environmental aspect, there is Wi-Fi network access at the airport and in public areas, and halal tourism seminars have been held. In terms of services, Yogyakarta has 262 halal-certified restaurants and food stalls, and there are mosques and or prayer rooms at the airport and in various public places, three Sharia hotels, and 11 Islamic cultural tourism sites.

To confirm the development and perception of Yogyakarta’s halal tourism policy, the researchers interviewed some tourism stakeholders. The interviews confirmed that despite the designation of Yogyakarta as Indonesia’s top halal tourism destination by the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy, the regional government took little to no action to enforce halal tourism policy in the region. Instead, there are very few traces of halal certification in Yogyakarta’s tourism landscape, all of them being self-declared. Sources confirm that while some stakeholders have a growing understanding of the concept, many tourism stakeholders in Yogyakarta are still unaware of it. This unawareness, in turn, has become the source of misperception regarding halal tourism in Yogyakarta.

Through interviews with the Association of The Indonesian Tours and Travel Agencies (ASITA) Yogyakarta and local guides in Yogyakarta’s tourism destinations, we found two main misperceptions concerning halal tourism in the region. Most of Yogyakarta’s public misperceives halal tourism as a more comprehensive policy of Islamization that will affect even those outside the tourism sector. First, among the tourism stakeholders themselves, they consider halal tourism will overshadow the pre-existing branding of Yogyakarta as a cultural heritage destination. Second, among the larger public, it is feared that halal tourism will invoke an identity politics sentiment, implying an Islamization process. In contrast with what happened in Lombok, the misperception in Yogyakarta happened earlier in halal tourism policymaking. The misperception already existed among the regional policymakers and stakeholders of Yogyakarta’s regional tourism, restraining regional policy development in the first place. This is why, compared to Lombok, there are even fewer traces of halal tourism infrastructure and knowledge in Yogyakarta’s tourism destinations.

5.3. Implications for the practice and study of halal tourism

The previously discussed findings of this research contextualize halal tourism policy as a broader public policy that is also affected by belief systems and misperceptions. Underlining this paradigm suggests that it is possible to further generalize these findings as a lesson for developing similar policies in other regions. Firstly, we need to explore the implication of these findings in the study of halal tourism. As discussed in our literature review, the state of halal tourism discussion often neglected the nature of the industry as a highly state-led one. In the cases of Yogyakarta and Lombok, the halal tourism industries developed due to government exploration of pre-existing business modalities. Therefore, previous business management-oriented research could not address this emerging phenomenon, mainly developing in non-western countries. Modalities and market niches are insufficient to produce business innovation, and state intervention in the form of policy is needed.

By acknowledging this finding, we can discuss the role of belief systems as a social variable in policy implementation. The findings in Yogyakarta and Lombok suggested that as a public policy, halal tourism policy is highly intertwined with the life of local communities. However, interviews with policymakers and stakeholders suggest that there is a gap in the policymaking process, for instance, in the case of Yogyakarta, where civil society is not deliberately included in that process. This resulted in a gap and clash between the policy design and public perception towards it, causing misperceptions. This highlighted the point regarding the need to broaden the concept of ‘halal’. Unlike other public policies, halal tourism policy is highly cultural, and the culture it tries to regulate is diverse. This research found challenges in implementing a cultural public policy in a heterogeneous culture society compared to a homogeneous culture society.

From the aforementioned two findings, we can advance the findings as a lesson learned towards the formulation of halal policymaking in other countries and regions. The most important lesson is to understand and acknowledge the society in which the policy will be implemented. The object of the halal tourism policy is limited to tourists, stakeholders, and local communities. They must be included in the policymaking process, starting with a level of understanding between all parties to prevent misperceptions. The research of Kovjanic (2014), for instance, found that Islamic tourism—a similar form to halal tourism thrived in the Middle East, mainly due to the underlying understanding between business owners, government, and tourists. Kovjanic argued that Islamic tourism goes as far as becoming a driver of regional development. Kovjanic’s research sampled Arab countries with homogenous Sunni followers. Meanwhile, Islam’s (2014) research found that halal tourism development in Bangladesh is still underdeveloped. While over 90% of Bangladesh’s population identifies as Muslim, Bangladesh sees more diversity in its Islam, for instance, between Sunni and Sufism. Moreover, the country sees more tension among ethnic and religious groups. This proves that situations between countries are similar to those between regions. A deeper and more comprehensive analysis of culture and belief systems must be done to explain their impact on halal policymaking. This finding should encourage countries, especially those with dominant Muslim populations, to advance their halal tourism industry, as it is proven that with the combination of encouraging government policy and existing modalities, halal tourism could serve as both economic leverage and a national branding tool.

