![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
Notes
1 Eric Garcia, ‘GOP Calls for Military Intervention in Response to Murdered American Tourists in Mexico’, Independent, 7 March 2023.
2 This refers to 2022 data. World Justice Project, ‘WJP Rule of Law Index’.
3 Ena Aguilar Peláez, ‘Impunity in Mexico: 93% of Crimes Go Unreported’, Global Press Journal, 5 April 2023.
4 Haiti’s prisons are the second-most overcrowded out of a ranking of 207 countries, followed quite closely by prisons in Guatemala (9th), Bolivia (12th) and El Salvador (17th). Across the Americas (excluding the Caribbean islands, other than Haiti), only the US (133rd), Chile (142nd) and Belize (196th) have fewer prisoners than the official capacity that their prison system can hold. See World Prison Brief, ‘Highest to Lowest – Occupancy Level (Based on Official Capacity)’, accessed 7 June 2023.
5 Lucas Chancel et al., ‘World Inequality Report 2022’, World Inequality Lab, 2022.
6 This represents an increase from the levels seen before the coronavirus pandemic: in 2019, 30.4% of the population lived in poverty and 11.4% in extreme poverty. For further detail see UN Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Social Panorama of Latin America and the Caribbean 2022 (Santiago: UN, 2022), p. 56.
7 Youth (people between the ages of 14 and 25) unemployment in Latin America in 2022 was 20.5%, compared to 24.8% in the Arab states and 29.2% in Northern Africa. See International Labour Organization, ‘Global Employment Trends for Youth: Recovery in Youth Employment Is Still Lagging: Investing in Transforming Futures for Young People’, 11 August 2022.
8 Pan American Health Organization, ‘Half of All Deaths of Young People in the Americas Can Be Prevented’, 5 March 2019.
9 Indeed, cocaine production (tons) and coca crops (hectares) reached record levels in 2021. See UN Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Global Report on Cocaine 2023’, March 2023.
10 Peter Reuter, ‘The Mobility of Drug Trafficking’, in John Collins (ed.), Ending the Drug Wars (London: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2014), pp. 33–40.
11 Juan Albarracín, ‘Crimen Organizado en América Latina’ [Organised Crime in Latin America], Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, February 2023.
12 Congressional Research Service, ‘Mexico: Evolution of the Mérida Initiative, FY2008–FY2021’, IF10578, 20 September 2021.
13 June S. Beittel, ‘Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations’, R43813, Congressional Research Service, 16 December 2021.
14 The US Southern Command sponsors annual multinational security and military exercises in the region, including the PANAMAX 2022 (August 2022) and Fuerzas Comando 2023 (June 2023) with personnel from 22 Latin American and Caribbean security forces between the two events. See US Southern Command, ‘Fuerzas Comando 2023’; US Southern Command, ‘PANAMAX 2022’; and US Southern Command, ‘Building Partner Capacity | Supporting Our Partners’.
15 US Department of State, ‘Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs: Colombia Summary’; and US Embassy in Colombia, ‘Cooperación entre Estados Unidos y Colombia hacen del país suramericano un líder en seguridad regional’ [Cooperation Between the United States and Colombia Makes the South American Country a Leader in Regional Security], 4 May 2023.
16 Despite all having a national leadership, these groups adopt different organisational structures, including vertical structures (i.e., some FARC dissidents), horizontal structures (i.e., ELN guerrillas) and cooperation networks (i.e., the Gulf Clan).
17 According to the 2023 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report by the US Department of State, in 2022 cocaine trafficking via El Salvador was mostly seaborne, without entering into the country itself.
18 UN Verification Mission in Colombia, ‘Secretary-general Stresses the Importance of Implementing the Peace Agreement and Advancing on Other Dialogues That Aim to Consolidate Peace’, 10 April 2023.
19 Paisley Dodds, ‘AP Exclusive: UN Child Sex Ring Left Victims but No Arrests’, AP News, 12 April 2017.
20 For more information on changing migration patterns in the region see Inter-American Development Bank, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, ‘Migration Flows in Latin America and the Caribbean: Statistics on Permits for Migrants’, September 2021.
21 The latest ND-GAIN Country Index, which assesses countries’ vulnerability to climate change together with their readiness to improve resilience, places Haiti, Honduras and El Salvador in the bottom part of its rankings at 169th, 142nd and 108th respectively out of 185 positions. Brazil (86th), Mexico (88th) and Colombia (97th) are doing slightly better but are still quite vulnerable. See ND-GAIN, ‘ND-GAIN Country Index: Country Rankings’, 2021.
22 Douglas Farah and Marianne Richardson, ‘The PRC’s Changing Strategic Priorities in Latin America: From Soft Power to Sharp Power Competition’, Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, no. 37, October 2021.
23 For more details on the negotiations see: Catherine Osborn, ‘Petro Pushes to Restart Venezuela Talks’, Foreign Policy, 28 April 2023.
24 See ‘Fentanyl Trafficking Tests America’s Foreign Policy’, The Economist, 11 May 2023.
1 Douglas Farah and Marianne Richardson, ‘Gangs No Longer: Reassessing Transnational Armed Groups in the Western Hemisphere’, Institute for National Strategic Studies Strategic Perspectives, no. 38, May 2022.
2 Author interviews with Italian intelligence officials in Santiago and Buenos Aires, March 2023.
3 This information was obtained in author interviews in Quito and Manta Ecuador, October 2022.
4 ‘The “Narco Generals” Case in Ecuador’, Cuenca Dispatch, 21 December 2021.
5 International Crisis Group, ‘Ecuador’s High Tide of Drug Violence’, 4 November 2022.
6 Peter Appleby et al., ‘InSight Crime’s 2022 Homicide Round-up’, InSight Crime, 8 February 2023; and David Gagne, ‘InSight Crime’s 2016 Homicide Round-up’, InSight Crime, 16 January 2017.
7 Ibid.
8 Mario Alexis González, ‘Ecuador cerrará 2021 con la peor crisis de seguridad de la década’ [Ecuador Will End 2021 with the Worst Security Crisis in a Decade], Primicias, 27 December 2021.
9 James Marson and Giovanni Legorano, ‘Drug Trail from Europe to Ecuador: Inside the Hunt for Elusive Narco Suspect’, Wall Street Journal, 24 November 2021.
10 Alessandro Ford, ‘Albanian Mafia Leaves Trail of Blood in Ecuador’, InSight Crime, 5 January 2021.
11 Luis Bastús, ‘Rosario crece: sube su tasa de homicidios’ [Rosario Grows: Its Homicide Rate Rises], Página 12, 26 February 2023.
12 Gabrielle Gorder, ‘Why Are Murders Spreading Across Argentina’s Most Violent City?’, InSight Crime, 8 November 2022.
13 Sebastian Fest, ‘Messi and Rosario’s Narco Wars: “We Are Waiting for You”’, The Athletic, 12 March 2023.
14 InSight Crime and American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, ‘The Rise of the PCC: How South America’s Most Powerful Prison Gang Is Spreading in Brazil and Beyond’, CLALS Working Paper Series No. 30, December 2020, p. 5.
15 Leonardo Coutinho, ‘The Evolution of the Most Lethal Criminal Organization in Brazil – the PCC’, PRISM, vol. 8, no. 1, 19 February 2019.
16 Cecilia Anesi, Giulio Rubino and Luís Adorno, ‘O PCC e a máfia italiana’ [The PCC and the Italian Mafia], UOL Noticias, 5 December 2018.
17 Appleby et al., ‘InSight Crime’s 2022 Homicide Round-up’.
18 ‘Hay un crecimiento espectacular del sicariato en el Paraguay’ [There Is a Spectacular Rise in Hitmen Assassinations in Paraguay], Ultima Hora, 6 February 2022.
19 ‘Hombre acribillado en San Matías tenía unos 17 procesos en Brasil’ [Man Shot Down in San Matias Had 17 Criminal Cases in Brasil], El Deber, 20 January 2022.
20 Douglas Farah, ‘How to Make a Billion Dollars Disappear: José Luis Merino, PDVSA, Alba Petróleos and the Bukele Administration’s Enduring Ties to Transnational Criminal Structures’, IBI Consultants, September 2020.