6. Conclusion

This research contributes to the discussion on halal tourism by pioneering the inclusion of a socio-cultural variable in its policy research. This research uses the concept of a belief system as a bridge to connect socio-cultural factors with halal tourism policymaking. Identity in the constructivist sense affects policymaking in various ways, although belief systems have become one of identity’s most fundamental fragments. Belief systems are especially relevant when explaining change and continuity in halal tourism policymaking, as the policy relates to religion as a part of the belief system. Belief systems affect policymaking both through the policymakers, as well as the other stakeholders. The belief systems of the local communities are especially relevant in this matter due to the nature of tourism as an inclusive economic sector.

We offer the case of Indonesia as a perfect laboratory to demonstrate how belief systems affect halal tourism policymaking. We also use the cases of Lombok and Yogyakarta as two of Indonesia’s designated halal tourism destinations due to the differences in the belief system context in both regions. Both regions interestingly have a similar phenomenon of having a segmented religious community. In Yogyakarta, the abangan and santri debate is moderated by the priyayi who, in turn, has become the region’s ruling elite. Given the traditional moderating role that the elites have, as well as the multicultural background of the Yogyakartan community, the institutionalised Islam in Yogyakarta is moderate and embracing of diversity, refusing to let any single religion or belief dominate the region. The misperceptions of halal tourism in the region include that the industry may erode this state of moderate Islam and multiculturalism.

On the other hand, Lombok’s segmented sasak community was dominated by a particular strand of purist Islamism. The Sasak Waktu Lima, representing purist Islamic practices, has produced several religious leaders including Tuan Guru who have gained public support and political legitimacy. This purist group perceives other more moderate groups, namely the Sasak Wetu Tiga and Sasak Bodha communities, as wrong and uses their political power to maintain their ideal Islamic practice in the region. In contrast to Yogyakarta, the institutionalized discourse of Islam in Lombok is dominated by this purist strand. The misperception produced by this belief system is that halal tourism is threatening the purity of Islamic practice in Lombok.

This research found that while the problem of halal tourism unsustainability in Indonesia is due to the lack of political will and decentralization model, the differing results due to misperception in the case of Yogyakarta and Lombok is due to the different context of belief systems in both communities. Halal tourism is supposed to adhere to the principles of inclusivity prescribed by the concept of sustainable tourism, and this research found that unsustainability is mainly affected by the misperceptions of the local community. These misperceptions are essential for policymakers and business owners, as the two main pillars of tourism are part of the local community and thus are affected by the communal belief systems. Therefore, an intensive and inclusive socialization process sensitive to these socio-cultural factors is needed to overcome the belief system challenges in Indonesia’s halal tourism.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia under grant number 443/UN3.15/PT/2021.

Notes on contributors

Citra Hennida

Citra Hennida is an assistant professor in the Department of International Relations at Universitas Airlangga. She pursued her studies in International Relations at Flinders University, Australia, and Universitas Airlangga, Indonesia. Her research group, comprising six members, consists of academicians. Over the past few years, she has focused on thematic research in Halal Tourism. This research received support from the Ministry of Research, Technology, and Higher Education of the Republic of Indonesia in 2021 and 2022. The study on Halal Tourism was conducted across three Indonesian cities: Bali, Yogyakarta, and Lombok. Various publications have emerged from this research, including two book chapters: “Dimensions of Indonesian-United Kingdom Relations” (2024) and “Selected Contemporary Issues on Law, Social, and Politics” (2023). It is anticipated that this research will contribute to the development of public policy and foster engagement with non-state actors, particularly international institutions, in domestic policy formulation.

Demas Nauvarian

Demas Nauvarian is a research assistant at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Airlangga. His recent publications are “ASEAN, COVID-19, and Myanmar Crisis: Dealing with Critical Juncture (2023)” and “Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Beyond Resolution: A Critical Assessment (2022)”.

Nabila Olivia Saptari

Nabila Olivia Saptari is a research assistant at the Department of International Relations, Universitas Airlangga. Her recent publications are “Difficulties in Developing Halal Tourism in Indonesia (2023)” and “Halal Tourism in United Kingdom and Lessons Learned for Indonesia (2024)”.

Rizky Sugianto Putri

Rizky Sugianto Putri is a lecturer in the Department of Anthropology, at Universitas Airlangga. Her recent publication is Interpersonal Violence in Colonial Era in Papua, Indonesia: A Case Study of Trauma Patterns of a Biak Individual (2023).