21 Héctor Silva Ávalos, ‘Corrupción en las cárceles de Nayib Bukele: denuncian que cobran 1.500 dólares a los familiares para poder visitor a los presos’ [Corruption in Nayib Bukele’s Prisons: Family Members Denounce Being Charged 1,500 Dollars to Visit Family in Prison], Infobae, 19 March 2023.
22 This assessment is based on author interviews with law-enforcement officials in Argentina, Chile and Paraguay, June–December 2022.
1 South Carolina Department of Alcohol and Other Drug Abuse Services, ‘Atlanta–Carolinas High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area’s 2019 Threat Assessment’, 16 December 2019.
2 Gobierno de México [Government of Mexico] ‘#ConferenciaPresidente | Martes 17 de enero de 2023’ [#President’sConference | Tuesday, 17 January 2023], YouTube, 17 January 2023.
3 Gobierno de México [Government of Mexico], ‘Informe Seguridad, Secretaria de Seguridad y Proteccion Ciudadana’ [Security Report, Secretary of Security and Civilian Protection]; and Gobierno de México [Government of Mexico], ‘#ConferenciaPresidente | Jueves 20 de enero de 2022’ [#President’sConference | Thursday, 20 January 2022], YouTube, 20 January 2022.
4 Reuters, ‘“Cambié de opinión”: AMLO justifica militarización de seguridad pública en México’ [‘I Changed My Mind’: AMLO Justifies Militarisation of Public Security in Mexico], El Economista, 6 September 2022.
5 Pablo Ferri, ‘El asesinato de seis policías en Nuevo León pone de nuevo el foco en la frontera’ [The Murder of Six Police Officers in Nuevo León Puts a Renewed Focus on the Border ], El País, 27 June 2022.
6 Elena Reina, ‘Eduardo Guerrero: “El narco mexicano no está debilitado, está más fuerte que nunca”’ [Eduardo Guerrero: ‘The Mexican Narco Is Not Weakened, It Is Stronger Than Ever’], El País, 21 August 2022.
7 Alejandro Santos Cid, ‘Los familiares de los 43 de Ayotzinapa : “Desde un principio señalamos al Ejército y los policías que participaron en ese crimen de Estado”’ [The Relatives of the 43 from Ayotzinapa: ‘From the Beginning We Signalled to the Army and the Police That They Participated in This State Crime’], El País, 29 August 2022.
8 US Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, ‘Ex-Mexican Secretary of Public Security Genaro Garcia Luna Convicted of Engaging in a Continuing Criminal Enterprise and Taking Millions in Cash Bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel’, 21 February 2023.
9 Gabriel Moyssen, ‘Mexicanos quieren más militares en seguridad; 80% está a favor, revela encuesta’ [Mexicans Want More Military in Public Security; 80% Approve, a Survey Reveals], El Universal, 30 August 2022.
10 Vanessa Buschschlüter, ‘Mexico Congress Votes to Keep Military on Streets’, BBC News, 13 October 2022.
11 Redacción Animal Político [Editorial Staff, Animal Político], ‘Operativo para detener a Ovidio Guzmán dejó 29 muertos, 35 heridos y 21 detenidos; descartan bajas civiles’ [Operation to Detain Ovidio Guzman Leaves 29 Dead, 35 Wounded and 21 Detained; No Civilian Casualties], Animal Político, 6 January 2023.
12 ‘Mexican Soldiers Seize Nearly 630,000 Fentanyl Pills Inside “Highest-capacity Synthetic Drug Production Lab on Record”’, CBS News, 16 February 2023.
13 ‘Armed Group Kidnaps 14 Security Ministry Staff in Mexico’, Al-Jazeera, 28 June 2023.
14 Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit, ‘Proyecto de presupuesto de egresos de la federación 2022: análisis de las funciones y subfunciones del gasto programable por destino del gasto’ [Federal Expenditure Budget Project 2022: Analysis of the Functions and Sub-Functions of Programmable Expenditure by Expenditure Destination], September 2021; and Secretariat of the Treasury and Public Credit, ‘Proyecto de presupuesto de egresos de la federación 2023: análisis de las funciones y subfunciones del gasto programable por destino del gasto’ [Federal Expenditure Budget Project 2023: Analysis of the Functions and Sub-Functions of Programmable Expenditure by Expenditure Destination], September 2022.
15 Ibid.
1 The Gulf Clan taxes migrant-smuggling activities in the Darién region between Colombia and Panama. In the areas bordering Venezuela in the departments of Norte de Santander and Arauca, groups such as the ELN recruit Venezuelan migrants and/or force them to work on coca farms.
2 Under Plan Colombia, the United States provided more than US$10bn in financial assistance to the Colombian armed forces, mainly to fight terrorist groups and drug trafficking. In 2002, non-state armed groups were present in 561 out of 1,101 municipalities of the country. For more information, see June S. Beittel, ‘Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations’, R43813, Congressional Research Service, 16 December 2021; and Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica [National Centre for History’s Memory], ¡Basta Ya! Colombia: Memorias de guerra y dignidad [It is Enough! Colombia: Memories of War and Dignity] (Bogotá: National Printing House, 2013).
3 National Reintegration Agency, ‘ARN en cifras corte marzo 2023’ [ARN in Data Cut-off March 2023], 27 April 2023.
4 In the first half of 2022, the Gulf Clan operated in 326 municipalities, FARC dissident groups in 161 and the ELN in 162, out of 1,123 municipalities. Indepaz, ‘Informe sobre presencia de grupos armados en Colombia 2021–2022 (1)’ [Report of Presence of Armed Groups in Colombia 2021–2022 (1)], 22 February 2023.
5 Ibid. Besides the Gulf Clan, there are other smaller narco-paramilitary groups including the Caparros, Oficina de Envigado, Pachely, Pachenca, Popular Liberation Army (EPL) and Rastrojos.
6 Juan Esteban Lewin and Camila Osorio, ‘18 muertos por combates entre dos grupos disidentes en el Putumayo’ [18 Dead in Clashes Between Two Dissident Groups in Putumayo], El País, 21 November 2022.
7 ‘Las cifras del aumento de la guerra en Colombia que reveló el propio comisionado’ [The Figures of the Increase in Conflict Levels in Colombia Revealed by the Commissioner Himself], El Tiempo, 19 April 2023.
8 IISS calculation using data from the International Displacement Monitoring Centre, ‘Global Internal Displacement Database’, May 2023; and ‘Colombia Killings of Social Leaders Hit Record in 2022 – Ombudsman’, Reuters, 23 January 2023.
9 Richard Emblin, ‘Colombia’s Petro Recalls Peace Negotiators After ELN Kills Nine Soldiers’, City Paper, 29 March 2023.
10 Camilo Castillo, ‘Estado Mayor Central le pide al Gobierno restablecer el cese al fuego bilateral’ [Central General Staff Asks the Government to Restore the Bilateral Ceasefire], El Tiempo, 15 June 2023.
11 The bilateral ceasefire refers to military clashes between the state forces and the ELN, but it does not include other criminal activities such as kidnapping and forced recruitment. Regarding the negotiations with criminal organisations held in Medellín, instead of agreeing to a political negotiation, the government offered a reduction of jail time (with a maximum of eight years) in exchange for ceasing criminal activities, mostly drug trafficking.
12 According to the latest available data in the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime ‘World Drug Report 2023’, in 2021 Colombia hit record highs in terms of cocaine manufacturing and hectares used for coca-bush cultivation since records began in 2005 and 1998, respectively.
13 For PONAL figures, see Policia Nacional de Colombia, ‘Cifras de personal’ [Personnel Figures], 21 June 2023.
14 ‘Aprobado presupuesto 2023: ¿Qué cambió en comparación con el último cálculo del gobierno de Iván Duque?’ [Approved Budget for 2023: What Changed Compared to the Last Calculation of the Government of Iván Duque?], Cambio, 19 October 2022. Calculation based on 18 October 2022 US dollar to Colombian peso exchange rate.
15 State figures suggest up to 6,000 members, although independent estimates point at up to 9,000. ‘Las cifras del aumento de la guerra en Colombia que reveló el propio comisionado’ [The Figures of the Increase in Conflict Levels in Colombia Revealed by the Commissioner Himself ], El Tiempo, 19 April 2023; and Méndez, ‘Informe confidencial del Gobierno: en Venezuela hay 1.441 disidentes y elenos’ [Government’s Confidential Report: There Are 1,441 Dissidents and ELN Combatants in Venezuela].
16 Indepaz, ‘Informe sobre presencia de grupos armados en Colombia 2021–2022 (1)’ [Report of Presence of Armed Groups in Colombia 2021–2022 (1)], p. 11.
17 Méndez, ‘Informe confidencial del Gobierno: en Venezuela hay 1.441 disidentes y elenos’ [Government’s Confidential Report: There Are 1,441 Dissidents and ELN Combatants in Venezuela].
18 Ibid.
19 Indepaz, ‘Informe sobre presencia de grupos armados en Colombia 2021–2022 (1)’ [Report of Presence of Armed Groups in Colombia 2021–2022 (1)], pp. 90–9.
20 Alicia Liliana Méndez, ‘Son 14.626 los integrantes de redes criminales que piden pista en la “paz total”’ [There Are 14,626 Members of Criminal Networks That Ask to be Considered in the ‘Total Peace’], 5 March 2023.
21 ‘Las cifras del aumento de la guerra en Colombia que reveló el propio comisionado’ [The Figures of the Increase in Conflict Levels in Colombia Revealed by the Commissioner Himself ]; and Méndez, ‘Informe confidencial del Gobierno: en Venezuela hay 1.441 disidentes y elenos’ [Government’s Confidential Report: There Are 1,441 Dissidents and ELN Combatants in Venezuela].
22 Ibid.
1 Information collected in an interview with a public attorney in São Paulo State, April 2023.
2 Alba Zaluar, ‘Turf War in Rio de Janeiro: Youth, Drug Traffic, Guns and Hyper-masculinity’, in Vania Ceccato (ed), The Urban Fabric of Crime and Fear (Dordrecht: Springer, 2012), pp. 217–37.
3 Roberta H. Maschietto and Marcos A. Ferreira, ‘Limitations of the State Bias in the Analysis of Violence in Peace and Conflict Studies: Reflections from the Northeast of Brazil’, paper presented to the conference ‘IV Encontro Brasileiro de Estudos para a Paz’ [IV Brazilian Meeting of Peace Studies], Uberlândia, Brazil, 22–24 November 2022; and Centro de Documentação Dom Tomás Balduíno (CPT), Conflitos no Campo – Brasil 2021 [Conflicts in Rural Areas – Brazil 2021] (Goiânia: CPT, 2022).
4 ‘17° Anuário Brasileiro de Segurança’ [17th Brazilian Security Report], Fórum Brasileiro de Segurança Pública, 2023.
5 Ciro Biderman et al., ‘Pax Monopolista and Crime: The Case of the Emergence of the Primeiro Comando da Capital in São Paulo’, Journal of Quantitative Criminology, vol. 35, September 2019, pp. 573–605; and Marcos Alan Ferreira and Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Blockages to Peace Formation in Latin America: The Role of Criminal Governance’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, vol. 15, no. 2, February 2021, pp. 161–80.
6 Interview with a Federal Police officer who served as an intelligence liaison for Amazonas State, 10 April 2023; see also Ryan C. Berg, ‘Tussle for the Amazon: New Frontiers in Brazil’s Organized Crime Landscape’, Florida International University, October 2021.
7 Information collected in fieldwork in Fortaleza, Ceará State, January 2023.
8 ‘Brasil: Alteração nas rotas internacionais do tráfico de drogas “pioram” cenário de violência no país’ [Brazil: Change in International Drug Trafficking Routes ‘Worsens’ Setting of Violence in the Country], e-GLOBAL, 23 February 2023.
9 Lívia Torres, ‘Operação da Vila Cruzeiro deixa 23 mortos, diz Polícia Civil’ [Operation in Vila Cruzeiro Leaves 23 Dead, Says Civil Police], G1, 26 May 2022.
10 Aiala Colares Couto, cited in Leandro Machado, ‘Facções controlam tráfico e financiam crimes ambientais naAmazônia, diz pesquisador’ [Gangs Control Trafficking and Finance Environmental Crimes in the Amazon, Says Researcher], BBC News, 15 March 2023.
11 Rob Picheta, ‘The Violent Attack on Brazil’s Government Was Months in the Making. Here’s What You Need to Know’, CNN, 9 January 2023.
12 ‘Sem Concurso, PMERJ Tem 30 Mil Soldados a Menos que Previsto em Lei’ [Without Competition, PMERJ Has 30 Thousand Fewer Soldiers than Provided for by Law], Folha Dirigida, 7 October 2019.
13 Marcos Alan S.V. Ferreira, ‘Brazilian Criminal Organizations as Transnational Violent Non-state Actors: A Case Study of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)’, Trends in Organized Crime, vol. 22, 2019, pp. 148–65; and ‘Crime e poder: PCC movimenta R$ 1 bilhão e tem “batizados” fora do país’ [Crime and Power: PCC Moves R$1 Billion and Has Members Outside the Country], UOL, 9 January 2023.
14 Ferreira, ‘Brazilian Criminal Organizations as Transnational Violent Non-state Actors: A Case Study of the Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC)’.
15 Robson Bonin, ‘Comando Vermelho vira preocupação do governo Bolsonaro – entenda’ [Red Command Is a Concern in Bolsonaro’s Administration – Understand], Veja, 22 August 2020.
16 Luís Adorno et al., ‘As 53 facções criminosas do Brasil’ [The 53 Brazilian Gangs], Record TV, 2 February 2022.
17 Daniel Hirata and Maria Isabel Couto, ‘Mapa Histórico dos Grupos Armados do Rio de Janeiro’ [Historical Map of Armed Groups in Rio de Janeiro], Grupo de Estudos dos Novos Ilegalismos/Instituto Fogo Cruzado, September 2022.
18 Marcela Lemos, ‘Como Liga da Justiça se transformou no Bonde do Zinho, maior milícia do RJ’ [How Justice League Transformed into Gang of Zinho, Most Powerful Militia in Rio], UOL, 26 August 2022.
19 ‘PCC’, Americas Quarterly; and InSight Crime and American University’s Center for Latin American & Latino Studies, ‘The Rise of the PCC: How South America’s Most Powerful Prison Gang Is Spreading in Brazil and Beyond’, CLALS Working Paper Series No. 30, 6 December 2020, p. 23.
20 Cadu Freitas, ‘GDE tem mais de 25 mil membros e domina maioria dos bairros de Fortaleza, diz PC’ [GDE Has 25 Thousand Members and Dominates Most of Fortaleza’s Neighborhoods, Says PC], Diário do Nordeste, 18 January 2021.
21 These organisations are (by state): Acre: Bonde dos 13 (13 Tram, B13), Ifara; Amapá: Família Terror do Amapá, Amigos para Sempre, União do Crime do Amapá; Amazonas: Revolucionários do Amazonas, Crias da Tríplice; Bahia: Katiara, Comando da Paz, Caveira, Bonde do Maluco, Mercado do Povo Atitude, Ordem e Progresso, Bonde do Ajeita; Ceará: Guardiões do Estado (Guardians of the State, GDE); Distrito Federal: Comboio do Cão; Espírito Santo: Primeiro Comando de Vitória, Trem Bala; Goiás: Família Monstro; Maranhão: Bonde dos 40, PCM; Minas Gerais: Família Monstro; Pará: Comando Classe A (Class A Command), Bonde dos 30, União do Norte (Northern Union), Equipe Rex, Equipe Real; Paraíba: Okaida, Estados Unidos; Paraná: Máfia Paranaense; Pernambuco: Okaida; Rio Grande do Norte: Sindicato do Crime (Crime Syndicate, SDC); Rio Grande do Sul: Abertos, Bala na Cara, Os Manos, Comando Pelo Certo, Farrapos, Unidos pela Paz, Os Tauras, Vândalos, Mata rindo, Grupo K2, Cebolas, PCI; Rondônia: Primeiro Comando do Panda; Santa Catarina: Primeiro Grupo Catarinense (First Group of Santa Catarina), CVSC, Força Revolucionária Catarinense, Primeiro Crime Revolucionário Catarinense; Sergipe: Bonde dos Maluco; Tocantins: Máfia Tocantinense (Tocantins Mafia).
1 A dispute between president Moïse and the opposition over the termination of Moïse’s five-year term resulted in the former dissolving parliament in early 2020 and ruling by decree until his death. Moïse had also proposed controversial constitutional changes, including allowing two consecutive presidential five-year terms.
2 UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, ‘Key Political Developments, Sanctions Offer Hope to Haiti’s Recovery if Supported by International Community, Special Representative Tells Security Council’, 24 January 2023.
3 Evens Sanon, ‘Haiti Appoints Council amid Push to Hold General Elections’, AP News, 6 February 2023.
4 Luke Taylor, ‘Haitian Cops Are Poorly Paid and Outgunned – and Part of the Problem’, Guardian, 2 February 2023.
5 Dánica Coto, ‘Haitian Gang Alliance Makes Demands in Contest with Government over Power’, PBS, 14 October 2023; and Etant Dupain and Hande Atay Alam, ‘Critical Haiti Gas Terminal Freed After Weeks of Talks with G9 Gang Leader’, CNN, 6 November 2022.
6 InSight Crime, ‘400 Mawozo’, 23 March 2022.
1 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Transnational Organized Crime in Central America and the Caribbean: A Threat Assessment’, September 2012, p. 27.
2 Anna-Cat Brigida, ‘Surge in Gang Killings Spurs Fear, Uncertainty in El Salvador’, Al-Jazeera, 28 March 2022; and Marcos Alemán, ‘El Salvador aprueba nueva prórroga a estado de excepción’ [El Salvador Approves a New Extension to the State of Exception], Los Angeles Times, 14 February 2023.
3 Anna-Cat Brigida, ‘El Salvador Prisoner “Rearrests” Fuel New Concerns’, Al-Jazeera, 17 February 2023.
4 Parker Asmann and Carlos Garcia, ‘MS-13’s Mexico Program Key to El Salvador Gang Negotiations’, InSight Crime, 1 March 2023.
5 Jeannette Aguilar, ‘Las políticas de seguridad pública en El Salvador 2003–2018’ [Public Security Policies in El Salvador 2003–2018], National Civil Police, 10 March 2021, p. 61.
6 Kylie Madry, ‘El Salvador Boosts Jail Time for Gang Members After Rash of Murders’, Reuters, 31 March 2022.
7 Human Rights Watch, ‘World Report 2020’, 2020, p. 187; and Douglas Farah and Kathryn Babineau, ‘The Evolution of MS 13 in El Salvador and Honduras’, PRISM, vol. 7, no. 1, 2017.
8 US Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of New York, ‘Three of the Highest-ranking MS-13 Leaders in the World Arrested on Terrorism and Racketeering Charges’, 23 February 2023.
1 Secretaria de Estado en el Despacho de Seguridad, Gobierno de Honduras [Secretary of State in the Security Bureau, Government of Honduras], ‘Situacion Comparativa de Casos de Homicidios a Nivel Nacional (Datos Preliminares)’ [Comparative Situation of National Homicide Cases (Preliminary Data)], 2022; and Peter Appleby et al., ‘InSight Crime’s 2022 Homicide Round-up’, InSight Crime, 8 February 2023.
2 US Embassy Tegucigalpa, ‘Security Alert: Department of Colón and Areas Near Trujillo’, US Embassy in Honduras, 25 April 2022.
3 Jeff Ernst, ‘Honduras Declares War Against Gangs – and for Control of Popular Narrative’, Guardian, 4 January 2023.
4 ‘Honduras Extends, Expands State of Emergency for Second Time’, Reuters, 21 February 2023.
5 ‘Honduras dispuso el estado de excepción en su guerra contra las pandillas y desplegó cientos de policías en las calles’ [Honduras Deploys the State of Exception in Its War Against the Gangs, Sending Hundreds of Police to the Streets], Infobae, 7 December 2022.